I don't know if decapitation strikes would even be in the Russian government's best interest. By now, the current Ukrainian government decisionmakers are known quantities to the Russian government, they're very predictable. They're also amassing morale problems as Ukrainian citizens question their leaders' competence. Why risk replacing ineffective and unpopular leaders with potentially effective and popular ones?

Given internal security issues in Russia, I don't think opening the Pandora's box of going after politicians with decapitation strikes would be a wise move. For now, both sides stay largely clear of this. Russia could kill Zelenskyy, but what would the consequences be?

Russia could send 1000 Gerans/Shaheds, along with cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, to a Ukrainian city and concentrate on bombing population centres that way. Russian aircraft are not going to be flying over the Ukrainian capital soon, so thats the option available to Russia. But what would that accomplish militarily? I guess this option for Russia acts as deterrence that prevents Ukraine and NATO for launching large scale drone attacks on Moscow, which many Ukrainian politicians likely want to do.

Oreshnik is a ballistic missile that uses multiple warheads consisting of cluster munitions (six seperate re entry vehicles with six cluster munitions each, for 36 munitions total), designed for a specific target set, wide area time sensitive targets such as airbases filled with aircraft and sensitive equipment for example. It's also likely very expensive and limited in numbers. Does Ukraine have a target that justifies the use of this weapon militarily and beyond the shock value of the footage? Oreshnik is more to deter NATO than to bomb Ukraine.

They'd probably be lugged around on land, because of the range of the system a TLAM launched from Lviv can still hit Moscow and St Petersburg. I highly doubt that Ukraine has suitable ships to carry the Mk 70 system, the "Ukrainian Navy", if it can be called that, mainly consists of unmanned surface vessels that can be rigged with explosives, launch short range surface to air missiles, or launch drones, manned patrol boats to shoot down incoming drones, and Neptune missiles. I doubt that Russia has the capability to take out launchers on land in Lviv in a time sensitive manner though. However they aren't being sent yet (according to public information), so this is very much talking about hypotheticals. But it is very much technically possible. As for delivery, a Mk 70 container can fit in the back of a C-17 that lands in Poland, and be sent over the Polish border by land. The super heavy trucks and support vehicles/command centres from the Typhon aren't required, just need a truck that can tow the container and an energy source, and some ability to program the missile, if the goal is to shoot some missiles deep into Russia. Effectiveness would be comprised as you rightfully point out, but if the primary goal is to launch missiles into Russia, it's still doable. Throughout the war, Ukraine and NATO have been willing to heavily compromise on optimal effectiveness in order to get a capability on the battlefield, which is what I'm basing my thoughts on here. Jerry rigging Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG cruise missiles to be launched from Su-24s, and HARM anti radiation missiles from MiG 29s and Su-27s as escorts, is in no way optimally effective for instance. But Ukraine still did it, and have at least hit things of note with these attacks, including damaging a Kilo class submarines and damaging or destroying multiple landing ships.

Ukrainian airstrikes on Russia have mainly been more of an annoyance up until now, targeting warehouses, drone operator locations, and trenches/fortified positions, but they are progressing as Ukraine gets more planes. Recently they started destroying bridges with JDAM ER glide bombs, and deploying multiple aircraft at once. The Russian response is very much "kill the archer and not the arrow", bombing Ukrainian airbases, airports, and support infrastructure during their nightly air raids. The low altitude attack vector limits the kind of airstrikes Ukraine carry out, but it also limits Russian ground based air defences ability to shoot down Ukrainian aircraft. If Russia wants to shoot down Ukrainian strike packages directly, Russian fighter jets are going to have to get closer to the line of contact and engage in closer range fights, with R-77 missiles at least. Launching R-37Ms from safely within Russian controlled skies is no longer working to disrupt strikes. Ex Russian Air Force pilot FighterBomber alluded to such a few weeks ago, that Russian commanders were finally allowing the air force to engage in closer range fights (he sarcastically compared it to the moon landing in terms of significance). Russia has the capability to suppress Ukraine's efforts before the Ukrainian Air Force becomes a more serious threat (even if it means Russia taking losses now), so it would be an error to allow Ukraine to rebuild the air force.

Imagining a Brady bunch deep fake of Trump saying rusha rusha rusha,

I like your drawing of a pipe

I've seen some people make the same claim that the bombers flown through Azerbaijan, but I wasn't able to fully visualize what they meant until I saw your map.

That's the Fars report. We have footage of Israeli airstrikes on June 16 using earth penetrator/bunker buster munitions and it does not look like a ballistic missile attack to me, and does look similar to the footage of similar Israeli operations in Beirut. Here is the footage and images. Israel does have two air launched ballistic missiles with conventional 1000lb class warheads, a variant of ROCKS, and Air LORA. Rampage has too small a warhead, and as for Blue Sparrow/Golden Horizon, the warhead is also likely too small from publicly available images. It's possible that ROCKS missiles were used, but I find it unlikely for two reasons. We have video evidence, although not the highest quality, is conclusive enough to state that a JDAM or SPICE 2000 was dropped on Tehran on June 15th, a day before, and not a ballistic missile or cruise missile. There were also further Israeli airstrikes on Tehran, practically every day, that produced large explosions, and I don't think Israel has enough stock of air launched ballistic missiles with 1000lb unitary warheads to do the kind of bombardment that took place. Even Russia who produce hundreds of Iskander ballistic missiles a month (and get plenty of KN-23s from North Korea) don't perform such attacks. The most likely conclusion is that Israeli aircraft were flying over or very near Tehran. This is ignoring strikes in central locations like Isfahan by Israel, were an Israeli Hermes UCAV was shot down, that would require Israel to reach deep into Iran. That doesn't mean Israel had complete air superiority over all of Iran of course, they were only able to bomb Yadz after the USA got involved for instance. But the western half of Iran and Tehran saw intense bombardement.

That June 16th article cites an Iranian/Russian telegram with no evidence provided. A more likely explanation is using gaps in ground based radar coverage from the mountains in that region of Iran towards the Caspian sea, than flying over Azerbaijan. There were a few Israeli airstrikes in Mashhad that likely used the route over the Caspian sea.

I just think that the most likely explanation is the true one. We can come up with reason after reason, that gets more and more unlikely about why Israeli aircraft weren't actually over Iran, or we can accept that Iranian air defences performed poorly, and only managed to shoot down a handful of MALE UAV and UCAVs.