The resilience of Iran’s underground “missile cities” has become one of the most significant and contested questions in the aftermath of the US-Israeli bombardment earlier this year. While Donald Trump has focused on the damage done to the facilities, to Iranian officials and some outside analysts, the war has proved that the Islamic republic’s missile force can be suppressed — but not destroyed. Much of Tehran’s arsenal is ready again for the next confrontation. That has helped Tehran maintain the core of its asymmetric strategy against the US and Israel, emboldening it to threaten shipping and energy infrastructure across the Gulf even after weeks of bombardment. In exchanges of fire with Israel and the US this week, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards launched multiple ballistic missile barrages. A regime insider said the war — and the fate of the missile cities — had fundamentally reinforced the leadership’s belief that military power, rather than diplomacy, remains the ultimate guarantor of security. “More than ever before, we have concluded that building trust is a meaningless strategy,” he said. “Only strength can serve as a deterrent, not arguments in international forums about our rights. The enemy must be convinced of our capabilities and must never be allowed to miscalculate again. Iran is demonstrating in practice that it is prepared to go further than its adversaries.”

He claimed that the Yazd missile complex extended roughly 500 metres into the surrounding granite mountains and that it remained operational throughout the conflict. Bombings destroyed entrances to the missile cities, he said, but they were reopened relatively quickly. In his speech launching the war on February 28, Trump said: “We’re going to destroy their missiles and raze their missile industry to the ground. It will be totally, again, obliterated.” Israel said in April that most Iranian launchers had been “taken out of operation”. But US intelligence assessments reported in American media have suggested that Iran still retains roughly 70 per cent of its mobile launchers and approximately 70 per cent of its prewar missile stockpile. They also indicated that Tehran had restored access to many of its missile sites, launchers and underground facilities, including positions along the Strait of Hormuz. A senior western diplomat in Tehran said those estimates broadly aligned with his own. “We believe they have protected a significant portion of their arsenal and capability,” the diplomat said. “The entrances to some tunnels were bombed, but they could dig themselves out.” Accounts from residents appear to back this up. “Often, only a few hours after a bombing, Iran would launch missiles from the same locations,” said one resident of Kermanshah province. “We couldn’t believe those facilities were surviving such intense attacks.”

Sam Lair, of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, said views of the missile cities had evolved since the war, and depended on different interpretations of Iranian objectives and the analytical timeframe. During the most intense phase of the conflict, he noted Iranian missile fire rates fell from high levels to a few dozen a day — a sign the US and Israeli suppression campaign had an effect. “But if you think about this in kind of a broader timeline, then the missile cities have succeeded in preserving a large portion of the Iranian missile force,” he said. “It is a strategy that preserves this asset for later rounds of conflict, but it assumes that you’re going to have later rounds of conflict . . . with enough time and enough shovels, then you can dig your way out.” And while the volume of missiles fired ebbed and flowed, Iran repeatedly showed that it was able to respond swiftly to US and Israeli strikes in like-for-like attacks, particularly using its short-range arsenal to hit energy facilities and other infrastructure in Gulf states. Nicole Grajewski, an assistant professor at Sciences Po, said evidence from the conflict suggested Iran was restoring access to parts of the network far more rapidly than many expected. “We only discovered that during the later stages of the war because there’d be persistent strikes on a certain base and then Iran would fire from there,” she said. “They’re excavating quite a bit from the bases, but even during the war.”

She said the repeated pattern of strikes followed by launches suggested either rapid excavation, repairs to launch equipment or the use of decoys. “The rapid kind of turnaround on cleaning up the missile bases during the war, at least enough to lob some missiles and make it operational, was very impressive,” she said. While acknowledging shortcomings in Iran’s missile strategy, she argued that the force had performed better than many expected, particularly against targets in the Gulf. “The missile strategy was a survival strategy,” she said. “The survivability aspect of it is important when we’re thinking about this in a long-term, strategic perspective, but not just the tactical and operational.” The precise number of underground missile complexes remains unclear. Analysts estimate that Iran operates dozens of such facilities across the country, many buried deep inside mountainous terrain. Their location has proved critical. Decker Eveleth, an associate research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, said facilities close to Iran’s western borders were more vulnerable because drones could loiter overhead and strike launchers as they emerged from tunnels. Sites deeper inside the country, however, were harder to suppress. “The problem for the US and Israel has been that the things needed to pin down a lot of these bases require a lot of continuous operations,” he said.

A second person close to the Islamic regime argued the depth of many sites rendered them largely immune to conventional aerial bombardment. He said some were not even used during the war because numerous other facilities remained operational. “No bomber can do much against facilities buried more than 70 metres underground,” he said. “Watching B-52s drop multiple bunker-buster bombs on a single site looked terrifying. Yet, only a few hours later, missiles were being launched from the same location. They cannot be destroyed. Full stop!” Iran has significant tunnelling experience, developed through decades of building metro systems and long tunnels through mountainous terrain. But Grajewski said Iran drew crucial lessons from North Korea after a visit by Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the former head of the missile force who was assassinated by Israel last year.

earlier thread about the DPRK

“He was also the head of the construction aspect of the missile force,” said Grajewski. “He went to North Korea, he saw their underground missile silos and he’s like: ‘This is great. We can actually defend ourselves and build these cities that you could have, you don’t necessarily need air defences’.”

Another factor was Tehran’s move, over the past two decades, to increasingly decentralise its missile programme to compensate for a weak air force and limited air-defence capabilities. This increased resilience but also strengthened the position of the Revolutionary Guards, which oversee much of the missile programme. Analysts suggest the war is likely to reinforce that trend further. “Today the guards are stronger than they were before the war,” said the second person close to the regime. “Their standing within the system has risen dramatically because they fought under extraordinary pressure and continued launching missiles until the final moment.”

Venezuela’s Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) have launched a large-scale operation on Tuesday in Bolívar state, one of the country’s main mineral-rich regions in the southeast and also one with a heavy presence of criminal organizations. Local media outlets and non-governmental organizations reported helicopter overflights, explosions, and the displacements of hundreds of people leaving gold extraction zones in Las Claritas and the area known as Kilometer 88, two key locations within the Orinoco Mining Arc. According to Bloomberg, the military actions targeted illegal mining operations controlled by armed groups. Former opposition lawmaker for Bolívar state Américo De Grazia claimed that military forces attacked several gold-mining enclaves through aerial bombardments and gunfire. The Venezuelan government, led by acting President Delcy Rodríguez, and the armed forces have offered no official information regarding the operations, as well as casualties, arrests, or official goals. Rodríguez met with military leaders on Wednesday to discuss a “100-Day Plan” to optimize the functioning of the armed forces but did not comment on the reported Bolívar deployment.

The operation took place in a region where the state has struggled to assert authority in the face of a proliferation of armed groups that control and administer mines, run artisanal mining activities, and regulate economic activity linked to gold extraction. At the same time, local reports indicated that the military operation could be aimed at capturing Yohan José Romero, known as “Yohan Petrica,” a founding member of the Tren de Aragua criminal outfit, who reportedly operates in the area alongside Juan Gabriel Rivas Núñez, alias “El Negro Juancho,” and a third figure known as “Humbertico.” Some sources have also not ruled out the presence of Héctor Guerrero, alias “Niño Guerrero,” the top leader of the large-scale criminal group that emerged inside Tocorón prison in Aragua state.

well, Guerrero did get got

after several months of Iran-related bullshit, this whole thing is making me doubt if he was even killed by the US, or this is just Trump taking credit for a Venezuelan operation to distract from failures elsewhere

as per https://archive.ph/QGeu7 Venezuela did admit to a "joint operation between Venezuelan and United States security agencies", but specifically said “During the operation, clashes occurred with members of these criminal groups, resulting in the neutralization of Héctor Rusthenford Guerrero Flores—alias “Niño Guerrero”—the leader of a criminal organization.”, which sounds less like an airstrike (the American claim) and more like a good old-fashioned gunfight

In September 2023, the Venezuelan government deployed “Operation Gran Cacique Guaicaipuro,” with more than 11,000 security personnel, to intervene in Tocorón prison. However, multiple reports indicated that “Niño Guerrero” and other senior gang leaders were warned in advance and escaped through a network of secret tunnels. Guerrero is currently the subject of an Interpol Red Notice on charges related to transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, and arms trafficking. The US State Department is offering a reward of up to US $5 million for information leading to his capture. For its part, the media platform Miraflores al Momento denied separate reports alleging the presence of US military contingents in El Callao, another major gold-mining area in Bolívar state. Likewise, fact-checking outlets Cazadores de Fake News and CotejoInfo confirmed that images circulating were generated by artificial intelligence. However, local outlets confirmed that, though without any military presence, US officials and business executives have conducted visits to gold-processing facilities belonging to the state-owned Venezuelan Mining Corporation (Minerven) in El Callao.

Last April, Venezuela approved a new mining law granting expanded incentives for private corporations to exploit gold and other “strategic minerals.” Concessions will last up to 30 years and may be renewed for two additional ten-year periods. The legislation additionally introduced provisions for international arbitration in dispute resolution, a safeguard sought by investors, and a reduction of royalties and taxes at the Venezuelan government’s discretion. Among the companies expressing interest are Canadian firms Gold Reserve and Augusta Capital Corporation, which seek to revive the large-scale gold and strategic minerals project known as “Siembra Minera.” Likewise, Roland Mineral Enterprises Corp. has already begun procedures to explore and develop gold, copper, and silver deposits. Swiss commodities giant Trafigura is also advancing a responsible sourcing program in partnership with state-owned Minerven. There have additionally been corporate initiatives and feasibility studies by US companies—including mining firms such as Hartree, Peabody Energy, Ivanhoe, and TechMet—to enter the sector, though security concerns reportedly remain an obstacle.

Mining municipalities in southern Venezuela report some of the country’s highest rates of homicide, as well as reports of forced labor and widespread sexual violence. The gold extracting activities are mostly unregulated. According to former opposition lawmaker Américo De Grazia, only the gold processed by Minerven enters official records, while the rest circulates through parallel channels. Similarly, Transparency Venezuela estimates that just 14 percent of the revenues generated by the gold sector reach the Central Bank and public coffers through royalties and export-related payments.

Ukraine plans to open its military recruitment system to foreign nationals and aims to have foreigners fill as many as half of all assault and infantry positions in its armed forces, Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said. The proposal is part of a broader effort to strengthen combat units while reducing the burden on Ukrainian troops fighting Russia’s full-scale invasion, Fedorov said in a statement. “We are opening the foreign recruitment market to strengthen combat units and preserve the lives of Ukrainian service members,” Fedorov said. According to the minister, the government’s goal is for foreign nationals to occupy between 30% and 50% of assault and infantry positions in the Ukrainian military. Fedorov also said the government plans to begin gradually releasing from military service those who have spent the longest time in Ukraine’s armed forces and have served the most time in combat. The process is expected to start before the end of the year.

He described the initiative as only the first stage of a broader military transformation. A second phase will focus on overhauling recruitment and mobilization procedures. Fedorov said the government is seeking to build an army with clear rules and greater respect for service members, adding that protecting the lives of soldiers remains a top priority.

lol. lmao

Such an army, he said, would give Ukraine a stronger position from which to bring the war to an end. Zelensky said direct funding for combat brigades and more flexible personnel distribution have already shown results, alongside increased autonomy for units in training and staffing decisions. “These are solid foundations for introducing fixed terms of service,” he said, adding that the effectiveness of the reforms should become visible over the summer.

Ukraine launches a major reform of its wartime military

Ukraine is moving to boost the financial resilience of its armed forces and overhaul military service conditions, according to President Volodymyr Zelensky. Zelensky on Friday said he held talks with Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko, Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, and Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko, with top military leadership backing the reform package. The plan aims to strengthen defense funding, modernize contracts, and introduce clearer service timelines in an army that has been under wartime strain since 2022. Zelensky said the government has the resources to raise military salaries, including a minimum of Hr.30,000 ($667) for rear-area service, with higher compensation depending on combat intensity. He also announced new infantry contracts offering an average of Hr.300,000 ($6,667) for frontline positions. “New, significantly stronger contracts for infantry will be introduced,” he said, stressing the central role of Ukraine’s ground forces. Currently, the maximum base salary for infantry is about Hr.100,000 ($2,222) in frontline conditions with combat bonuses, while rear positions typically start from much lower levels.

The decision would limit NATO’s ability to launch long-range strikes and conduct surveillance, the report said. The U.S. plan includes cutting the number of F-16 and F-15E fighter jets from roughly 150 to 100, reducing maritime reconnaissance aircraft from 26 to 15, and removing all eight aerial refueling tanker jets it previously made available to Europe, the report said. The U.S. also aims to redeploy a missile-launching submarine and an aircraft carrier, along with several warships and scores of jets that join the carrier’s missions, the New York Times said, adding that one of two groups of bombers previously assigned for Europe’s defense may also be reallocated.

“Historically there has been an over-reliance on U.S. forces and capabilities,” NATO spokesperson Allison Hart told Reuters, adding that as Europe and Canada invest more in defense and develop greater capabilities, the balance of responsibility can shift. This would strengthen NATO’s defense by reducing reliance on a single ally and reflect a broader change happening within the alliance, Hart said in an emailed statement. The U.S. Department of Defense did not immediately respond to requests for comment. The U.S. European Command said in a statement last week that it would “rightsize” its contributions to the NATO Force Model, without providing further details. Reuters reported in May that the U.S. planned to scale back the military capabilities it would make available to its NATO allies during a major crisis. U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration has repeatedly accused European governments of underinvesting in ​their militaries and relying too heavily on U.S. protection, while urging both Europe and Asian allies ⁠to boost defense spending to 3.5% of GDP.

Data provided by official Venezuelan sources indicates that the nation’s crude output rose by 3.78%, representing an increase of 43,000 barrels per day (bpd) compared to April, bringing total production to 1,179,000 bpd. Meanwhile, OPEC’s secondary sources reported that May’s production increase stood at 3.97%, which comes out to 36,000 bpd more than the previous month, placing the output at 1,072,000 bpd. OPEC regularly compiles its monthly reports utilizing both official tracking and secondary data, which accounts for the standard variations in estimated figures across member states.

Imperialist blockades and legislative shifts

This sustained growth follows a highly volatile period in late 2025. Throughout November and December 2025, the US empire intensified its illegal blockade against Venezuela, aggressively seizing tankers on the high seas that were transporting Venezuelan oil to Cuba, Iran, and China. While this imperialist offensive threatened to collapse the nation’s energy sector, the industry has staged a significant recovery. So far this year, Venezuelan crude production—supported by the world’s largest proven oil reserves—has surged by 27.6% from the 924,000 bpd recorded in January. This recovery began the same month the US empire launched a bombing campaign against the country, illegally kidnapped President Nicolás Maduro, and murdered more than 100 people, including 32 Cuban and 47 Venezuelan soldiers. Weeks after the kidnapping of President Maduro, the Chavista-controlled National Assembly unanimously approved an overhaul of the Hydrocarbons Law to aggressively incentivize foreign investment. Political analysts interpreted the legislative shift as a departure from the legacy of President Hugo Chávez, who pioneered the original 2001 law and its subsequent 2006 reform to guarantee dominant state participation, ownership, and sovereign control over national oil activities.

Export volumes hit seven-year peak

The production rebound is closely mirrored by a massive surge in export performance and US meddling in Venezuelan internal affairs. On June 8, the US Chargé d’Affaires in Caracas, John Barrett, controversially reported that Venezuela’s oil exports reached 1.25 million bpd, marking the highest production and export milestone the country has witnessed in seven years, while reiterating the US post-invasion mantra: stabilization, recovery, and transition. Industry experts explain that May’s export numbers exceeding actual monthly production reflects the offloading of crude inventories that had previously accumulated during the height of the US illegal maritime blockade. Maritime tracking data published by Reuters confirmed that combined shipments of crude oil and refined products reached 1.25 million bpd in May, marking a third consecutive monthly increase. The US settler entity remained the primary destination for Venezuelan oil, absorbing 558,000 bpd, followed closely by India with 427,000 bpd, and Europe with 169,000 bpd.

The head of the German arms giant Rheinmetall has not ruled out a French withdrawal from the Franco-German MGCS tank project, after the failure of the [FCAS], the combat aircraft initiated by Paris and Berlin. "The danger is still present, but nothing has been decided," stated Armin Papperger, CEO of Rheinmetall, in an interview with the German Sunday newspaper Welt am Sonntag. According to Papperger, France is already planning to drastically reduce the budget for the MGCS project. The figure being discussed is "less than half" of the initial projections, he told Welt am Sonntag. "We have not made any decisions regarding the final budget," he added.

"It's obviously very little money."

The consequence of a reduced budget would be the elimination of certain services and, therefore, further delays to the project. "When you have less money, you don't go any faster, and we're already very slow," emphasized the head of the Düsseldorf-based group. To date, the four companies involved (KNDS France, KNDS Germany, Rheinmetall, and Thales) have received only €25 million under this program, which has been running for about ten years. "It's obviously very little money," added Armin Papperger. Considered two flagship projects of Franco-German cooperation, the MGCS (Main Ground Combat System) and the FCAS (Future Combat Air System) were launched in 2017 by President Emmanuel Macron and Chancellor Angela Merkel. The MGCS is intended to succeed the German Leopard 2 and the Leclerc by 2040. Buried on Monday by Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Emmanuel Macron, the [FCAS] was intended to replace the Eurofighter Typhoon in Germany and the Dassault Rafale in France from the 2040s onwards.

Just over a year ago, the German companies involved in the MGCS, Rheinmetall and KNDS Germany, launched the development of a Leopard 3 as a temporary solution. The first examples should enter service in the early 2030s, almost ten years before the MGCS tank, which is not expected to be operational before the 2040s. "That's a crazy timeframe. I can't say today if there will ever be an MGCS," concluded Armin Papperger. Another Franco-German project in trouble, according to the German daily Handelsblatt published on Friday, is the Eurodrone. According to the newspaper, which cites sources close to the matter, Dassault is demanding compensation from Airbus because the French company would be allocated a smaller share in the project. This situation stems from the French government's decision not to allocate funds for drone purchases until 2035, writes Handelsblatt. Intended as an alternative to the American Reaper, the Eurodrone is being jointly developed by France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.

Denmark's National Audit Office (Rigsrevisionen) on Monday, June 8, published report containing assessment of entire F-35 fifth-generation fighter program lifecycle cost, including fighter procurement, technical maintenance, pilot training and so on, which proved 25% higher than previous defense department estimates. If previously defense ministry estimated project at 57.1 billion Danish crowns (approximately €7.64 billion), now it involves already 71.2 billion (€9.53 billion) to be spent on fighter over 30 years. This is €1.89 billion difference. BFM reports this.

Accordingly Rigsrevisionen emphasizes such defense department inability to predict real costs causes concern. Although the long-term sum does not appear excessively significant, the audit office laments that either overall spending will now need increasing or financing for F-35 program will need to be found through cutting other project spending. Moreover, Denmark will hardly be able to reduce fighter orders to cut costs, as it already received 23 aircraft and remaining four should be delivered by early 2027. Thus total overspending per aircraft will amount to €70 million, again, this involves entire lifecycle. Also under question is whether the spending increase will impact additional fighter procurement. Recall last year Denmark's defense department head announced plans to purchase additional F-35 aircraft from Lockheed Martin despite all U.S. President Donald Trump's Greenland annexation talk. Then 10 additional aircraft were discussed, now 16 are written about.

Overall it turns out that F-35 fighter buyers should prepare for increased spending on these aircraft, as this is already not first such story. As example, Switzerland can be recalled, forced to reduce order from 36 to 30 aircraft due to price growth. This also involves related costs, not only aircraft price. Previously problems with infrastructure deployment in Switzerland became known, when price grew from 152 to 252 million dollars immediately, and this is purely about basic minimum. Previously, Defense Express reported that after 6 years of waiting first F-35s arrived in Poland.

At a European Union summit earlier this month, Sweden’s migration minister revealed that there is “strong support” among European governments for excluding military-aged Ukrainian men from the bloc’s temporary protection scheme for Ukrainian refugees. The policy, which allows Ukrainian citizens to live and work in the European Union, currently covers more than 4.3 million people. The majority of the beneficiaries are women, children, and the elderly since Ukrainian men between the ages of 23 and 60 are legally barred from leaving the country without prior authorization. Nevertheless, 26.6% of those in the EU are adult men, many of whom either were already in the bloc prior to the current conflict or left Ukraine in order to avoid mobilization and deployment to the front.

Despite a warm reception in early 2022, European publics and governments have started to sour on Ukrainian refugees. In a 2022 survey, 94% of Polish respondents supported accepting Ukrainians fleeing the conflict across the border, but that figure has since plummeted to 48%, with 46% opposing. In Germany, two-thirds support cancelling unemployment benefits to Ukrainians, and 62% support sending military-aged Ukrainian men back to their country. And, though the Czech Republic has generally been supportive of Ukraine, 47% of Czechs now believe that their country has accepted more Ukrainian refugees than they can handle, with only 23% in favor of allowing them to settle permanently. Amid this growing weariness, some European leaders are pushing to repatriate Ukrainian men. In 2024, the Polish and Lithuanian defense ministers pledged to assist with repatriation of Ukrainian men. Last year, in response to the increased number of Ukrainian arrivals after Ukraine raised the exit ban age from 18 to 23, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz urged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to ensure that young men did not leave the beleaguered and conflict-riddled country. Earlier this year, the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration announced that Ukrainian men between ages 18 and 60 who arrived after May 5 will no longer be covered by temporary collective protection and would instead have to apply individually.

Though drone warfare has altered the relative significance of conventional infantry units, Ukraine’s manpower shortage has continued to grow more acute. This trend could weaken Ukraine’s negotiating leverage and push the Ukrainian leadership to make concessions to reach a final peace agreement with Russia. This would run counter to the apparent preference of many Western policymaking elites, some of whom view the conflict as a valuable way of weakening Russia. As the long-time German diplomat and head of the Munich Security Conference Wolfgang Ischinger stated, “As long as this war is being fought, you know, vigilantly and courageously, by our Ukrainian friends, Europe is safe.”

By seeking to replenish Ukraine’s manpower through an infusion of men living in the EU, European governments risk simply extending the conflict while increasing the number of combatant deaths on both sides. Though European Commissioner for Migration Magnus Brunner argues that this is “what the Ukrainians want us to do,” a prolongation of the conflict will likely exacerbate Ukraine’s already catastrophic demographic crisis and trajectory. A brief swelling of the Ukrainian ranks is unlikely to meaningfully alter the course of the conflict, especially when one takes into account the time it would take to repatriate, train, and deploy a cohort of unenthusiastic conscripts. The collapse in the number of volunteers in the Ukrainian military is an overlooked aspect of the conflict, one that reflects a wider, structural challenge that officials in Kyiv have so far been unable to resolve. While there was an uptick in volunteer enlistments in the spring of 2022, by June 2024 three-quarters of the Ukrainian military consisted of those who were there not by choice but by force. Meanwhile, domestically many are avoiding military service. By January of this year, according to Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, approximately 200,000 soldiers were absent without official leave, and an additional two million men have been avoiding the draft. As the journalist Peter Korotaev and sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko have noted, the failure to mobilize more troops is rooted in decades of poor governance. “This failure to deliver meaningful opportunities and protections for the majority of Ukrainians has left the state unable to demand much from them in return,” Korotaev and Ischchenko wrote. “As a result, today, Ukraine is unable to fully mobilise its people who are divided by a profound sociopolitical disconnect.”

It remains unclear what a cancellation of temporary protection for Ukrainian men will actually entail. Under the current scheme, most Ukrainians in the EU have not applied for asylum, which is determined by national governments, so a policy reversal here might lead to a surge in asylum applications that may take months if not years to assess. Differences between EU member states may also result in Ukrainian men moving around the bloc. Many may simply find themselves as undocumented migrants who are unable to access public services and are therefore forced to live underground. This is already the case for many within Ukraine, where men live in hiding out of fear of being apprehended by mobilization officers. Some European governments may even wish to carry out formal deportations. Rather than trying to address domestic political pressure by fueling conflict in Eastern Europe while further destroying Ukraine’s prospects for postwar reconstruction, EU leaders need to focus their efforts on addressing the root causes of the fighting. While European leaders have become increasingly supportive of direct talks with Russia, this has largely been reactive, emanating from a fear of being excluded by US-Russia talks. A proactive approach can save lives instead of resorting to sex-based discrimination against refugees.