[–] 43 points 1 day ago (1 child)

https://archive.ph/eQqjY

Are yearlong deployments the Navy’s new normal?

That's what officials are telling sailors' families in Japan, where two destroyers are slated for 12- and 14-month cruises.

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When the U.S. Navy destroyer John Finn left home in January, sailors expected to be home in March. Now, after extensions on top of extensions, their families have been told to expect them next March—after a 14-month deployment. The Mustin, another Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, switched homeports this year, leaving San Diego in February and arriving in Yokosuka, Japan, in March. As the sailors stepped off the ship, they were told they needed to be ready to deploy “tomorrow.” The Mustin actually left Japan in April for a deployment that was supposed to end in August. Now its crew has been told they will return in April 2027, the spouse of one of the sailors told Defense One. These marathon deployments—a month or more longer than the carrier Abraham Lincoln’s record-breaking 322 days—may be the new normal for U.S. warships. Last week, a Navy official told families at Yokosuka that all ship deployments and patrols, stateside and overseas, will be 10 to 12 months long for the foreseeable future. Asked about that statement, a Navy spokesperson told Defense One, “It is U.S. Navy policy not to discuss future operations or movements due to operations security.”

But last month, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle said that sailors and their families should expect “longer deployments” until “I can grow the Navy we need.” The service’s battle force currently consists of about 290 warships, down from 295 two years ago but up from about 275 a decade ago. In recent decades, the Navy has generally kept deployments to six or seven months, although that is not a set-in-stone policy, said Katherine Kuzminski, vice president of studies at the Center for a New American Security. But, she said, “that commitment is being violated now.” “Certainly, depending on operational needs and demands, I think service members and their families are fully on board with providing—with the requirements that are put on them in ongoing operations,” Kuzminski said. “A potential way that the Navy can mitigate this is actually to just commit to the longer term upfront and be clear with service members and their families.” After initial reports of the Lincoln’s woes emerged, some veterans of other services and other conflicts were quick to post online about their own longer deployments. But the issue, Kuzminski said, is not so much the length of the deployment, but the “dissonance between what was said at the beginning and what is happening in actuality.”

That dissonance is particularly pronounced for the John Finn, one of several “forward deployed” guided-missile destroyers based at Yokosuka. While other Navy ships tend to deploy for about six months and then return home for a year, forward-deployed ships typically leave for two or three months at a time, then return to port for two to three months of maintenance before heading back out to sea. Those deployments are designed to keep the ships ready for combat in the region, deter aggression from China, and “maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.” Last year, the John Finn left home in June for a “normal” deployment in the region and returned in early November. But much of the following two months were spent in hasty preparations to return to sea. “We really only saw him a collective 20 days,” the spouse of a sailor on the ship told Defense One. In early January, the ship left again, for what was expected to be a deployment of perhaps 45 to 60 days. It headed to the Indian Ocean and was involved in the boarding of a Venezuelan oil tanker before being directed to the Arabian Sea, shortly before Operation Epic Fury began. The ship was part of the initial attack on Iran, the spouse said, and they’re “still there.”

Earlier this month, the sailors were told they would likely not be home until March 2027. “There’s cars that were left on base that have been stickered to be towed and then to be junked. So there’s sailors that are going to come back and have no cars,” the spouse said. “They left in the winter months, and there’s some sailors that live off base and are single sailors and will have abandoned their entire house, their apartment, for over a year. And when they left in the winter months, when they left everything on heat mode, and then the summer came.” Sailors know “that they’re going to come home and all their stuff will be trashed.” For families, it’s more than a year without a parent—without any of the planning for a long deployment. “It’s been absolutely gut-wrenching to my kids,” the spouse said, and there is “next to no mental health support” available on base. The deployment length is “absolutely unheard-of for a destroyer,” she said.

The Finn’s story is extreme—but not unique among Yokosuka-based destroyers. Photos posted on the Pentagon’s DVIDS media site show the Rafael Peralta in the Philippine Sea in November, in the South China Sea in December, and back in the Philippine Sea on Jan. 8. Then, instead of returning home, it headed for the Middle East in April, where it remains today. Families have been told not to expect the ship home until April 2027. The Higgins, which lost power and propulsion for a few hours in the Indo-Pacific in April, continued its deployment after repairs and is currently operating in the Indian Ocean. The Milius left Japan in February and has been in the Middle East since March. The Mustin left its old homeport of San Diego in February and arrived in Japan in March. Sailors are usually given 30 days to help their families move and settle in for a homeport shift, particularly when the move is to a foreign country, and the majority of the families had waited until the ship arrived to make the move. But “the moment they pulled in, my husband stepped off the ship, and he goes, ‘We have to be prepared to leave tomorrow,” a Mustin spouse told Defense One. The ship did stay in its new port for a few weeks because of a sonar problem that required an expert to fly in to fix it, but sailors did not get time off during that time frame because they needed to be ready at a moment’s notice, the spouse said. They left in April with the expectation that they would return in August and then go out again over the holidays before monthslong scheduled maintenance beginning in February. But when August came, the ship’s commander told the sailors they would be out for “about another month,” the spouse said. A few weeks ago, they were told they wouldn’t be home until April 2027.

The situation is all the more frustrating for sailors and families because the ship has spent virtually the entire deployment in the Indian Ocean as “backup.” “They’re not in the blockade, they’re like the next in line, just out there waiting,” she said. The distinction means that the Mustin sailors don’t get combat pay or benefits. “I know they feel forgotten about,” she said. The John Finn spouse said it has been frustrating for families and sailors to read all the media coverage of the Lincoln’s long deployment, while knowing that other ships supporting her were “left behind.” “I can do a long deployment,” she said. “The problem with this is that there is no answer as to when this will be over. … Why are we not rotating ships? And then why are we there? Why are you sending home stateside ships before your forward deployed ships?” In response to questions about why the ships have not been replaced, a Navy spokesperson said, “The Department takes a thoughtful and deliberate approach to global force management, continually balancing immediate operational requirements against risks across theaters.” If longer deployments increasingly become the norm, Kuzminski said, it’s important that the Navy be upfront with sailors and their families about what to expect. But the situation highlights another problem: The Navy doesn’t have a confirmed civilian secretary, “a person who is fundamentally the accountability to Congress on how things are working,” she said. Without a Navy secretary, she said, it’s hard to answer the big questions: “Is this the new normal? How are you handling that? How are we preparing sailors for that? How are we preparing their families for that? How are we preparing our ships for that?”

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  • [–] 64 points 1 day ago* (15 children)

    https://archive.ph/fS5kF

    The Pentagon wants ketamine wafers as a battlefield medicine option

    The Pentagon wants ketamine wafers. And it seems to want them now. Earlier this year, the Defense Department awarded a nearly $41 million development contract to Singapore-based iX Biopharma to develop Wafermine, a small, ketamine-packed wafer that dissolves under the tongue.

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    Recently, the drug’s manufacturer announced that it is pursuing an emergency authorization that could make the medication available to troops before it receives full Food and Drug Administration approval, citing a September U.S. declaration of a military emergency that justifies the emergency use of drugs deemed necessary by the Pentagon. A federal emergency use approval declaration by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services on Sept. 3 opened the possibility of early official authorization, giving the FDA a route to use unapproved medications to treat war wounds. According to the notice, on July 15, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth determined “a military emergency, or significant potential for a military emergency, involving a heightened risk to U.S. military forces of an attack with a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agent or agents,” or an attack with agents that would cause life-threatening injuries. The declaration continues: “Injuries arising from these attacks may cause those forces to experience moderate to severe acute pain and place them at risk of developing life-threatening hemodynamic instability, including shock or respiratory distress.”

    Because of Hegseth’s determination, Health and Human Services Secretary Robert Kennedy, Jr. declared that “circumstances exist justifying the authorization of emergency use of drugs” identified by the Pentagon. The notice did not elaborate on the emergency circumstances or state which drugs would be identified for emergency authorization. A Politico investigation published Tuesday found that iX Biofarma’s domestic manufacturing partner lacks the Nevada license required to operate. iX Biofarma called the non-opioid medication the “world’s first sublingual ketamine for acute moderate to severe pain,” and said the wafer enables a different delivery mechanism, letting patients absorb the ketamine through the mucous membrane into the bloodstream. Typically administered via injection, ketamine can alleviate pain, increase euphoria and cause dissociation and amnesia.

    A 2023 study found that opioid use to alleviate battlefield injuries decreased between January 2010 and December 2019, while ketamine use increased. The researchers found that “ketamine is generally used first for more severely injured patients and has increasingly been employed by the U.S. military as the primary analgesic for combat casualties.” The company said it received a “sole-source” award for Wafermine development, meaning it did not solicit other vendors.

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  • [–] 50 points 1 day ago* (7 children)

    khamenei-what endless fucking capeshit for the imperial military! https://archive.ph/FPQz4

    Palmer Luckey unveils start-up to breed ‘genetically enhanced’ dogs for military

    Anduril’s co-founder and entrepreneur Ben Lamm conceived of company to clone and genetically edit working canines

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    A Texas-based start-up promising to give the US an edge on the battlefield by rebuilding the country’s supply of “military working dogs” has raised $200mn from investors including Sequoia Capital and Cathie Wood’s Ark Invest. Warhound, the brainchild of Anduril’s co-founder Palmer Luckey and software entrepreneur Ben Lamm, “will produce genetically enhanced working dogs” domestically and equip them with advanced technology to ensure they have “battlefield situational awareness”, the new company said. Warhound was valued at $1.2bn in its funding round, including the new investment, said a person with knowledge of the deal. Lamm, who conceived of the plan with Luckey 18 months ago, described it as a “Captain America programme for dogs [which] also solves a real problem in the welfare of these animals”.

    you know what would solve the "problem in the welfare" of these animals? NOT USING THEM AS FUCKING TOOLS OF WAR doggirl-growl

    The outlandish start-up has attracted interest from some of the biggest names in Silicon Valley and elsewhere, including Sequoia, Lux Capital, Franklin Templeton and In-Q-Tel, a venture firm started by the CIA that invests in early-stage technology companies directly applicable to intelligence and national security operations. Lamm’s company, Colossal Biosciences, works on species preservation, animal cloning and “de-extinction”, which it describes as “a functional application of advanced gene-editing technology aimed at rebuilding the DNA of lost megafauna”. The company claims to be in the process of the “de-extinction of the woolly mammoth”. Its technology will be used to clone and genetically edit working dogs, in an effort Lamm said would improve performance and was more humane for the animals, many of which currently fail to complete training.

    “Our idea is: take the top dogs, biobank them and clone them . . . in addition to cloning the dogs, could you edit them and improve longevity and performance. That’s more healthy for the dog, the firefighter, cop or warfighter,” said Lamm, who will serve on the company’s board. Anduril, a maker of autonomous drones, submarines and other military vehicles, and America’s most high-profile defence technology start-ups, will develop body armour and “cybernetics” to improve the performance of the dogs.

    “Man’s best friend deserves man’s best tech,” said Luckey, who will not hold equity in Warhound or play a day-to-day role in the business.

    i-love-killing-people you're my best friend, which is why I'm going to strap this armor on you and send you into deadly combat scared

    Warhound will be run by David Spirk, a former US Marine who was the first chief data officer at the Pentagon and a senior counsellor at Palantir Technologies. The company aims to kick-start domestic supply of working dogs, most of which come from European breeders. Spirk said: “Leading Warhound and strengthening America’s working-dog capabilities is an opportunity to apply my experience to a mission I care deeply about: protecting people and helping the animals who support them.”

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  • [–] 47 points 1 day ago (4 children)

    https://archive.ph/W4CSk

    Yes, B-1 Lancer Crews Are Now Logging Proficiency Hours In A Honda Business Jet

    The US Air Force has made headlines recently with divestments of legacy airframes, bringing the total fleet inventory to the lowest point since the end of WWII. At around 4,900 aircraft in total, the USAF has a shortage of combat-capable bombers, fighters, and every other airframe as well. In addition to limiting its deployable squadrons, it is also making it more challenging to keep pilots current on training flights.

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    This has led to an innovative solution involving the most economical bomber-like plane available in the private sector. Although a supersonic heavy bomber and a 422-knot light business jet have almost nothing in common, both directly contribute to the flight time that keeps USAF bomber pilots qualified. The arrangement is formally called the Bomber Supplemental Trainer for Aircrew Readiness, or BSTAR. At the Air and Space Forces Association's Air, Space and Cyber Conference on September 17, General Stephen L. Davis, commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, confirmed the program. Specifically, the HondaJet is being used to help Rockwell B-1 Lancer pilots log flight hours while their own aircraft sit in the maintenance bay. So how did the world's most powerful air force, and one of only three with bombers in its Fleet, reach this point?

    A Fleet That Cannot Fly Its Own Pilots Enough

    As a result of its long career, the airframe of the B-1 Lancer isn't what it used to be. The B-1's mission-capable rate fell from 55% in fiscal 2022 to 43% in fiscal 2024. Similarly, the Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit stealth bomber fleet has been slipping from roughly 59% in fiscal 2021 to 52.8% in fiscal 2022. The famous flying wing is one of the most notoriously high-maintenance aircraft ever built, but the B-1 is not far behind it with its swing wings and supersonic mission profile, which calls for 'yanking and banking' just above the nap of the Earth. Bomber-wide, mission-capable rates across the B-1, B-2, and Boeing B-52 Stratofortress fleets averaged just over 50% in fiscal 2024, Air and Space Forces Magazine reported. That is distributed on a combined bomber inventory of 140 aircraft spread across nine squadrons. The combined average age of all those airframes is nearly 50 years, with the B-52 being the oldest but also averaging the highest readiness.

    A fighter squadron with half its jets grounded is a problem. However, a bomber squadron with half its jets grounded is a crippling blow to a tiny force. While the entire US bomber force once reached a peak of 422 planes in the Cold War, the current force levels are likely to only grow smaller in the future. But not only leaves fewer planes for missions, but also fewer aircraft to fly for training. So, if the jets are not available, what exactly does a pilot do to stay proficient?

    Renting Business Jets To Keep Crews Current

    During a panel titled 'Flying and Fixing to Fight and Win,' Davis explained that bringing in the HondaJets helps provide vital flight experience. XSTAR Aviation grew directly out of a USAF Global Strike Command study into the same aircrew readiness gap it now exists to solve. Under BSTAR, XSTAR supplies the Air Force with HondaJet Elite light business jets to address its pilot readiness issue while it works on remedying the fleet readiness. The plane is a twin-engine civilian aircraft built by Honda Aircraft Company that cruises at up to 422 knots, reaches a service ceiling of 43,000 feet (13,106 meters), and is powered by a pair of GE Honda HF120 turbofans. These light jets give pilots a chance to fly and log crucial time in the seat. The HondaJet Elite itself is a twin-engine light jet measuring 43 feet (13.11 meters) long with a 40-foot (12.19 meters) wingspan. Its two GE Honda HF120 turbofans each produce roughly 2,050 pounds of thrust. It is true that the plane is diminutive by comparison to the enormous bombers of the USAF. It is a machine designed for regional corporate travel rather than anything resembling heavy bomber operations. Still, the logic behind using the Honda Jet is straightforward. It saves a great deal of funding for maintaining basic flight currency and depends heavily on instrument flying, approach work, and general stick time. A light jet can sustain these foundational skills. This practical workaround allows pilots to keep their core aviation instincts sharp while their primary aircraft are grounded.

    What Grounded The Bombers In The First Place

    The B-1 Lancer, fondly known as the Bone, was made to penetrate Soviet airspace using sheer speed and maneuverability. The huge plane first flew in October 1984 and was delivered between 1985 and 1988, originally entering service as a nuclear penetrator before converting exclusively to conventional roles in the 1990s.

    Today, the Lancer stands as the Air Force's sole carrier of the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile.

    technically, this is a bit out-of-date, it was recently also confirmed for the B-2, there are ongoing tests for the F-35 and some other planes, and it can also be used on the F/A-18E/F (but that's the Navy so technically it doesn't count towards the USAF's capability)

    Its swing-wing airframe can haul up to 75,000 pounds (34,019 kg) of ordnance, more than any other aircraft in the US inventory, but that massive capability now rides on an active fleet that has shrunk to roughly 45 airframes from an original production run of 104. Air Force officials have pointed to a combination of funding, parts, and workforce shortfalls as the primary drivers behind falling mission-capable rates across the entire aircraft inventory. The consequences of these thin flying hours are far from abstract. Colonel John 'JV' Venable wrote an analysis of the state of the fleet for Air and Space Forces Magazine in mid-2025.

    The Hazards Of Deprioritizing Flight Time

    Venable noted that the bomber fleet was struggling, and in at least one mishap, the pilot had a paltry number of hours in recent months: "US bomber crews are in even worse shape [than fighters]. Years of underfunding flying-hour programs and weapons system sustainment accounts make it unlikely that a single bomber squadron can execute peer-level mission requirements within their respective designed operational capability statements." "Employing forces that are not trained for a high-end fight would undoubtedly suffer higher loss rates, not just in combat, but during the more benign phases of flight, like taking off and landing. Recent accident reports, like one that followed the January 2024 crash of a B-1, confirm this. That $300 million bomber was lost during a routine instrument approach into its home field. The mishap pilot had three sorties in the previous month, and the instructor pilot had just two in the previous 60 days." That accident serves as the immediate backdrop against which BSTAR was conceived, and it fits a dangerous pattern the Air Force has acknowledged across its entire combat aviation community. Aviation analysts have documented a fighter pilot shortfall that has grown from 200 pilots in 2006 to roughly 1,150 today, driven in large part by a lack of available aircraft for pilots to train on. This same dynamic, fewer flyable airframes chasing the same strict currency requirements, applies just as directly to the bomber community.

    A Parallel Push to Fix the Bombers Themselves

    While BSTAR treats the immediate symptoms of thin flying hours, the Air Force has also launched a major effort aimed at fixing the underlying cause. In September, Air Force Global Strike Command partnered with Air Force Materiel Command and the Defense Logistics Agency to launch the North Star Readiness Campaign. This initiative is explicitly designed to raise the number of mission-capable B-52 and B-1 aircraft by speeding up the delivery of vital spare parts, engineering support, and depot-level maintenance. General Davis of AFGSC commented on the initiative earlier this month, saying: “The North Star Readiness Campaign is our commitment to ensuring the warfighter has the nation's bomber force ready to go at a moment’s notice. This is a team effort. It brings together the operators at Air Force Global Strike Command, the acquisition and sustainment experts at Air Force Materiel Command, and our logistics partners at the Defense Logistics Agency to focus on one thing: operational readiness.” “By modernizing these incredible platforms and ensuring our maintainers have the parts and support they need, we are sending a clear message to our adversaries and allies alike that the United States’ long-range penetrating strike capability is, and will remain, second to none.”

    Making Do To Accomplish The Mission

    BSTAR is a readiness story about a bomber force so depleted, at just 140 aircraft compared to a Cold War peak in the hundreds, that the Air Force decided renting civilian aircraft was a more reliable path to pilot currency than waiting for its own maintenance pipeline to catch up. Davis candidly acknowledged that the program exists because so many airframes face ongoing readiness challenges, a plain admission that the solution is not entirely within the Air Force's own hands yet. Whether this pays off depends on two timelines staying roughly on schedule: the North Star Readiness Campaign for the B-52 and B-1 fleets, and the B-21's smooth transition to a combat aircraft. Until both objectives are met, a small fleet of light jets will continue doing quiet, unglamorous work that no high-profile press release ever mentions. These corporate jets will keep giving Lancer crews just enough stick time to stay current on paper while their own supersonic bombers wait in the hangar.

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  • submitted 2 days ago* (last edited 2 days ago) by to c/games@hexbear.net
     

    https://nitter.tiekoetter.com/kettukaa/status/2114616403374530966

    As automated hacking starts to take off, AI company employees are saying that now is a good time to start recording audio logs to leave scattered around

    leave a gun, 3 scattered bullets (different caliber than the gun), a half eaten chocolate bar, and some coins in your fridge too

    ah, I love democracy (thelemmy.club)
     

    https://x.com/ripplebrain/status/2113021690750091717 (privated account)

    With a heavy heart, today I am announcing that we will regrettably once again be cancelling our elections due to the war of aggression I started and have every intention of continuing indefinitely

    Unfortunately this means we will also have to delay my trial for corruption and various anti-democratic crimes. Disappointing, I know, and a heavy blow to me personally, considering how important the principle of justice is to me.

     

    OUCH!

    ≈230-ish joules is basically the energy of a .32 ACP bullet btw (some loadings of it anyway, a single cartridge can vary a lot in its different variants ). the ≈190-ish joules on the lighter stone is comparable to some .22LR loads


    also, from 9:50

    the visor was 8mm polycarbonate, and that smashed... now, polycarbonate is, basically, is often used in place of bulletproof glass, it's used for riot shields...

    phoenix-think do-not-do-this

    [–] 7 points 1 week ago* (last edited 1 week ago)

    Or, y'know... they didn't fire a warning shot? The post I quoted specifically says "either as a near miss or a warning shot", and I've previously posted his analysis on why carriers are so difficult to hit. We don't know what truly happened, and won't for a while (if ever) - we do know the US has shown itself to be very cautious and casualty-averse, given their expenditure of long-range munitions, and the recent retreat of the B-1 bombers from the British air base, so why wouldn't a near miss causing them to get scared and flee be just as likely of a scenario? We don't need to admonish Iran over hypotheticals which may or may not have happened.

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  • [–] 79 points 1 week ago (4 children)

    followup to the carrier positions

    https://x.com/ripplebrain/status/2111474767345709210 (privated account), https://nitter.tiekoetter.com/MoloWarMonitor/status/2111459879600677297

    I just found a U.S. Navy destroyer assigned to the USS George Washington CSG on Sentinel-2 satellite imagery, 17/10/2026. The vessel is sailing off the coast of Pakistan, in the northern Arabian Sea, approximately 400km from Iran. As I told you about a month ago, American carrier strike groups in the CENTCOM AOR no longer venture near the Gulf of Oman, instead, they operate hundreds of kilometers away from the so called "naval blockade line."

    I've been waiting for weeks for Molo to spot a component of the remaining CSG in the Arabian Sea, which hasn't been spotted since September. As we suspected, the naval assets have moved even farther away from Iran. During most of the war, there have been two CSGs operating in the Arabian Sea. One (the Lincoln for most of the war) held a western position, while another (previously the Bush) held the eastern position. The two CSGs continuously circled within a several hundred square km box at these positions. Both kept approximately 270km from the Iranian coast, just outside of the range of most Iranian anti-ship cruise missile systems, presuming a launch point >30km inland. Now, the Washington's CSG is operating ~420km from the Iranian coast, on the Pakistani border, or perhaps 500km from a likely ASCM launch point inland. The most plausible explanation for this move is that the Iranians were telling the truth when they said they detonated an anti-ship ballistic missile "above" a US naval vessel, either as a near miss or a warning shot, and CENTCOM reacted by pushing these naval assets even farther away from Iran. The distance allows more time to evade Iranian anti-ship missiles, and makes the Iranians' job much more difficult in terms of both detecting and successfully hitting a mobile naval target. The Washington's CSG is so far east it's now nearly off the coast of India. Iran's anti-ship ballistic missile systems are, in reality, probably launching from fairly deep into the Iranian interior, so it's possible they'd need a range of 1000km or even greater to hit a target this far away from Iran. The Washington being this far from Iran comes with a steep cost, however, as its sortie rate and range of its air wing will be greatly reduced for any kind of mission over the Persian Gulf or Iran itself.

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  • [–] 25 points 1 week ago* (last edited 1 week ago) (2 children)

    for a visual demonstration of the distances - here's two roughly 1900km-ish circles (I couldn't get them quite at the same size, I wish this site would let me just input a radius number instead of having to adjust it with the mouse) centered on Iran & Venezuela

    (they look kind of different-sized on the pic, which I assume is some Mercator fuckery)

    ripplebrain in the post I linked was talking about medium-range ballistic missiles, which are generally defined as in the 1000-3000km range. As we can see, basically everything Iran needs to hit is solidly within MRBM range (with a lot of it even being on the shorter end of the range), and even the furthest targets - Israel and the Saudi Red Sea coast bases - are still not even pushing the upper end of the range provided by higher-end MRBMs. Venezuela's situation is, indeed, fundamentally different, geographically. At the upper end of MRBM range, they can... maybe harass Florida somewhat desantis-beta-walk

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  • [–] 73 points 1 week ago (29 children)

    some notes on Iranian strategy, and that for countries trying to replicate their success it's very much not as simple as "just invest into missiles"

    https://x.com/ripplebrain/status/2111131716366602518 (privated account), https://nitter.tiekoetter.com/trismegistus99/status/2111128920322167238, https://nitter.tiekoetter.com/trismegistus99/status/2111136358450475511

    The world has seen the success of the Iranian program and may try to follow its example, but how replicable is what Iran has done? How far could Saudi get throwing cash at a missile program? Or countries like Turkey or Israel?

    Iran's missile program is part of a comprehensive state-wide strategy that doesn't map cleanly to other states. The Israelis did, in a way, implement their own version of it by investing heavily in ALBMs. But you have to stand back and take into account that Iran's strategy includes passive defense (missile cities), control over Hormuz, the ability to strike Gulf infrastructure, the political structure of Iran (the IRGC), the mosaic strategy, and so on. Other states could certainly invest more heavily in ballistic missile capability but it doesn't automatically mean they could convert that capability into the same strategic advantages Iran enjoys. The strategy could be summed up as "we can hit you (MRBMs), and you can't hit us (missile cities), and even if you kill our leadership, that won't change (mosaic, IRGC), and if you try to destroy our infrastructure, we'll destroy yours (Gulf targets), and until you leave us alone the global economy will be held hostage (Hormuz)".

    You can't map this onto a state like Turkey because their strategic position has nothing in common with Iran's. If you remove just one pillar of Iran's strategy, everything falls apart. Without the missile cities it's conceivable that Iran's MRBM launch capability could be seriously attrited (it would still be a tall order, considering the geography). Without the Iranian political structure, you could cut a deal with moderates. Without Hormuz, there'd be no ticking clock incentivizing Iran's enemies to retreat. Without the MRBMs and drones, the US could have destroyed Iran's water and power infrastructure.

    Well said. The sheer political will it takes to undertake a state-wide strategy like this is also something Turkey and Saudi do not possess. And as clients of a larger empire, they'd also never be allowed to develop the political will for this kind of project, even if they wanted

    Yes and it's a decades-long project which required serious strategic vision and national leadership willing to listen to their commanders and devote resources to it

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