The Government Accountability Office (GAO) says low availability of unnamed “legacy” aircraft has created hurdles for flight testing of the new AGM-181A Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) nuclear-armed cruise missile. The B-52 is the only platform known to be involved in this effort. The fleet of these bombers is highly in demand, underscored by heavy use in strikes on Iran earlier this year, and has also recently suffered a tragic loss. U.S. Air Force officials have previously highlighted how the relatively small number of B-52s in service and the heavy demands placed on them create challenges when it comes to modernizing the aircraft themselves. GAO, a Congressional watchdog, provided new details about flight testing plans and other aspects of the LRSO program in an annual report published last week. The AGM-181A has been in active development since 2020, when the Air Force chose Raytheon to be the prime contractor. “LRSO reported unfavorable cost and schedule changes over the past year,” GAO reported. “For example, flight testing challenges, largely due to the poor readiness rates of legacy aircraft supporting LRSO testing, resulted in a 4-month delay to its initial capability.” The Air Force is now aiming to reach initial operational capability with the AGM-181 in November 2030.

GAO says that there have been nine LRSO test flights since October 2024. That is when developmental testing of the missile began. Six of those flight tests, along with seven ground test events, occurred last year. In a report dated December 2022, the Pentagon had previously disclosed nine more test flights as part of earlier phases of the program. Whether additional test flights occurred between December 2022 and October 2024 is unclear. “Since our last assessment, program officials realigned the test schedule, leaving less time to complete the 27 remaining test flights before operational testing starts in September 2027,” the report GAO put out last week also notes. “However, they noted that some re-testing can still be accommodated.” As noted, the B-52 is the only aircraft known to be involved in LRSO flight testing, and certainly meets the definition of a “legacy” platform. The last of these bombers rolled off Boeing’s production line in 1962, though the remaining examples have been upgraded repeatedly since then. The sighting last year of a B-52 carrying a pair of AGM-181s, or relevant test articles, on a pylon under its right wing offered the first public glimpse of the missile. Spotters have caught these bombers supporting LRSO tests on several other occasions since then. The Air Force currently has 75 B-52H bombers in service, in total. The entire fleet is never available at any one time for taskings of any kind, due to routine maintenance and other factors. The mission-capable rate for the bombers has been hovering between 50 and 55 percent in recent years. In addition, only one of the bombers is explicitly set aside to support test and evaluation efforts. B-52s from operational units are also used to support research and development and test and evaluation work on a more ad hoc basis. This is on top of the heavy operational demands put on the fleet, both for conventional combat operations and as a key component of the air leg of America’s nuclear deterrent triad. As mentioned, B-52s were heavily utilized just earlier this year for conventional strikes on Iran, adding to these strains.

Last month, the Air Force also lost one of its B-52s in a fatal crash at Edwards Air Force Base in California, which tragically killed all eight individuals onboard at the time. The aircraft in question was headed out on a flight test in support of a critical radar modernization program for the bombers when it went down, as you can read more about here. The radar modernization effort is part of a slew of major upgrades for the B-52 fleet, which also includes all-new engines, improved communication suites, and more. The upgrades are so substantial that the bombers’ designations will change from B-52H to B-52J in the process. They are also in line to see their arsenals grow, including with the addition of the LRSO. The future B-52Js are set to continue serving through at least 2050. Other aspects of the B-52 modernization plan have also been beset by cost growth and delays. Air Force officials have said this has been compounded by the total size of the fleet and operational demands placed on it. “The challenge with B-52 that I think everybody forgets, it’s such a small fleet that has such a tremendous requirement in terms of readiness,” Air Force Gen. Dale White, the service’s Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Critical Major Weapon Systems, told TWZ and others at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) annual Warfare Symposium in February. “You’ve got to have a certain number on the ramp. That’s a requirement.” The question becomes “how do you get these through the depot while at the same time meeting the operational requirements?” Gen. White further explained at that time. “That choreography, I think, is going to be tough.”

It’s worth pointing out here that both the war with Iran and the crash at Edwards came after the cutoff date for GAO’s report, and further impacts on the LRSO flight test schedule would not have been recorded therein. There has also been a broader surge in demand across the U.S. military for flight test assets. This is being driven by the needs of modernization efforts for several aircraft beyond the B-52, including the F-22 Raptor, as well as next-generation developments, like the F-47 sixth-generation fighter. Going back to LRSO, GAO’s latest assessment also highlights other challenges that the program has been facing that are unrelated to flight testing. “Program officials stated that 12 of 14 software releases are delivered, with the final delivery planned for March 2026. According to program officials, nuclear certification of LRSO software continues to be a risk that they expect to fully address by November 2026. As we reported last year, the program risks delays if additional LRSO software development is needed to satisfy this certification requirement,” per the report. “LRSO cybersecurity testing continues with some delays reported during the past year. Program officials stated these delays did not bring about any cost or schedule changes, with the final cybersecurity assessment still planned for September 2027.” “The missile’s technology maturity has advanced since our last assessment, with only two out of the six critical technologies still approaching maturity. They are both expected to be fully mature in fiscal year 2026, about 5 years after development start. DOE [Department of Energy] also identified critical technologies for the warhead, of which 80 percent are considered mature, more than double the percentage reported last year,” the report adds. “However, DOE may not mature all the remaining warhead technologies until the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2026. As we previously reported, both the missile and warhead started development with immature technologies, requiring parallel technology and design maturity efforts. This method falls short of the best practice to start with mature technologies and would have minimized the risks of future cost increases and schedule delays associated with concurrency during system development.”

There is also cost growth, as well as cost discrepancies. “Program costs increased by $347 million after Air Force leadership directed a 1-year extension to LRSO production due to near-term budget constraints,” according to GAO. “As we previously reported, Office of the Secretary of Defense and Air Force officials continue to work together to resolve a $1.9 billion difference between their production cost estimates for future LRSO production,” the report also says. “While a fully updated estimate is not expected until later in 2026, program officials now agree that OSD’s higher cost estimate provides an appropriate basis for the program’s fiscal year 2027 budget request and future year procurement funding needs.” Buoyed in part by the successful flight testing it has conducted to date, GAO says the Air Force remains confident that it can meet its goal of starting low-rate initial production of the LRSO next year. Hitting that milestone will be key to staying on schedule to start fielding the missiles in 2030.

According to Estonian Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur, a new rotation of U.S. forces is expected to arrive this summer and remain until the end of the year. However, there are currently no confirmed plans for a continued U.S. military presence in Estonia beyond 2026, Estonian broadcaster ETV reported. Until recently, the U.S. contingent in Estonia numbered between 500 and 700 troops, stationed at Tapa, in southern Estonia, and at other military sites across the country. That number has now fallen to fewer than 100 personnel. Officials have not disclosed any information about future troop movements or the deployment of additional U.S. forces to Europe. The deployment of U.S. forces to Estonia is governed by a bilateral defense agreement between the two countries, and the terms of that agreement remain unchanged.

Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur said he learned about the next U.S. troop rotation, scheduled to arrive this summer, during talks with NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Commander of U.S. Army Europe and Africa. The size of the upcoming rotation and the long-term future of the U.S. military presence in Estonia remain undecided. A final decision is expected to depend on the outcome of the Pentagon’s ongoing six-month review of U.S. defense policy. Previous U.S. troop rotations to Estonia were drawn from American brigades deployed in Poland and Romania. Sending a new 4,000-strong U.S. brigade to Poland — and potentially assigning part of it to Estonia — is a lengthy process that is expected to take years. Kalev Stoicescu, chairman of the Estonian Parliament’s National Defence Committee, said the United States has effectively placed Estonia and other NATO eastern flank countries in a holding pattern. He added that this is happening regardless of how much the Baltic states spend on defense as a share of their GDP.

Stoicescu added that the final decisions are made by the White House and the U.S. administration based solely on America’s own interests and strategic priorities.

dang, almost as if you're just vassals or something...

In his view, if U.S. troops are to remain in Europe, they should be stationed on the continent’s eastern flank. Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur also said no announcements about the future of the U.S. military presence in Estonia are expected at the upcoming NATO summit in Ankara. He said Estonia will have to rely on its own armed forces and the NATO battlegroups that continue to rotate through the Baltic region. The rotational deployment of U.S. military units in Estonia began in 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine. Those events prompted NATO to strengthen its defense posture and reassess security along its Baltic flank. Earlier this month, Lithuania began the withdrawal of more than 1,000 U.S. troops and their equipment after the completion of a routine rotational deployment. The unit had been stationed in Lithuania as part of NATO’s efforts to reinforce its eastern flank. The United States is also planning to withdraw around 5,000 troops from Germany over the next six to 12 months. The planned drawdown is expected to include a U.S. Army combat brigade, as well as a missile unit that had previously been slated for deployment in Europe.

Pentagon leaders are still struggling to meet weapons delivery timelines despite their frequent pledges to get new equipment into troops’ hands more quickly, according to a new government watchdog report. “The overall average time frame to deliver a capability increased this year to over 12 years,” the Government Accountability Office (GAO) wrote in a report released today. “Further, several MDAPs [major defense acquisition programs] have not set new delivery dates or are delaying critical interim milestones.” Essentially, that 12-year average may even be optimistic since program officials are not updating the delivery timelines to account for those delays, GAO added. And when it comes to the use of rapid prototyping and fielding pathways — made possible under the Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) authorities created to either design or field weapons within a five-year timeline — those efforts are also continuing to exceed their deadlines and require more time to develop “immature technologies,” the office added, using an industry phrase for programs that are not yet proven, reliable and ready for broad deployment. GAO’s findings are part of an annual report to Congress assessing the state of weapons systems. This year’s report covers dozens of programs and associated delays. While each development program is unique, GAO made one overarching recommendation this year: the Pentagon should require programs to start with mature technologies and/or develop those immature technologies separately. The department agreed. Here is a look at some of the programs facing delays and cost growth, according to GAO.

Air Force

GAO called out “significant delays” for the Air Force’s T-7 program, echoing a list of problems laid out in a recent Breaking Defense investigation of the new jet trainer. Although the service made the decision to begin production on the T-7 in April, the majority of developmental testing won’t be done until April 2028, with lower-priority requirements wrapping up even later, in May 2029, the report said. GAO stated the T-7’s delays are “largely a result” of the need to complete additional engineering analysis, “lower than anticipated aircraft availability due to maintenance personnel issues and lack of spare parts,” and longer timelines needed to finalize software. “As a result, program officials stated the developmental program underwent a replan to provide a meaningful training capability to the user,” the report said. On one of the Air Force’s most secretive development efforts — the VC-25B, known colloquially as Air Force One when the president is onboard — GAO noted that the troubled program made some strides, having completed its final configuration design in October. It also resolved several “schedule risks” ranging from resolving cabin pressure issues to hiring more skilled mechanics to build the plane. However, “other schedule risks remain, including the detailed designs for the aircraft interiors, fabrication of the wire bundles, and rework to correct defects in structural modifications,” GAO said. The program office is also revising the VC-25B test plan so the Air Force can take over airworthiness certification duties from the Federal Aviation Administration, GAO noted. Program officials told the agency the transition would increase flexibility to address technical issues, noting that “the compressed time frame for testing continues to be the biggest risk for the program moving forward.” As of October, the Air Force has approved only seven of about 80 certification plans for the aircraft, and has not determined when operational testing will begin.

The report also laid out concerns about the service’s Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) effort, which was set to conduct its first flight test in the second quarter of fiscal 2026. However, program officials warned GAO that “there is effectively zero margin left in the schedule for the rapid prototyping effort” despite the Air Force having reduced the test program from seven to five planned test flights. “If a significant flight test failure occurs, it is likely that the program will not be able to complete all five tests within the 5-year rapid prototyping timeframe,” the report states. “According to the program, completing at least the first three flight tests is critical for informing the Air Force’s decision to initiate a rapid fielding effort and procure HACM in fiscal year 2027.”

Army

GAO revealed the second battery as part of the Army’s Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), an MTA program, will be fielded “at least” six months later than it was originally scheduled to due to “missing, inconsistent, and unclear work standards for missile production.” The Army’s LRHW program consists of a ground-launched hypersonic missile, called the Dark Eagle, which is designed to provide the service with a long-range precision strike capability for contested environments. As Breaking Defense previously reported, the Army and Navy are working together on the program in hopes that the missiles can be launched from both land and sea. The second battery was originally scheduled to be fielded in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2027. However, this is now pushed back to fiscal 2028, per the report. The change is in part due to production challenges that delayed testing of a new variant of the Dark Eagle that will be delivered with the second battery, which could also delay the delivery of the third battery, the report stated.

The Army’s Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) Increment 3 program is also facing delays, according to GAO, as “none of its critical technologies are fully mature.” GAO said there was a discrepancy regarding readiness levels between the program office and the contractors — Raytheon and Lockheed Martin — but the watchdog did not elaborate. “The program found through its own assessment that some critical technologies are less mature than the contractors reported. Program officials told us that they have independently assessed all critical technologies,” the report read. GAO added that program officials “could not definitively state why there was a discrepancy.” However, the officials noted that it could be due to the contractors “interpreting technology maturity in less restrictive terms than the program office.” The M-SHORAD Increment 3 is the service’s effort to replace the Stinger missile on Increment 1 of the M-SHORAD with a next generation short range interceptor. It is scheduled to start production in the second quarter of fiscal 2028. However, GAO stated that “prior work has shown that increasing even one maturity level can take multiple years and becomes more challenging as the technology approaches maturity,” adding that any delays to future development “could affect the planned production start.”

Navy

GAO also found the first 13 follow-on DDG 51 Flight III destroyers are now 55 months behind schedule – up from 41 months in last year’s GAO report. The delays are due to issues hiring a “robust” workforce amid the current wages, supply chain issues, and frequent design changes, GAO said. The watchdog noted that these challenges are “not unique” to the DDG 51 program. Still, GAO determined the program is slated to reach initial operating capability by the end of fiscal 2027, roughly three years after it was initially scheduled to hit that milestone due to changes in operational test plans, the report said. Likewise, GAO determined the DDG 1000 program suffered delays integrating the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic weapon system onto the initial ship since the watchdog’s previous assessment. Specifically, the report said program officials estimated that CPS integration was approximately nine months behind schedule, stemming from “unforeseen testing and production challenges.” However, a live-fire demonstration remains on track for next year, which is “consistent with expectations from our last assessment and about 2 years later than previously planned,” GAO added. Additionally, GAO found that the Navy’s ORCA Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV) program also encountered some delays. The first prototype for the program, which got underway in 2017, was delivered in September 2025. However, the four remaining prototypes are expected for delivery in January 2027 – more than a year later than the watchdog reported last year, according to the GAO.