Widespread errors in State Department efforts to terminate contracts may have wasted money and exposed the agency to lawsuits, its inspector general said in a report published on Monday. Within a month of Donald Trump taking office for the second time, the department began reviewing some contracts for termination, particularly ones regarding foreign aid and diversity, equity and inclusion initiatives. Then Trump issued an executive order directing agencies to review their contracts and grants for cancellation or modification “to reduce overall federal spending or reallocate spending to promote efficiency and advance the policies of my administration.” This led State workers to review nearly 5,600 contracts worth a total of about $65 billion. From Jan. 20 to June 15, 2025, the department terminated almost 400 contracts, totaling roughly $360 million. But auditors found several instances where employees didn’t rescind obligated funds. Across at least six terminated contracts, there was about $8.1 million that still had not been deobligated as of August 2026, the IG reported.

“Because [contracting officers] did not take timely action to deobligate excess funds, the department’s ability to redirect those resources to other mission priorities was limited and the risk that the funds would expire before they could be used increased,” auditors wrote. The watchdog recommended that officials repurpose the $8.1 million, which the department agreed to do, except for nearly $50,000 that it determined was owed to the contractor as part of the termination settlement. Auditors also found that, out of a sample of 30 terminated contracts, 25 lacked adequate written termination notices. For example, the paperwork for 10 of the cancellations listed two different termination dates, which increases “the risk of disputed costs, administrative delays or contractor claims.”

The IG also highlighted four terminated contracts in which State employees didn’t ensure that contractors returned their government-issued laptops and phones.

Similarly, the IG for the IRS reported in August that the agency could not account for nearly 600 agency electronic devices valued at more than $270,000 from employees who separated in spring 2025. Auditors acknowledged that State, while undergoing the contract review, also was dealing with the Trump administration’s reductions to the civil service, a department reorganization and taking over the U.S. Agency for International Development’s operations. But they also emphasized that the agency did not standardize contract cancelation procedures and that some contracting officers had never terminated a contract before. The IG recommended that State specify steps for returning government-issued property due to a contract termination, set procedures for reviewing unused funds from a canceled contract and establish a process for tracking deobligation actions. Officials concurred with all three. The Government Accountability Office recently criticized State for entering inaccurate information into its grant management system following significant cuts to foreign assistance grants, contracts and cooperative agreements. For example, more than 4,000 awards (out of around 10,000) were categorized as both active and terminated. The IG for the Veterans Affairs Department in September similarly reported on the VA’s contract cancellations, finding that employees generally complied with termination requirements but that, in some cases, they had “only a few hours” to complete reviews.

Half of the U.S. Navy’s Japan-based destroyers are currently supporting the war on Iran, belying Trump-administration strategy documents that called the Pacific theater a top priority and undermining relations with Western Pacific allies. Five of the 10 destroyers homeported in Yokosuka, along with the Yokosuka-based aircraft carrier George Washington, are deployed to U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility to help fight a war of choice. Navy officials have told the crews of at least some of those destroyers they won’t return home until 2027. “It’s really a big problem. It’s a problem for credibility. It’s a problem for our allies in the Far East…who, in a lot of cases, have been planning months in advance for carrier visits and for carrier battle group visits,” said Ralph Cossa, chairman and WSD-Handa chair in peace studies for the Honolulu-based Pacific Forum. And aircraft carriers deploy with several other types of ships, he pointed out. “That’s all assets that normally would be in the Pacific, that normally would be showing the flag, that normally would be reminding our allies of our commitment. And they’re nowhere to be found.”

to be America's friend is fatal, as it turns out

This is not what is prescribed by the National Security Strategy, which was released less than a year ago. “Preventing conflict requires a vigilant posture in the Indo-Pacific,” the NSS says. “The days in which the Middle East dominated American foreign policy in both long-term planning and day-to-day execution are thankfully over.”

lol. lmao

This was echoed in January by the National Defense Strategy, which declared that its top priorities were the U.S. homeland and deterring China. But five weeks later, President Trump launched a war against Iran. And although Operation Epic Fury officially concluded in June, the Pentagon is keeping a large force in the region, making occasional attacks, and waiting to see whether Trump will order more.

really cool how the war isn't even really on (beyond the US feeding drones into the meat... or, uh, metal-grinder, I guess? and occasionally bombing a patch of sand somewhere) yet it's still thoroughly draining the imperial war machine of capabilities...

U.S. Pacific Command officials pushed back on the suggestion that they are scaling back the China-deterrence mission. “Our commitment to the security of the Indo-Pacific and to our allies and partners remains steadfast,” a PACOM spokesperson said, adding that the command “remains focused on deterring aggression and maintaining the readiness required to execute our assigned missions. We continually assess operational requirements and coordinate with the Department of War to ensure our forces have the capabilities and support necessary to meet them.” Highlighting the recent Keen Sword military exercise, which included participation from the California-based Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group, the spokesperson said “continuous training and exercises across the Indo-Pacific strengthen readiness and interoperability, while demonstrating our ability to respond to regional contingencies.” Last week, at the TechNet Indo-Pacific conference in Honolulu, PACOM’s deputy commander, Lt. Gen. George Rowell, underscored that message in a keynote speech. “Our mandate at U.S. Pacific Command is very clear: deterrence is our highest duty, and our guiding framework is to establish denial defense in the first island chain. We aim to prove that military aggressions will be infeasible, escalation will be catastrophic, and the costs of conflict far outweigh any gains.”

But, said Katherine Kuzminski, vice president of studies at the Center for a New American Security, sending so many of the U.S. Navy warships that are earmarked for patrolling the Pacific to the Middle East—and keeping them there for much longer than traditional Navy deployments—indicates “that our operations currently are not aligning with the administration’s stated national security strategy and national defense strategy, and that makes it really difficult at the service level or at the combatant command level to determine what the requirements are going to be.” The military must be ready to respond, Kuzminski said, so “if there was some sort of incident that happens in the Indo-Pacific, we would want to be able to shift all of our resources there. But right now we’re kind of treating the [U.S. Central Command area of responsibility] in that way when we’ve committed to not be bogged down in the CENTCOM AOR.” It’s not the first time the U.S. pivoted on the Pacific. In 2012, under President Barack Obama, the Pentagon called for a “rebalance to the Indo-Pacific region,” including moving more troops and ships to the area. In 2016, then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter said the rebalance was not transient, but “enduring.” One year later, during the first Trump administration, a State Department official declared the rebalance officially dead.

Chinese president Xi Jinping has reportedly told his military to be prepared to take Taiwan by 2027. Cossa, like other experts, said he doesn’t believe “for a minute” that the Chinese will actually attack Taiwan next year, “but certainly, part of deterrence is convincing Xi that the U.S. has a commitment in this area and that we are going to respond. And when we have a third of our operational fleet out in the Middle East, that just sends the wrong signal.” Keeping 7th Fleet sailors in the U.S. Navy Central region “for a year is going to be really poor for morale aboard ship and at home,” a Navy officer and expert on Pacific security told Defense One. “Trying to hide the cost by pulling [7th Fleet] away from home is just accounting fraud, and is hurting the fleet’s ability to show up for exercises in the Pacific, which will create its own hangover of damaged credibility, and contributes to the perception that the U.S. isn’t living up to its commitments on security in the region. I’ve heard that the fleet has been told to expect a 17 DDG requirement [in the Middle East] until 2029, which is insane. In terms of deterrent capability, most people I know think this is China’s clearest operational window for action against Taiwan, if the military balance were its only consideration.” The good news from a Chinese standpoint, Cossa said, “is it continues to show how unpredictable our president is.” “At this point, no Chinese planner in their right mind is going to factor the U.S. out. If you’re doing war gaming and practicing for an invasion, you have to factor the U.S. in.” The question is, he said, “what do they think we can do if we’re there?”

• Lviv City
• Hlyniany, Lviv Oblast
• Kremenets, Ternopil Oblast
• Dubno, Rivne Oblast
• Kostopil, Rivne Oblast
• Hoshcha, Rivne Oblast
• Rivne City
• Manevychi, Volyn Oblast
• Netishyn, Khmelnytskyi Oblast
• Slavuta, Khmelnytskyi Oblast
• Shepetivka, Khmelnytskyi Oblast
• Horodok, Khmelnytskyi Oblast
• Letychiv, Khmelnytskyi Oblast
• Derazhnya, Khmelnytskyi Oblast
• Khmelnytskyi City
• Chernivtsi City
• Mohyliv-Podil's'kyi, Vinnytsia Oblast
• Turbiv, Vinnytsia Oblast
• Kozyatyn, Vinnytsia Oblast
• Lypovets, Vinnytsia Oblast
• Illintsi, Vinnytsia Oblast
• Vinnytsia City
• Chudniv, Zhytomyr Oblast
• Rudnya-Horodyshche, Zhytomyr Oblast
• Ozerne, Zhytomyr Oblast
• Korostyshiv, Zhytomyr Oblast
• Zhytomyr City
• Uman, Cherkasy Oblast
• Cherkasy City
• Bila Tserkva, Kyiv Oblast
• Fastiv, Kyiv Oblast
• Bucha, Kyiv Oblast
• Irpin, Kyiv Oblast
• Brovary, Kyiv Oblast
• Kalynivka, Kyiv Oblast
• Multiple different districts of Kyiv City
• Vylkove, Odesa Oblast
• Usatove, Odesa Oblast
• Mayaky, Odesa Oblast
• Odesa City
• Dolyns'ka, Kirovohrad Oblast
• Baburka, Zaporizhzhia Oblast
• Rozumivka, Zaporizhzhia Oblast
• Vilnyansk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast
• Kamianske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Dnipro, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Synelnykove, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Oril'ka, Kharkiv Oblast
• Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast
• Chuhuiv, Kharkiv Oblast
• Rohan, Kharkiv Oblast
• Vasyshcheve, Kharkiv Oblast
• Kharkiv City
• Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast
• Hlobyne, Poltava Oblast
• Putyvl, Sumy Oblast
• Konotop, Sumy Oblast
• Shostka, Sumy Oblast
• Okhtyrka, Sumy Oblast
• Nosivka, Chernihiv Oblast

The first half (24 hours) of the attack involved a little over 600 Geran-2/4/5 drones, and focused primarily on targeting energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, as well as railway and energy infrastructure across Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Zhytomyr, and Ternopil Oblast. There were also a large number of strikes on Kyiv and its surroundings, and heavy attacks on Sumy City and its surroundings. Southern Ukraine (Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts) were largely spared from attacks. The second half (24 hours) of the attack involved around 700 Geran-2/4/5 drones, and continued to focus on energy and railway infrastructure in the western regions of Ukraine, although strikes on Ternopil Oblast were swapped for heavier attacks on the neighbouring Rivne Oblast. Kyiv and its surroundings continued to see a lot of activity, although this decreased compared to the first half. Odesa Oblast was struck this time, and there was also more activity seen in Zaporizhzhia Oblast too. Strikes on energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava Oblasts decreased compared to the first half.

The close attention that Beijing is paying to the new USMC strategy became clear about a year ago when the Global Times [环球时报] published an unusual editorial decrying Washington’s new determination to deploy anti-ship missiles proximate to China. Arguing that the new American strategy aims to correct a U.S. Navy prioritization for “open ocean control” rather than “close-quarters engagement in confined waters,” this article concludes that Washington’s effort to “control maritime chokepoints [aims to] curtail the freedom of rivals to operate at sea … [and] introduces new risks … .” A much more detailed study of the new USMC strategy appeared in early 2025 in the naval magazine Modern Ships [现代舰船]. This Chinese assessment noted with considerable alarm that the USMC was experimenting with unmanned surface vessels capable of firing the stealthy LRASM anti-ship cruise missile and that these units could alternatively serve as forward scouts, fixing targets for long-range U.S. military fires. Still, this analysis underlines some weaknesses of the USMC strategy, including the range limitations of related sensors and drones, and even characterized the air-defense capabilities of the USMC as “precarious.” Another study in this same magazine had earlier drawn attention to the logistics quandaries raised by the new strategy.

A 2026 Chinese analysis in another Chinese navy-affiliated magazine, Shipborne Weapons [舰载武器], offers a sharper critique of the Marines’ new approach, noting that the creation of the Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR) “actually represents campaign preparation by the USMC to militarily intervene in China’s unification.” At the outset, this study notes that many American think tanks raised doubts about the strategy, suggesting that forward bases without sea and air control could prove “untenable.” There is a recognition in this analysis that the new mobile missile launchers that are being deployed by the USMC are small, light, and thus “not easily discovered by … surveillance.” In the end, this study concludes that the USMC strategy is vulnerable because the “U.S has no way to quickly establish air superiority. This could take weeks or months and would entail massive losses.” Among the most remarkable pieces written by Chinese experts on the new USMC direction is one that was published in translation recently by the China institute at U.S. Naval War College (NWC). That translation deserves extra attention due to the fact that it was written by senior active-duty Chinese Navy officers and also because it was published originally in a sensitive internal circulation Chinese military journal too. Though this piece does not touch directly on the sensitive Taiwan issue, and it also explicitly notes the USMC strategy aims at deterrence of Beijing, it nevertheless explains that the new USMC deployments amount to “continuous penetration and encroachment into our near seas” and argues that China must “establish effective countermeasures.” Notably, this high-level rendering links the USMC strategy to China’s improving submarine force in significant detail, observing that forward deployed Marine forces could deploy “hydro-acoustic arrays and other assets to establish barrier zones and monitoring areas to track Chinese submarine operations.” Similar arguments are made that U.S. deployments could degrade Chinese air defenses by employing drone swarms “to overwhelm our radar tracking capacity.”

The Chinese Navy authors caution against applying resource-intensive assets to defeat such American asymmetric tactics. However, the conclusion of the article is rather disturbing since it argues that China must counter this posture by deploying a Chinese “proactive offensive posture, aggressively expand[ing] our operational reach, [and] project[ing] forces forward.” Elaborating, they counsel: “We must maintain and normalize forward-deployed forces, extend[ing] undersea combat capabilities as far forward as feasible.” This conclusion and other aspects of these Chinese-language analyses raise some rather uncomfortable questions for U.S. defense planners. The final translation done by NWC strongly hints that the Chinese Navy may be adopting a more aggressive approach as a direct reaction to the forward lean in American strategy. This seems to be a very clear manifestation of the so-called ‘security dilemma,’ wherein two powers’ defensive measures develop into a dangerous escalatory spiral. Moreover, there is a clear recognition by Chinese strategists that forward USMC elements could be vulnerable due to logistics challenges and lack of proper air and missile defenses. It would not be the first time that the USMC was deployed haphazardly in East Asia at the cost of many American lives. Understanding these dynamics, American leaders should recalibrate and opt to rely less on forward defense. Alternatively, the USMC should aim to embrace the strategic depth of the Pacific and its myriad island archipelagos (e.g. the Philippines) in a less costly, less risky, more sustainable, and clearly defensive strategy.

Army Lt. Gen. Brett Sylvia was removed as head of strategy, plans and policy on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is the second general to be ousted from the post, known in military circles as the “J5,” under Hegseth. His predecessor, Lt. Gen. Joseph McGee, was forced to retire last October. The defense official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive personnel matters, said there is no immediate replacement for Sylvia and no reason has been given for the firing. The move was reported earlier by The Atlantic. A spokesperson for the Joint Staff said “the Chairman, the Joint Staff, and the Joint Force extend our deepest gratitude to Lt. Gen. Brett Sylvia and his family for their 32 years of distinguished service to our nation” and they “wish him and his family the best.”

Typically, the J5 director and their staff are responsible for generating and coordinating military plans with both the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the president. Sylvia’s firing comes as Trump has repeatedly floated starting new military operations against Iran. Trump has vowed to “finish the job” in Iran after launching the war with Israel eight months ago and said new strikes are an option after the midterm elections next week. U.S. officials have told several Middle East countries and regional allies to be prepared for potential renewed military action after Tuesday’s elections as well as for the possibility that Iran will attempt to retaliate against them, two diplomats briefed on the matter said. They say Trump has not made a final decision on new strikes. A third U.S. aircraft carrier and thousands of additional troops are making their way to the region.

Before arriving at the Joint Staff, Sylvia served as the commander of the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, until May 2025, according to his official biography, which has now been taken offline. He also previously served as the vice director for the J5. He is the latest in nearly two dozen generals, admirals and other military leaders to be fired, forced to retire or otherwise depart under Hegseth’s tenure — almost all of which have not been publicly explained by the Pentagon. That includes the civilian secretaries of the Army and Navy as well as some top uniformed officers for the military services. The Pentagon did not immediately respond to messages seeking comment late Wednesday. Hegseth said last month that he ordered the military to double the cuts to the overall number of top officers to a 20% decrease to be completed by Jan. 1, 2027. There are currently roughly 800 flag and general officer positions. “I call it accountability and long overdue,” Hegseth told junior officers and enlisted leaders at the Marine Corps Base Quantico on Sept. 30. Some members of Congress have criticized cuts to the ranks of generals as a “purge” that will take years to rebuild. “He’s got some kind of like deep-seated grievance about leadership in the military,” Sen. Mark Kelly, D-Ariz., a former Navy combat pilot who has been critical of Hegseth, said last month. “He’s purging a generation of great leaders of the military, and it’s going to take a generation to recover from it.”

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth fired Army Lt. Gen. Brett Sylvia as head of strategy, plans and policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a defense official said late Wednesday. Typically, the general in the position and their staff are responsible for generating and coordinating military plans for both the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the president. No reason was given for the firing, the latest in a series of ousters or departures of military leaders under Hegseth. However, a Pentagon official, who was not authorized to comment publicly and spoke on condition of anonymity, later said in a statement that Sylvia was under investigation over allegations of sharing classified information about the Iran war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict and other topics with journalists. The statement claims that Sylvia failed three polygraph tests about leaking classified information.

lol. fucking polygraphs

Chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said in a social media post that the department “took necessary personnel action to protect sensitive information” without mentioning Sylvia by name. He said the matter has been sent to the Justice Department for “potential further legal action.” It is not clear why the Pentagon would appear to be pursuing charges in civilian courts instead of trying the general in the military justice system. Sylvia did not immediately respond to a voicemail, text messages, emails and a LinkedIn message on accounts and numbers that appear to belong to him. When asked about Sylvia’s firing by reporters Thursday, President Donald Trump said, “She’s gonna have big problems,” incorrectly identifying the male general as a woman.

he's Brett Sylvia, Sylvia's the family name, but 's going "General Sylvia? hmm, must be a gal, as we all know generals are usually referred to by their first name"

“We’re very much looking for leakers,” Trump said. In a confusing twist, the Joint Staff on Thursday also withdrew a statement from a day earlier that wished Sylvia well because “upon further review, we determined that the statement did not appropriately reflect the full circumstances.” A spokesperson late Wednesday had said the Joint Staff extended its “deepest gratitude to Lt. Gen. Brett Sylvia and his family for their 32 years of distinguished service to our nation.” The firing of Sylvia from the Pentagon’s top military planning post comes as Trump weighs renewed strikes on Iran in the eight-month-long war following next week’s midterm elections. The Pentagon official, however, insisted Sylvia was not a “central planner” on the Iran conflict and said that was the purview of U.S. Central Command. Before arriving at the Joint Staff, Sylvia served as commander of the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, until May 2025, according to his official biography, which has now been taken offline. He also previously served as the vice director for the office he recently led. His military awards include six Bronze Star Medals, including one for valor, and a Purple Heart, indicating he was wounded in combat.

Sylvia’s case is Hegseth’s latest accusation against top Pentagon officials of leaking to the media. He fired three aides from his inner circle last year as part of a broader leak investigation that included polygraph tests. In a joint statement shared by senior aide Dan Caldwell, the trio protested the firing and said they were “incredibly disappointed by the manner in which our service at the Department of Defense ended. Unnamed Pentagon officials have slandered our character with baseless attacks on our way out the door.” Hegseth never provided more information on what the three were accused of, and Caldwell would go on to be hired by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Under Hegseth, the Pentagon also has carried out a series of moves restricting media access, including requiring that journalists be escorted while on Pentagon grounds and declaring that its press office was a classified space inaccessible to journalists.

European leaders meet next month to discuss ways to help Ukraine fill a projected €70 billion budget deficit. But their capacity for direct aid is constrained by efforts to rearm their own militaries amid a challenging economic environment, while Belgium continues to oppose the conversion of frozen Russian assets into a loan. Western financial aid—€170 billion ($189.5 billion) since 2022—has been key to helping Kyiv stay financially afloat since Russia's wider invasion, according to the Kiel Institute. But the U.S. has drastically cut aid under the second Trump administration, leaving the European Union, Canada, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom to shoulder most of the burden. Earlier this year, the EU approved a plan to lend Ukraine €90 billion to Ukraine through 2027, two-thirds of which will go to buy weapons and the rest to budgetary support. Around €14 billion has been disbursed to date, and by year's end that figure should grow to €45 billion. But Russian attacks on critical infrastructure and other stresses mean that Kyiv is still looking at a budget deficit of around €70 billion for 2027.

European governments are spending more on their own defenses. In 2021, the defense budgets of NATO's European members averaged around 1.6 percent of GDP, below NATO’s then-target of 2 percent. The alliance has since boosted its goal to 2.5 percent of GDP, and at last year's summit, committed to raising ‘core’ defense expenditure to 3.5 percent over the next decade. At the same time, they are facing rising debt and slowing economies. Eurozone countries have an average debt-to-GDP ratio of nearly 89 percent, and nearly 83 percent in EU nations generally. Buffeted by the trade wars and energy shocks of the Trump administration, eurozone economies will grow only 1.1 percent in 2026, according to a recent projection by the International Monetary Fund. Some northern EU members are in much better fiscal shape than their southern and western counterparts. The budget picture is getting cloudier. Annual inflation in the eurozone rose to 3.8 percent in September, according to Eurostat, well above the European Central Bank (ECB) target of 2 percent. The ECB raised interest rates at its June and September meetings, and is expected to deliver another hike at one of the year's two remaining meetings. Rising prices may force the ECB to continue tightening policy, raising debt-service payments from government budgets.

Supporting Ukraine remains broadly popular in the EU, but the challenging economic environment makes it a tough sell for governments to increase aid to Ukraine along with their own defense spending. European governments are already facing domestic criticism over rearmament. Italy, for example, was approved for an allocation of up to €14.9 billion from the E.U.’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) loan facility, meant to aid rearmament. Yet Rome requested only about €8 billion from SAFE, as Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government sparred with critics within her own coalition and in the opposition on financing more defense spending with debt.

Frozen Russian assets

EU countries are thus once again looking at alternative methods of backstopping Ukraine’s budget. One of the most obvious options is the conversion of frozen Russian financial assets into a loan to Kyiv. After Russia's February 2022 invasion, the G7 froze Russian government securities held abroad. As much as $300 billion was impounded as a result and remains in limbo to this day, including about €210 billion held in the European financial system. While the principal has remained untouched, the EU has begun to use the interest income on those securities to help Ukraine, on the grounds that Russia, as aggressor, should pay for the damage caused to Ukraine. That has generated about €8 billion, of which €3.8 billion has been delivered to Ukraine, and €4.2 billion has been reserved to repay E.U. or G7 loans to Ukraine. In September, Germany and other E.U. members revived the topic of converting the Russian assets into a loan for Kyiv, POLITICO reported. Berlin views the step as a ‘win-win’ for the E.U., enabling the bloc to help Kyiv address its financial needs, while replacing some of the funds that would be reserved for Ukraine in the E.U.’s upcoming multi-year budget.

But the politics around seizing the Russian assets have barely budged. Belgium is the custodian of much of those Russian funds, which are housed in the Brussels-based Euroclear. The Belgian government blocked a 2025 proposal to seize the funds, fearing that it alone would bear the legal and financial risk of seizing the funds. Earlier this year, the Bank of Russia sued Euroclear in a Russian court for the funds, arguing that they were illegally seized. The court backed the Russian central bank’s challenge in a ruling two months later, though it lacks jurisdiction to enforce the judgment. Concern over the legal risks means Brussels will likely stymie the proposal again. “I am certain that the European Commission will not make proposals to meet Ukraine’s financing needs through a new operation linked to Russian assets,” Belgian Prime Minister Bart de Wever told reporters on Oct. 21. “I am certain of that, because that is what was said.” As European leaders prepare for a November meeting to iron out next year's assistance to Ukraine, the EU is already pushing other partners to increase their contributions to Kyiv. The situation is becoming more urgent. Ukraine has largely exhausted its stockpile of interceptors, leaving its cities and energy grid vulnerable to Russian attack. The Ukrainian military intelligence agency HUR recently estimated that Russia can produce 10,000 long-range strike drones and decoys each month. Mounting damage increases Ukraine’s financial needs, as the country scrambles to keep the lights on.

It’s not a new problem. “Years ago, the Navy got itself into a hole on conventional surface ship maintenance due in part to what turned out to be underestimates in planning, scheduling, and funding that work. Since then, the Navy has been working for years to dig itself out of that conventional surface ship maintenance hole. Perturbations in ship maintenance and repair schedules caused by ships being used for extended deployments can add to the Navy’s challenge of digging itself out of that hole,” O’Rourke said. So the service needs to give its ships the maintenance they need. But that’s unlikely to happen while the Navy is keeping so many ships in theater, a second Navy expert said. “The end result is that deferred maintenance becomes more and more problematic, causing knock-on effects like parts and equipment wearing out or breaking before they should. In the end, these ships will reach their end of service life well before their scheduled date.”