Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Gregory Masiello, who took over the F-35 Joint Program Office last July, testified before an open session of the Airland Subcommittee as the program defends a fiscal 2027 request that bundles more than $13 billion for the jet in fiscal 2027 alone. The request includes a buy of 85 U.S. aircraft and full funding for the Block 4 modernization effort and the engine core upgrade. This hearing marks the first time the F-35 program’s leader has appeared before the subcommittee since 2016. Since then, the fleet has grown from 170 aircraft to more than 1,300. In his written testimony, Masiello pointed to a sustainment system that was originally built to support 700 to 800 aircraft, well short of the fleet now flying. “If I have over 1,300 operational aircraft out there, I believe we have set and enabled a sustainment system for about 7 to 800,” he said. “So there is our challenge in readiness.”

what is with with western militaries and forgetting to buy enough spare parts

The hearing comes on the heels of a Government Accountability Office report this month that found just one in four F-35s were fully mission capable (FMC), meaning able to fly all assigned missions. Overall mission capable rates of jets able to fly at least one mission fell from 67% in fiscal 2021 to 44%. Masiello put the program’s mission capable rate at 56%, above GAO’s 44%, a gap he ascribed to methodology. He stopped short of contesting the GAO’s FMC figure, but emphasized that “context matters,” arguing the discrepancy results from how his program defines mission capable. Partially dragging down the FMC rate is the acceptance of incomplete jets. Pressed by ranking member Sen. Mark Kelly, D-Ariz., Masiello confirmed the Marine Corps has accepted six F-35Bs with no radar installed, opting instead to wait for a newer APG-85 radar. When Kelly asked whether an F-35 with no radar could be considered FMC, Masiello conceded, “I don’t think I would count them as fully mission capable,” adding that he would discuss the radar’s capability in more detail in the closed session that followed.

Masiello blamed years of underbuying spare parts as the fleet grew, not a broken system. In response, the program has launched what it calls the Global Support Solution Reset, a roughly $13.7 billion effort through 2031 that targets five problem areas including spares, depot capacity and maintenance plans. “It’s not a systemic issue with the system having the ability,” he said. “It’s the fact that we didn’t put enough parts and pieces on the shelf, and we’ve increased the demand exponentially with the number of aircraft fielded, and we didn’t do the same thing with the spare parts and the system.” Asked what is most responsible for keeping jets from FMC status, Masiello pointed to software issues and the jet’s canopies, whose limited lifespan he called a particular problem on a low-observable jet. The modernization track is running behind as well. The full Block 4 suite, once due in 2026, is now years off. Masiello said the program has fielded 22 of 55 planned Block 4 capabilities, the suite of new sensors, electronic warfare and weapons meant to keep the jet ahead of modern air defenses. The program fielded seven of those in last year’s software upgrade, with another six due this summer. Contributing to modernization delays are the jet’s power and cooling capabilities. The engine core upgrade, slated for fielding in 2031, is meant to power and cool the full Block 4 suite, whose new radar and sensors draw more power and generate more heat than the current jet can handle.

On program accountability, Masiello said in his written statement that the program would revise contracts to carry “meaningful incentives and penalties,”

I've got a "meaningful incentive" for ya:

a change GAO has urged for years after finding the program paid Lockheed Martin millions in fees even as readiness slid. But that isn’t GAO’s only recommendation. GAO has made 46 sustainment recommendations since 2014, including three in this month’s report. As of March, the Pentagon had implemented just 14, leaving most still open a decade later. Asked by the committee’s newest member, Sen. Ashley Moody, R-Fla., how many of the GAO’s recommendations the program had closed, Masiello wouldn’t commit to a specific number, preferring to note that they were “probably all to some degree in process.” Despite all the criticism, the jet’s unique capabilities drew high praise from across the aisle. Kelly, a Democrat and former Navy combat pilot, called himself and the committee strong supporters of the F-35 program. Kelly recalled flying an F-16 against an F-35, noting that he “could not see it on radar even when I’m looking right at it.” But he tied that support to accountability, telling Masiello the program needs to show it can improve readiness and control costs.

Masiello made the same case from the program side, citing the jet’s prominent role in recent operations, including Epic Fury, the U.S. air campaign against Iran. He said operators had told him it was “the only aircraft that can hit some of the targets” those missions required and could “act as a quarterback of that joint force.” The program’s global reach adds to the sustainment burden. Allied nations own and operate most of the F-35s based in Europe and the Pacific, and they keep buying more. Masiello said Poland signaled plans to double its 32-jet order during his visit this month, though he had not yet seen a contract. That growing fleet draws on the same global spares pool

HOW THE HELL DID YOU NOT FACTOR THAT IN!? You're the ones EXPORTING the jet, if you don't have the spare parts, don't fucking sell it! Capitalists will literally sell the last bit of firewood they have and then proceed to freeze to death in the winter, you don't even need to buy rope to hang them with from them anymore, they'll just fucking kill themselves through ineptitude!

and sustainment system now straining to keep U.S. jets ready, even as it spreads the program’s cost and industrial base across allied countries. Masiello warned that funding only part of the fiscal 2027 request would slow the production line and cut deliveries. For now, the readiness fight, modernization and the sustainment reset all hinge on a budget Congress has yet to pass.

"Upon arrival at the 'Skala' distribution center, they stripped us naked, searched us, made us take off our underwear and do squats. The invaluable first experience of using the toilet - in groups, under the muzzles of automatics, elaborate insults and brutal prods for not standing in sufficiently straight formation or for external appearance. "According to his words, there are two guards per tent: if one escorts to the latrine, the second stays behind. Going out alone, for example just to breathe some fresh air, is also forbidden." "The perimeter around the training centers is mined. Signs reading 'mines' are hung on the fencing tape around the tents(...). A man who spent several weeks in the tent camp says that explosions could be heard almost every night, often animals stumbling onto mines: hares or roe deer."

"In short, they found us. Knocked out teeth, broke ribs, well, just a slaughter. And that guard I escaped from says: 'What do you want, you bastard, for me to go to zero instead of you?' "Almost all the men who escaped from there talk about being bound with duct tape in the training centers." "Oleksandr Zhykyn has similar memories: 'Some chief of staff or someone like that came up to our tent: "And who's here? Ah, third company. One-and-dones." And he walked off. Can you imagine what they call the guys? "One-and-dones." Yeah, in the sense that one trip out and that's it.' 'Over Maksym Skipa, according to his words, the abuse continued even on the training ground: "He could barely walk. We helped him put on and take off his vest, because if he didn't put it on - they'd beat him." One morning the recruits woke up and saw that Maksym had hanged himself.'

"Beatings in 'Skala' don't always require a serious reason, says a former instructor with combat experience. He knows of cases where people in rear positions were abused - because of disruptions in Starlink operation or errors in paperwork. Ribs were broken, he says, right in front of everyone at roll call. The soldier also saw how dogs were set on mobilized men." The author of the report established that in the last six months, there were at least 26 fatal cases of recruits in the "Skala" training centers. The official cause of death in most cases was pneumonia, as well as various strange reasons meant to explain visible beating marks like "fall from a pine tree."

Unfortunately, the article focuses exclusively on describing the first stage of training. There's nothing, however, about what happens to recruits once they reach the regiment's actual subunits fighting on the contact line. I can briefly write that there are also interesting "tidbits" there, like handing out individual weapons to soldiers only right before the assault itself. I also remind you that I was one of the first who, on Twitter, already in September 2025, started writing about how something was off with the 425th Assault Regiment "Skala" and it looked like the so-called "meat unit." At that time, I published a long text here based on info from posts by families of missing Skala soldiers, found on social networks. In April 2026, after another such text, I was attacked by representatives of Osint Polo (I won't name nicknames, but it's easy to guess or search who it concerns), supported by other "experts" from Osint Polo and Karolina Kuzema. They wrote then that I was "leading a witch hunt" and "don't know what I'm talking about because I've never been on the front" and the regiment is just a regular unit. These people once again proved that they are ordinary Ukrainian propagandists for five hryvnia or, in the optimistic version, ignorant fake experts with no clue about the behind-the-scenes of the war in Ukraine.

U.S. maintenance facilities would be overwhelmed and would lack sufficient spare parts to repair ships in theater, concluded the study by RAND, a Washington-based think tank. Nor can the U.S. Navy assume that its Pacific allies have adequate shipyard capacity — or political willingness — to fix damaged vessels. The U.S. Navy has struggled with overworked ships and crews, as well as overburdened shipyards and repair depots. But a war with China, which has the world’s largest navy, would almost certainly result in American ships being hit by everything from ballistic “carrier-killer” missiles, to hypersonic weapons and torpedoes, the study says. “The Navy has not faced damage at the level likely to occur in a major war since World War II,” warned RAND. The study recommended that command-and-control authority for repair work be streamlined, including prior agreements with allied nations regarding access to facilities. It also urged the U.S. Navy to expand its mobile repair capabilities, including “deployable repair teams, flyaway assessment units, and scalable Expeditionary Mobile Repair Facilities.”

Barriers to repairs

RAND’s analysis was based on a tabletop wargame conducted in August 2025. The setting was a hypothetical war with China, as U.S. ships race to defend Taiwan from invasion or blockade. The American vessels in question were Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, the backbone of the U.S. surface fleet. The U.S. Navy will need every ship it can get, including damaged vessels patched up and rejoining the fight. However, “existing Navy systems for battle-damage repair are burdened by a variety of inefficiencies that hinder the Navy’s capacity for responding to widespread battle damage,” the study warned. Analysts also found that “attempting repairs in a hostile Indo-Pacific environment will be significantly more complex than existing plans allow. This complexity creates serious risks to U.S. and allied rapid force regeneration and maritime dominance.”

Meanwhile, Chinese ships would be operating close to their home bases and repair facilities. “China is not only closer, it also has significantly better industrial repair capability,” Bradley Martin, a RAND analyst who co-authored the report, told Defense News. Though the game focused on Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, repair issues would “apply to all ship classes, and in fact may be more pronounced where nuclear repairs are involved. Issues of access, vulnerability, and industrial capacity apply across all ship classes.” Rather than combat, the game focused on how damaged ships could be repaired in the Pacific theater and returned to combat, rather than spending weeks limping back to U.S. ports. This would likely require U.S. access to ports and shipyards in allied nations. During the game, teams represented the U.S. and its allies, including Japan, Korea and Australia. The four scenarios spanned a variety of situations. They included a U.S. destroyer colliding with a Chinese frigate in the Straits of Malacca, two destroyers damaged by gunfire and rockets from Chinese ships and helicopters while escorting Philippines ships in disputed waters in the South China Sea, several destroyers severely damaged by Chinese anti-ship missiles while defending the Philippines, and multiple destroyers badly damaged while intercepting a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan.

Poor coordination with allies

The common denominator was that all of the American ships needed quick repairs. But that was easier said than done. For starters, there were difficulties determining what resources were needed for repairs, and whether a vessel could be fixed locally or would have to sail back to the United States. Players also “assumed that regulations and standards for repair and maintenance would remain the same in a wartime environment as they are during peacetime,” the report said. Nor were command arrangements clear. For example, “the group that represented the in-theater logistics and maintenance team at times took actions, specifically those related to in-theater repair options, that the theater operational commander had already rejected because of operational constraints,” said the report. In addition, coordination was lacking between organizations in the Pacific and the U.S. The U.S. team didn’t fully understand what its Pacific allies could offer.

“U.S. participants demonstrated knowledge gaps about the locations of host nations’ ports,

Americans will never learn geography, even if it's literally a matter of life or death

not to mention host nations’ capabilities or access requirements,” the study noted. Though Japan, Korea and Australia have significant resources, “some kinds of operations — such as ordnance handling or a lengthy repair — would bring complications.“ Allied nations were also mindful that repairing U.S. warships could bring Chinese retaliation. “Japan, the ROK [Republic of Korea], and Australia are in principle committed to supporting U.S. repair, but this cannot be assumed once the threat level starts to escalate,” said Martin. However, the study did note that “although there were significant knowledge gaps at the outset of the exercise, once ally members explained their capabilities, collaboration was mostly seamless.” Sufficient spare parts were also an issue, especially for older ships. “Even ships within the same class can be significantly different from one another,” the study noted. “Some critical parts or systems from one ship might not translate to another ship.”