Widespread errors in State Department efforts to terminate contracts may have wasted money and exposed the agency to lawsuits, its inspector general said in a report published on Monday. Within a month of Donald Trump taking office for the second time, the department began reviewing some contracts for termination, particularly ones regarding foreign aid and diversity, equity and inclusion initiatives. Then Trump issued an executive order directing agencies to review their contracts and grants for cancellation or modification “to reduce overall federal spending or reallocate spending to promote efficiency and advance the policies of my administration.” This led State workers to review nearly 5,600 contracts worth a total of about $65 billion. From Jan. 20 to June 15, 2025, the department terminated almost 400 contracts, totaling roughly $360 million. But auditors found several instances where employees didn’t rescind obligated funds. Across at least six terminated contracts, there was about $8.1 million that still had not been deobligated as of August 2026, the IG reported.

“Because [contracting officers] did not take timely action to deobligate excess funds, the department’s ability to redirect those resources to other mission priorities was limited and the risk that the funds would expire before they could be used increased,” auditors wrote. The watchdog recommended that officials repurpose the $8.1 million, which the department agreed to do, except for nearly $50,000 that it determined was owed to the contractor as part of the termination settlement. Auditors also found that, out of a sample of 30 terminated contracts, 25 lacked adequate written termination notices. For example, the paperwork for 10 of the cancellations listed two different termination dates, which increases “the risk of disputed costs, administrative delays or contractor claims.”

The IG also highlighted four terminated contracts in which State employees didn’t ensure that contractors returned their government-issued laptops and phones.

Similarly, the IG for the IRS reported in August that the agency could not account for nearly 600 agency electronic devices valued at more than $270,000 from employees who separated in spring 2025. Auditors acknowledged that State, while undergoing the contract review, also was dealing with the Trump administration’s reductions to the civil service, a department reorganization and taking over the U.S. Agency for International Development’s operations. But they also emphasized that the agency did not standardize contract cancelation procedures and that some contracting officers had never terminated a contract before. The IG recommended that State specify steps for returning government-issued property due to a contract termination, set procedures for reviewing unused funds from a canceled contract and establish a process for tracking deobligation actions. Officials concurred with all three. The Government Accountability Office recently criticized State for entering inaccurate information into its grant management system following significant cuts to foreign assistance grants, contracts and cooperative agreements. For example, more than 4,000 awards (out of around 10,000) were categorized as both active and terminated. The IG for the Veterans Affairs Department in September similarly reported on the VA’s contract cancellations, finding that employees generally complied with termination requirements but that, in some cases, they had “only a few hours” to complete reviews.

Half of the U.S. Navy’s Japan-based destroyers are currently supporting the war on Iran, belying Trump-administration strategy documents that called the Pacific theater a top priority and undermining relations with Western Pacific allies. Five of the 10 destroyers homeported in Yokosuka, along with the Yokosuka-based aircraft carrier George Washington, are deployed to U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility to help fight a war of choice. Navy officials have told the crews of at least some of those destroyers they won’t return home until 2027. “It’s really a big problem. It’s a problem for credibility. It’s a problem for our allies in the Far East…who, in a lot of cases, have been planning months in advance for carrier visits and for carrier battle group visits,” said Ralph Cossa, chairman and WSD-Handa chair in peace studies for the Honolulu-based Pacific Forum. And aircraft carriers deploy with several other types of ships, he pointed out. “That’s all assets that normally would be in the Pacific, that normally would be showing the flag, that normally would be reminding our allies of our commitment. And they’re nowhere to be found.”

to be America's friend is fatal, as it turns out

This is not what is prescribed by the National Security Strategy, which was released less than a year ago. “Preventing conflict requires a vigilant posture in the Indo-Pacific,” the NSS says. “The days in which the Middle East dominated American foreign policy in both long-term planning and day-to-day execution are thankfully over.”

lol. lmao

This was echoed in January by the National Defense Strategy, which declared that its top priorities were the U.S. homeland and deterring China. But five weeks later, President Trump launched a war against Iran. And although Operation Epic Fury officially concluded in June, the Pentagon is keeping a large force in the region, making occasional attacks, and waiting to see whether Trump will order more.

really cool how the war isn't even really on (beyond the US feeding drones into the meat... or, uh, metal-grinder, I guess? and occasionally bombing a patch of sand somewhere) yet it's still thoroughly draining the imperial war machine of capabilities...

U.S. Pacific Command officials pushed back on the suggestion that they are scaling back the China-deterrence mission. “Our commitment to the security of the Indo-Pacific and to our allies and partners remains steadfast,” a PACOM spokesperson said, adding that the command “remains focused on deterring aggression and maintaining the readiness required to execute our assigned missions. We continually assess operational requirements and coordinate with the Department of War to ensure our forces have the capabilities and support necessary to meet them.” Highlighting the recent Keen Sword military exercise, which included participation from the California-based Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group, the spokesperson said “continuous training and exercises across the Indo-Pacific strengthen readiness and interoperability, while demonstrating our ability to respond to regional contingencies.” Last week, at the TechNet Indo-Pacific conference in Honolulu, PACOM’s deputy commander, Lt. Gen. George Rowell, underscored that message in a keynote speech. “Our mandate at U.S. Pacific Command is very clear: deterrence is our highest duty, and our guiding framework is to establish denial defense in the first island chain. We aim to prove that military aggressions will be infeasible, escalation will be catastrophic, and the costs of conflict far outweigh any gains.”

But, said Katherine Kuzminski, vice president of studies at the Center for a New American Security, sending so many of the U.S. Navy warships that are earmarked for patrolling the Pacific to the Middle East—and keeping them there for much longer than traditional Navy deployments—indicates “that our operations currently are not aligning with the administration’s stated national security strategy and national defense strategy, and that makes it really difficult at the service level or at the combatant command level to determine what the requirements are going to be.” The military must be ready to respond, Kuzminski said, so “if there was some sort of incident that happens in the Indo-Pacific, we would want to be able to shift all of our resources there. But right now we’re kind of treating the [U.S. Central Command area of responsibility] in that way when we’ve committed to not be bogged down in the CENTCOM AOR.” It’s not the first time the U.S. pivoted on the Pacific. In 2012, under President Barack Obama, the Pentagon called for a “rebalance to the Indo-Pacific region,” including moving more troops and ships to the area. In 2016, then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter said the rebalance was not transient, but “enduring.” One year later, during the first Trump administration, a State Department official declared the rebalance officially dead.

Chinese president Xi Jinping has reportedly told his military to be prepared to take Taiwan by 2027. Cossa, like other experts, said he doesn’t believe “for a minute” that the Chinese will actually attack Taiwan next year, “but certainly, part of deterrence is convincing Xi that the U.S. has a commitment in this area and that we are going to respond. And when we have a third of our operational fleet out in the Middle East, that just sends the wrong signal.” Keeping 7th Fleet sailors in the U.S. Navy Central region “for a year is going to be really poor for morale aboard ship and at home,” a Navy officer and expert on Pacific security told Defense One. “Trying to hide the cost by pulling [7th Fleet] away from home is just accounting fraud, and is hurting the fleet’s ability to show up for exercises in the Pacific, which will create its own hangover of damaged credibility, and contributes to the perception that the U.S. isn’t living up to its commitments on security in the region. I’ve heard that the fleet has been told to expect a 17 DDG requirement [in the Middle East] until 2029, which is insane. In terms of deterrent capability, most people I know think this is China’s clearest operational window for action against Taiwan, if the military balance were its only consideration.” The good news from a Chinese standpoint, Cossa said, “is it continues to show how unpredictable our president is.” “At this point, no Chinese planner in their right mind is going to factor the U.S. out. If you’re doing war gaming and practicing for an invasion, you have to factor the U.S. in.” The question is, he said, “what do they think we can do if we’re there?”

• Lviv City
• Hlyniany, Lviv Oblast
• Kremenets, Ternopil Oblast
• Dubno, Rivne Oblast
• Kostopil, Rivne Oblast
• Hoshcha, Rivne Oblast
• Rivne City
• Manevychi, Volyn Oblast
• Netishyn, Khmelnytskyi Oblast
• Slavuta, Khmelnytskyi Oblast
• Shepetivka, Khmelnytskyi Oblast
• Horodok, Khmelnytskyi Oblast
• Letychiv, Khmelnytskyi Oblast
• Derazhnya, Khmelnytskyi Oblast
• Khmelnytskyi City
• Chernivtsi City
• Mohyliv-Podil's'kyi, Vinnytsia Oblast
• Turbiv, Vinnytsia Oblast
• Kozyatyn, Vinnytsia Oblast
• Lypovets, Vinnytsia Oblast
• Illintsi, Vinnytsia Oblast
• Vinnytsia City
• Chudniv, Zhytomyr Oblast
• Rudnya-Horodyshche, Zhytomyr Oblast
• Ozerne, Zhytomyr Oblast
• Korostyshiv, Zhytomyr Oblast
• Zhytomyr City
• Uman, Cherkasy Oblast
• Cherkasy City
• Bila Tserkva, Kyiv Oblast
• Fastiv, Kyiv Oblast
• Bucha, Kyiv Oblast
• Irpin, Kyiv Oblast
• Brovary, Kyiv Oblast
• Kalynivka, Kyiv Oblast
• Multiple different districts of Kyiv City
• Vylkove, Odesa Oblast
• Usatove, Odesa Oblast
• Mayaky, Odesa Oblast
• Odesa City
• Dolyns'ka, Kirovohrad Oblast
• Baburka, Zaporizhzhia Oblast
• Rozumivka, Zaporizhzhia Oblast
• Vilnyansk, Zaporizhzhia Oblast
• Kamianske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Dnipro, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Synelnykove, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Oril'ka, Kharkiv Oblast
• Lozova, Kharkiv Oblast
• Chuhuiv, Kharkiv Oblast
• Rohan, Kharkiv Oblast
• Vasyshcheve, Kharkiv Oblast
• Kharkiv City
• Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast
• Hlobyne, Poltava Oblast
• Putyvl, Sumy Oblast
• Konotop, Sumy Oblast
• Shostka, Sumy Oblast
• Okhtyrka, Sumy Oblast
• Nosivka, Chernihiv Oblast

The first half (24 hours) of the attack involved a little over 600 Geran-2/4/5 drones, and focused primarily on targeting energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, as well as railway and energy infrastructure across Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Zhytomyr, and Ternopil Oblast. There were also a large number of strikes on Kyiv and its surroundings, and heavy attacks on Sumy City and its surroundings. Southern Ukraine (Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Kirovohrad, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts) were largely spared from attacks. The second half (24 hours) of the attack involved around 700 Geran-2/4/5 drones, and continued to focus on energy and railway infrastructure in the western regions of Ukraine, although strikes on Ternopil Oblast were swapped for heavier attacks on the neighbouring Rivne Oblast. Kyiv and its surroundings continued to see a lot of activity, although this decreased compared to the first half. Odesa Oblast was struck this time, and there was also more activity seen in Zaporizhzhia Oblast too. Strikes on energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava Oblasts decreased compared to the first half.

The close attention that Beijing is paying to the new USMC strategy became clear about a year ago when the Global Times [环球时报] published an unusual editorial decrying Washington’s new determination to deploy anti-ship missiles proximate to China. Arguing that the new American strategy aims to correct a U.S. Navy prioritization for “open ocean control” rather than “close-quarters engagement in confined waters,” this article concludes that Washington’s effort to “control maritime chokepoints [aims to] curtail the freedom of rivals to operate at sea … [and] introduces new risks … .” A much more detailed study of the new USMC strategy appeared in early 2025 in the naval magazine Modern Ships [现代舰船]. This Chinese assessment noted with considerable alarm that the USMC was experimenting with unmanned surface vessels capable of firing the stealthy LRASM anti-ship cruise missile and that these units could alternatively serve as forward scouts, fixing targets for long-range U.S. military fires. Still, this analysis underlines some weaknesses of the USMC strategy, including the range limitations of related sensors and drones, and even characterized the air-defense capabilities of the USMC as “precarious.” Another study in this same magazine had earlier drawn attention to the logistics quandaries raised by the new strategy.

A 2026 Chinese analysis in another Chinese navy-affiliated magazine, Shipborne Weapons [舰载武器], offers a sharper critique of the Marines’ new approach, noting that the creation of the Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR) “actually represents campaign preparation by the USMC to militarily intervene in China’s unification.” At the outset, this study notes that many American think tanks raised doubts about the strategy, suggesting that forward bases without sea and air control could prove “untenable.” There is a recognition in this analysis that the new mobile missile launchers that are being deployed by the USMC are small, light, and thus “not easily discovered by … surveillance.” In the end, this study concludes that the USMC strategy is vulnerable because the “U.S has no way to quickly establish air superiority. This could take weeks or months and would entail massive losses.” Among the most remarkable pieces written by Chinese experts on the new USMC direction is one that was published in translation recently by the China institute at U.S. Naval War College (NWC). That translation deserves extra attention due to the fact that it was written by senior active-duty Chinese Navy officers and also because it was published originally in a sensitive internal circulation Chinese military journal too. Though this piece does not touch directly on the sensitive Taiwan issue, and it also explicitly notes the USMC strategy aims at deterrence of Beijing, it nevertheless explains that the new USMC deployments amount to “continuous penetration and encroachment into our near seas” and argues that China must “establish effective countermeasures.” Notably, this high-level rendering links the USMC strategy to China’s improving submarine force in significant detail, observing that forward deployed Marine forces could deploy “hydro-acoustic arrays and other assets to establish barrier zones and monitoring areas to track Chinese submarine operations.” Similar arguments are made that U.S. deployments could degrade Chinese air defenses by employing drone swarms “to overwhelm our radar tracking capacity.”

The Chinese Navy authors caution against applying resource-intensive assets to defeat such American asymmetric tactics. However, the conclusion of the article is rather disturbing since it argues that China must counter this posture by deploying a Chinese “proactive offensive posture, aggressively expand[ing] our operational reach, [and] project[ing] forces forward.” Elaborating, they counsel: “We must maintain and normalize forward-deployed forces, extend[ing] undersea combat capabilities as far forward as feasible.” This conclusion and other aspects of these Chinese-language analyses raise some rather uncomfortable questions for U.S. defense planners. The final translation done by NWC strongly hints that the Chinese Navy may be adopting a more aggressive approach as a direct reaction to the forward lean in American strategy. This seems to be a very clear manifestation of the so-called ‘security dilemma,’ wherein two powers’ defensive measures develop into a dangerous escalatory spiral. Moreover, there is a clear recognition by Chinese strategists that forward USMC elements could be vulnerable due to logistics challenges and lack of proper air and missile defenses. It would not be the first time that the USMC was deployed haphazardly in East Asia at the cost of many American lives. Understanding these dynamics, American leaders should recalibrate and opt to rely less on forward defense. Alternatively, the USMC should aim to embrace the strategic depth of the Pacific and its myriad island archipelagos (e.g. the Philippines) in a less costly, less risky, more sustainable, and clearly defensive strategy.