Soldiers received “sub-optimal” meal service while taking part in a major exercise last month at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, an Army colonel acknowledged in a recent letter to a member of Congress. The July 27 letter from Col. Nicholas Sinclair, which has been shared on social media, came in response to an inquiry from Rep. Jeff Crank of Colorado, who had been contacted by an Army specialist about the meal issues at the National Training Center. A spokesperson at Fort Carson, Colorado, where the 4th Infantry Division is based, confirmed to Task & Purpose that the letter was authentic. Sinclair wrote that the concerns the specialist had raised about the quality of the food available to soldiers were “valid,” explaining that all meals provided to soldiers in the field during the exercise were provided by a local vendor. “However, due to high employee turnover and staffing shortages, the meal service was sub-optimal for 4th Infantry Division soldiers,” Sinclair wrote. At the time the letter was written, Sinclair was commander of the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division. The unit has since become a Stryker brigade. Army officials talked to the vendor, which received a “Corrective Action Request” on June 30 and then took steps to correct the issues, Sinclair wrote. The specialist who contacted Crank said they knew that Army leaders are required to answer an inquiry from a member of Congress, which would force them to look into the food situation. The soldier also told Task & Purpose that since he exited the simulated combat zones at the center known as “the box” at the end of July, the food is “a good 65% better”

(more photos in the article)

Nearly 10,000 troops took part in the recent exercise at the National Training Center. Photos posted to social media and shared to both the unofficial Army subreddit and the Hots & Cots app show small portions, bad toppings, such as expired salsa, and appear to show shortages of food. The food was provided to the soldiers before they went “in the box,” where troops lived as if in the field. The actual exercise ran 10 days, from July 20 to 29, but soldiers with the 4th Infantry Division arrived in advance, with some arriving in late June. The food at the chow hall was available for breakfast and dinner, with participating troops having to go to private vendors or eat Meals Ready to Eat, or MREs, for lunch or meals. But soldiers reported long lines for the chow hall and poor food offerings.

“Some of it was inedible,” a junior officer with 4th Infantry Division told Task & Purpose. “Some sausages that you couldn’t tell were that bad on purpose or not. Protein ran out more than once. Some of the empty trays are because dudes didn’t take everything that was available, but those optional items at the end of the chow line looked pretty bad more than once.” Rob Evans, an Army veteran and founder of the Yelp-like Hots & Cots app, said that he heard from soldiers, both officers and enlisted, in mid-July who reached out about “subpar, not great” food options. Soldiers who spoke to Task & Purpose said that complaints were widespread and that they raised these concerns to leadership. However, the junior officer said that there was no official response beyond substituting MREs for food at the chowhall. “It wasn’t a ‘you’re new to the Army this is the standard,’” kind of issue, the officer said. Evans said he wasn’t sure if the training center was prepared to have a full division come through — which is between 10,000 and 15,000 soldiers, compared to a brigade, which can have between 3,000 and 5,000 soldiers. “NTC is not going to be your great [dining facility] meal; you’re not having campus-style dining, but you expect more than what these service members got,” Evans told Task & Purpose. The junior officer was more blunt: “I get NTC is supposed to suck, but it went from suck to insulting.”

In the summer of 2025, it expended more than a quarter of its total inventory of THAAD interceptors during Israel’s 12-Day war and Operation Midnight Hammer, where U.S. forces struck Iran’s nuclear sites. The current conflict “has made those inadequacies even worse,” said Brad Bowman, an Army veteran and senior director at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. While Hegseth and the Pentagon have announced numerous new industry framework agreements to rebuild the arsenal, defense firms “aren’t going to start bending metal until you have a contract and congressional appropriations,” Bowman said. As a result, it could be years before the inventories are rebuilt. “We’re often talking years between spending what we need to spend, getting the contracts signed, and delivery,” he said. “You don’t just flip the switch and suddenly the munition appears in the hands of the warfighter.”

really cool that US administrations last for shorter than the timeline necessary to actually scale up production, ensuring that MIC companies will always have an excuse for not scaling since the next government could change their policies. most efficient system!

President Donald Trump’s frustration over the Iran war boiled over at Camp David last week, where he demanded answers from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on why he had apparently been misled on extreme munitions shortages that now threaten to limit military options with Iran, two people familiar with the exchange told The Washington Post. The encounter took place on the sidelines of his Cabinet meeting at Camp David on Friday where Trump vented at Hegseth that he thought the munitions issue “had been fixed,” according to both people familiar with the conversation, who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity due to fear of retaliation. The shortages, particularly in long-range guided missiles and air-defense interceptors, have been part of the reason Trump has pulled back from launching additional massive strikes against Iran in recent days, one of the sources said.

greatest military in the world baybee! ran out of steam in like a month and a couple weeks of a moderately intense bombardment campaign. and these fucks think they could fight a war with China!

Trump said Monday that he had ordered and subsequently called off “the biggest attack since World War II,” pending claims of new negotiations over the Strait of Hormuz. After The Post’s story published, Trump asserted overnight that the United States has “massive amounts” of munitions, saying on Truth Social that “large amounts are being manufactured and shipped to the U.S. as needed.” The “‘leakers’ of these treasonous statements are being hunted down,” he added. Later Thursday, the president said in a separate post that he was “extremely happy with the job that Pete Hegseth is doing. Everything has been extraordinary,” Trump wrote, and suggested reporting otherwise might be “treasonous.” While the United States has announced new production agreements for some of the most critical munitions, such as Patriot air defense missiles, the munitions themselves can take as long as two years to produce, and there’s no immediate relief in sight for the shortages.

tbf, Trump might genuinely have thought that those agreements meant munition production had instantly scaled up, he doesn't exactly seem like a guy who'd know the fine details of industrial production and, like, the fact that stuff is made out of raw materials and doesn't just materialize in the factory when you press a button (and tbf, he's not necessarily supposed to, that's why you have advisors and subordinates - you just need to put actually competent people in those positions, and not, you know, Pete Kegseth), and who knows what bullshit the MIC execs he was meeting with told him, "oh yes Mr. President we'll just fire up the Missilenator™ 9000 which we totally have sitting around and simply haven't been using up until now because of woke, but we'll do it for you and pump out a gajilion missiles!"

In the first month of fighting alone, the U.S. fired off more than 850 Tomahawk cruise missiles and more than 1,000 Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, The Post previously reported.

sorry for this "erm it's called a magazine not a clip" digression but that "systems" should probably be "munitions" or "interceptors", generally "system" is used to refer to the actual launchers or the trucks carrying them

The U.S. also used more than 1,300 of the Army’s tactical ballistic missiles in the initial weeks of fighting, one U.S. official told The Post. The ATACMS stockpile — a short-range missile also in demand by Ukraine — is drained to the extent that there’s basically none left, said one of the people familiar, an assessment also reported earlier this week by Reuters. The scarcity of defensive munitions has had an impact beyond the Middle East. Ukraine is running out of air defenses, and there are few options with which to replenish from Western stockpiles, leaving them exposed to Russia’s long-range attacks. The lack of interceptor missiles is also altering how the U.S. decides whether to employ munitions against an incoming threat, based on where it’s assessed to be heading and whether or not it’s “a factor,” the U.S. official told The Post, a change in tactics that was first reported by NBC News.

Back at Camp David, as he was confronted by Trump over the bare weapons stockpile, Hegseth defended himself and blamed his deputy, Stephen Feinberg, for the shortages and for not ensuring Trump was fully apprised of the issue, both people familiar said.

that's what we have underlings for! to take the blame, of course! (ironically for Hegseth, his own is role is to be scapegoated for Trump's stupid decisions, it's scapegoating all the way down! a sure sign of a functional government system)

The exchange underscored Trump’s increasing frustration with his defense secretary, who was one of the biggest early advocates for taking military action against Iran, convincing Trump it would be a quick and relatively easy win, according to multiple officials. “This is 100% fake news. Literally never happened. And President Trump has the utmost confidence in Secretary Hegseth,” said White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt in response to questions from The Post. More than five months after the start of the conflict, and with 18 U.S. service members killed and hundreds injured, Iran and the U.S. remain at a stalemate, with increasing concern from Arab neighbors about the long-term economic effects of the war and the impact of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. “Secretary Hegseth did not mislead anyone about our munitions posture, and he did not blame Deputy Secretary Feinberg. These claims about depleted stockpiles, internal disagreements, the Secretary’s position on Iran … are equally fictional,” Pentagon chief spokesman Sean Parnell said.

In a July Senate hearing, Hegseth sparred with Democrats over whether he had provided Trump with honest assessments of the Iran war, including the risks an extended campaign would pose for U.S. military inventories. During the hearing, Hegseth declined to discuss his advice to the president and repeatedly blamed any shortages on the Biden administration’s handling of the military, not on the operations that have occurred under Trump’s watch.

Hegseth, Feinberg and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine have asked lawmakers to provide them $67 billion in additional military funding to help cover the costs of the Iran war, with Hegseth telling lawmakers in testimony last month the request filled an “urgent, necessary” need to refill the military’s stockpiles.

"we don't have any munition shortages, but also please hand us tens of billions of dollars. this is not at all suspicious"

Senate Republicans have yet to agree on a strategy to take up the package. The administration’s overall defense budget request for the coming fiscal year is a record $1.5 trillion and includes tens of billions of dollars to build missiles. But the proposal has stalled as Democrats object to the massive increase, leaving the Pentagon without a clear path to replenishing critical weaponry. Ever since Signalgate, where Hegseth sent classified information to a chat group that included a reporter just months after being confirmed to the role, rumors have swirled about how long the defense secretary would remain in Trump’s good graces. The president has consistently praised Hegseth, saying he looks straight out of “central casting” and that “he loves war.”

the most important qualities for the guy in charge of your military!

Since taking office, Trump has launched military operations in seven countries: Yemen, Somalia, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria and Venezuela. The successful operation to capture former Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro appeared to further secure Hegseth’s position. But the stalemate over the Strait of Hormuz and the massive cost and length of the Iran war has eroded Trump’s confidence in him, one of the people familiar with the Camp David conversation said. “Secretary Hegseth isn’t going anywhere, and he’s going to continue to work side by side with Deputy Secretary Feinberg to execute President Trump’s agenda,” Parnell said in response to questions about that exchange and the munitions depletion. Stockpile pressures are not a new challenge. Before the war even started, Caine warned Trump that the U.S. did not have the stockpiles necessary to sustain a prolonged conflict. But the pace and sheer volume of munitions expended by both sides has rapidly accelerated the depletion of key U.S. offensive and defensive munitions. From Feb. 28 to April 7, which marked the first day of the ceasefire, the U.S. struck more than 13,000 targets in Iran. It has also defended against more than 8,500 incoming Iranian munitions or drones. The U.S. launched Operation Epic Fury already facing shortfalls in critical munitions.

The Army adopted a string of changes in its discrimination and harassment policies, shortening the time a soldier has to file a complaint, rolling back rules for anonymous reports and handing more power to commanders to dismiss them. The new Army policies will reflect Pentagon rule changes developed after Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said that investigations under the Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) program had been “weaponized.” The MEO office reviews reports of discrimination and harassment related to race, sex, or religion. Hegseth said in an April 2025 video on X that some service members have used the system to “retaliate against superiors.” The new Army policy, which will take effect when the regulation is published in the coming months, ends the option for soldiers to make anonymous reports of discrimination or discriminatory harassment. Instead, they can make “confidential” reports which will withhold their identity unless there is a larger safety threat, or a law or Department of Defense regulation “imposes a duty to report information.” Soldiers making reports of bullying, hazing and sexual harassment cases, which are covered by separate federal laws, can still do so anonymously. Rachel VanLandingham, a military justice expert and former Air Force lawyer, said the policy is trying to “square Hegseth’s overly broad directive,” and implement “commander’s intent while complying with federal law in these specific areas.”

More discretion for commanders

Gary Barthel, a retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel and military justice lawyer, said another major change is giving commanders more authority and discretion in handling these complaints. “They’re trying to give the commands more lenience in investigating what they feel they want to investigate, and they can dismiss whatever they feel is not credible,” Barthel said. “In the past, commanders and commanding generals have always taken the step that ‘Hey, I’m going to investigate this because I know if I don’t, Congress is going to be all over me because somebody made a complaint and they’re feeling like it was swept under the rug.’” The Army policy’s stated intent is to reduce formal MEO and harassment complaints and instead settle disputes “efficiently before they escalate” through “conflict resolution, mediation and facilitation.” Complaints can now be dismissed within 14 days if there is not “sufficient or actionable information” or if it was filed more than 60 days after the most recent incident — a timeline that can be extended by a commander or civilian in the MEO program. Once an agreement is reached, a mediator will draft a memorandum of agreement which details terms and follow-up actions. VanLandingham said commanders were always in charge of accountability measures or punishments that resulted from MEO investigations, so changing the process for racial discrimination complaints is more of a “message” to soldiers and commanders. “We’re going to give it all back to the commanders. That’s the underlying tenor,” she said. “This really comes down to what’s being undercut here because it doesn’t have the statutory protections that hazing and bullying and sexual harassment textually specifically do.”

ah, I'm sure turning military units into personal fiefdoms of their commanders who can deal with soldiers' complaints as they see fit is liable to lead to no negative consequences whatsoever

‘Professional’ activities, like boot camp, exempt

The new policy also shifts definitions of what constitutes bullying and hazing in boot camp and other training, which Hegseth said he believes have gone soft. Hegseth first hinted at related reforms when he told hundreds of military generals at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, that complaints of bullying and hazing and “toxic leadership” had “been weaponized and bastardized.” Hegseth told the military’s top brass that he wanted to make basic training “scary, tough and disciplined” and allow drill sergeants to bay toss, do shark attacks, and “put their hands on recruits.” He said that it didn’t mean they could be “reckless or violate the law, but they can use tried and true methods to motivate new recruits.” The Defense Department has set definitions for harassment, bullying and hazing. But the new Army policy adds stipulations or additional scenarios to those three categories. For bullying, the definition now includes posting “malicious gossip, rumors and lies” on social media, sharing humiliating photos or sending “vicious texts.” Barthel said encompassing rules for cyberbullying is useful “given where we are in society.” A reworked definition of harassment, VanLandingham said, is “intentionally trying to broaden the scope of what’s allowable and to limit the scope of what could be punishable.” The Defense Department’s underlying definition of harassment continues to include oral, written, or physical actions that would be “unwelcome or offensive” to a “reasonable person,” and creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment. The Army’s new definition includes that language but also notes that official military activities “conducted in a professional manner,” such as basic training and other training programs, disciplinary actions or combat exercises, “do not constitute harassment.”

so, as long as you say "beating this recruit to near-death in his bed was simply a training exercise about, uh, how to respond to being stealthily attacked at night!" it's all fine!

The new policy also stipulates that “rude, ignorant, abrasive or unkind” behavior is “not necessarily indicative of harassment,” but can be depending on the “totality” of circumstances. VanLandingham said many dangerous or sometimes fatal cases of bootcamp bullying or hazing were accompanied by harassment. She gave the example of Raheel Siddiqui, who was forced into a clothes dryer during bootcamp at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, South Carolina. A Marine Corps investigation found that he was subjected to anti-Muslim slurs and physical abuse before he took his own life. “You can’t have bullying without having harassment,” she said. “One of the most common places is during basic training, so don’t tell me: ‘Well, if it’s conducted in a professional manner or such as basic training, it’s not harassment.’ It may well be because you didn’t define what ‘professional’ here is. Just being in basic military training doesn’t inoculate and immunize behavior — in fact, that’s where you have some of the highest risk of harassment.”

The ground-force posture is decisive here. Limited U.S. forces in the CENTCOM region—primarily in Gulf partner states, Jordan, and other locations—can defend bases, support air operations, and conduct limited raids. They cannot threaten the seizure of Tehran, the occupation of key population centers, or the systematic destruction of Iran’s remaining ground-force and internal-security apparatus. Without a credible ground component—whether conventional U.S. divisions or a heavily organized, equipped, and backed indigenous opposition force—Iranian leaders can reasonably conclude that they can absorb further punishment, impose reciprocal costs through missiles and Hormuz disruption, and wait for political fatigue, oil-market pressure, or alliance fractures to erode American resolve. Moreover, the longer a pure-air campaign continues without decisive political results, the greater the risk of horizontal escalation. Iran has long accepted that it cannot compete in conventional maneuver warfare; instead, it built its regional strategy around state-sponsored terrorism, missile harassment, and proxy operations. Tehran’s asymmetric reach—underscored by recent drone strikes expanding the war into previously untouched sovereign nations, including Egypt’s Mediterranean ports—proves that external bombardment does not isolate the fight. Rather than forcing submission, an open-ended standoff campaign gives the Islamic Republic both the pretext and the time to expand the conflict regionally—testing American alliances and driving up global economic pain.

Two of the classic Principles of War help explain why this pattern is so persistent. The Principle of the Objective requires that every military effort be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal. In the current campaign the political objective has shifted—from demands for unconditional surrender, to ensuring Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon, to protecting commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Each successive formulation is more limited, yet the force applied has remained essentially the same: air and naval power without a credible ground component. When the objective itself moves, measuring progress becomes difficult and the campaign risks becoming an open-ended exercise in attrition. The Principle of the Offensive is equally relevant. The initial strikes in late February seized the initiative through surprise and concentrated force. That initiative has since eroded. Iran has adapted its missile tactics, dispersed residual capabilities, and imposed reciprocal costs. A prolonged air-centric campaign that reacts to Iranian actions rather than dictating the terms of the conflict gradually cedes the initiative the United States once held. None of this is an argument for a full-scale occupation of Iran. History and practicality both counsel against such an undertaking. The point is narrower and more practical: the type of force employed must be matched to the political-military objective actually being pursued. If the objective remains truly limited—temporary freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, or a measurable delay in Iran’s nuclear timeline—sustained and focused air and naval power may still be sufficient. But when the objective is defined as Iran never obtaining a nuclear weapon, the problem changes character. The Islamic Republic’s ideology includes the destruction of Israel and sustained resistance to the United States. Nuclear capability is treated as the ultimate insurance that would allow the regime to survive long enough—and deter retaliation sufficiently—to continue pursuing those goals. Absolute and permanent denial of that capability is therefore a regime-threatening demand.

Really funny to still be banging the nuclear drum at this point. No wonder Americans do so bad at war, even their more critical and skeptical military analysts are still basing everything on completely made up ideas about the enemy - any attempt to genuinely seriously evaluate the situation seems impossible within these circles, whenever they start getting close to a point they always manage to jam some completely invented bullshit in.

History shows that air and naval power alone have not reliably delivered such outcomes against governments that view a forbidden capability as essential to their survival. Policymakers therefore face a choice grounded in evidence rather than aspiration. They can accept more limited objectives that air and naval power have historically been able to support, or they can recognize that guaranteeing permanent nuclear denial—or full regime capitulation—requires either a credible ground element to alter the enemy’s strategic arithmetic or a serious commitment to a capable proxy ground force. Continuing to rely primarily on air and naval instruments while demanding outcomes that history shows those instruments cannot deliver alone is a strategy of hope over experience. The Iranian regime, like others before it facing existential stakes, appears prepared to test which approach prevails.

For more than a century, theorists from Giulio Douhet onward have argued that air power could shatter an enemy’s will or capacity to resist without the messy necessity of ground combat. The empirical record has been far less cooperative. The only clear World War II case of a defended position reduced primarily by bombardment was the Italian island of Pantelleria in June 1943. After more than five thousand Allied sorties and accompanying naval shelling, the garrison of roughly 11,000 Italians and a handful of Germans surrendered as landing forces approached. Water shortages and the cumulative weight of the bombardment left the defenders unable or unwilling to resist further. Yet Pantelleria was a military outpost, not a sovereign nation. Troops still went ashore to accept the formal surrender. No equivalent exists for an entire country. In the opening days of Germany’s May 1940 Blitzkrieg against the Low Countries, Dutch forces were already locked in combat with advancing German ground troops and airborne units when the Luftwaffe’s bombing of Rotterdam and the explicit threat of further city destruction triggered national capitulation the same day. German ground forces were fighting inside Rotterdam itself, the Dutch air force had been largely neutralized, and the broader invasion was a classic combined-arms operation. Air power accelerated an ongoing ground campaign; it did not act in isolation. Japan’s 1945 surrender is the most consequential case involving strategic bombing. The atomic attacks and the long naval blockade that had already strangled Japan’s merchant fleet were major factors. By mid-1945, conventional firebombing had destroyed large portions of Japan’s urban industrial base, while submarine warfare and mining had reduced its shipping capacity to a fraction of pre-war levels. Yet historians continue to debate the relative weight of the Soviet ground invasion of Manchuria—which eliminated Japan’s last hope of a mediated end to the war—and the imminent threat of a massive Allied amphibious assault on the home islands. The decision to surrender was multi-causal. Pure air and naval pressure, however devastating, did not act alone.

The 1999 Kosovo campaign is often cited as the purest modern example of air power alone coercing political concessions. NATO flew for 78 days without committing ground combat troops and ultimately compelled Slobodan Milošević to withdraw Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. Air-power advocates initially celebrated it as historic validation. Subsequent analyses, however, revealed a more complex picture: NATO was visibly preparing a ground option, the Kosovo Liberation Army exerted pressure inside the province, Russia withdrew diplomatic cover, and the bombing threatened elite interests inside Serbia. Even then, the result was limited territorial and political concessions, not the occupation or collapse of the Yugoslav state itself. Serbia’s government and most of its army survived. Even in cases where standoff air power coincided with regime collapse, such as Libya in 2011, the strikes succeeded only because they served as flying artillery for an active indigenous ground force that physically seized territory and occupied the capital. Operation Desert Storm in 1991 remains the benchmark for the limits of air power even against limited objectives. Thirty-nine days of the most concentrated, technologically advanced air campaign in history failed to compel Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait or induce internal regime collapse; a massive 100-hour combined-arms ground offensive was still required to eject his forces and force compliance.

Naval blockades have likewise contributed to attrition—Britain against Germany in World War I, the Union against the Confederacy, the Allied submarine campaign against Japan—but in every major instance they operated alongside significant land campaigns or the clear prospect of them. The British blockade of 1914–1918 produced severe shortages and undermined German civilian morale, yet the armistice came only after the failure of the 1918 offensives and the collapse of the Western Front. The Union’s Anaconda Plan steadily strangled the Confederate economy, but victory still required the destruction of Southern armies in the field. No modern nation has been forced into total strategic submission by naval power in isolation.

These patterns help explain why pure air and naval campaigns so often fall short of decisive political results. In his landmark study Bombing to Win, Robert Pape demonstrates that coercive air campaigns fall into two fundamental categories: punishment (inflicting pain on infrastructure and elites to break political will) and denial (destroying an adversary’s physical capability to control territory or wage war). The current U.S. strategy mistakenly treats a punishment campaign as if it can achieve denial results without boots on the ground. Threatening tit-for-tat escalation—such as bombing a key bridge or power plant for every American warfighter killed—is classic punishment. It attempts to manipulate the regime’s cost-benefit math rather than decisively pursue a singular objective. Against a leadership facing existential stakes, punishment rarely breaks political resolve; it merely escalates infrastructure destruction while leaving the regime’s core coercive machinery intact. When a government calculates that compliance equals the end of its rule or the dismemberment of the state, the threshold for capitulation rises dramatically. Iran has spent years preparing precisely for this contingency. Its “Mosaic Defense” concept disperses authority, multiplies command nodes, and distributes retaliatory capabilities. The country’s size, mountainous terrain, and population of more than 85 million make occupation extraordinarily costly. Even after the loss of Khamenei, institutional continuity proved possible; a successor process unfolded and core security organs adapted. Crucially, air campaigns against autocratic regimes often produce a domestic "rally 'round the flag" dynamic that the state leverages to its own advantage. External bombardment provides the Islamic Republic with both the ideological pretext and emergency authority to crack down internally. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) routinely uses external strikes as cover to enforce martial measures, ration critical resources, and ruthlessly suppress domestic dissent—framing anti-government sentiment as treason during a national crisis. Rather than inciting a popular uprising to overthrow the state, standoff bombardment often tightens the security apparatus's grip over a population consumed by daily survival.

https://xcancel.com/anonrespector/status/2084633048637722936

It’s weird the US has just casually run its stockpiles of missiles and interceptors down to zero on two pointless conflicts. You think at minimum they would have paced their consumption to not go to zero

They're supposed to ramp up PrSM production since ATACMS is being sunsetted. They might feel comfortable doing this because it's difficult to imagine when or where they'd even use tactical ballistic missiles going forward. They're pulling out of Kuwait, probably forever. Expending as many JASSMs as they have is more insane to me.

I would say that these missile systems are still vital to any future US entanglements involving actual ground deployments - so, ironically for this being a mainly air campaign, it's still managing to defang the ground branch too by eating up a bunch of their highly valuable munitions. With the missiles out, artillery shell production scaling going the way it is (New $500M Artillery Shell Plant Failed To Produce Any 155mm Parts), and readiness issues affecting their vehicles (Weapon System Sustainment: Various Challenges Affect Ground Vehicles' Availability for Missions) the Army's chances to actually win on the ground against a serious opponent aren't doing too good

https://xcancel.com/Mikethejohnson/status/2084651378350387317

My new favorite cope is that the missile shortage is a psyop being put out by Trump and there is a secret classified stockpile of missiles and interceptors. Meanwhile nobody has an explanation about what happened to the US "air superiority" and why they arent leveraging that to drop gravity bombs on Iran.

https://xcancel.com/SideGiver69714/status/2084680540095926345

Reading consevatweets on this topic has informed me:

1. This is a lie/disinfo
2. Whoever leaked this must be caught, prosecuted and possibly executed
3. The US army has a bunch of secret, much more powerful hardware they will use once the war gets "serious"

if Steiner unleashes his secret stash of Panzer 3000 laser-tanks everything will be alright

The international OSINT project TrackANaziMerc reports: Griselda Inés Ortiz, 45, a former Buenos Aires provincial police officer, was arrested in Tigre, Argentina, accused of recruiting mercenaries to fight on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Authorities alleged she recruited former police officers and other personnel trained in weapons use to fight in the conflict. They were lured with promises of monthly payments of $3,000. A pistol, several Ukrainian army insignia, recruitment forms, and Ortiz's old police badges with her number were found in her apartment in a multi-unit building. The investigation began in March of this year, when airport security officers identified four men at Ezeiza Airport who were planning to travel to Ukraine on a suspicious route. The passengers claimed they were going to work on infrastructure restoration, but their statements contained contradictions, and none of them could explain who was funding the trip or provide details about their return to the country.

An analysis of their itineraries revealed that they were all scheduled to fly on Turkish Airlines to Istanbul, Turkey, with a final destination in Chisinau. They were then to enter Ukraine under the pretext of performing "infrastructure restoration work as construction workers." It's important to note that interrogations of the captured Colombians clearly showed that their logistical route appeared identical. Also included were Turkish Airlines, a layover in Turkey, and subsequent transit through Moldova. All of this suggests, at a minimum, the knowledge of Turkish and Moldovan intelligence agencies regarding the transit of foreign mercenaries to Ukraine. It's significant that while Istanbul is used exclusively for the transit of Latin American mercenaries, Ukrainian intelligence agencies have effectively set up a transit base in Moldova. Authorities are also investigating the involvement of Griselda's partner, a former federal police officer who later transferred to the city police and is currently on the run. According to investigators, he likely fled to Brazil and was part of an organization recruiting and transporting Argentines to the conflict zone under false promises of employment. This is Jorge Alberto Otero, call sign Trembo, a former member of the Argentine Federal Police who later worked in the security service of the city of Tigre. He is also originally from Buenos Aires.

It should be noted that, according to our information, an investigation into Ukrainian recruiters is also underway in Colombia. However, following the presidential elections in that Latin American country, all proceedings have been suspended, allowing several Ukrainian military intelligence officers to leave Bogotá.

“The current industrial base has demonstrated significant challenges, including production delays, quality control issues, and critical obsolescence (i.e., diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortages) across key engine components,” warned the Air Force’s Request for Information. The deadline is Aug. 28. “The government will pursue a strategic competition requiring industry to innovate manufacturing and guarantee supply chain resiliency,” the RFI said. The initiative comes as the Air Force struggles with its jet engines. For example, F-35 fighter deliveries and upgrades have been delayed by engine issues, with a Government Accountability Office report noting last year that “the engine contractor is still not delivering engines to contract specifications after 20 years of production.” Meanwhile, B-52 modernization has been stalled in part by engine issues that have raised costs by $3 billion and delayed initial operational capability by 15 months, according to GAO. In turn, the Air Force is now embarking on a multiyear fighter engine procurement project that envisions more than 180 engines per year by 2034. The RFI specifically cites engines for the F-15EX and F-16.

The RFI promises “five foundational pillars designed to drive a paradigm shift in engine procurement and sustainment,” as the government shifts from “legacy procurement toward incentivizing industry-led technological evolution and capacity expansion.” These include “holding vendors accountable” for delivering new engines that are more capable, reliable and cheaper.

you know what would really help to hold manufacturers accountable? owning them yourself instead of having them be private companies!

The Air Force will focus “on the total lifecycle cost of the engine, not just the initial purchase price.” Contractors are also responsible for ensuring reliable supply chains.

okay, and how are they going to achieve that? if, hypothetically, no contractor is able to actually ensure this, because there's problems with the access to the raw materials you need to even start production, something which is beyond the capacities of any manufacturer to solve as, unless you have Japan/South Korea-style vertically integrated megacorporations (or, you know, state ownership), the resource extraction and processing is simply a whole other sector of the economy that they can't do much for beyond sending smoke signals over The Free Market™ to ask those guys to pretty please scale up their production so you can eventually scale up yours... then what, are you just going to not buy anything?

“We will implement an acquisition strategy that prioritizes ease of maintenance and establishes a resilient, sustainable supply chain from day one,” the Air Force said. “This effort is designed to solve key fleet-level issues by requiring a newer engine with improved supportability.” “The result is a streamlined logistics footprint that reduces downtime, lowers the burden on our maintainers, and ensures the continuous flow of parts and support to maximize flightline readiness.” Ultimately, the question is whether the U.S. defense industrial base can deliver. The Air Force intends to “enforce stringent producibility requirements.”

“We will select a partner capable of scaling production to meet surge requirements, guaranteeing a steady and uninterrupted supply of engines for USAF/FMS [Foreign Military Sales] aircraft (e.g. F-15EX and F-16) programs,” the RFI reads.

and if no such partner exists on the current market?

Companies responding to the RFI are asked to provide a variety of details, such as a timeline for developing and manufacturing an engine. They should also specify “at what minimum volume your supply chain can justify private capital investments (such as facility expansion, tooling modernization, or advanced automation) and how those investments will structurally lower your long-term unit costs.” With nations competing to obtain raw materials — and China restricting sales of rare earths — the Air Force wants to be certain manufacturers can find the raw materials they need. “From your company’s market perspective, what are the primary raw material constraints (e.g., specialized titanium/nickel alloys) or manufacturing process bottlenecks (e.g., advanced casting or forging capacity) that pose the highest risk to scaling up fighter engine production?” the RFI asks.