The close attention that Beijing is paying to the new USMC strategy became clear about a year ago when the Global Times [环球时报] published an unusual editorial decrying Washington’s new determination to deploy anti-ship missiles proximate to China. Arguing that the new American strategy aims to correct a U.S. Navy prioritization for “open ocean control” rather than “close-quarters engagement in confined waters,” this article concludes that Washington’s effort to “control maritime chokepoints [aims to] curtail the freedom of rivals to operate at sea … [and] introduces new risks … .” A much more detailed study of the new USMC strategy appeared in early 2025 in the naval magazine Modern Ships [现代舰船]. This Chinese assessment noted with considerable alarm that the USMC was experimenting with unmanned surface vessels capable of firing the stealthy LRASM anti-ship cruise missile and that these units could alternatively serve as forward scouts, fixing targets for long-range U.S. military fires. Still, this analysis underlines some weaknesses of the USMC strategy, including the range limitations of related sensors and drones, and even characterized the air-defense capabilities of the USMC as “precarious.” Another study in this same magazine had earlier drawn attention to the logistics quandaries raised by the new strategy.

A 2026 Chinese analysis in another Chinese navy-affiliated magazine, Shipborne Weapons [舰载武器], offers a sharper critique of the Marines’ new approach, noting that the creation of the Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR) “actually represents campaign preparation by the USMC to militarily intervene in China’s unification.” At the outset, this study notes that many American think tanks raised doubts about the strategy, suggesting that forward bases without sea and air control could prove “untenable.” There is a recognition in this analysis that the new mobile missile launchers that are being deployed by the USMC are small, light, and thus “not easily discovered by … surveillance.” In the end, this study concludes that the USMC strategy is vulnerable because the “U.S has no way to quickly establish air superiority. This could take weeks or months and would entail massive losses.” Among the most remarkable pieces written by Chinese experts on the new USMC direction is one that was published in translation recently by the China institute at U.S. Naval War College (NWC). That translation deserves extra attention due to the fact that it was written by senior active-duty Chinese Navy officers and also because it was published originally in a sensitive internal circulation Chinese military journal too. Though this piece does not touch directly on the sensitive Taiwan issue, and it also explicitly notes the USMC strategy aims at deterrence of Beijing, it nevertheless explains that the new USMC deployments amount to “continuous penetration and encroachment into our near seas” and argues that China must “establish effective countermeasures.” Notably, this high-level rendering links the USMC strategy to China’s improving submarine force in significant detail, observing that forward deployed Marine forces could deploy “hydro-acoustic arrays and other assets to establish barrier zones and monitoring areas to track Chinese submarine operations.” Similar arguments are made that U.S. deployments could degrade Chinese air defenses by employing drone swarms “to overwhelm our radar tracking capacity.”

The Chinese Navy authors caution against applying resource-intensive assets to defeat such American asymmetric tactics. However, the conclusion of the article is rather disturbing since it argues that China must counter this posture by deploying a Chinese “proactive offensive posture, aggressively expand[ing] our operational reach, [and] project[ing] forces forward.” Elaborating, they counsel: “We must maintain and normalize forward-deployed forces, extend[ing] undersea combat capabilities as far forward as feasible.” This conclusion and other aspects of these Chinese-language analyses raise some rather uncomfortable questions for U.S. defense planners. The final translation done by NWC strongly hints that the Chinese Navy may be adopting a more aggressive approach as a direct reaction to the forward lean in American strategy. This seems to be a very clear manifestation of the so-called ‘security dilemma,’ wherein two powers’ defensive measures develop into a dangerous escalatory spiral. Moreover, there is a clear recognition by Chinese strategists that forward USMC elements could be vulnerable due to logistics challenges and lack of proper air and missile defenses. It would not be the first time that the USMC was deployed haphazardly in East Asia at the cost of many American lives. Understanding these dynamics, American leaders should recalibrate and opt to rely less on forward defense. Alternatively, the USMC should aim to embrace the strategic depth of the Pacific and its myriad island archipelagos (e.g. the Philippines) in a less costly, less risky, more sustainable, and clearly defensive strategy.

Army Lt. Gen. Brett Sylvia was removed as head of strategy, plans and policy on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is the second general to be ousted from the post, known in military circles as the “J5,” under Hegseth. His predecessor, Lt. Gen. Joseph McGee, was forced to retire last October. The defense official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive personnel matters, said there is no immediate replacement for Sylvia and no reason has been given for the firing. The move was reported earlier by The Atlantic. A spokesperson for the Joint Staff said “the Chairman, the Joint Staff, and the Joint Force extend our deepest gratitude to Lt. Gen. Brett Sylvia and his family for their 32 years of distinguished service to our nation” and they “wish him and his family the best.”

Typically, the J5 director and their staff are responsible for generating and coordinating military plans with both the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the president. Sylvia’s firing comes as Trump has repeatedly floated starting new military operations against Iran. Trump has vowed to “finish the job” in Iran after launching the war with Israel eight months ago and said new strikes are an option after the midterm elections next week. U.S. officials have told several Middle East countries and regional allies to be prepared for potential renewed military action after Tuesday’s elections as well as for the possibility that Iran will attempt to retaliate against them, two diplomats briefed on the matter said. They say Trump has not made a final decision on new strikes. A third U.S. aircraft carrier and thousands of additional troops are making their way to the region.

Before arriving at the Joint Staff, Sylvia served as the commander of the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, until May 2025, according to his official biography, which has now been taken offline. He also previously served as the vice director for the J5. He is the latest in nearly two dozen generals, admirals and other military leaders to be fired, forced to retire or otherwise depart under Hegseth’s tenure — almost all of which have not been publicly explained by the Pentagon. That includes the civilian secretaries of the Army and Navy as well as some top uniformed officers for the military services. The Pentagon did not immediately respond to messages seeking comment late Wednesday. Hegseth said last month that he ordered the military to double the cuts to the overall number of top officers to a 20% decrease to be completed by Jan. 1, 2027. There are currently roughly 800 flag and general officer positions. “I call it accountability and long overdue,” Hegseth told junior officers and enlisted leaders at the Marine Corps Base Quantico on Sept. 30. Some members of Congress have criticized cuts to the ranks of generals as a “purge” that will take years to rebuild. “He’s got some kind of like deep-seated grievance about leadership in the military,” Sen. Mark Kelly, D-Ariz., a former Navy combat pilot who has been critical of Hegseth, said last month. “He’s purging a generation of great leaders of the military, and it’s going to take a generation to recover from it.”

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth fired Army Lt. Gen. Brett Sylvia as head of strategy, plans and policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a defense official said late Wednesday. Typically, the general in the position and their staff are responsible for generating and coordinating military plans for both the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the president. No reason was given for the firing, the latest in a series of ousters or departures of military leaders under Hegseth. However, a Pentagon official, who was not authorized to comment publicly and spoke on condition of anonymity, later said in a statement that Sylvia was under investigation over allegations of sharing classified information about the Iran war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict and other topics with journalists. The statement claims that Sylvia failed three polygraph tests about leaking classified information.

lol. fucking polygraphs

Chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said in a social media post that the department “took necessary personnel action to protect sensitive information” without mentioning Sylvia by name. He said the matter has been sent to the Justice Department for “potential further legal action.” It is not clear why the Pentagon would appear to be pursuing charges in civilian courts instead of trying the general in the military justice system. Sylvia did not immediately respond to a voicemail, text messages, emails and a LinkedIn message on accounts and numbers that appear to belong to him. When asked about Sylvia’s firing by reporters Thursday, President Donald Trump said, “She’s gonna have big problems,” incorrectly identifying the male general as a woman.

he's Brett Sylvia, Sylvia's the family name, but 's going "General Sylvia? hmm, must be a gal, as we all know generals are usually referred to by their first name"

“We’re very much looking for leakers,” Trump said. In a confusing twist, the Joint Staff on Thursday also withdrew a statement from a day earlier that wished Sylvia well because “upon further review, we determined that the statement did not appropriately reflect the full circumstances.” A spokesperson late Wednesday had said the Joint Staff extended its “deepest gratitude to Lt. Gen. Brett Sylvia and his family for their 32 years of distinguished service to our nation.” The firing of Sylvia from the Pentagon’s top military planning post comes as Trump weighs renewed strikes on Iran in the eight-month-long war following next week’s midterm elections. The Pentagon official, however, insisted Sylvia was not a “central planner” on the Iran conflict and said that was the purview of U.S. Central Command. Before arriving at the Joint Staff, Sylvia served as commander of the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, until May 2025, according to his official biography, which has now been taken offline. He also previously served as the vice director for the office he recently led. His military awards include six Bronze Star Medals, including one for valor, and a Purple Heart, indicating he was wounded in combat.

Sylvia’s case is Hegseth’s latest accusation against top Pentagon officials of leaking to the media. He fired three aides from his inner circle last year as part of a broader leak investigation that included polygraph tests. In a joint statement shared by senior aide Dan Caldwell, the trio protested the firing and said they were “incredibly disappointed by the manner in which our service at the Department of Defense ended. Unnamed Pentagon officials have slandered our character with baseless attacks on our way out the door.” Hegseth never provided more information on what the three were accused of, and Caldwell would go on to be hired by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Under Hegseth, the Pentagon also has carried out a series of moves restricting media access, including requiring that journalists be escorted while on Pentagon grounds and declaring that its press office was a classified space inaccessible to journalists.

European leaders meet next month to discuss ways to help Ukraine fill a projected €70 billion budget deficit. But their capacity for direct aid is constrained by efforts to rearm their own militaries amid a challenging economic environment, while Belgium continues to oppose the conversion of frozen Russian assets into a loan. Western financial aid—€170 billion ($189.5 billion) since 2022—has been key to helping Kyiv stay financially afloat since Russia's wider invasion, according to the Kiel Institute. But the U.S. has drastically cut aid under the second Trump administration, leaving the European Union, Canada, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom to shoulder most of the burden. Earlier this year, the EU approved a plan to lend Ukraine €90 billion to Ukraine through 2027, two-thirds of which will go to buy weapons and the rest to budgetary support. Around €14 billion has been disbursed to date, and by year's end that figure should grow to €45 billion. But Russian attacks on critical infrastructure and other stresses mean that Kyiv is still looking at a budget deficit of around €70 billion for 2027.

European governments are spending more on their own defenses. In 2021, the defense budgets of NATO's European members averaged around 1.6 percent of GDP, below NATO’s then-target of 2 percent. The alliance has since boosted its goal to 2.5 percent of GDP, and at last year's summit, committed to raising ‘core’ defense expenditure to 3.5 percent over the next decade. At the same time, they are facing rising debt and slowing economies. Eurozone countries have an average debt-to-GDP ratio of nearly 89 percent, and nearly 83 percent in EU nations generally. Buffeted by the trade wars and energy shocks of the Trump administration, eurozone economies will grow only 1.1 percent in 2026, according to a recent projection by the International Monetary Fund. Some northern EU members are in much better fiscal shape than their southern and western counterparts. The budget picture is getting cloudier. Annual inflation in the eurozone rose to 3.8 percent in September, according to Eurostat, well above the European Central Bank (ECB) target of 2 percent. The ECB raised interest rates at its June and September meetings, and is expected to deliver another hike at one of the year's two remaining meetings. Rising prices may force the ECB to continue tightening policy, raising debt-service payments from government budgets.

Supporting Ukraine remains broadly popular in the EU, but the challenging economic environment makes it a tough sell for governments to increase aid to Ukraine along with their own defense spending. European governments are already facing domestic criticism over rearmament. Italy, for example, was approved for an allocation of up to €14.9 billion from the E.U.’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) loan facility, meant to aid rearmament. Yet Rome requested only about €8 billion from SAFE, as Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government sparred with critics within her own coalition and in the opposition on financing more defense spending with debt.

Frozen Russian assets

EU countries are thus once again looking at alternative methods of backstopping Ukraine’s budget. One of the most obvious options is the conversion of frozen Russian financial assets into a loan to Kyiv. After Russia's February 2022 invasion, the G7 froze Russian government securities held abroad. As much as $300 billion was impounded as a result and remains in limbo to this day, including about €210 billion held in the European financial system. While the principal has remained untouched, the EU has begun to use the interest income on those securities to help Ukraine, on the grounds that Russia, as aggressor, should pay for the damage caused to Ukraine. That has generated about €8 billion, of which €3.8 billion has been delivered to Ukraine, and €4.2 billion has been reserved to repay E.U. or G7 loans to Ukraine. In September, Germany and other E.U. members revived the topic of converting the Russian assets into a loan for Kyiv, POLITICO reported. Berlin views the step as a ‘win-win’ for the E.U., enabling the bloc to help Kyiv address its financial needs, while replacing some of the funds that would be reserved for Ukraine in the E.U.’s upcoming multi-year budget.

But the politics around seizing the Russian assets have barely budged. Belgium is the custodian of much of those Russian funds, which are housed in the Brussels-based Euroclear. The Belgian government blocked a 2025 proposal to seize the funds, fearing that it alone would bear the legal and financial risk of seizing the funds. Earlier this year, the Bank of Russia sued Euroclear in a Russian court for the funds, arguing that they were illegally seized. The court backed the Russian central bank’s challenge in a ruling two months later, though it lacks jurisdiction to enforce the judgment. Concern over the legal risks means Brussels will likely stymie the proposal again. “I am certain that the European Commission will not make proposals to meet Ukraine’s financing needs through a new operation linked to Russian assets,” Belgian Prime Minister Bart de Wever told reporters on Oct. 21. “I am certain of that, because that is what was said.” As European leaders prepare for a November meeting to iron out next year's assistance to Ukraine, the EU is already pushing other partners to increase their contributions to Kyiv. The situation is becoming more urgent. Ukraine has largely exhausted its stockpile of interceptors, leaving its cities and energy grid vulnerable to Russian attack. The Ukrainian military intelligence agency HUR recently estimated that Russia can produce 10,000 long-range strike drones and decoys each month. Mounting damage increases Ukraine’s financial needs, as the country scrambles to keep the lights on.

It’s not a new problem. “Years ago, the Navy got itself into a hole on conventional surface ship maintenance due in part to what turned out to be underestimates in planning, scheduling, and funding that work. Since then, the Navy has been working for years to dig itself out of that conventional surface ship maintenance hole. Perturbations in ship maintenance and repair schedules caused by ships being used for extended deployments can add to the Navy’s challenge of digging itself out of that hole,” O’Rourke said. So the service needs to give its ships the maintenance they need. But that’s unlikely to happen while the Navy is keeping so many ships in theater, a second Navy expert said. “The end result is that deferred maintenance becomes more and more problematic, causing knock-on effects like parts and equipment wearing out or breaking before they should. In the end, these ships will reach their end of service life well before their scheduled date.”

A few years ago, a port call in the Middle East might mean bottomless-mojito brunches in Bahrain, hitting the indoor ski slopes in a Dubai megamall, or a desert safari in Qatar. But since Operation Epic Fury began eight months ago, U.S. warships in the theater have basically had just one option: Diego Garcia, some 2,500 miles away. It’s not great for morale, but the consequences go beyond disgruntled sailors who tire of fishing off the British island in the Indian Ocean. The remote coral atoll lacks the pierside infrastructure that many Gulf, Mediterranean, and Pacific ports can offer. As the Navy stretches its fleet with longer deployments and fewer port calls, warships are losing the ability to do crucial mid-cruise maintenance. “When a ship is deployed overseas for longer than the nominal seven-month deployment period, that increases the amount of time for equipment on the ship to break, get worn down, or worn out. As a result, when the ship finally does make it back to the United States, it might need more maintenance and repair work than it would have needed if the deployment had not exceeded seven months,” said Ron O’Rourke, who retired this year after more than 40 years as a naval analyst for the Congressional Research Service. “That can increase the time and cost to do the maintenance and repair work, and an increased time needed to do the work could prevent other ships from entering maintenance and overhaul as scheduled. This can lead to a cascading effect in delaying maintenance on other ships.”

A Navy officer with expertise in maritime security agreed, noting that “even deployed ships need time alongside”—that is, moored directly to a pier or tender vessel for what’s called voyage repair availability—“to fix broken things, remediate rust, paint, etc. If these ships are kept out for 10 to 12 months, they’ll be missing other scheduled maintenance events and be much more broken than they should be when they get home.” The Navy itself nodded to the problem in a recent press release about the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln, which is changing homeports to receive overdue depot-level maintenance after a nearly 11-month deployment. “Regularly scheduled depot-level maintenance maximizes the lifespan of our Navy vessels and keeps our fleets lethal, modern, and ready to defend the nation.” The Lincoln’s 321-day deployment—and the carrier Gerald R. Ford’s 326-day deployment before it—set records for consecutive days at sea and length of deployment, respectively. But a few Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers are on track to far surpass those numbers. And Navy officials recently told families in Yokosuka, Japan, that for the foreseeable future they should expect all ships to deploy for 10 to 12 months. A Navy spokesperson said they would “not discuss specific readiness rates, operational requirements, force-allocation deliberations, or future force movements. However, we remain committed to regular maintenance to maximize the lifespan of our Navy vessels and keep our fleets lethal and ready to defend our nation.”

‘It’s empty’

Instead of the luxury hotels and hundreds of restaurants sailors can visit in ports like Dubai and Bahrain, Diego Garcia has a military supply base and a small town with a handful of restaurants. And since virtually every ship deployed in the region is using the island for port calls and resupply, store shelves don’t always stay stocked.

lol. lmao. country with the best logistics in the world, folks!

looking forward to when the treatlerite troops launch a mutiny because they were deployed to a base with too few restaurants

The guided-missile destroyer John Finn, which left Japan in January, pulled into Diego Garcia after months at sea. “Everybody’s going to the ship store and it’s empty,” a sailor’s spouse told Defense One. “You can find ice cream, but you’re not going to find your necessities that you need to function.” The ship had pulled in because it was “empty,” the spouse said, after having spent all of its weapons in the campaign against Iran. “So they had to spend that week resupplying.” The spouse of a sailor on the Mustin, another guided-missile destroyer, said her husband was able to get socks but not shoe polish at the exchange on base during the only port call the ship has made since leaving Japan in April. “He got off like, preparing to be able to get the stuff that he needed right now, and he goes, ‘They don’t have shit,’” she said. “They didn’t have anything.” For the Mustin crew, the port call seemed like a welcome respite from their months at sea, until they were told just before getting off the ship that they would not return in August as originally planned, but stay deployed until April 2027, the spouse told Defense One. “The sad part is, they were actually in good spirits,” she said. “And then I know things went really rowdy in Diego Garcia because they were given the bad news literally the day before they pulled in. … There was one of the nights in Diego Garcia that two sailors ended up in the ER with alcohol poisoning. And so then they lost their last night of liberty because of it.” O’Rourke said the British island “can provide an opportunity to be on land for a while, and to engage in certain R&R activities. But the options for doing R&R things at Diego Garcia are a lot more limited than they are at other ports, such as Singapore or somewhere in the Mediterranean.” Ralph Cossa, chairman of the Pacific Forum, was less diplomatic. “Please shoot me if that’s the only R&R I’m going to get in 10 months,” he said.

Mail delays

Sailors have asked their families and friends to send them supplies, but mail is taking three to six months to reach the destroyers, the spouses said. The Mustin spouse sent her husband six boxes at the end of June; he received one in September and the rest in October. The John Finn spouse said it took four months for a few packages to reach her sailor, and some that “took even longer than six months to get out there.” “I think I’ve sent my husband the same thing three different times now, and I’m like, well, hopefully one of these gets to you in the next two or three months, and whenever the other ones show up, you’re just gonna have an abundance. Share it with somebody else.” Both spouses expressed concern about the sailors’ ability to vote in the upcoming elections, given the mail delays. The John Finn spouse said her husband, who has done multiple deployments in the past, said, “There has been no conversation about voting because we don’t have time for it. We don’t have time to even have conversations because we are busy doing all of this other crap that nobody wants to be doing to begin with.” By contrast, sailors aboard the George Washington aircraft carrier generally “can expect to receive mail shipped from the states within weeks,” Lt. Cmdr. Bobby Dixon, a ship spokesperson, told Defense One. “However, this can take longer when deployed overseas. We work with our U.S. military logistics teammates to minimize mail delays and we are committed to ensuring all service members can exercise their right to vote.”

Maintenance

Navy ships, like any other vehicles, require a certain amount of maintenance to continue working. There are three levels of repairs: basic, intermediate, and depot-level maintenance. Deployed ships are under stress from the salt water and sea air, and more things are likely to wear down or break when they’re being used frequently for long periods of time. And the forward-deployed destroyers based in Yokosuka—including the John Finn and the Mustin—are usually in a cycle in which they spend just a few months at sea before heading back home for a few months of maintenance. Now those two destroyers are slated to be at sea for a year or more, which will mean they will miss the beginning of their planned five-month shipyard maintenance periods. And the Mustin spouse said there were already some maintenance problems on that ship when it shifted homeports from San Diego, Calif., to Yokosuka, just before it left for deployment. “Their maintenance log was 100 percent not empty,” and there were a lot of things “that they should have been turned around for,” she said. The ship was told to head to Japan anyway. And though the sailors were told their lone port call was planned so they could perform maintenance, “they never got anything fixed when they went to Diego Garcia. … They didn’t actually go up pierside.”

O’Rourke said there are consequences for delays to the intermediate and depot levels of maintenance. “If you have a period where the total fraction of the Navy being on deployment overseas is elevated above what the notional model calls for, there will be a period downstream where you have to pay the piper, where the fraction of the Navy that will be available for deployment will be less than what the notional model called for because you're making up for that earlier period,” he said.