France faces a different challenge from Germany and Poland, which have ample funding for equipment but struggle to attract enough personnel to meet force targets, according to Justel. The French Army has “more than enough” recruitment candidates, and last year declined to recruit the equivalent of a regiment due to budgetary constraints, the deputy chief said in a briefing here on Thursday. European NATO members have lifted defense budgets following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and as the United States pushes for allies to take on more conventional defense. While many countries including France are expanding reserve forces, Germany and Poland also plan to grow active-duty personnel by tens of thousands in coming years, with measures such as higher pay to make military service more attractive. “We have completely asymmetrical situations,” Justel said. “I see in Poland and Germany a huge budgetary and industrial effort to acquire weapons. Now, they face enormous personnel difficulties, and having a lot of weaponry without the fighters behind it, well, that remains problematic.”

Germany aims to expand its armed forces to 260,000 active soldiers by 2035 from about 186,000 now, according to a federal law governing Bundeswehr force development, while Poland intends to increase its armed forces to 300,000 from around 210,000 in mid-2025. Meanwhile, France has a force of around 191,000 military personnel and plans to recruit 21,400 active-duty troops in 2026. Poland has high ambitions to grow its forces, “they have a real sense of urgency, but there are still difficulties recruiting,” Justel said. The Polish armed forces face intensifying competition for labor in a growing economy, with Poland having the second-lowest unemployment rate in the European Union, RAND wrote in a report last year. “In terms of human resources, we are in the opposite situation,” Justel said. “This year, we’re already slowing down recruitment because not only are we recruiting better, but we’re retaining people better.” France has one of the largest youth cohorts in Europe, with those aged 15 to 19 making up 6.2% of the population in 2024, compared with 4.7% for Germany and 5% for Poland. Meanwhile, trust in the armed forces is among the highest in France, with 84% of the French expressing trust compared with 73% of Germans and 76% of Poles, according to a Eurobarometer poll published in May.

“To see the number of young people coming to enlist, and not enlisting just to find a job, they’re joining to serve in combat units and looking to defend their country,” Justel said. “There’s a dynamic in this country, there’s a demographic that makes it possible, and there’s a mindset that makes it possible.” “When I talk with my foreign counterparts, what strikes me most is the difference in recruitment, in terms of quantity, quality, motivation, and mindset,” Justel said. “Where we’re in the opposite situation is in terms of equipment, we’re not sufficiently equipped to handle a high-intensity conflict.” The French Army continues to lack spare parts and stockpiles, and has “very significant gaps” in deep fires, ground-to-air defense, counter-drone operations, and electronic warfare, according to Justel. He said France’s two most recent defense-planning laws improved the equipment situation a lot, and the Army’s armored-vehicle modernization is “progressing well,” but more is needed. Justel said France retains expertise in areas such as electronic warfare but needs to spread those capabilities more broadly across the force. The Army has identified the equivalent of about ten battalions needed to be more effective in areas including command, logistics, deep fires, drones and electronic warfare, he said.

“But there, we’re moving into a change in format, into additional capabilities,” Justel said. “So these are more long-term efforts.” The deputy commander said France’s force structure means it would be difficult for the country to permanently replace U.S. troops in parts of Europe, with the Army already “very committed” with deployments in Romania and Estonia. The French Army is instead counting on regular exercises in countries such as Finland rather than permanent basing, to ensure troops are familiar with the terrain, conditions and local friendly forces, and to be able to deploy reinforcements “quickly and effectively” the day they are needed, Justel said.

Years ago, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev described Baku’s relationship with Israel as an iceberg, with 90% hidden below the surface. Last week, CNN attempted to pull the hidden portion into full view. Notably, the report relied on four anonymous sources with apparent knowledge of highly sensitive Israeli military and intelligence activities in the greater Middle East. While CNN did not identify them, the nature of the information disclosed strongly suggests that the sources were either American, Israeli, or closely connected to the security establishments of one or both countries. According to these sources Israel secretly deployed elite military and intelligence units — including special operations forces, Mossad personnel, and heliborne rescue teams — to multiple locations in southern Azerbaijan during the recent war with Iran.

From positions just 60 miles from Tabriz, a major Iranian city in the north, Israeli commandos allegedly conducted drone operations, installed listening devices, and even helped prepare the ground for the assassination of an IRGC intelligence chief. CNN put this all in the context of other covert sites used by Israel in Iraq, the UAE, and Somaliland during the war, pointing to a ring of forward positions around Iran. Predictably, Baku reacted to the CNN report with fury. The Azerbaijani foreign ministry called the report “entirely baseless” and a violation of journalistic ethics, insisting that “Azerbaijan has never allowed, and will never allow, its territory to be used for such purposes.” Baku demanded that CNN retract what it called “unfounded allegations.” Whether or not CNN’s reporting proves fully accurate, the allegations fit a strategic relationship that has long been the subject of regional scrutiny. Israel provides Azerbaijan with advanced weapons (according to the Stockholm-based SIPRI, up to 70% of its arms imports) and buys its oil (around 40% of Israel’s consumption). Israel gets a foothold on Iran’s borders, and Azerbaijan gets the support of the powerful pro-Israel lobby in Washington. The late Quincy Institute fellow Mark Perry reported in a detailed essay in Foreign Policy as early as 2012 that Azerbaijan was “Israel’s secret staging ground” against Iran.

But why are the details being leaked now? While no official claims have been made, one possibility could be that the U.S. and Israel want to ensure Azerbaijan won’t rescind its cooperation. If so, by publicizing the alleged bases, Washington and Tel Aviv are burning Baku’s plausible deniability with Tehran. This dovetails with a pattern. After the active phase of the war, reports emerged of a secret visit by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the UAE. Emirati officials vehemently denied them, while their Israeli counterparts openly boasted about the trip. The leak may have been at least partially linked to Israeli domestic political considerations — Netanyahu needs to burnish his credentials as a statesman to see off a tough challenge from his main rival Naftali Bennett in elections later this year. But its effect was to further tie Abu Dhabi to Israel’s regional posture toward Iran. The same logic may apply here: tie Azerbaijan’s hands. If Iran lashes out at either UAE or Azerbaijan, or both, the logic presumably goes, they’d have to turn to Israel for protection, thus solidifying their security dependence on Tel Aviv.

So far, Tehran has shown restraint. The Iranian drone attack on Nakhchivan in March — which Aliyev called “an act of terror” — has been interpreted by Iranian sources as a warning shot, not an opening salvo for greater hostilities. Iran has avoided a northern front throughout the war, concentrating instead on the Persian Gulf and its missile exchanges with Israel. If that was indeed Tehran’s message, then it succeeded: despite his vows of retaliation, Aliyev has to date done nothing — and in fact, shipped humanitarian cargoes to Iran soon thereafter. Neither Baku nor Tehran wanted an open confrontation at that stage, but the more recent revelations can provide fuel for Tehran to act against Baku next time — if the war resumes. That is the real danger. If hostilities restart, Iran could treat Azerbaijan as a legitimate military target. Baku would then be forced to choose between full alignment with Israel — and devastating retaliation — or a break with its most important defense partner, alongside Turkey. However, there is a crucial caveat. Baku's direct, operational involvement in specific hostile actions against Iran — such as enabling Israeli air sorties from Azerbaijan as opposed to logistical roles, such as hosting Israeli commando units that helped kill an IRGC general on Iranian soil — is a distinction that matters enormously. This could be considered a potential casus belli.

Tehran’s muted reaction so far suggests that it will first review the CNN claims carefully and reach its own conclusions. Iranian actions so far have indicated caution. Tehran is calculating: is this disclosure useful? Does it provide leverage? Or does it force Tehran’s hand before it is ready? There is also the Turkish factor. Despite recent friction, Ankara remains Baku’s steadfast ally. Iran sees Turkey as a military peer, and would not precipitate any action that would put it on a collision course with Ankara. And, as Amwaj Media’s Mohammad Ali Shabani points out, Ankara played a helpful role in restraining Kurdish groups from mounting a campaign against Iran in the opening days of the U.S.-Israeli war that was launched February 29 — a service Tehran won’t forget. All of this plays into the next steps for Tehran.

Tangentially, the CNN story is also a blow to the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) — the so-called "Caucasus Corridor" announced by the U.S. president as part of a peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia. TRIPP has been touted as a strategic wedge against Russian and Iranian influence in the South Caucasus. It is designed to link Azerbaijan overland through Armenia to its Nakhchevan exclave and Turkey, bypassing Iran. But TRIPP requires stability. The investors need to be assured that the region is a safe, neutral transit hub, not a forward operating base for Israeli commandos. A fresh crisis on its Azeri leg could scare off potential investors, already shaken by the Iran war. Despite TRIPP’s status as one of Trump’s signature peace projects that, in his view, should earn him the Nobel Peace Prize, Israel is unlikely to let Azerbaijan off very easily — Baku has become their strategic depth now. That may be the whole point of the CNN leak — whether intended or not: to make any future Azerbaijani reconciliation with Iran politically impossible. The iceberg has been mapped. Now Baku, Tehran and everyone else has to sail around it. Or try to blow it up.