America’s Military Humiliation

When, in reaction to the war in Gaza, the Houthis of Yemen started imposing their blockade on the Red Sea, it was seen as a sure sign of waning American power: a global hegemon was allowing its control over a vital sea route to be contested.

And so, in January 2024, Operation Poseidon Archer was launched, which involved British as well as American aircraft trying to bomb the Houthis into submission.

The operation was unsuccessful, doing almost nothing to dent Houthi attacks or open up the Red Sea to shipping.

Operation Poseidon Archer was followed by Operation Rough Rider, in March of this year, which tried to show a new, much more muscular American military response against Houthi targets in Yemen — for all of six weeks.

US warplanes pounded Yemen around the clock, with rare and expensive stealth bombers flying missions out of Diego Garcia in support of carrier-based aircraft.

This was trumpeted as a beautiful victory for the US military, with the Houthis finally promising to not attack US ships anymore, and America kindly returning the gesture.

The Houthis only had to stop attacking American ships in exchange for America stopping the bombing; they were free to continue preventing access the Red Sea or firing missiles at Israel.

Trump’s Operation Rough Rider, unlike Biden’s operations, utilised many of America’s most limited, expensive, and advanced weapons to try to bring the Houthis to heel.

But the US has no alternative modes of warfare to fall back on, which means that its days as a military hegemon are probably coming to a close.

To understand just how big a mess the air war against the Houthis has turned out to be, it’s important to understand a very basic rule to US military inventories.

For while, on paper, America has 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, an impressive figure that far outstrips any other country on the planet, that top line figure is barely relevant in practice.

The UK has two large aircraft carriers, putting it near the top of the international leaderboard when it comes to the ability to project military force.

The number of carriers the UK can actually send out and use is far lower, a number which is fairly close to zero.

For while the ships exist, the Royal Navy doesn't have the crew, the planes, the escorts, and the organizational ability to actually put them to use for any length of time in a real war.

Though the situation for the US Navy isn't quite as terrible and serious, in practice, the problem is the same: it cannot realistically put more than two to four carriers to sea at any given moment.

For Operation Rough Rider, the US Air Force added some six B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, many would say the most advanced (and by far the most expensive) airframe in the US storehouse of weapons.

But a closer look at these planes suggest that those six used in Rough Rider very likely represent the whole list of working US stealth bombers.

Only half of US bombers even qualify for what’s called "mission capable" status on an average day, a status which doesn't actually mean that the plane works; it simply means the plane isn't completely broken.

“Full mission capable” is your standard Pentagon-speak; it means the plane is in working order, has nothing broken that’s really important, and can realistically be used for what it was built for.

America basically pulled out all the stops to attack the Houthis.

Fighting a very expensive and intensive air war against a group of armed citizens controlling most of Yemen, the fourth-poorest nation in the world.

The cost to operate a B-2 stealth bomber is very high on a per-hour basis; and their delicate stealth coating is not particularly especially of the warm, salty sea air at Diego Garcia.

America also committed roughly half of its active carriers, spent a fortune in land attack and air defence missiles, and it even cannibalised ammo stores and air defence systems from the Pacific theatre of operations for the benefit of the operation.

The US couldn’t establish air supremacy, meaning it couldn’t risk flying its older, non-stealth planes for fear of losing them.

This is not a problem of weakness or fear, but of force generation: even if the US military suffers zero losses due to enemy fire in the years ahead, scheduled to shrink steeply and dangerously.

This shrinkage and loss of capacity is just due to America’s planes and ships wearing out, with not enough workers, dockyards, engineers, and dollars to replace them.

The result of this American Achilles’ heel has been an very expensive reliance — when it has come to defending the Red Sea what’s commonly called “standoff” weaponry.

But even then, there were problems: according to leaked reports, even the well respected F-35 stealth fighter had to avoid incoming anti-air missiles on at least one occasion.

In Operation Rough Rider, the US sent out and used many of its most rare and custom-made weapons, such as the AGM-158 JASSM (Joint Air-To-Surface Standoff Missile) as well as heavy, specialised bunker-buster bombs.

Trump could have sent another carrier to the area in support of his operation, bringing the total up to three.

But this would hardly have made much difference to the air campaign because the problem with this offensive wasn’t lack of deck space or fighter sorties.

US planes were too wary to go anywhere near Yemen’s air defence, and even stealth jets were according to reports not completely safe.

Operation Rough Rider was supposed to be a clear show of force against an under-prepared, internally divided third-world nation.

Instead, it ended up looking like the last hurrah of a truly old and useless form of warfare, unable to successfully deal with cheaper and better anti-air weapon systems.

Iran is far bigger than Yemen, with a much more strong air defence network.

The critical parts of Iran’s nuclear programme are kept under hundreds of feet of solid mountain.

The US, using the heaviest and most advanced weapons in its whole arsenal, did not succeed against the much shallower Houthi bunkers and missile storage facilities in Yemen.

All of the problems that forced America’s tacit surrender of the Suez canal would be large and be far more deadly in any action against Iran.

With exploding deficits, a growing internal political problem, and a slowly collapsing military, America is a leopard that doesn't have the ability to even attempt to change its spots.