news

The Secretaries of State, Education, and Homeland Security will report on activities that could be considered ‘anti-Semitic’. On Wednesday, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order to identify and deport foreign students and professors who participated in pro-Palestinian protests.

He instructed the Secretaries of State, Education, and Homeland Security to ask universities to monitor and report on activities by foreign students and professors that could be considered “antisemitic.” His executive order includes several provisions regarding antisemitism but focuses particularly on the protests that erupted on U.S. campuses, where approximately 3,100 people were arrested last year.

Between April and June 2024, thousands of students and academics across the United States protested against the genocide in Gaza and against Washington’s support for Israel. “Jewish students have faced an unrelenting barrage of discrimination; denial of access to campus common areas and facilities, including libraries and classrooms; and intimidation, harassment, and physical threats and assault,” the order said referring to the 2024 protests.

However, members of the American academic community have repeatedly argued that the protests were not intended to be anti-Semitic, but rather sought to highlight the consequences of the Israeli military offensive in Gaza, where the Zionist army killed more than 47,000 Palestinians. The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), one of the country’s leading organizations defending Muslim rights, warned that it would challenge the order in court if it is implemented.

Authorities have designed several mechanisms to take advantage of the economy’s partial dollarization. During a televised roundtable on Wednesday, Mildred Granadillo, the Vice Minister of Economy, explained the characteristics and scope of the “partial dollarization” of the Cuban economy, which has accompanied the recent opening of stores operating directly in U.S. dollars in the country.

“One of the main restrictions facing the economy is the lack of foreign currency,” she said, indicating that the Cuban government decided to address this deficit through the partial dollarization of the economy— a temporary measure that will be implemented gradually while its effects are monitored.

President Miguel Diaz-Canel has implemented a set of measures aimed at capturing and managing foreign currency to boost Cuban output by promoting linkages between different productive sectors. As part of the strategy to attract foreign currency, the Cuban government has authorized the opening of commercial establishments that sell products in U.S. dollars. Initially, these businesses were concentrated in the most tourist-heavy areas, but their gradual expansion to the rest of the country is expected.

Authorities have also allowed the acceptance of cash in U.S. dollars in certain establishments with the intention of channeling the circulating dollars that are currently outside the formal financial system. The Diaz-Canel administration has designed several mechanisms to direct remittance inflows into the state banking system. In this regard, authorities have strengthened banking formalization and the use of electronic payment methods.

Currently, the Cuban banking system maintains operational accounts in Freely Convertible Currency (MLC) and their associated cards, allowing citizens and businesses to carry out transactions in foreign currency. Additionally, authorities have introduced new financial products, such as the prepaid card from the Bank of Credit and Commerce, which is designed to facilitate transactions in U.S. dollars.

Through these monetary and financial policies, Cuba aims to increase the production of goods for both domestic consumption and export. However, the Economy vice minister emphasized that the process of partial dollarization does not mean that the national currency has ceased to be the primary component of the Cuban economy.

To illustrate this point, Granadillo noted that over 90 percent of retail commercial transactions in 2025 are expected to be conducted in Cuban pesos. “Only 10% of commercial transactions take place in the foreign currency sales network. The Cuban peso remains the core of our financial system and must have purchasing power. That is why we must move forward with a set of decisions linked to the macroeconomic stabilization program,” she said.

“Generating foreign currency is of vital importance to reviving the production of goods and services because Cuba has an open economy that is highly dependent on imports. If the necessary foreign currency is not available to carry out these imports, it will be very difficult to foster all the linkages planned as part of the government’s program.”