Earlier this month, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Miao Deyu met with Omani National Security Council Secretary-General Idris Abdulrahman Al Kindi. The pair reaffirmed support for each other’s core interests, discussed deepening cooperation between the Belt and Road Initiative and Oman Vision 2040, and talked about regional security issues. During the visit, Al Kindi also met with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) official Jin Xin. Both sides expressed interest in expanding bilateral exchanges and cooperation, while Oman said it hopes to learn from the CCP’s governance experience and strengthen collaboration in trade, investment, industrial parks, and tourism. The meeting was notable for the level of representation. The participation of Oman’s National Security Council secretary-general suggested that bilateral engagement is expanding beyond trade toward political and strategic consultation. It also sent clear messages to Beijing that China is becoming a broader strategic partner, and to Washington that Muscat intends to preserve its foreign policy independence. “Oman survives by ensuring that no single relationship can hold its sovereignty hostage,” said Hamed S. Al Ghaithi, senior research associate at Country Risk Solutions, in an interview with RS, noting that diversification of partnerships is the “oldest instinct in modern Omani statecraft.” “What the war has done is convert a preference into a necessity,” he said.

As tensions with Washington rise and the fallout from the Iran war reverberates across the Middle East, Oman is seeking greater strategic autonomy by diversifying its international partnerships. Its expanding relationship with China is a critical part of that agenda, as Muscat seeks to gain greater flexibility without abandoning its longstanding security ties with the United States. At stake is a fundamental question about the extent to which the U.S. will show flexibility to smaller states that seek to navigate among competing centers of power in an increasingly multipolar world rather than align exclusively with Washington. Oman, known for its independent foreign policy, has long balanced relations among regional states and global powers, embracing the role of a neutral mediator and partner. It is not seeking a grand pivot away from the West. But it is hoping to preserve strategic autonomy and strengthen its resilience in an increasingly multipolar world. Within this context, Oman’s relationship with China warrants particular attention.

Diversifying without realignment

Recent events have reinforced Omani concerns about excessive dependence on Washington. Particularly concerning from Oman’s point of view were the Trump administration’s decision to sabotage Omani-facilitated diplomacy with Tehran in late February by launching a reckless war on Iran, as well as Trump’s subsequent threat to “blow up” Oman amid reports that Muscat was in talks with Tehran about imposing a joint toll on the Strait of Hormuz. “From Muscat’s perspective, a country that has acted for decades as a reliable mediator and maintained constructive relations with Washington should not be publicly threatened merely because it refuses to surrender its independent foreign policy,” said an Omani geopolitical analyst who spoke to RS on the condition of anonymity. “Oman is therefore likely to deepen relations not only with China, but also with European powers, India, Russia, and other Asian states. The objective is not to replace one dependency with another. It is to create a wider network of economic, diplomatic, technological, and security partnerships that gives Oman greater room to maneuver,” he explained, adding that a “more openly multipolar Omani foreign policy” could become the outcome. “Oman’s neutrality and mediation role will remain central, but Muscat may become more assertive in defending its sovereignty and less willing to accommodate pressure to choose sides.” Oman generally avoids dramatic realignments. Instead, Muscat is seeking to expand relationships incrementally, preserving longstanding Western security ties while deepening diplomatic, economic and political engagement with China and other Asian partners. “Oman is not exchanging one patron for another,” said Al Ghaithi. “It is redistributing risk so that it never again faces a moment where a single capital can dictate its choices.”

The broadening China-Oman partnership

While energy remains the foundation of Sino-Omani relations, the partnership is likely to broaden into more investment and partnerships in logistics, manufacturing, renewable energy, and digital infrastructure, reflecting the alignment between Oman Vision 2040 and China’s connectivity ambitions. As a credible and effective intermediary in the Middle East, Oman pursues a diplomatic approach to regional security dilemmas that gives Beijing ample reason to view Muscat as a valuable partner. As China constantly works to build up its image as a champion of political dialogue and international law, as well as a constructive stakeholder in the Middle East, Beijing and Muscat’s cooperation stands to extend into new domains including crisis management, maritime governance, and the facilitation of post-conflict regional diplomacy. That both countries, along with Iraq, used their diplomatic leverage to help bring Saudi Arabia and Iran to renormalization of formal relations in March 2023 underscored such synergies between Oman and the Asian giant. “China and Oman share an interest in preventing the Strait of Hormuz from becoming either a battlefield or an instrument of political coercion. China requires uninterrupted energy flows, while Oman requires stability, freedom of navigation and respect for the sovereignty of the states bordering the Strait. This creates a strong basis for maritime and diplomatic coordination,” the Omani analyst told RS. “China may also find Oman useful as a diplomatic bridge. Oman maintains experience in mediation and communication with parties that often refuse to speak directly to one another. China, meanwhile, seeks to present itself as a supporter of diplomatic settlements and a significant political actor in the Middle East. Cooperation between the two countries could therefore extend into conflict de-escalation, maritime arrangements and post-war regional dialogue,” he added. Bilateral cooperation is also likely to expand in areas like maritime security coordination, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, military education, intelligence exchanges on non-traditional threats, and limited defense procurement in areas where Chinese systems offer practical advantages. However, such cooperation is likely to remain confined within clear boundaries. Muscat favors selective diversification on security issues rather than alliance commitments or permanent military basing.

Balancing great powers without choosing sides

Oman’s longstanding defense relationships with the U.K. and U.S. make it highly unlikely that China will replace Western partners as Muscat’s principal security guarantor. Instead, recent regional instability has reinforced Oman’s preference for balanced partnerships that preserve strategic autonomy while expanding its diplomatic and economic options. Muscat will take necessary steps to avoid too much economic dependence on China, which could undermine the Sultanate’s sovereignty. This balancing strategy reflects a broader Omani view that strategic autonomy depends not on choosing one external partner over another, but on maintaining the flexibility to work with multiple powers while protecting national interests. “Oman is the test case for whether small states can preserve multi-alignment in a bifurcating order and whether the United States can tolerate partners rather than merely clients,” Al Ghaithi said. “If the current pressure succeeds in forcing Oman to choose, Washington will not gain a more obedient ally; it will lose the region’s most useful diplomatic instrument, and China will inherit, at no cost, a partnership Americans spent two centuries building.” “The question worth asking is not whether Oman is drifting toward China, but why American policy is doing so much of the pushing.”