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Kofod is best known for having sex with a 15 year old girl in 2008 during a seminar in the Social Democrat youth organisation. He was 34 at the time. The 9th-grader had previously completed a one week internship at Kofod's office in parliament. The girl and her parents were both party members and the party was successful in putting a lid on the case and sparing Kofod from consequences. Although some rumours suggest less than full consent, the relationship was technically legal and no charges were brought.

In his book How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, Ivan Arreguín-Toft presents a compelling perspective on how conflicts unfold when there is a significant power imbalance. Toft argues that in asymmetric warfare, the more powerful side often ends up being defeated, not because they are outright beaten, but because they fail to achieve a decisive victory. Conversely, weaker parties win by enduring, persevering, refusing defeat, and maintaining sustained resistance. This explains how resistance movements interpret their confrontations with powerful adversaries – as seen in the Israeli war on Lebanon, where the outcome of a ceasefire, without realizing the stated objectives, left many in Israel disillusioned despite military superiority.

The Lebanese front: A force that transformed the conflict

Militarily, Hezbollah's involvement forced Israel to split its focus between Gaza and the northern border of occupied Palestine. This divide stretched Israeli forces thin, hindering their progress and complicating their strategy. Hezbollah's actions indicated that, for over a year, Israel faced a two-front battle – diverting troops and resources from Gaza to secure its northern regions. As acknowledged by The Times of Israel in August, Israel's shortage of manpower was evident, “The IDF is suffering manpower shortages caused by the hostilities on the northern border and the ongoing war in Gaza.”

This two-front struggle also stalled several planned Israeli ground operations in Gaza. The heightened tension on the northern border gave Palestinian resistance movements the time they needed to regroup and disrupt Israel's military timetable. An example of this was Israel's delay of a major ground offensive in Gaza until the US reinforced their air defenses in the area – a move attributed to fears of escalation from Lebanon.

Economic and psychological impact on Israel

The war on the Lebanese front led to severe economic losses for Israel. Israeli newspaper Walla reported in August that Hezbollah's attacks set off fires that destroyed approximately 180 dunams (around 44.5 acres) of land, including 7,500 dunams (around 1,853 acres) in the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan Heights and 4,600 dunams (around 1,137 acres) in the Upper Galilee. Extensive devastation was seen in agricultural fields and forests, contributing to environmental and economic losses. Agriculture, a key sector in Israel's economy, was heavily affected; over 1,000 dunams (around 247 acres) of cultivated land were damaged, including avocado, pear, apple, olive, and grape plantations. The departure of Thai and Palestinian workers due to the lack of safety and security in the area further exacerbated irrigation and pest control issues, as well as overall agricultural productivity.

Israel suffered from another huge blow – mass emigration – that came as a result of the Lebanese resistance's attacks on the north. Around 62,480 settlers in Israel's north fled or were evacuated – with many choosing not to return, citing safety concerns. Moreover, as of August 2024, 4,378 claims for property damage had been filed in the north, and losses in tourism reached NIS 1.15 billion (around $320,998,164) in direct revenues, with indirect losses at over NIS 2.64 billion (around $736,900,135). Agricultural and poultry production, which represents 70 percent of Israel's chicken supply, was significantly jeopardized, raising concerns over local food security.

The resistance heavily engaged in psychological warfare against the occupation state, planting an undeniable sense of insecurity and fear among the settlers and disrupting daily life across the north. Psychological warfare waged by Hezbollah also sought to influence the awareness of Israeli leaders and civilians about the risks of confronting the Axis of Resistance forces beyond Palestine.

Hezbollah employed hybrid warfare, integrating military and non-military strategies, including cognitive warfare, to shape Israeli perceptions. This approach involves introducing and promoting narratives about the Israeli occupation that align with the resistance movement's objectives while strengthening its social media presence to amplify these views. Hezbollah also highlighted internal issues within Israel through multilingual broadcasts, videos, and media campaigns that underscore Israel's vulnerabilities. Additionally, it periodically showcases its military advancements and directly addresses the Israeli public to foster uncertainty about their security and the country's future. These diverse tactics aim to influence the morale and perceptions of the Israeli population.

From resistance to repelling aggression

Despite these notable achievements, the war between Israel and Lebanon did not lead to the end of the war on Gaza. However, the occupation army was made to pay a hefty price, strategically undermining its broader objectives. As John Mearsheimer argues in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, objectives in warfare are dynamic, often shifting when external pressures collide with internal challenges. Israel’s campaign, which began offensively, became increasingly defensive as the focus diverted from achieving outright victory to ensuring survival.

The Lebanese front’s objective developed, too – from supporting Gaza to directly countering Israeli aggression against Lebanon. Israel initially sought to eliminate Hezbollah and establish a buffer zone along the Lebanese border, aiming to reassure northern settlers of their safety. However, these goals remained out of reach; rather than demonstrating overwhelming dominance, Israel found itself embroiled in a familiar quagmire.

Hezbollah performed an average of 23 military operations per day on Israel since the start of the war, targeting military outposts, barracks, and bases – even reaching deep into occupied Palestinian territories. This displays the resistance movement's enhanced capabilities. Moreover, Israel's ground invasion of south Lebanon, which was launched in early October, caused a lot of setbacks for the occupation forces: over 130 Israeli soldiers were killed, and 59 Merkava tanks, alongside various other military equipment, were destroyed. Despite multiple aggressive attempts to enter, Israeli forces failed to occupy any key towns in south Lebanon or to create a secure buffer zone. Hezbollah’s resilience turned what Israel had hoped would be a swift campaign into a costly ordeal, mirroring Israel’s defeat in the 2006 war.

The cost of war and the measure of victory

Modern warfare shows us that victory is not solely about inflicting the greatest losses or causing the most destruction; it is about achieving strategic goals. In conflicts like the Vietnam War or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the weaker side's ability to endure ultimately led to victory despite overwhelming casualties and devastation. The Lebanese resistance movement demonstrated the same resilience during the July 2006 war and again now – managing to withstand Israeli attacks and preventing the occupation from meeting its strategic goals.

Wars of national liberation always come at a high cost, especially for civilians. However, this is often a prerequisite for success against a militarily superior adversary. Hezbollah’s ability to withstand Israeli pressure and sustain its operations solidified its position as a formidable opponent – proving once again that true victory lies in thwarting the enemy's stated objectives, and not in mere survival.