Controlled Experiments

Even if US military and intelligence strategists had failed to anticipate the failures outlined above, they had an incredible advantage in projecting how the 2026 Iran War would unfold: a series of five limited military operations that demonstrated each of the failures in advance of the major conflict itself. These were Prosperity Guardian (December 2023), Poseidon Archer (January 2024), Days of Repentance (October 2024), Rough Rider (March 2025), and Rising Lion (June 2025). Prosperity Guardian showed that even a relatively resource-poor and weak military force could shut down a crucial maritime chokepoint with standoff munitions, and that an American naval force would be unable to stop it. Poseidon Archer and Rough Rider proved that a limited air campaign could fail to suppress the launches of those standoff munitions. Despite these three operations costing billions, they didn’t restore commercial confidence in shipping in the Red Sea, which was still down 60% from pre-2023 levels at the beginning of 2026. A post-mortem on the Red Sea Crisis published by West Point in June 2025 offered a blunt description of the failure of every option available to two successive presidential administrations:

This was the menu of options that the Biden administration had in November 2023, and it was largely the same menu that the Trump administration had in March 2025. Over the past year and a half, the United States has either attempted or threatened nearly all of these options, with little success.

The lesson for a prospective war with Iran was obvious. If the US couldn’t do it in Yemen, it wouldn’t be able to suppress Iranian drone and missile launches in the Persian Gulf or reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The two major Israeli air operations against Iran in 2024 and 2025, “Days of Repentance” and “Rising Lion,” respectively, showed that even massive air attacks on Iran would fail to seriously degrade Iranian missile and drone launch capability. Video evidence of dozens of Iranian missiles striking targets in Israel proved that the Iranians were capable of penetrating the US/Israeli missile defense system at long range. Air Force findings from two decades earlier on the impossibility of destroying deeply buried targets held, as evidence slowly emerged that the Fordow site struck by the US in the closing days of the 12-Day War hadn’t been “obliterated,” as the Trump administration claimed, with the centrifuges there “largely intact,” according to the DIA. Israeli narratives that they had achieved freedom of movement in Iran’s skies were later thrown into question as disclosures revealed many of their supposed airstrikes had been drone and ground-based missile launches from within Iran itself. The Iranians have consistently, in every stage of conflict against them, demonstrated their ability to retaliate, precluding an assessment that airstrikes would prevent them from launching ballistic missiles and drones.

Regime Change

Prior to the 2026 Iran War, five successive mass protest movements from 1999 to 2022 had failed to topple the Iranian government, despite strong western support. The USAF commissioned Dangerous But Not Omnipotent, a RAND report on Iranian political and military power in 2009. The report concluded that American decision-makers should avoid direct conflict with Iran, as this would be unlikely to bring about regime change. RAND said even attempting to employ Cold War-era containment strategies would create “opportunities for Tehran to exploit” and “regime survival” was a fundamental driver of Iran’s behavior. In 2019, the DIA outlined how the Iranian state had restructured itself specifically to survive internal threats, and said its opponents were disorganized, writing, “Iranian political and ethnic opposition groups are largely localized and lack unity, posing little threat to the regime.” In the weeks leading up to the war, American planners recognized that the latest wave of protests had failed. The CRS found that “even so-called moderates have backed the crackdown against what the regime has characterized as a US and Israeli-backed plot” and that there had been no “widespread defections from within Iran’s military, security forces, or political elite.” The USAF’s doctrinal publication Strategic Attack identified the limitations of decapitation strikes:

Leadership attack is a specific form of attrition that removes enemy leadership by direct attack when members of that leadership constitute lawful targets…. Leadership attack is most effective when an enemy is led by a single charismatic and authoritarian figure who cannot be easily replaced. It is also effective against organizations with rigid, hierarchical leadership structures, since US forces can identify, locate, and remove those leaders and their replacements… As a matter of practice, US forces have often avoided attacks on the national leadership of an enemy State based on comity.

American planners knew that Iran, with its complex, parallel political, clerical, and military structures, was a poor target for a leadership attack. The NIC told the Trump administration this in mid-February, just weeks before the war began. Iran’s military and political structure had “pre-arranged protocols” in place in the event of Khamenei’s assassination, the report said. It was “unlikely” that even a large, prolonged military campaign would result in regime change, “even if the current leadership was killed.” The NIC was entirely correct. The mass protests failed, just as they had in the past, and Iran’s power structure rapidly adapted to the US/Israeli assassination campaign.

Assessment vs. Assessment

Given the clear historical record of American anticipation of these failures, it should now be asked why these warnings went largely ignored. If the Pentagon and intelligence community understood the bleak prospect for success in Iran, if their assessments anticipated debasification, munition shortages, the closure of Hormuz, the superiority of diplomacy, the difficulties with achieving air supremacy, and the unlikely prospect of regime change, how did they find themselves embarking on what was, by all available evidence, an unwinnable war? The answer to this question can be found in a series of leaks made shortly after the war began to The New York Times. In the lead-up to the war, every assessment made by the Pentagon and US intelligence apparatus was directly contradicted by competing assessments made by Israeli planners and presented directly to the Trump administration. Mossad chief David Barnea traveled to Washington in mid-January and delivered a comprehensive plan to assassinate the Iranian leadership and stir mass protests to accomplish regime change. The Israelis also presented a supporting plan to invade Iran with Kurdish proxy forces, but American strategists had already identified that the Kurds were too dispersed and disorganized to be used for this purpose, and doing so would strain relations with Turkey. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu heavily lobbied the Trump administration to convince them the plan was achievable. Throughout this process, US military and intelligence officials fought fiercely to convince the administration that the plan would fail, but were overruled.

On the 11th of February, Trump held a situation room meeting with Rubio, Hegseth, General Caine, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, and Netanyahu. Barnea and other Israeli officials attended virtually. The meeting lasted more than an hour, and the Israelis made their final case for the war. They said Iran’s ballistic missile program could be destroyed in a few weeks, Iran would be too weak to block the Strait of Hormuz, airstrikes would inspire the Iranian people to rise up against the government, Kurdish forces would bog Artesh down in Western Iran, and exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi would be on standby to seize power at the opportune moment. After Netanyahu’s presentation, President Trump responded, “Sounds good to me.” When others present brought up potential risks, Netanyahu told them inaction was a greater risk than action. The American military and intelligence structure scrambled to present a rebuttal to the Israeli plan, and produced a comprehensive response the next day in an American-only meeting. They agreed that they could kill Khamenei and degrade Iran’s ability to project power, but triggering a popular uprising and achieving regime change were “detached from reality.”

When Mr. Trump joined the meeting, Mr. Ratcliffe briefed him on the assessment. The C.I.A. director used one word to describe the Israeli prime minister’s regime change scenarios: “farcical.”

Trump asked Caine directly what he thought:

“Sir, this is, in my experience, standard operating procedure for the Israelis. They oversell, and their plans are not always well-developed. They know they need us, and that’s why they’re hard-selling.”