This is precisely the problem faced by Ukraine’s relatively slow, large drones and cruise missiles. Keeping in mind the 9,800 interceptions in July, Ukrainian media triumphantly displays about 5-10 successful hits daily, implying an interception rate of 97-98%. Similarly, the Ukrainian military blogger Bohdan Myroshnykov today gave an average long-range drone success rate of 1.5-2%. A few hours ago Ukrainian military telegrams sadly posted, for instance, this video of an intercepted unmanned sea vehicle near the Russian city of Novorossirsk. On July 31, Ukrainian sources glumly shared photos of a missile intercepted over the Rostov region. Pro-Ukrainian military analysts reported that over the course of May and June, six of the 39 Flamingo cruise missiles launched actually hit their target. This is just based on open source data, and I suspect that Fire Point is less keen to share videos of Flamingos it unsuccessfully launches than it is of successful hits. The Flamingo has a maximum speed of 900 kilometers per hour, about 10 times slower than Russian ballistic missiles. Just a few hours ago, all 5 of the latest Flamingo flight towards Russia were shot down, despite flying at very low altitudes along rivers to avoid detection. Perhaps all the rumours about the massive state privileges and graft characterizing Fire Point were true. The Flamingo is a large and relatively slow target.

I recently reported on the claims in the Ukrainian media that defense minister Mikhailo Fedorov was dismissed in July precisely because he wanted to reduce the share of Fire Point drones in long-range strikes from 80% to 25%. Not that this stopped European companies from investing billions into the enterprise, with le Figaro reporting in early July that Flamingo missiles feature French automatic guiding systems. But while automatic guiding is useful to overcoming electronic warfare, it is irrelevant if the drone is so slow and large that it can be easily shot down with other means. Anyway, strana.ua recently calculated that Ukraine’s air campaign against Russia costs around a billion dollars a month. The main drones that Ukraine uses are the Liutyi ($200,000 per unit), the Beaver ($100,000), and the FP-1 ($60,000). These costs are estimates, all around the cost of Russia’s Geran drones (though generally much less advanced than the new Geran models when it comes to evasion and speed). Assuming an average cost of $100,000 to $120,000 (depending on how many Flamingos are used), the 9,800 drones shot down in July would have cost Ukraine $980 million to $1.18 billion USD. Annually, that’s $12 billion, more than 12% of the entire defense budget. It’s also necessary to factor in spending on intelligence, operational planning, and other infrastructure on the ground needed for these operations.

This also probably accounts for why Ukraine has been rather illogically changing the target of its operations. If the goal is to destroy the economy of the opponent, one would not take switch from target to target. Instead, Ukraine spent March and April focusing on Russian oil and gas port infrastructure, then shifted to oil refineries for a few months, and now, since July 18, has been targeting the warehouses of online marketplaces. There have been some more strikes on oil refineries in the past few weeks, but this changing focus allows Russia to repair damaged facilities. Following the spring strikes, Russia’s Baltic ports fully restored shipping operations. During the pause on oil refineries, most of the damaged plants were either fully or partially restored. According to the Financial Times, only 7 of the 26 refineries that suspended production remained completely idle as of July 27. Eight had returned to full capacity and another eleven had partially resumed operations. As a result, Russia’s fuel shortages have been easing, with restrictions removed or relaxed in much of the country, apart from Crimea and other territories close to the frontlines. Even Kuban, a region close to Crimea, has lifted fuel restrictions for vehicles. Contrary to Ukrainian hopes, there have been no mass anti-government uprisings due to the shortages, even at their peak. The conclusion is that Ukraine keeps on changing targets because it lacks sufficient drones to overcome the Russian air defenses that are developed once one set of targets is struck. This also indicates Ukraine will also eventually run out of unprotected targets. All this was hinted at recently by former commander-in-chief Valery Zaluzhny, who wrote that Ukraine’s long-range strikes, despite all the hype, ‘are expensive, technologically complex, and ultimately provoke countermeasures’.

https://xcancel.com/EventsUkraine/status/2085810040741777530

A calculation today of the terribly low drone success rate from the Ukrainian military telegram DroneBomber:

We parsed the main Russian monitoring channels tracking drone shoot-downs in Moscow and the Moscow region. We logged around 1,500 reported interceptions. To put the scale into perspective: In July alone, according to Moscow Mayor Sobyanin, 6,225 drones flew toward the Moscow region. Of those, 780 were shot down on the near approaches to Moscow. Now for the results of our sample. To put it mildly, they’re disappointing:

• 🔴~1,400 drones (≈93%) were shot down at the 1st and 2nd air defense lines in the region.
• 🔴~100 drones (≈6%) were shot down within the 3rd defense line (the MKAD ring).
• 🔴Within Moscow itself — a grand total of 1 (0.07%). One. A single drone.

And what about actual targets hit over the past two months? Here’s almost the entire list:

• 🟢The Dubna Space Communications Center
• 🟢Wildberries warehouses and logistics hubs
• 🟢Oil storage depots
• 🟢The Kapotnya oil refinery (several times in June)
• 🟢A couple of industrial zones and residential buildings hit by debris

That’s it. Against the backdrop of thousands of launches, this isn’t even a drop in the bucket. It’s almost laughable. If the tactic was to “draw out all the air defense missiles in this area,” it has failed. They appear to be in good shape, they have sufficient stocks, and the air defense ring is functioning effectively. If the goal was to identify routes for a breakthrough, the maps show they tried from every direction. There are no open corridors.

Draw your own conclusions about whether that’s acceptable or not.

https://xcancel.com/halvardous/status/2085490879582621763

Oil refinery strikes are extremely dramatic visually and get people very excited but often mask the fact that these facilities are highly modular and just because one section was damaged/destroyed it doesn’t mean the entire plant has been put out of action. They all have extremely effective means of restricting fires to the areas of damage and not allowing them spread, so Im not surprised in the least at the reports of them most being back online.