Pentagon leaders are still struggling to meet weapons delivery timelines despite their frequent pledges to get new equipment into troops’ hands more quickly, according to a new government watchdog report. “The overall average time frame to deliver a capability increased this year to over 12 years,” the Government Accountability Office (GAO) wrote in a report released today. “Further, several MDAPs [major defense acquisition programs] have not set new delivery dates or are delaying critical interim milestones.” Essentially, that 12-year average may even be optimistic since program officials are not updating the delivery timelines to account for those delays, GAO added. And when it comes to the use of rapid prototyping and fielding pathways — made possible under the Middle Tier Acquisition (MTA) authorities created to either design or field weapons within a five-year timeline — those efforts are also continuing to exceed their deadlines and require more time to develop “immature technologies,” the office added, using an industry phrase for programs that are not yet proven, reliable and ready for broad deployment. GAO’s findings are part of an annual report to Congress assessing the state of weapons systems. This year’s report covers dozens of programs and associated delays. While each development program is unique, GAO made one overarching recommendation this year: the Pentagon should require programs to start with mature technologies and/or develop those immature technologies separately. The department agreed. Here is a look at some of the programs facing delays and cost growth, according to GAO.

Air Force

GAO called out “significant delays” for the Air Force’s T-7 program, echoing a list of problems laid out in a recent Breaking Defense investigation of the new jet trainer. Although the service made the decision to begin production on the T-7 in April, the majority of developmental testing won’t be done until April 2028, with lower-priority requirements wrapping up even later, in May 2029, the report said. GAO stated the T-7’s delays are “largely a result” of the need to complete additional engineering analysis, “lower than anticipated aircraft availability due to maintenance personnel issues and lack of spare parts,” and longer timelines needed to finalize software. “As a result, program officials stated the developmental program underwent a replan to provide a meaningful training capability to the user,” the report said. On one of the Air Force’s most secretive development efforts — the VC-25B, known colloquially as Air Force One when the president is onboard — GAO noted that the troubled program made some strides, having completed its final configuration design in October. It also resolved several “schedule risks” ranging from resolving cabin pressure issues to hiring more skilled mechanics to build the plane. However, “other schedule risks remain, including the detailed designs for the aircraft interiors, fabrication of the wire bundles, and rework to correct defects in structural modifications,” GAO said. The program office is also revising the VC-25B test plan so the Air Force can take over airworthiness certification duties from the Federal Aviation Administration, GAO noted. Program officials told the agency the transition would increase flexibility to address technical issues, noting that “the compressed time frame for testing continues to be the biggest risk for the program moving forward.” As of October, the Air Force has approved only seven of about 80 certification plans for the aircraft, and has not determined when operational testing will begin.

The report also laid out concerns about the service’s Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) effort, which was set to conduct its first flight test in the second quarter of fiscal 2026. However, program officials warned GAO that “there is effectively zero margin left in the schedule for the rapid prototyping effort” despite the Air Force having reduced the test program from seven to five planned test flights. “If a significant flight test failure occurs, it is likely that the program will not be able to complete all five tests within the 5-year rapid prototyping timeframe,” the report states. “According to the program, completing at least the first three flight tests is critical for informing the Air Force’s decision to initiate a rapid fielding effort and procure HACM in fiscal year 2027.”

Army

GAO revealed the second battery as part of the Army’s Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), an MTA program, will be fielded “at least” six months later than it was originally scheduled to due to “missing, inconsistent, and unclear work standards for missile production.” The Army’s LRHW program consists of a ground-launched hypersonic missile, called the Dark Eagle, which is designed to provide the service with a long-range precision strike capability for contested environments. As Breaking Defense previously reported, the Army and Navy are working together on the program in hopes that the missiles can be launched from both land and sea. The second battery was originally scheduled to be fielded in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2027. However, this is now pushed back to fiscal 2028, per the report. The change is in part due to production challenges that delayed testing of a new variant of the Dark Eagle that will be delivered with the second battery, which could also delay the delivery of the third battery, the report stated.

The Army’s Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) Increment 3 program is also facing delays, according to GAO, as “none of its critical technologies are fully mature.” GAO said there was a discrepancy regarding readiness levels between the program office and the contractors — Raytheon and Lockheed Martin — but the watchdog did not elaborate. “The program found through its own assessment that some critical technologies are less mature than the contractors reported. Program officials told us that they have independently assessed all critical technologies,” the report read. GAO added that program officials “could not definitively state why there was a discrepancy.” However, the officials noted that it could be due to the contractors “interpreting technology maturity in less restrictive terms than the program office.” The M-SHORAD Increment 3 is the service’s effort to replace the Stinger missile on Increment 1 of the M-SHORAD with a next generation short range interceptor. It is scheduled to start production in the second quarter of fiscal 2028. However, GAO stated that “prior work has shown that increasing even one maturity level can take multiple years and becomes more challenging as the technology approaches maturity,” adding that any delays to future development “could affect the planned production start.”

Navy

GAO also found the first 13 follow-on DDG 51 Flight III destroyers are now 55 months behind schedule – up from 41 months in last year’s GAO report. The delays are due to issues hiring a “robust” workforce amid the current wages, supply chain issues, and frequent design changes, GAO said. The watchdog noted that these challenges are “not unique” to the DDG 51 program. Still, GAO determined the program is slated to reach initial operating capability by the end of fiscal 2027, roughly three years after it was initially scheduled to hit that milestone due to changes in operational test plans, the report said. Likewise, GAO determined the DDG 1000 program suffered delays integrating the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic weapon system onto the initial ship since the watchdog’s previous assessment. Specifically, the report said program officials estimated that CPS integration was approximately nine months behind schedule, stemming from “unforeseen testing and production challenges.” However, a live-fire demonstration remains on track for next year, which is “consistent with expectations from our last assessment and about 2 years later than previously planned,” GAO added. Additionally, GAO found that the Navy’s ORCA Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV) program also encountered some delays. The first prototype for the program, which got underway in 2017, was delivered in September 2025. However, the four remaining prototypes are expected for delivery in January 2027 – more than a year later than the watchdog reported last year, according to the GAO.