As more and more IDF soldiers are killed and injured by Hezbollah drones, while demolishing buildings in Lebanon. The soldiers are complaining that they are being used irresponsibly and taking a great amount of damage as a result. An article in Haaretz today shed light on this:

1. Capt. Maoz Israel Rakanti was killed Friday by an explosive drone while securing a tour held at midday despite standing guidelines to minimize daytime movement due to the drone threat. A commander in the division who had argued against the tour put it bluntly: "For what? To secure a visit by the division commander who wanted to see the Litani and the Galilim Bridge. There was no operational benefit to this visit." He added that the timing made the decision especially indefensible, coming a day after Sgt. Negev Dagan of the same Golani battalion was killed by a mortar in the same area: "The directive is not to move during daytime unless it's a matter of life and death. This infuriates me to levels I can't even describe."
2. The army's defense of the decision concedes much of the criticism. A senior military source argued Norkin acted on operational judgment, but acknowledged the security arrangements were inadequate: "Maybe a tank instead of an open jeep. Maybe not staying there 20 minutes after a senior commander leaves." The justification ultimately fell back on command prerogative: "He's the commander, and if he thought he needed to see the bridge with his own eyes in daylight, then we execute." The IDF has not ruled out that Hezbollah identified Norkin's presence and targeted the location accordingly.
3. The incident reflects a broader erosion of operational discipline around the drone threat. Commanders and soldiers describe a pattern in which troops are exposed to serious risk for missions that are neither urgent nor essential, often demolition work that could be done at night. As an officer serving in the north described the dynamic: "Forces that are required to hide all day and avoid unnecessary exposure find themselves on missions that could be done at night, without endangering the troops beyond what's already dangerous."
4. The demolition mission itself structurally exposes troops to the drone threat. A central part of IDF activity in southern Lebanon is the systematic destruction of buildings, with commanders required to report daily tallies of structures demolished. This work demands sustained exposure in open terrain, precisely the conditions in which explosive drones are most effective. One soldier captured the contradiction directly: "We stand exposed securing house demolitions while there are drones in the air. There's no logic to it." An earlier account from a soldier in the sector framed the deeper problem: "The only mission is to keep destroying."

What we are seeing is that the IDF mania to destroy every building in Lebanon is putting their soldiers at risk. But the IDF command would rather put the soldiers at risk in daytime to increase the speed of demolition, than secure the lives of soldiers. Life is cheap for Israel.

“The directive is not to move during daytime unless it's a matter of life and death.” For decades, the American military, and its allies and proxies, operated with the certainty that anything that can be seen could be killed. This was what the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that began in the 1970s had promised and had delivered. American dominance on the battlefield was evident and US adversaries were only able to fight US forces asymmetrically, mostly through guerrilla or insurgent campaigns, emphasizing concealment from observation by operating at night, in forbidding terrain or dense urban areas, or among populations. US surveillance and firepower prevented enemies from massing and rarely were US forces in danger of being tactically defeated in combat. American bases were secure, and, while harried by indirect fire, US bases were, by and large, safe and never in any danger of being overrun (with some exceptions in Afghanistan). IED attacks did greatly hamper and hinder US force and logistics movements but US freedom of movement was never fully denied, and the US was always able to mass forces, set the tempo of operations and take initiative at the tactical and operational levels of war.

Now that advantage is gone. The US, allied and proxy dominance of the enemy through surveillance and applied firepower has been equaled. Whether through Iranian drones and missiles damaging and forcing the evacuation of nearly all US Gulf bases, the inability of US carriers to get closer than 1,000km from the Iranian coast, or the IDF unable to move in daylight in Southern Lebanon, the great advantage US forces and their allies once had has been met. Now, with certainty, if US and allied forces can be seen, they too can be killed. I cannot overstate how dramatic this is for an American empire that depends upon the conquest and control of terrain to achieve, demonstrate and report success and victory. An American military unable to openly operate without challenge upends decades of American warfighting on all levels: tactically, doctrinally, industrially, psychologically, politically… The 1970s RMA brought about the high tech weaponry that provided American dominance at the tactical and operational levels of war. This dominance allowed the US to not suffer battlefield defeats while garrisoning terrain and cities. No enemy could fight the US symmetrically and US forces could not be forced to retreat or hunker in their bases (at least not at the tactical level of war, but certainly so at the strategic and political levels). Now nearly any American adversary enjoys that same “if we see it, we can kill it” guarantee.