cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/12591097
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Russia’s intensifying repression during the ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine has affected not only traditional government critics, but also officials inside the system itself. According to researchers at the CEDAR center, from the beginning of 2023 through mid-2026, one in 10 mayors of large and midsize cities, 9% of senior regional officials, and around 8% of ministerial-level administrators were named as defendants in criminal cases.
Overall, the rate of arrests among officials has risen fivefold since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, with Russia’s regional elites bearing the brunt of the campaign. Growing economic problems and declining revenues are fueling a new redistribution of property. Unsurprisingly, Moscow’s security services are playing a central role.
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Political scientists describe this kind of system as neopatrimonial. From the outside, it looks like a formal system of official offices, powers, regulations, laws, and courts. Inside, however, are patron-client networks that fill those positions, making decisions and distributing resources for the benefit of a privileged few.
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Kormlenie — literally “feeding” — is a Russian term rooted in the historical practice that saw officials draw their income from the territories they governed. Today, it is commonly used as shorthand for patronage-based access to public resources. The practice is formally illegal, but authorities often tolerate it so long as the political balance remains stable. The arrangements also leave evidence behind — kickbacks, property registered to relatives, and contracts awarded to favored firms — giving investigators material for criminal cases that can be activated against subordinates when needed.
Protection in this system comes from the practical influence of a patron, not their formal office. A governor with a powerful federal patron can blunt attacks by rival security-service clans, which of course have their own powers (including those of arrest and asset seizure). A governor whose patron has been weakened or departed their post loses that protection, and his positions are then gradually occupied by clients of other, stronger patrons. Formally, the structure remains unchanged, made up of the same deputy governor posts and the same ministries.
As long as there are enough resources in the system, conflict is rare. When the quantity of resources shrinks, however, groups that once tolerated someone else’s collection of rents begin making claims on them, and if a governor can no longer protect his clients, the security services gain an opening to enter the region to begin “fighting corruption.”
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The purges are changing the behavior of those officials who remain free. They effectively have two options: demonstrate loyalty, or face a choice between jail and the front. Since 2024, signing a contract with the military has been enough to have criminal proceedings suspended.
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