• In many countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Nordics, Chinese influence efforts even triggered an increase in critical reporting about China.
• One example of backlash concerned Estonia, where China’s embassy tried to publish paid articles in traditional media that were denying human rights violations in Xinjiang, but eventually led to a public scandal that made most outlets refuse future articles.
• The confluence of Chinese and Russian channels, which began around 2017, increased. A prominent example is Bulgaria, where the China Global Television Network and Russia Today reportedly shared not only a building but also an editor.
• China’s messaging is no longer limited to positive fluff about China. Negative messaging about the EU, national governments, and NATO has become core.
• Faced with the backlash that open efforts via traditional media provoked, Beijing has shifted to less visible methods such as Chinese outreach of visiting schools and co-organizing events such as Chinese New Year celebrations with local governments.

...

This year's CEE-Nordic Dialogue on China - co-organized by the Association for International Affairs (AMO)’s China Team behind China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (CHOICE) and the Swedish National China Centre (NKK) at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) - came to the table with fresh research, including a mapped “playbook” of borrowed mouths and laundered messages, distilled from the Chinese foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) practices observed across Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

An NKK survey of Swedish media documented intensifying efforts by Beijing to influence the work of foreign journalists.

...

The panel drew speakers working on Sweden, the Baltic states, and CEE – countries that sit on the front line of Russian interference while also facing active efforts from Beijing. Differences in the state of relations with China and linguistic barriers give each country its own story; the Russian-speaking communities of the Baltics are a partial exception. Yet a common playbook runs beneath the local variation. As one speaker cautioned, someone who concludes there is no Chinese messaging in their country is most likely looking in the wrong place.

...

A survey of journalists suggests that traditional Swedish media were quite successful in countering Chinese influence efforts. In fact, Chinese actions triggered an increase in critical reporting. The unique situation of the wolf-warrior ambassador Gui Congyou (2017–2021) played a big part in the reception of Beijing’s efforts in the country.

Another example of backlash concerned Estonia, where China’s embassy tried to publish paid articles in traditional media. One such article denying human rights violations in Xinjiang led to a public scandal that made most outlets refuse future articles.

...

Publicly attributable placements [paid advertorials by Chinese organizations in independent media] have largely disappeared from CEE, where that approach was abandoned around 2019. In their place came message laundering: planting content indirectly so that it reads as homegrown. Some less rigorous broadcasters in the Visegrad Four (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) carried paid or promoted segments built on scripts supplied from China, with political content folded into lifestyle items on tourism, food, or culture. One telling example had Taiwan’s Yushan mountain presented as the highest peak “in the province of Taiwan.”

...

The Chinese embassy’s activities in Sweden have decreased since the departure of Ambassador Gui in 2021. Beijing’s strategy is changing. It now focuses more on alternative media and the right side of the political spectrum.

A similar lack of results with traditional media efforts in Estonia led to a shift there as well. Chinese outreach now consists of visiting schools and co-organizing events such as Chinese New Year celebrations with local governments. Many of these activities are directed at the country’s Russian-speaking minority. Local officials do not always see this as a problem, often because they cannot imagine themselves important enough to be a target.

China has been making greater use of influencers in Sweden, the Baltics, and CEE. The playbook is consistent: invite individuals to China on paid trips, help them produce content on safely apolitical themes, frequently food and travel, and inject subtle political messaging.

...

A confluence of Chinese and Russian channels began around 2017. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the migration of Chinese efforts to social media intensified. Following local governments’ closure of Russian channels after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many related individuals and narratives moved to Chinese channels.

...

Chinese efforts face a tough crowd when they are publicly linked to Beijing. Czechia and Sweden rank among Europe’s most China-skeptic countries because of their recent experiences with Beijing. Added to this is the anti-communist sentiment that is widespread in the entire CEE region, including the Baltic countries, as a consequence of Soviet history.

Coercion, indeed, tends to backfire: blunt attempts to buy influence at the height of the “16+1” format that Beijing created for summit meetings between China and CEE countries, and pressure on the Czech Senate’s leadership over a planned Taiwan visit, produced backlash rather than compliance. Chinese support for Russia’s war effort against Ukraine has further damaged Beijing’s image in the region. Yet the focus on Russia also means that China’s politics are not widely known among the public and not a priority for politicians.

...

Now, Chinese efforts are moving from targeting the elites – journalists, fringe politicians, businesspeople, and so on – to targeting the broader population, especially young people. Blunt and easily attributable moves backfired, yet work with influencers is less counterproductive.

...

The convergence of Chinese and Russian efforts is real but mostly opportunistic. The starkest evidence came from a participant’s description of Bulgaria, where media channels China Global Television Network and Russia Today reportedly shared not only a building but also an editor. The pattern is one of China exploiting infrastructure that already exists. A worry for the future is that, as Moscow’s economic situation deteriorates, more of its clients may find a better-funded patron in Beijing.

Transnational information suppression is not only about what Beijing actively pushes, but also what messages it seeks to suppress. Suppression is far harder to detect, since it results in something not happening. Beijing has been reported to go over targets’ heads – to an employer or a party chief – when it wants to stop e.g. politicians, since ignoring one’s own boss is harder than defying Beijing. Advances in AI do not only help content creation but also content deletion.

...

A particular blind spot is EU citizens of Chinese origin. Their information environment and ties to the PRC make them targets of Chinese propaganda efforts. Yet as the EU-funded RESONANT project and a recent minibook by the journalist Chu Yang illustrate through fieldwork, this environment is difficult to study. One proposed remedy is greater support for independent Chinese-language journalists already in Europe, who can report China from a different vantage point and teach others how to do the same.

...

This situation carries risks. The Chinese toolbox has significantly changed since 2019, learning from the Hong Kong protests and the COVID-19 pandemic. Beijing’s messaging is no longer limited to positive fluff about China. Negative messaging about the EU, national governments, and NATO has become core.

...

As media consumption splinters into bubbles, influencers, not bound by a journalistic code, will only gain ground. A fragmented ecosystem is a harder target for FIMI researchers. The defense most often urged by the participants was media literacy – which should not only consist of teaching people critical reading of sources but also ‘critical avoidance’ to prevent wasting limited attention spans – paired with exposing Chinese operations, since Chinese actors remain remarkably sensitive to being named.

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Archived

Sochi Mayor Andrei Proshunin presented the Order of Courage to the parents of Aik Roganyan, a local resident killed in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

...

According to data compiled by the independent Russian news outlet Mediazona, which maintains a named list of those killed in the war, Roganyan was born in 2001 and died on February 20, 2024, at age 22. An obituary cited by journalists says he was a cadet at the Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School, from which he graduated early “due to a shortage of officers” and was sent to the Western Military District as a commander.

...

Archived

Better archive this one boys because I have a feeling this stuff will age like fine wine that Henry the VII had in his private reserve.

cross-posted from: https://ani.social/post/35731509

cross-posted from: https://slrpnk.net/post/41596092

The measure came into force on 10 July 2026

[...] the annual financial requirement is likely to be between €20 million and €25 million.

[...]

The policy is intended to encourage more people to leave their cars at home and use public transport for journeys within Porto and the surrounding urban region.

[Mayor] Duarte has cautioned that abolishing fares will not, by itself, resolve Porto’s congestion problems. He described the programme as part of a broader mobility strategy that must also include faster services, better connections, increased capacity and more reliable journey times.

Porto currently has about 16 kilometres of dedicated bus lanes. The municipality plans to increase this to approximately 22 kilometres by the end of 2026, giving buses greater priority over private vehicles on some of the city’s busiest routes.

The mayor said public transport would need to become more convenient and dependable than travelling by car before a substantial change in daily habits could be expected. The municipality’s objective is for public transport to become the main means of travelling around Porto, with private cars taking a secondary role.

The scheme is unusual because Porto is paying for its residents to travel across the entire metropolitan network rather than offering free journeys only inside the municipality.

The Porto Metropolitan Area comprises 17 municipalities, each of which remains responsible for its own spending decisions. [...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/50320770

Temporarily closing residential streets to allow kids to play and socialise safely outside has proved beneficial for both children and adults.

Germany, Denmark, the ​Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden said in a ​joint statement that the Commission's proposed budget of nearly €2 ⁠trillion ($2.33 trillion) for 2028-2034 should be reduced "in a ​balanced manner" with all areas of spending contributing to ​cuts.

Icelanders will vote in a referendum on Saturday whether to resume entry talks with the European Union amid growing global insecurity. Voters are not being asked to decide just yet if they want to join the 27-member bloc – only whether they want their government to negotiate possible terms.

From France to the Baltic states, Scandinavian countries and Germany, governments are expressing concern and issuing warnings about Russian on-the-ground attacks and disinformation campaigns, as key elections are held across the Continent this year.

...

As major elections in the European Union loom, member states are no longer hiding their concern over Russian interference. In their view, the war waged by Moscow is not confined to the Ukrainian front, but aims to undermine democracies from within. Announcements of destabilization operations have now become a routine part of daily life for the general public. Governments have passed new legislation in response and mobilized their intelligence services. But while EU member states have sounded the alarm, they act on an individual basis, despite the entire continent being the target of these attacks coordinated from Russia.

At an international conference held on August 20 in Stockholm, Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur warned his partners: "Sweden will soon be holding elections [on September 13]. Latvia will have theirs just after [on October 3]. We will have ours in March [2027]. That means Russia will be looking for ways to influence our societies and to stoke tensions." Standing alongside him, Polish official Henryka Moscicka-Dendys, undersecretary of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said, "Elections are ideal opportunities to try to sow distrust and to test the resilience of our societies. We must remain vigilant and act to counter this, but we must do it together."

Two days earlier, Sweden, which hosted the conference, was targeted by several fake videos posted on X in less than an hour, featuring the logos of Swedish and German national media outlets. They discredited the upcoming legislative elections by warning of imaginary fraud and accused the prime minister, Ulf Kristersson, of corruption. The group Antibot4navalny, which tracks Russian disinformation on social media, identified the videos. The Russian opposition collective said this campaign is part of the pro-Russian influence operation known as "Matryoshka," which has also been detected elsewhere on the continent.

"We are seeing these kinds of videos all over Europe. The Russians are used to targeting countries that support Ukraine," said the Swedish prime minister. The Swedish Psychological Defense Agency, a state institution based in Stockholm that is responsible for tracking attempts at electoral destabilization, meanwhile assessed that this offensive "does not aim to convince voters of irregularities related to the elections," but to "overload the media with large amounts of disinformation."

Explosives-laden drone

In February, the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment said it had uncovered a group of pro-Russian hackers who attempted to influence the Norwegian elections scheduled for September 2025. The researchers specifically mentioned a cyberattack targeting the conservative Hoyre party. "According to our analysis," said Eskil Grendahl Sivertsen, special adviser at the institute, "this attempt had no impact on the election itself, but it demonstrates an intent to carry out actions directly targeting democratic processes."

...

Denmark's three main intelligence services warned of the risks of a pro-Russian disinformation campaign ahead of the latest parliamentary elections, held on March 24, 2026. The aim, they said, was to "promote Russian interests, sow discord and weaken support for Ukraine," but "this could also have repercussions for certain candidates and parties, as well as for their election campaigns." These interference operations targeted both the domestic and foreign policies of countries providing assistance to Kyiv.

As the leading European contributor of aid to Ukraine, Germany has been particularly targeted by attacks on its infrastructure and information systems. Although the country's political leaders almost never explicitly identify Russia as being behind these attacks, they have acknowledged the reality of the threat. "There is not always legally usable evidence to identify who is piloting a drone," admitted Federal Defense Minister Boris Pistorius in November 2025. "But there are many clues that make it possible to determine who benefits from the flight of such a device in a given location."

...

On August 4, Germany was targeted in an attempted attack at Leipzig Airport. Authorities discovered a drone loaded with explosives in the secure cargo operations area, close to several Ukrainian cargo planes. A second device reportedly struck a DHL aircraft a few minutes later, and a third was found in a nearby field 10 days after that. Remaining silent until then, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz warned on Tuesday, August 25, that Berlin would ensure those behind the attacks "will pay a price for their actions."

In 2025 alone, the Bundeskriminalamt (Germany's Federal Criminal Police Office) recorded more than 320 destabilization attempts in the country – including acts of sabotage, theft, burglary and attacks on critical infrastructure. Russia is suspected of orchestrating most of them. In April, politicians and lawmakers' accounts on Signal, an application known for its security, were targeted by a phishing attack, which was also attributed to Moscow. One of the accounts targeted belonged to president of the Bundestag, Julia Klöckner.

German authorities are also investigating the involvement of a foreign country behind the surge in attacks, some of them deadly and often carried out by foreigners, that took place in the run-up to the February 2025 elections. These incidents shocked public opinion and helped put the issue of immigration at the center of the campaign.

...

Political destabilization Latvia is gearing up for its elections, scheduled for October 3. The country has stepped up efforts to detect possible Russian interference. The government's anti-disinformation website, Melns uz balta ("black on white"), has reported a barrage of false or misleading information aimed at dividing the country, particularly targeting Russian-speaking citizens, who make up nearly one third of the population. So far, authorities have not reported any operations specifically targeting the vote.

The explanation for this apparent paradox can be found on Baltnews, a propaganda website that covers regional news from Moscow's perspective, which published an article on July 7 about the Latvian election. While it expressed a preference for the far-right Latvia First party, led by businessman Ainars Slesers, it considered a "reversal" of Riga's pro-European and pro-Ukrainian foreign policy "impossible," "even if Slesers and a conservative coalition were to come to power." The article added: "Latvia's economic and military dependence on Brussels leaves it little room for maneuver."

The aim, then, was not to foster closer ties with Russia by supporting friendly candidates, but to undermine the Latvian state itself, targeting both its current policies and its history. As highlighted by Melns uz balta, the usual channels of Russian propaganda – social media, fake internet sites and broadcasts from the Belarusian state radio, which can be heard in eastern parts of Latvia – were filled with narratives all seeking to portray the Baltic state as a puppet country, whose independence, gained for the second time in 1991 after the period from 1918 to 1940 and five decades of occupation by the USSR, would be illegitimate.

One of the tools of pro-Russian propaganda in the country has been to circulate embellished false memories of the Soviet era to promote the narrative of a failed Latvian state since it left Moscow's sphere of influence. The relative calm surrounding the election campaign is not a sign of easing tensions. Instead, it seems laden with threats – not against the vote itself, but against the very existence of Latvia as an independent state.

France has also faced highly targeted political destabilization operations. In early August, the Paris public prosecutor's office opened an investigation into suspected Russian interference targeting two of Emmanuel Macron's former prime ministers, Gabriel Attal (Renaissance, the centrist party founded by Macron) and Edouard Philippe (center-right Horizons), as well as the Member of the European Parliament Raphaël Glucksmann (center-left Place Publique). All three, who are candidates in the 2027 presidential election, filed complaints after the circulation of deepfakes and fake news reports produced by media outlets alleging they had health problems or had committed acts of corruption. Viginum, the government agency responsible for combating foreign digital interference, lamented the publicity surrounding these operations, which, according to the agency, provides "greater visibility to content that is seen by very few citizens."

...

In a rare joint response on July 13, France, the EU and the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on nine Russians and four entities linked to the FSB, Russia's Federal Security Service. British authorities added 24 people to this list, including leaders of the GRU, Russia's military intelligence agency, and members of Rybar LLC – a Russian disinformation organization targeting Ukraine, known for orchestrating electoral interference across Europe. The announcement echoed comments made by the EU foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas: "Today's wars are not only fought with tanks and drones but with lies and algorithms too. [...] Compared to last year, the use of artificial intelligence tools in FIMI [foreign information manipulations and interference] incidents has increased exponentially. Artificial intelligence is now fully embedded in Russian and Chinese FIMI operations."

While European governments rarely speak with one voice when it comes to tackling foreign interference, their intelligence services are working closely together – secretly, bilaterally, or within the so-called Bern Club, which brings together the UK, Switzerland, Norway and the 27 EU member states, with the exception of Austria. "It's the only multilateral circle that really matters for the continent's collective security," confided one French intelligence leader, speaking on condition of anonymity. This club meets regularly in different European capitals, sometimes in plenary sessions or in smaller groups, depending on the topic and recent developments.

European spies know they have no choice but to cooperate, as Russian political interference targets all of Europe. According to the French Interior Ministry, the deputy chief of staff of the Russian presidential administration, Sergei Kiriyenko, has played a central role in these destabilization campaigns, as part of what Moscow calls directives against "unfriendly countries." "There is a general mandate, and each Russian intelligence structure then implements possible actions according to its access, information or opportunity," the French intelligence source added.

...

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/10965158

...

Experts from the Gdańsk University of Technology, the Maritime University of Gdynia, and the Institute of Telecommunications have for months been indicating that the main sources of interference and signal falsification (spoofing) are located in the [Russia-controlled] Kaliningrad region.

Poland is one of the most exposed countries to the problem, as a significant part of its territory, especially at cruising altitude, falls within range of jamming systems from the area.

Lithuania reported in 2026 that spoofing infrastructure in Kaliningrad had been significantly expanded, with the number of antennas increasing from just a few at the start of 2025 to several dozen. This reportedly makes it possible to falsify signals over distances of up to 450 km, meaning it could potentially cover much of Poland, the Baltic states, and parts of the Nordic region.

The Institute of Telecommunications warned people against relying solely on their phone's maps. It is instead advised that people use traditional navigation and orientation methods where possible, or to download maps for offline use in advance.

...

In the longer term, Poland is developing its own monitoring systems, including a portal based on the ASG-EUPOS network and a planned network of sensors run by the Polish Space Agency.

...

Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, dozens of similar incidents have been recorded in Europe, particularly in the Baltic, Nordic, and Black Sea regions.

Western officials and experts have repeatedly pointed to Russia, which claims the actions are taken to defend against Ukrainian drones. But Baltic and Scandinavian countries stress that the range and intensity of the interference go far beyond Russia's borders and amount to a systematic provocation.

...

Archived

CIA chief John Ratcliffe held ​talks with Russian intelligence officials during his visit to ​Moscow, ‌but did not ‌meet President Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin ⁠said Wednesday. President Donald Trump described Ratcliffe's visit to Moscow as a "semi-routine" mission, while implying that the intelligence chief was in the Russian capital to discuss the Ukraine war.

Former Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladic, convicted of genocide in the 1992-95 ​war ‌in Bosnia, has died in ​the United Nations detention centre in ​The ​Hague after suffering several strokes, according to local media.

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/10964600

Hungary has described Russia as a "threat to Europe and the global order" in guidelines for its delegation attending the UN General Assembly next month, Der Spiegel reported on Aug. 26.

The move marks a dramatic shift in Hungary's stance since Prime Minister Peter Magyar defeated the Russia-friendly Viktor Orban in elections earlier this year.

"Hungary condemns Russian military aggression and fully supports Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders," the document states.

"Russia's behavior poses a threat to Hungary, Europe, and the global order," it adds.

...

Archived

Czech intelligence warns of Russian sabotage risks as fake websites, TikTok accounts and social profiles spread pro-Russian narratives in Czechia.

...

Czechia is facing a continuing risk of Russian-directed sabotage, while increasingly sophisticated online campaigns are being used to spread pro-Russian narratives and stir tensions with neighboring countries, Czech counterintelligence says.

The warning comes as the Security Information Service (BIS) publishes its 2025 annual report. Separately, a new disinformation campaign targeting Czech-Polish relations has used fake websites, social-media profiles and artificial intelligence to create the appearance of rising tensions between the neighboring countries.

...

The number of sabotage operations organized from Russia fell during the first half of 2025 but began rising again in the second half, according to the report.

BIS uses the term “one-time agents” for people recruited to carry out individual operations who can be disavowed by Russia if they are caught. They are often inexperienced and recruited primarily for money.

...

“They are often inexperienced amateurs and at the same time people of lower social status, or with criminal experience. The predominant motivation is the prospect of receiving a financial reward,” BIS said.

Agents typically receive specific instructions only after telling their handlers what targets they can access, making the threat difficult to detect, BIS said.

...

TikTok network targeted Czech voters

BIS also identified a network of TikTok accounts spreading pro-Russian and anti-system narratives before last year's Czech parliamentary elections.

The network had been built over an extended period, with mostly fake accounts interconnected through mutual follows and by sharing the same content. BIS said the artificial coordination was designed to increase the reach of the material.

...

Fake campaign targets Czech-Polish relations

The BIS report comes as a separate disinformation campaign targeting Czech-Polish relations has emerged.

According to ČT24, unknown attackers have created fake websites and social-media profiles designed to make it appear that relations between Czechia and Poland are deteriorating.

One fake Facebook account, using the name Adam Sikora, promoted an alleged anti-Polish demonstration in Třinec on Saturday. But local officials said no such demonstration had been reported.

...

Fake media helped build the campaign

Seznam Zprávy reporter Lukáš Valášek said the operation involved a chain of fabricated identities and media outlets: first a fake profile impersonating the Czech ambassador to Poland, then a fake Czech Radio website quoting that supposed ambassador, followed by a fake profile promoting the nonexistent demonstration.

“The campaign required coordination,” Valášek said.

Polish domain administrator NASK said the attackers' methods were consistent with those known to be used by Russia, although the perpetrator has not been definitively identified.

...

Archived

Tldr: green energy = price stability

Chinese workers are circulating instructions [on Chinese social media] for reporting excessive working hours to European authorities, using the EU’s forthcoming forced-labour rules as leverage in a domestic labour system where complaints often produce limited results.

Videos tagged with phrases such as “EU reporting website” and “EU reporting procedures” received more than 200,000 views on Douyin, China’s version of TikTok, according to an examination of social-media activity by Reuters. Similar discussions appeared on RedNote, although some posts were later removed.

The activity shows that workers are beginning to view access to the European market as a pressure point before the regulation becomes fully applicable in December 2027.

...

The EU Forced Labour Regulation prohibits products made wholly or partly with forced labour from being placed on or exported from the Union market. It applies to every sector and origin, including individual components within a finished product.

Authorities will be able to investigate substantiated concerns, prohibit affected goods and order their withdrawal. Customs officers will enforce decisions at the border, while a single portal and shared database are intended to collect information and co-ordinate cases.

Excessive overtime is evidence, not a verdict

...

The European measure uses the International Labour Organization definition: work or service exacted under the menace of a penalty and not offered voluntarily. Excessive overtime can be an indicator when workers are coerced, threatened, indebted, deprived of documents or unable to leave. Hours alone do not settle the case.

Official figures indicate that Chinese employees work more than 48 hours a week on average, compared with a legal standard of 44. Enforcement is uneven, particularly where factories face tight export deadlines or workers depend on overtime to reach an acceptable income.

...

Some Chinese companies have announced mandatory clock-off times, partly in response to public criticism of the “996” culture of working from 9am to 9pm, six days a week. The persistence of online complaints suggests that formal policies and factory practice can diverge.

...

Lu Ming, a member of China’s top political advisory body, warned earlier this year that weak [Chinese] labour protection could provoke foreign trade barriers if other countries concluded that export competitiveness was built on excessive work and poor living conditions.

A new risk for European importers

The regulation does not create a blanket presumption against Chinese goods. EU and national authorities must use factual, verifiable information and follow a risk-based process. The burden of establishing a violation rests with the lead authority, not with an individual worker posting a video.

Worker testimony may nevertheless provide the starting point for an inquiry. A detailed submission identifying a factory, product, production period and coercive practice is more useful than a general complaint about long hours. Preserving evidence is difficult when posts disappear or employees fear retaliation.

European companies will need to examine more than first-tier suppliers. The prohibition applies where forced labour has been used at any stage of extraction, manufacturing or processing, including in components. A finished product assembled under acceptable conditions can still be affected by conduct further upstream.

That prospect changes the economics of compliance. Importers may demand payroll records, working-time data, grievance procedures and access to employees. Audits arranged by suppliers are unlikely to be sufficient if workers cannot speak freely or records can be altered.

The worker interest also lands in a tense trade relationship. Brussels and Beijing are already disputing subsidies, market access and industrial overcapacity. A forced-labour investigation would be legally distinct from those cases, but Chinese officials may still regard it as part of a wider European effort to restrict competitive exports.

...

For workers, that political sensitivity is part of the attraction. A domestic overtime complaint can be contained within one employer or locality; credible evidence affecting EU market access can reach customers, customs authorities and corporate boards thousands of miles away.

The regulation applies from 14 December 2027. Its influence has begun earlier, not through a Commission enforcement action, but through workers testing whether European trade law can give their grievances a commercial consequence.

Archived

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/10966800

...

German Finance Minister and Vice Chancellor Lars Klingbeil said Germany could no longer rely solely on traditional free-trade principles while China strengthened its competitive position.

“They’re not playing by the rules,” Klingbeil ... said. “Overcapacity, state subsidies, joint venture obligations – all these things.”

“We simply have to do more in this regard,” he added.

His comments come amid growing concerns over Europe’s industrial competitiveness. European policymakers have increasingly argued that stronger trade-defense measures and industrial support mechanisms may be necessary to counter competitive pressures from China.

...

Archived

China has helped Russia make its Shahed-type attack drones faster and more difficult for Ukraine to intercept by supplying key components, including turbojet engines.

...

China has become a crucial hub in the global supply chain that allows Iran and Russia to obtain components for Shaheds, including engines, servomotors, gyroscopes, and electronics.

Ukrainian officials who examined captured Russian drones said newer models are increasingly equipped with Chinese-made components.

The shift became particularly evident in early July, when Russia used turbojet-powered Shaheds in a massive attack on Kyiv. The new drones can reportedly reach speeds of around 300 miles per hour (483 km/h) – roughly three times faster than older propeller-driven versions.

...

Ukraine has said the engines powering some of these drones were made by Telefly Telecommunications Equipment, a Chinese company based in Shenzhen that produces computer and communications equipment as well as small microturbine engines for drones.

After Ukraine publicized the discovery of its engines in Russian drones, the turbojet section disappeared from the company’s English-language website, although it remained available on Chinese-language pages and through other Chinese vendors.

...

China is a key link in Shahed production

The Shahed was originally developed by Iran, which itself relied heavily on foreign technology and components. Early Iranian drones were primarily designed for reconnaissance and air support, but their limited accuracy eventually pushed engineers toward one-way attack drones that could cause significant damage even without precision targeting.

...

Russia, which calls the drones Geran, frequently launches Shaheds alongside ballistic and cruise missiles to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. While the missiles carry much heavier warheads, Shaheds are relatively inexpensive and can be deployed in large numbers.

...

Archived