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Different CDMWorlds, different assumptions about privacy.
Turning this feature on right now, thanks for the reminder
What happened to the fourth amendment
It got amended out
It exists as part of your argument in court. The gos helps you enforce your right and catch them in the cookie jar if they try to be slick. At least that is how I think of it.... Or used to in more normal times.
Kinda wish people would go as hard on their Fourth Amendment rights as their second.
I mean I think privacy advocates are looking to set a precedent. This case is perfect for us.
The officer was the one that wiped the data, so hopefully he'll loose his job. And they should be sued to pay compensation to the victim for the damages caused by lost data
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What’s the charge?
Destroying evidence, which is funny because that assumes there was any to begin with, which they can't prove.
That wasn’t the charge. The charge is destruction of property that the government is trying to hold on to.
Which would still be unreasonable search and seizure.
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But he did not destroy, officer did by type in code he got. His mistake to trust user.
I agree. I don’t think the charges will hold for exactly that reason, the device owner didn’t do anything to destroy the device and also didn’t prevent seizure. The CBP still has the device.
Destroying what? The phone is still there, you just have to install an OS in there or something. A charge with "destruction of property" hinges on the assumption that 1.- there was something in there before the passcode (could have been an empty profile) 2.- that was property (corporate interests insist that our data is not ours, so I don't see how the agent can insist here that the user destroyed his own property, at least) 3.- that was destroyed (which relies on proving point 1).
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Eating a meal? A succulent Chinese meal!?
Get your hand off my penis!
Having a phone? Having a secretive phone?
Okay, new plan: instead of a duress password that deletes data, a duress password that randomly scrambles your decryption keys. (And of course all important data is already encrypted.)
No 'evidence' was destroyed. The encrypted data is still there, perfectly intact. It's just that easy access to it has been cut off, since now not even you have a way to decrypt it.
nah, the duress should load a 'fake' account with dummy information and media. While deleting the real account in the background. What gave it away was the 'blinking' screen. Something that GrapheneOS team should be avoiding.
That's actually what the duress password does and did here. Deleting the data would be too slow, so it gets rid of the keys instead.
I wonder; can those keys be backed up to a seprate device, and reinstated later?
So: could you use the duress passcode to wipe the keys, making the device unreadable; then later use a backup to restore those keys and regain access?
Must be related to why GrapheneOS only supports pixel hardware at the moment, because it has the hardware to keep the keys locked up and provide attestation that they are.
My recollection is that the keys are stored on the TPM and can't be exported. Backups kick the can down the road; now the adversary demands access to your backups. If the keys can't leave the TPM and the TPM is wiped, then there is no more leverage that can be applied that will unlock the phone. The adversary might still try to get at other kinds of backups anyway to search for whatever data they were after to begin with, but that's a separate issue.
I'm sure there's a difference between "I deleted evidence" and "I deleted evidence off this device you're inspecting without a warrant, you can have it with a warrant".
But I also feel that unless there's suspicion of a specific crime, you can't really accuse someone of deleting evidence. And no, protesting peacefully is not a crime.
In the US, they can't force you to give a password. Because they can't prove you haven't forgotten it.
In this case, it was an officer who was attempting to gain unauthorized access to a device and then accidentally entered a code that caused it to wipe its own data
So the activist has a pretty good case here to sue the officer for damages
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The correct solution is a duress password that just opens a generic smartphone interface with nothing on it. Nothing suspicious. They won't even know to investigate.
Both. Wipe the real keys so they can't read it if they do a more invasive look into the device; but present a clean profile to the dumb cop that entered your duress pass, to curb suspicion.
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Duress password that causes the phone to burst into flames. It also shouts "You killed me you murderer! I had a family! You sicko!" As it melts.
The smoke causes everyone to weep. It's not tear gas. Its emotional gas, as everyone in the room is crying at the death of the phone and the life it could have lived.
The charge is destruction of evidence because he used a duress password (he was legitimately under duress) to wipe the encryption keys off his phone, making it impossible for officers to do anything with.
This was a violation of his 4th Amendment and 5th Amendment rights (4A is unreasonable search and siezure, while 5A is prevention of forced self-incrimination). Oh wait, the PATRIOT Act and Red Flag laws made 4A and 5A (respectively) defunct.
There are 4th amendment free zones in the US surrounding certain areas... Meaning the government can just violate your 4th amendment because it decided you have no rights due to living within a no rights zone.
Freedom!
Aren't those the zones within 200 miles of the US border? Florida seems to have it the worst, as that state is surveilled big time.
And points of entry, airports
So, pretty much everyplace
Technically he didn't enter the PIN. When repeatedly asked for it with no way to speak to a lawyer first, he gave them his PIN. Did they ask for his phone PIN, yep, did he give them his phone PIN, yes. Had they asked for a specific PIN for the device, they might have been able to get one specific to a profile on the device but they didn't.
Did they ask him if this PIN was for a specific profile? Doubtful so it's kind of on them.
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