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[-] JelleWho@lemmy.world 62 points 2 weeks ago

For a second I though this was something bad for my computer. But is mainly a server permissions issue it seems. Will patch my server when I'm home though

[-] bookmeat@fedinsfw.app 28 points 2 weeks ago

It affects any device that can use raw sockets in the kernel. Patch everything.

[-] JelleWho@lemmy.world 9 points 2 weeks ago

"mainly", it is a 'lower' priority for single use local computers

[-] drkt@scribe.disroot.org 11 points 2 weeks ago

What do you mean? If you use Linux on your computer, it's also relevant. Any program can quietly drop a root shell from any privilege level in 10 lines of python.

[-] ipp0@sopuli.xyz 41 points 2 weeks ago

This attack must be run locally. The attacker must already have user access. They can then escalate privileges using this. Meaning your box must already be compromised for this to work. Still serious, but no need to panic in most cases.

[-] possiblylinux127@lemmy.zip 10 points 2 weeks ago

A local compromise happens more than you think

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[-] InnerScientist@lemmy.world 29 points 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago)
[-] s38b35M5@lemmy.world 5 points 2 weeks ago
[-] drkt@scribe.disroot.org 8 points 2 weeks ago

/c/selfhosted moment

Sure don't patch a quiet and easy root shell escalation because it is, by itself, not a remote exploit. I sure do hope you trust every single piece of software running on your computer.

[-] thesmokingman@programming.dev 14 points 2 weeks ago

I think you’re displaying a very big gap between understanding risk assessment and understanding task completion. So far I have not seen anyone say they would not complete the task. I have seen people complete risk assessment. Risk assessment does not mean I will not do something, it just reflects the urgency with which I will do it. Most self-hosted users can safely apply basic risk assessment to see, while the impact may be high, the likelihood is low. Obviously the likelihood increases the more hands off you are with, say, unattended container updates for things that can escape containers or access the underlying system. Should most self-hosted users literally drop everything, rush home, and apply the patch? No, basic risk assessment does not merit that. Should everyone apply the patch? Yes.

[-] Mondez@lemdro.id 58 points 2 weeks ago

This disclosure has been rushed for the views and hype IMO, none of the big distros had fixes ready to go on this this morning.

[-] purplemonkeymad@programming.dev 14 points 2 weeks ago

Yea I didn't think the post was that professional. Also the "unminified" version is just the minified with more white space. It still has poor names and no explanation of the binary blob.

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[-] ShortN0te@lemmy.ml 5 points 2 weeks ago

The patches where proposed over a month ago and the patch to the kernel was commited on 1th of April.

Either the Vulnerability was not proper communicated to the distro maintainers or they were the ones sleeping.

This was probably executed as a responsible discllsure where clear timelines and release dates get communicated from the beginning.

I find it hard to blame the security team here when there was 1 month of time between first commited patch and release of the PoC.

[-] WhyJiffie@sh.itjust.works 6 points 2 weeks ago

and the patch to the kernel was commited on 1th of April.

are you sure? what I have seen in git patch dates is 11th for the unreleased 7.0, and yesterday for the LTS versions

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[-] Crozekiel@lemmy.zip 21 points 2 weeks ago

Dumb question but... It says that patches were committed to mainline on April 1st. How would one know if their distro has already fixed this via updates or not? I run a rolling-release distro on my desktop and laptop, and usually update once every week (or two at most) so have already ran updates 2 or 3 times since the patch was deployed. Am I likely good? If I'm not, is running updates all I need to do to be good? How would I know?

[-] thesmokingman@programming.dev 29 points 2 weeks ago

The only guaranteed fix is in the kernel. You’ll want to check your distro for the CVE. The disclosers very happily bring up all the distros affected but do not seem to have reached out to any of them to also patch. The CVE itself is still waiting for NVD analysis beyond its base score.

I’m not actively saying they did anything wrong but I am saying they’re blowing smoke about responsible disclosure.

[-] ozymandias117@lemmy.world 20 points 2 weeks ago

Yeah... It seems like they only reached out to the kernel, and not to any distros...

They also disclosed after 37 days rather than the more standard 90 days for everyone to patch

[-] Danitos@reddthat.com 14 points 2 weeks ago

They sell a vulnerability discovery program. IMO, they did this dubious responsable disclousure to get the extra marketing.

[-] ozymandias117@lemmy.world 13 points 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago)

Check uname -r

If you're on 6.19.12 or newer (7.0.1 if they've already bumped to 7) you're definitely safe

For others, it looks fixed in 6.18.22 6.12.85 6.6.137 6.1.170 5.15.204

If you don't have a safe kernel, A better solution referenced below than a module blacklist is to set initcall_blacklist=algif_aead_init in your kernel boot parameters. There is not a generic way to do this across distros, so you will need to look it up for your case

~~If you don't have the updated kernel, you can echo "install algif_aead /bin/false" > /etc/modprobe.d/disable-algif.conf and reboot.

That ensures the buggy module cannot be loaded until you have an updated kernel~~

[-] StripedMonkey@lemmy.zip 8 points 2 weeks ago

I continue to protest against this claim. Blacklisting the kernel module does not work for a bunch of distributions including Alma, Rocky, RHEL and others because they have this module built into the kernel. There's no module to remove. You must use a syscall blacklist or similar mechanism to disable this.

[-] ozymandias117@lemmy.world 6 points 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago)

I'm working off the knowledge that OP is using a rolling release, so is likely fixed by that for them. (Arch based, Cachy, and OpenSUSE Tumbleweed all have it as a module, and are the most commonly suggested. Fedora fixed it 2 weeks ago since they follow mainline, so I'd expect Bazzite to have it too. If they're using Debian Sid/Testing, it's both fixed and a module)

If you're using something else, this eBPF filter is probably your best bet https://github.com/Dabbleam/CVE-2026-31431-mitigation

[-] StripedMonkey@lemmy.zip 5 points 2 weeks ago

My personal suggestion would be to add initcall_blacklist=algif_aead_init to your kernel arguments. Ebpf is cool, but not a very trivial solution.

I understand the suggestion might apply to a random, unspecified distro but I disapprove of both the exploit authors and the general Internet suggesting fixes that don't apply to every distro (including copy.fail's AI slop RHEL distro that doesn't exist) without caveating it.

The kernel module blacklist won't work for every situation, if you're not being specific in telling people where it applies, it's best to suggest a solution that actually works regardless of distro or explain how to validate when it applies but nobody is doing that.

[-] ozymandias117@lemmy.world 3 points 2 weeks ago

Giving a better solution is certainly useful.

I'd used initcall_debug before, but not initcall_blacklist

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[-] determinist@kbin.earth 7 points 2 weeks ago

I ran the script today and my system is vulnerable.

Cachyos, all up to date.

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[-] melsaskca@lemmy.ca 19 points 2 weeks ago

I've always though that the more popular linux becomes, the more vulnerabilities it will expose.

[-] Flax_vert@feddit.uk 27 points 2 weeks ago

Basically every server runs linux already, so it's already a big target

[-] ArcaneSlime@lemmy.dbzer0.com 9 points 2 weeks ago

And also "Good. If they're found they'll be patched. Worry about the ones that 'aren't' 'found.'"

[-] wewbull@feddit.uk 14 points 2 weeks ago

Honestly, if an attacker has shell access you're toast regardless. I know you shouldn't be able to escalate privileges, but better to never let them on the machine.

Most security in industry only holds because employees have no interest in attacking, or knowledge how to attack, their employer.

[-] ShortN0te@lemmy.ml 14 points 2 weeks ago

Honestly, thats a really bad take. Yes obviously, you should not let attackers access the terminal, but there are linux servers that rely on multiuser operations, like Servers that are meant for terminal access, like HPC.

Then services get hosted via container these days, so even with rootless containers you get root access if you only get RCE on one service. And even if there are additional VMs for more isolation between host, you still get root on the whole VM.

[-] jj4211@lemmy.world 4 points 2 weeks ago

Note that this is a rather narrow view of the scope of things.

Yes, the demonstrator is a python script that opens up 'su' and uses splice+this vulnerability to change it to 'just assume all privileges and become sh'.

However, it's that any process in any namespace can leverage a certain socket type and splice to effectively modify any filesystem content they want. It's easy to see how this could be part of a chained attack to, for example, replace a protected service that is firewalled off with a shell. An RCE in a service permits rewriting nginx in an entirely different container and replaces it with a shell backend of your choosing.

That 'flatpak' application on your single user system that is guarded from touching your files that aren't related? That isolation doesn't mean anything if this issue is in play.

In terms of shared systems, while it should be avoided if possible, practically speaking there's a lot of shared resources.

I don't get why I've seen so many people saying "ehh, no big deal, privilege escalation is just a fact of life".

[-] Ophrys@lemmy.dbzer0.com 4 points 2 weeks ago

I work for a critical, global communications infrastructure company, and it's painfully obvious that the moment someone has a foothold they could do whatever they want with some minor skill lol.

[-] pipe01@programming.dev 12 points 2 weeks ago

Why is the PoC obfuscated?

[-] HyperfocusSurfer@lemmy.dbzer0.com 10 points 2 weeks ago

Probably looks more 1337 this way 🤣

There's a readable version in the issues, tho: https://github.com/theori-io/copy-fail-CVE-2026-31431/issues/54#issuecomment-4351460190

[-] czardestructo@lemmy.world 7 points 2 weeks ago

For my trixie Debian boxes I just did a normal apt upgrade, rebooted, checked the kerenel with uname -r and confirmed it was 6.12.85-1. All set!

[-] BlackLaZoR@lemmy.world 6 points 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago)

Nothing much to do for me. Just apply patches as normal.

Edit: I wonder how bad is it on Android

[-] Hobo@lemmy.world 3 points 2 weeks ago

I don't think af_alg is exposed to non-root users on android.

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[-] brewery@feddit.uk 5 points 2 weeks ago

I have a mix of Debian and Ubuntu servers. I'll update manually anyway but for future cases, would unattended-upgrades set to security upgrades run daily be enough to stop this type of issue?

[-] vegetaaaaaaa@lemmy.world 14 points 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago)

This is a kernel bug, unattended-upgrades will take care of installing the new kernel once the fix is published, but you still have to reboot to load it. I've set up a cron job that runs needrestart nightly and reboots my servers if there is a pending kernel upgrade [1]

[-] possiblylinux127@lemmy.zip 7 points 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago)

Unattended-upgrades has a config option to auto reboot

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[-] mech@feddit.org 5 points 2 weeks ago

This doesn't affect my org at all. Our SAAS providers already demand ssh root access on our Linux VMs so their applications work.

[-] Decronym@lemmy.decronym.xyz 4 points 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago)

Acronyms, initialisms, abbreviations, contractions, and other phrases which expand to something larger, that I've seen in this thread:

Fewer Letters More Letters
Git Popular version control system, primarily for code
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol, the Web
LTS Long Term Support software version
NAS Network-Attached Storage
nginx Popular HTTP server

4 acronyms in this thread; the most compressed thread commented on today has 9 acronyms.

[Thread #267 for this comm, first seen 1st May 2026, 10:50] [FAQ] [Full list] [Contact] [Source code]

[-] TomasEkeli@programming.dev 3 points 2 weeks ago

That's a good bot!

[-] Redjard@reddthat.com 3 points 2 weeks ago

I haven't checked too deeply but I think fedora dropped the affected system between kernels 6.6 and 6.12 somewhere. 6.12+ appear to not have the modules.
Not too surprising given the system has been deprecated for a long time.

[-] possiblylinux127@lemmy.zip 3 points 2 weeks ago* (last edited 2 weeks ago)

Interesting enough systems running SELinux seem to be potentially protected against this assuming SELinux is configured to block AF_ALG

On Android AF_ALG is locked down with SElinux so it shouldn't be impacted

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this post was submitted on 30 Apr 2026
332 points (98.3% liked)

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