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[–] 62 points 4 months ago (2 children)

For a second I though this was something bad for my computer. But is mainly a server permissions issue it seems. Will patch my server when I'm home though

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  • [–] 11 points 4 months ago (3 children)

    What do you mean? If you use Linux on your computer, it's also relevant. Any program can quietly drop a root shell from any privilege level in 10 lines of python.

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  • [–] 41 points 4 months ago (1 child)

    This attack must be run locally. The attacker must already have user access. They can then escalate privileges using this. Meaning your box must already be compromised for this to work. Still serious, but no need to panic in most cases.

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  • [–] 5 points 4 months ago (1 child)
  • [–] 8 points 4 months ago (1 child)

    /c/selfhosted moment

    Sure don't patch a quiet and easy root shell escalation because it is, by itself, not a remote exploit. I sure do hope you trust every single piece of software running on your computer.

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  • [–] 14 points 4 months ago

    I think you’re displaying a very big gap between understanding risk assessment and understanding task completion. So far I have not seen anyone say they would not complete the task. I have seen people complete risk assessment. Risk assessment does not mean I will not do something, it just reflects the urgency with which I will do it. Most self-hosted users can safely apply basic risk assessment to see, while the impact may be high, the likelihood is low. Obviously the likelihood increases the more hands off you are with, say, unattended container updates for things that can escape containers or access the underlying system. Should most self-hosted users literally drop everything, rush home, and apply the patch? No, basic risk assessment does not merit that. Should everyone apply the patch? Yes.

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  • [–] 58 points 4 months ago (2 children)

    This disclosure has been rushed for the views and hype IMO, none of the big distros had fixes ready to go on this this morning.

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  • [–] 5 points 4 months ago (1 child)

    The patches where proposed over a month ago and the patch to the kernel was commited on 1th of April.

    Either the Vulnerability was not proper communicated to the distro maintainers or they were the ones sleeping.

    This was probably executed as a responsible discllsure where clear timelines and release dates get communicated from the beginning.

    I find it hard to blame the security team here when there was 1 month of time between first commited patch and release of the PoC.

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  • [–] 6 points 4 months ago (1 child)

    and the patch to the kernel was commited on 1th of April.

    are you sure? what I have seen in git patch dates is 11th for the unreleased 7.0, and yesterday for the LTS versions

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  • [–] 2 points 4 months ago (1 child)
  • [–] 21 points 4 months ago (5 children)

    Dumb question but... It says that patches were committed to mainline on April 1st. How would one know if their distro has already fixed this via updates or not? I run a rolling-release distro on my desktop and laptop, and usually update once every week (or two at most) so have already ran updates 2 or 3 times since the patch was deployed. Am I likely good? If I'm not, is running updates all I need to do to be good? How would I know?

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  • [–] 29 points 4 months ago (2 children)

    The only guaranteed fix is in the kernel. You’ll want to check your distro for the CVE. The disclosers very happily bring up all the distros affected but do not seem to have reached out to any of them to also patch. The CVE itself is still waiting for NVD analysis beyond its base score.

    I’m not actively saying they did anything wrong but I am saying they’re blowing smoke about responsible disclosure.

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  • [–] 13 points 4 months ago* (last edited 4 months ago) (6 children)

    Check uname -r

    If you're on 6.19.12 or newer (7.0.1 if they've already bumped to 7) you're definitely safe

    For others, it looks fixed in 6.18.22 6.12.85 6.6.137 6.1.170 5.15.204

    If you don't have a safe kernel, A better solution referenced below than a module blacklist is to set initcall_blacklist=algif_aead_init in your kernel boot parameters. There is not a generic way to do this across distros, so you will need to look it up for your case

    ~~If you don't have the updated kernel, you can echo "install algif_aead /bin/false" > /etc/modprobe.d/disable-algif.conf and reboot.

    That ensures the buggy module cannot be loaded until you have an updated kernel~~

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  • [–] 8 points 4 months ago (1 child)

    I continue to protest against this claim. Blacklisting the kernel module does not work for a bunch of distributions including Alma, Rocky, RHEL and others because they have this module built into the kernel. There's no module to remove. You must use a syscall blacklist or similar mechanism to disable this.

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  • [–] 6 points 4 months ago* (last edited 4 months ago) (1 child)

    I'm working off the knowledge that OP is using a rolling release, so is likely fixed by that for them. (Arch based, Cachy, and OpenSUSE Tumbleweed all have it as a module, and are the most commonly suggested. Fedora fixed it 2 weeks ago since they follow mainline, so I'd expect Bazzite to have it too. If they're using Debian Sid/Testing, it's both fixed and a module)

    If you're using something else, this eBPF filter is probably your best bet https://github.com/Dabbleam/CVE-2026-31431-mitigation

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  • [–] 5 points 4 months ago (1 child)

    My personal suggestion would be to add initcall_blacklist=algif_aead_init to your kernel arguments. Ebpf is cool, but not a very trivial solution.

    I understand the suggestion might apply to a random, unspecified distro but I disapprove of both the exploit authors and the general Internet suggesting fixes that don't apply to every distro (including copy.fail's AI slop RHEL distro that doesn't exist) without caveating it.

    The kernel module blacklist won't work for every situation, if you're not being specific in telling people where it applies, it's best to suggest a solution that actually works regardless of distro or explain how to validate when it applies but nobody is doing that.

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    [–] 19 points 4 months ago (1 child)

    I've always though that the more popular linux becomes, the more vulnerabilities it will expose.

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  • [–] 14 points 4 months ago (3 children)

    Honestly, if an attacker has shell access you're toast regardless. I know you shouldn't be able to escalate privileges, but better to never let them on the machine.

    Most security in industry only holds because employees have no interest in attacking, or knowledge how to attack, their employer.

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  • [–] 14 points 4 months ago

    Honestly, thats a really bad take. Yes obviously, you should not let attackers access the terminal, but there are linux servers that rely on multiuser operations, like Servers that are meant for terminal access, like HPC.

    Then services get hosted via container these days, so even with rootless containers you get root access if you only get RCE on one service. And even if there are additional VMs for more isolation between host, you still get root on the whole VM.

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  • [–] 4 points 4 months ago

    Note that this is a rather narrow view of the scope of things.

    Yes, the demonstrator is a python script that opens up 'su' and uses splice+this vulnerability to change it to 'just assume all privileges and become sh'.

    However, it's that any process in any namespace can leverage a certain socket type and splice to effectively modify any filesystem content they want. It's easy to see how this could be part of a chained attack to, for example, replace a protected service that is firewalled off with a shell. An RCE in a service permits rewriting nginx in an entirely different container and replaces it with a shell backend of your choosing.

    That 'flatpak' application on your single user system that is guarded from touching your files that aren't related? That isolation doesn't mean anything if this issue is in play.

    In terms of shared systems, while it should be avoided if possible, practically speaking there's a lot of shared resources.

    I don't get why I've seen so many people saying "ehh, no big deal, privilege escalation is just a fact of life".

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  • [–] 12 points 4 months ago (1 child)

    Why is the PoC obfuscated?

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  • [–] 7 points 4 months ago

    For my trixie Debian boxes I just did a normal apt upgrade, rebooted, checked the kerenel with uname -r and confirmed it was 6.12.85-1. All set!

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  • [–] 6 points 4 months ago* (5 children)

    Nothing much to do for me. Just apply patches as normal.

    Edit: I wonder how bad is it on Android

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    [–] 5 points 4 months ago (1 child)

    I have a mix of Debian and Ubuntu servers. I'll update manually anyway but for future cases, would unattended-upgrades set to security upgrades run daily be enough to stop this type of issue?

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  • [–] 14 points 4 months ago* (last edited 4 months ago) (1 child)

    This is a kernel bug, unattended-upgrades will take care of installing the new kernel once the fix is published, but you still have to reboot to load it. I've set up a cron job that runs needrestart nightly and reboots my servers if there is a pending kernel upgrade [1]

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  • [–] 5 points 4 months ago

    This doesn't affect my org at all. Our SAAS providers already demand ssh root access on our Linux VMs so their applications work.

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  • [–] [B] 4 points 4 months ago* (last edited 4 months ago) (1 child)

    Acronyms, initialisms, abbreviations, contractions, and other phrases which expand to something larger, that I've seen in this thread:

    Fewer Letters More Letters
    Git Popular version control system, primarily for code
    HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol, the Web
    LTS Long Term Support software version
    NAS Network-Attached Storage
    nginx Popular HTTP server

    4 acronyms in this thread; the most compressed thread commented on today has 9 acronyms.

    [Thread #267 for this comm, first seen 1st May 2026, 10:50] [FAQ] [Full list] [Contact] [Source code]

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  • [–] 3 points 4 months ago* (last edited 4 months ago)

    Interesting enough systems running SELinux seem to be potentially protected against this assuming SELinux is configured to block AF_ALG

    On Android AF_ALG is locked down with SElinux so it shouldn't be impacted

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  • [–] 3 points 4 months ago

    I haven't checked too deeply but I think fedora dropped the affected system between kernels 6.6 and 6.12 somewhere. 6.12+ appear to not have the modules.
    Not too surprising given the system has been deprecated for a long time.

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