None of this matters to the people who ordered these charges. What the indictment does do, quite effectively, is provide a scaffolding for a broader disinformation campaign. Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche claimed on Tuesday that the SPLC was “manufacturing the extremism it purports to oppose by paying sources to stoke racial hatred.” And almost immediately, conservative media figures and politicians seized on it as proof of all of their long-standing conspiracies.

Archived version

Latvia's State Security Service (VDD) urged the prosecutor’s office to initiate criminal proceedings against a long-time Russian ethnic policy activist for violating European Union (EU) sanctions by providing content to a Russian propaganda outlet. Latvian Television reports the individual in question is pro-Kremlin activist Viktors Guščins.

Criminal proceedings against the Latvian citizen were initiated on November 26, 2025, after the State Security Service (VDD) discovered publications created by the individual on a Russian propaganda website operated by a foundation included on the EU’s list of international sanctions. His posts contained messages glorifying Russia, including interpretations of the occupation of Latvia and other events of World War II in line with Russian interests.

Access to this specific Russian propaganda resource within Latvian territory has been blocked based on a recommendation from the State Security Service (VDD).

The VDD has urged the Prosecutor’s Office to bring criminal charges against the individual for the criminal offence specified in the first part of Article 84 of the Criminal Law, i.e., for violating EU sanctions. The VDD emphasises that providing any resources to an entity subject to EU sanctions is considered a violation of EU sanctions.

...

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/8556123

Archived version

Oleg Bessedin, a prominent figure in Estonia's Russian-speaking community, had run a Facebook group and YouTube channel, both now suspended, which allegedly disseminated pro-Russian propaganda in Estonia.

State Prosecutor Taavi Pern said Bessedin has "consistently" cooperated with Russian state institutions and their representatives, in order to take part in influence activities as described in the indictment.

"Russia is conducting active informational influence operations, during which large amounts of propaganda and disinformation are spread. The aim is to divide the populations of other countries and to sway them to support Russia's political choices. It is precisely in such influence activities that, in the prosecutor's assessment, Oleg Bessedin has participated. After examining the evidence collected in the criminal case, the court will be able to pass judgment on Oleg Bessedin's actions," Pern said.

...

According to the charge sheet, Bessedin had been actively participating in pro-Kremlin influence activities since at least May 2022, and had remained in contact with various Russian institutions, officials, and individuals involved in such influence operations.

In taking part in these activities, Bessedin is alleged to have committed non-violent actions directed against the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Estonia.

The prosecutor has also charged him with broadcasting Russian-sanctioned television programs and content in Estonia via television and social media channels under his control; he is also charged with making sanctioned content available to other channels.

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Of course, genocidal statements were made by many members of the War Cabinet and administration, including claims of Nakba, openly. So, evidence for genocide is fairly overwhelming. I think it mostly comes from, again, their genocidal statements, both in terms of dehumanizing the whole of the population as well as forecasting what they ended up doing, which is starving and creating tent cities and, of course, mass slaughter under the very thin military auspices of "eliminating Hamas," something that, of course, everybody knows was never possible, nor was it ever sort of a legitimate goal in any meaningful sense, because to them, anyone shooting back that is not on the Israeli or US payroll is considered Hamas.

And so that's the opening premise, and it's not one I really spend a lot of time litigating, because I think it's self-evidently true in key ways. And also, of course, if you don't accept that, or you reject the consensus of the scholarship on this, then I'm probably not going to convince you anyway. I think the book is primarily marketed to and written for what I would call fence-sitting liberals who vaguely sense that the media created the conditions for genocide but don't necessarily have the evidence for it or the argumentation and logic for it. So this book attempts to take those people and convince them of this so they themselves can sort of defend against that in the future and sort of look back at who was responsible and talk about what it means to have accountability, both politically and in terms of the media.

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The title is not meant to be provocative. I mean it literally. They sold a genocide. They packaged it and sold it like you would any other product. And just as The New York Times was essential to selling the war in Iraq to the public, the so-called center-left or liberal media, in this instance, was central—primarily because we had a Democratic president at the time, whose support was essential to maintaining the genocide, and who, of course, propped up many of the axioms of the genocide, and of course sent all the weapons for it.

So the intervention of Democratic-aligned media was essential, just as you needed the New Yorker, The Atlantic, and The New York Times to help launder propaganda for the selling of the Iraq War. Because right-wing media will always only get you 35–40%, but to get it over the finish line to 50–60%, or in this instance, to just get the left or anti-genocide activists off Biden's back, you need liberal buy-in. And really what the liberal buy-in here accomplished, and this is key, was to waste everyone's time. It was to buy time. By December of 2023, there's not really anyone defending the genocide on principle or from first principles or on its own terms. It's truly about hand-waving, buying time, and soft genocide denial.

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/51052747

Ukraine has accused Russia of organizing staged “anti-war” protests in Cyprus in an effort to disrupt discussions among European leaders over continued financial and military support for Kyiv, according to Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation on April 24.

Russian-backed actors are attempting to influence the outcome of a high-level EU meeting taking place on the island, where President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is presenting proposals for deeper defense integration across Europe.

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The protests, expected to continue through April 25, are reportedly coordinated by Russian diplomatic and cultural structures operating in Cyprus, including the embassy, Rossotrudnichestvo

-linked networks, and a so-called Russian cultural center. Ukrainian officials allege these groups routinely promote Moscow’s influence abroad under the cover of cultural initiatives.

“These actions are presented as a ‘struggle for peace,’ while in reality they push for ending EU financial support to Ukraine,” the Center said. It added that the campaign also promotes narratives suggesting that military assistance to Kyiv “prolongs the war,” a claim Ukrainian officials describe as an attempt to shift responsibility for Russia’s aggression.

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cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/8555683

Archived version

Energy is fast emerging as a new frontier in China’s cognitive warfare against Taiwan. China has consistently employed a carrot-and-stick strategy: positioning itself as an energy “savior” while simultaneously threatening an energy blockade to pressure Taiwan into yielding to coercion. As such, not only should the Taiwanese government recognize the importance of countering this emerging trend, but regional partners should also prioritize taking collective action to respond to energy-related coercion.

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cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/50989159

Russia is increasingly deploying videos and deepfakes generated by artificial intelligence (AI) in what Ukrainian officials describe as a coordinated psychological warfare campaign designed to distort reality and manipulate target audiences.

Researchers have identified more than 1,000 synthetic videos forming part of a structured “narrative kill chain” – a modular disinformation system built to target soldiers, civilians, and Western audiences with tailored messaging.

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According to Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation (CDD), citing research by Sensity AI, the scale and structure of these operations show how generative AI is now being used as a mass tool of cognitive warfare.

The content is carefully segmented. For military audiences, it pushes messages about a “failing war effort,” a “collapsing front line,” and seeks to undermine trust in commanders.

Civilian-facing videos are designed to drain morale, normalize Russian-imposed conditions, and weaken confidence in state institutions and the army.

For Western audiences, the focus shifts to discrediting Ukraine, portraying Ukrainian refugees negatively, and arguing against continued support for Kyiv.

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The goal, analysts say, is not just persuasion – but chaos. A reality where so much synthetic content circulates that even genuine evidence can be dismissed as fake or AI-generated.

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Officials warned that it would allow Moscow to muddy accountability for real-world atrocities by eroding trust in any form of visual proof.

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Web Archive link

cross-posted from: https://mander.xyz/post/50954866

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha has announced that Ukraine will assist Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia in countering Russian disinformation and accusations surrounding the use of airspace by Ukrainian drones.

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Sybiha emphasized the growing information warfare by Russia in the Baltic countries.

“The Russians are particularly active in spreading disinformation in the Baltic states. They are sending the message that you have provided your airspace for the use of Ukrainian drones. There are also other aspects,” he said.

The Minister further stated that the Baltic nations have requested Ukraine’s help in de-escalating the tension caused by Russia’s threats.

“Of course, we will help our friends,” Sybiha confirmed.

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In a related development, Estonia’s foreign intelligence service has issued a warning about the need for Europe to enhance its defense and internal security to prevent Russia from perceiving an opportunity to challenge NATO.

Kaupo Rosin, head of the Estonian intelligence service, stressed that “Europe must invest in defense and internal security so that... in the future, Russia would conclude it has no chance against NATO countries.”

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article: https://www.theatlantic.com/science/2026/04/missing-scientists/686885/

The Atlantic has a long article on the story of missing scientists recently featured here on Slashdot. In short, it is an incoherent conspiracy theory that spreads wide and far, not paying any attention to boundaries of time, space, or area of expertise. "Which is all to say that another piece of flagrant nonsense has ascended to the highest levels of U.S. politics and media," writes the Atlantic's Daniel Engber. "To call it a conspiracy theory would be far too kind, because no comprehensive theory has been floated to explain the pattern of events. But then, even the phrase pattern of events is imprecise, because there is no pattern here at all. Given all the people who could have been roped into this narrative but weren't, any hope of finding meaning falls away. Barring any dramatic new disclosures, the mystery of the missing scientists has the dubious honor of being a sham in every way at once." - https://news.slashdot.org/story/26/04/22/1934234/the-missing-scientist-story-is-unbelievably-dumb

(I would post archive link but I'm blocked because of DNS, VPN, or something else...)

Adam Johnson, media critic and co-host of Citations Needed, joins Mondoweiss US correspondent Michael Arria to discuss his new book, How to Sell a Genocide: The Media's Complicity in the Destruction of Gaza. All royalties from the book are being donated to the Middle East Children's Alliance.

Adam breaks down how US media manufactured consent for the genocide in Gaza, from the ISIS-ification of Hamas to the fake ceasefire theater that let Biden run out the clock. He explains how liberal media created an alternate reality where Biden was secretly furious with Netanyahu while never once threatening to cut weapons, how campus protests were smeared as antisemitic pogroms while 3,000 children were being killed in a single month, and why the Claudine Gay scandal got more coverage on MSNBC than the murder of Hind Rajab. He also looks ahead at how liberal Zionism will try to co-opt growing opposition to Israel with better PR instead of real policy change.

Culturally speaking, these tech elites are coded very differently from charismatic Holy Rollers who have had a long tradition of promising their followers that adherence to Christian faith and practices will yield material wealth. But essentially, they are offering a similar, though slightly inverted proposition:

Tech can make you rich and a good Christian. Call it the prosperity gospel of technology. Much in the way they have shaped culture with social media algorithms, tech evangelists now are attempting to normalize the use and acceptance of AI by wrapping it in a spiritual message. They also have explicit policy goals, and the Trump administration appears to be heeding their call, with new federal efforts aimed at unshackling AI from safety regulations.

A new investigation by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) reveals how certain Facebook pages posing as lifestyle hubs for hobbies and health tips inject Beijing’s political narratives into their feeds to influence public opinion in Taiwan. These pages are tied to the China-based digital marketing company Wubianjie, which blends entertainment, disinformation and political messaging in cognitive warfare campaigns that are difficult to detect.

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Web Archive link

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/8497014

The European Council is listing:

• Euromore, a media platform operating within the pro Kremlin information architecture as an unofficial media relay. Euromore amplifies, recycles, and legitimises Russian narratives and disinformation targeting European audiences. Furthermore, it recurrently disseminates content challenging the legitimacy of EU institutions and justifying Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

• The Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Pravfond). This is a core instrument of the Russian Federation’s foreign influence and propaganda strategy, which is founded and financed by the Russian state. Pravfond’s legal and analytical output is systematically used to reinforce key Kremlin disinformation points, notably allegations of the 'nazification' of Ukraine, claims of widespread 'Russophobia', and assertions of 'systematic persecution of Russian-speaking populations in neighbouring states'.

The designation subjects the entities to an asset freeze, and EU citizens and companies are forbidden from making funds, financial assets or economic resources available to them.

With this decision, restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities now apply to a total of 69 individuals and 19 entities.

Adam Johnson is a media analyst and co-host of the podcast Citations Needed, whose work has appeared in The Nation, The Intercept, and other major outlets. He joined Current Affairs Editor-in-Chief Nathan Robinson to discuss his new book How to Sell a Genocide: The Media’s Complicity in the Destruction of Gaza, an analysis of how U.S. corporate media covered Israel’s assault on Gaza.

https://www.plutobooks.com/product/how-to-sell-a-genocide/

Great very timely discussion!

I am getting really tired of lazy hyperbolic attacks on Piker, read his words before you listen to the distracting noise.

Al-Fassel and Pishtaz News look like typical news websites. They have neatly designed homepages and active social media accounts, where they share reporting and videos on Middle Eastern geopolitics in Arabic and Farsi, respectively, as well as English. Al-Fassel’s X account states the publication’s mission is “to investigate events of great significance that are often overlooked by local and regional media, and to shed light on them.” The Pishtaz News X account says it was established “to investigate and expand upon important news that local and regional media often overlook.”

These overlooked stories share the same ideological slant and editorial voice: that of the White House. Al-Fassel’s YouTube account, for instance, has racked up millions of views on Arabic-language videos praising the Trump administration’s Gaza policy and exhorting Hamas to cease “taking orders from the Iranian regime” and release Israeli prisoners. On Pishtaz News, a poll on the homepage recently asked: “[H]ow would you describe your belief about the Supreme Leader’s current health status and whereabouts?” Possible answers range from “In good health but hiding” to “Disfigured” or “Dead.” The excellence of Saudi and Emirati leadership, both close military partners of the U.S., is a recurring theme.

There’s a reason this coverage echoes American foreign policy talking points. Al-Fassel and Pishtaz News are, in fact, part of network of websites and social media accounts purporting to be legitimate Middle Eastern news outlets that are in fact propaganda mills funded by the United States government, The Intercept has found.

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Between February 28 (the start of the war), and April 10, DeSmog tracked 22 instances in which Canadian news media gave space to individuals representing Atlas Network-affiliated organizations arguing Trump’s war on Iran justifies the expansion of Canada’s oil and gas sector. In eight of those examples, Atlas-affiliated groups were quoted alongside industry associations, fossil fuel lobby groups, oil companies, or banks with considerable investments in Canada’s oil and gas sector.

These include appearances or attributions in the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), the Globe and Mail, the National Post, the Financial Post, as well as CTV and Global television networks, among others.

To evaluate the Bubblemetrix Index, a multidimensional instrument was constructed and pre-tested, with the initial version including five factors: “Echo Chamber Exposure”, “Algorithmic Curation Awareness”, “Source Diversity Perception”, “Ideological Homogeneity & Confirmation Bias”, and “Repetitive Interaction & Engagement”. As preliminary data indicated a lack of consistency in the “Echo Chamber Exposure” factor, and the removal of certain items did not yield acceptable reliability, this factor was excluded from the instrument. The final instrument demonstrated good pre-test metric properties.

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A central theoretical implication of the results is that user agency alone cannot account for the observed patterns of ideological reinforcement on social media platforms. While prior research has variously emphasised users’ capacity to seek diverse information or the constraining role of algorithmic curation, the present findings suggest that these dimensions are closely intertwined. Users with high levels of algorithmic awareness, that is, those who explicitly recognise personalisation mechanisms, are not necessarily less vulnerable to ideological encapsulation. On the contrary, one of the most prominent user profiles identified in this study combines strong algorithmic awareness with elevated confirmation bias and repetitive engagement. This counterintuitive pattern challenges optimistic assumptions underlying media literacy–based approaches to mitigating polarisation and calls into question policy strategies that prioritize user education as a standalone solution (Bechmann & Nielbo, 2018; Dubois & Blank, 2018).

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This study set out to examine how algorithmic personalisation shapes electoral perceptions by focusing on users’ experiences within filter bubbles. Through the development and application of the Bubblemetrix framework, the research provides empirical evidence that filter bubbles are structured, differentiated, and politically consequential phenomena. Rather than affecting users uniformly, algorithmic reinforcement emerges through specific configurations of awareness, engagement, and ideological alignment.

One of the most significant conclusions is that algorithmic awareness does not function as a protective factor against ideological encapsulation. Users who recognise personalisation mechanisms may nonetheless remain deeply embedded in self-reinforcing informational environments. This finding directly challenges policy approaches that prioritise media literacy and transparency as sufficient tools for mitigating polarisation (Bechmann & Nielbo, 2018; Dubois & Blank, 2018). While such measures are important, they are insufficient to counter structurally embedded dynamics of amplification.

The study further demonstrates that perceived source diversity does not necessarily weaken filter bubble effects. Exposure to multiple outlets can coexist with pronounced ideological homogeneity when algorithmic systems consistently prioritise engagement-congruent content. This insight has direct implications for regulatory strategies that equate diversity with pluralism without addressing how content is algorithmically selected and amplified (Bruns, 2019; Kaiser & Rauchfleisch, 2020).

From a governance standpoint, the findings underscore the need to reconceptualise filter bubbles as systemic risks rather than individual shortcomings. Approaches centred exclusively on user responsibility overlook the structural role of platform architectures in shaping political discourse. Effective mitigation therefore requires interventions that address engagement-driven ranking systems and feedback loops that entrench ideological segmentation.

The identification of distinct user profiles further suggests that regulatory approaches should account for heterogeneity in vulnerability and engagement patterns. Highly engaged users exhibiting strong ideological reinforcement may require more robust safeguards than users who interact selectively with political content. This observation raises broader questions about proportionality, responsibility, and personalisation in platform governance.

Beyond its substantive findings, the study offers a methodological contribution by demonstrating how psychometric instruments and person-centred analyses can inform policy debates. The Bubblemetrix framework provides a means of assessing algorithmic risks in a manner that is empirically grounded and normatively relevant, supporting the development of evidence-based governance strategies.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latent_and_observable_variables

In statistics, latent variables (from Latin: present participle of lateo 'lie hidden'[citation needed]) are variables that can only be inferred indirectly through a mathematical model from other observable variables that can be directly observed or measured.[1] Such latent variable models are used in many disciplines, including engineering, medicine, ecology, physics, machine learning/artificial intelligence, natural language processing, bioinformatics, chemometrics, demography, economics, management, political science, psychology and the social sciences.

Although the authors’ personal narratives give the book urgency and immediacy, its larger ambition is diagnostic. Mann and Hotez seek to explain how we arrived at a moment in which anti-science disinformation has become, in their words, “orchestrated,” and credible scientists are recast as public enemies.

Seventy years ago, federally supported research was often celebrated as creating an “endless frontier”—a driver of economic growth, national strength, and democratic vitality. Today, the incentives often run in the opposite direction. When scientific findings threaten entrenched economic or political interests, science itself becomes the target.

To explain this inversion, the authors identify five reinforcing forces that together generate sustained pressure on publicly funded science—what they alliteratively call plutocrats, petro-states, pros, protagonists, and the press. Rather than treating attacks as episodic or personality-driven, they map them as systemic features of the modern political economy and information environment.

What can be said is that the Times’ silence mirrors that of Democratic leaders in Congress, who also barely let out a peep during this period. For their part, it is clear that they aimed to conceal their support for the war from their base, who overwhelmingly oppose it. Within that dynamic, congressional Democrats waited until after the war began to propose a war powers resolution—demonstrating their issues, if any, were about process, not substance.

The Times likewise saved its feckless criticism until after the war began, penning an editorial (2/28/26) the day Trump launched the war (proving their capacity to move quickly when convenient) voicing process concerns: Trump lacked clear achievable objectives, threatened to mire the US in another “endless war,” and failed to consult Congress. Like Democratic leaders, the Times failed to reject—and indeed reiterated—the logic of the war itself: that article of faith that Iran is an intolerably evil and belligerent state (FAIR.org, 3/13/26).

Just like Democratic leaders, the New York Times failed to use its outsized influence to challenge this monstrous war. Instead, it participated in its genesis, through cowardice as much as through sanctimony.

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/8405152

Here is the full report: MANUFACTURING IMPUNITY: RUSSIAN INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN UKRAINE - (pdf)

Global Rights Compliance (GRC) lawyers and researchers at the Reckoning Project worked to expose how information operations and digitally enhanced propaganda were used as an integral part of criminal acts.

This report provides an in-depth examination of “information alibis”, a distinct form of disinformation employed by the Russian Federation (‘Russia’) in armed conflicts. Information alibis involve the preemptive dissemination of false information, carefully crafted to deflect responsibility for crimes committed by the actual perpetrator or perpetrating State.

By constructing these deceptive narratives, Russia aims to absolve its leadership of culpability and manipulate the information landscape to its advantage. This tactic represents a cynical weaponisation of rhetoric as part of Russia’s broader military strategy.

The report analyses the structure, purpose, and objectives of information alibis within the wider context of Russian information operations. It reveals a coherent strategy rooted in state doctrine, evident in operations within Ukraine, Syria, and other regions.

This strategy involves a complex interplay of state actors and carefully orchestrated disinformation campaigns designed to mislead both domestic and international audiences.

The report establishes a foundational understanding of how information alibis function as an important tool for a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Future efforts will focus on expanding case-specific investigations, strengthening attribution to individual perpetrators, and translating findings into probative evidence for accountability mechanisms.

The project was aimed at combining investigations into the command structure of Russian information operations, detailed content analysis of propaganda, data analysis of online behaviour, and other evidence to make a compelling case that:

– Shifted the public debate to clearly mark the difference between even the most extreme types of abhorrent but legal speech and the use of information operations as part of criminal conduct;

– Established a foundation for stronger sanctions and other forms of public pressure to disrupt the funding and functioning of Russian information operations, thus weakening Russia’s military and ‘hybrid war’ machine in Ukraine and across the world;

– Advanced legal principles and build the evidentiary basis necessary to pursue criminal cases against those responsible for integrating information operations into criminal acts.

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