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Did the CIA Conclude That Stalin WASN'T a Dictator? (www.youtube.com)
submitted 7 months ago* (last edited 7 months ago) by sadschmuck@hexbear.net to c/history@hexbear.net
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No.

According to a claim circulating online, there is a CIA document or internal communication from the 1950s asserting that Joseph Stalin was not a dictator. The existence of this document is cited as proof either that Stalin was not a dictator after all, or at least that even the CIA didn't think he was. However, looking at the document in question, we see it is not a pronouncement of fact by the CIA whatsoever, but an anecdotal information report submitted to CIA information gatherers. As such, the document is a primary source representing the perspective of one anonymous informant, not the opinion of the CIA as a whole. Additionally, the document is contradicted by dozens of more reliable or detailed documents obtained or created by the CIA in the same period, indicating that they did not believe Stalin was non-dictatorial as claimed.

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[-] RedWizard@hexbear.net 4 points 7 months ago* (last edited 7 months ago)

Or what about this one from 1947, stating that "ever greater concentration of power in the hands of Stalin himself is taking place. During the war he was already, to all intents and purposes, a dictator with unlimited powers, but at that time this was considered as a temporary state of affairs. It has now been made permanent. The USSR has now entered upon a period of personal dictatorship." This report, by the way, is also just far more detailed, with dozens of points explaining the argument.

But then we move beyond the realm of just information reports—meaning beyond just the raw intelligence—and look at the processed memorandums, briefs, and research reports prepared by the CIA from these inputs. For example, in a staff discussion just after Stalin's death, everyone seems to agree that he was a personal dictator. They talk about if "the enormous power concentrated in Stalin personally could be transferred to a successor or successors." One person "[REDACTED] began by stating flatly that any concept of solidarity or cooperative committee relations among the men in the top ruling group was utter nonsense," said he "[REDACTED] believed that modern totalitarianism inevitably removedd into personal dictatorship. Stalin had become more and more like Hitler."

Meanwhile, in another analysis, "Stalinism is defined as the theory and practice connected with Stalin's personal dictatorship, one-man rule." In the analysis of Khrushchev's secret speech, we read: "The Soviet leadership has recently reaffirmed that the Soviet people are irrevocably subordinated to authoritarian one-party dictatorship, iron discipline, individual leadership—in spite of the now proven fact that the party could not protect the people, the Soviet state, or itself against a Stalin."

And okay, one more: "Pure collectivity—the equal sharing of power and authority by a number of men—has never existed in the USSR. Stalin had succeeded in establishing an almost absolute dictatorship." And on and on they go.

So in sum, our document is already in the least credible category of reports and is contradicted by other, more detailed reports of the same type. But on top of that, it's contradicted in the more reliable categories repeatedly. Perhaps most revealing of all, none of these documents imply the CIA knew or acted as if Stalin wasn't a dictator. I could highlight every last instance of them literally saying the words "dictator," but what's more important is how they report on him and Soviet politics in general with the assumption that the system works dictatorially. For example, there's no talk of "elections are underway; we have to try to influence the results," or "we're not sure who the people will support," or "Stalin be outvoted." Here, they're talking about how the supreme leader acts and what they expect he personally will do.

Now, in the end, any such document at best tells us what the CIA thought about the Soviet Union, not necessarily what it actually was. They may have their reasons, but they're not infallible either. The CIA certainly had a lot of resources behind it and motivation to understand their enemy, but they were still an outside observer trying to peek across the Iron Curtain. To quote one analysis: "The CIA and Western intelligence in general faced an extremely difficult task in the early years of the Cold War, particularly in attempting to gain insights into the Soviet leadership, its deliberations, and what they intended to do. Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union was in several, if not most, respects a secret state."

So the CIA shouldn't be misconstrued as this authoritative, all-knowing source. It would be folly to take one comment in any such report as some smoking gun proving the fact, and that goes both for and against Stalin being a dictator. Such an assertion will be proven not by an off-hand CIA remark, but by examining the actual material reality on the ground and the much more revealing, reliable sources that the '50s CIA didn't have access to—namely, the Soviet government's own internal documents. So it's no wonder historians spend more time in the Soviet archives than on cia.gov.

All this to say: please stop using this CIA report as some sort of proof that Stalin wasn't a dictator. This is an unevaluated, anecdotal report from one unnamed source, not a statement of fact by the CIA. Even if that was legitimately what the 1950s CIA as a whole believed—which they didn't—that wouldn't sufficiently prove the claim anyway. This report is not the proof you think it is, and the fact that it's been touted as conclusive for so long despite the obvious shortcomings would say more about current research standards than any of the actual realities of Stalin's regime.

[-] RedWizard@hexbear.net 4 points 7 months ago

Footnotes

  1. "Comments on the Change in Soviet Leadership," 2 March 1955, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-00810a006000360009-0.

  2. The "Intelligence Cycle", and the obtainment of raw, human intelligence ("HUMINT") is discussed in the following: Mariusz Antoni Kamiński, "Intelligence Sources in the Process of Collection of Information by the U.S. Intelligence Community," Security Dimensions, no. 32 (2019): 82--105 (esp. 82--90); John Hollister Hedley, "The Challenges of Intelligence Analysis," in Strategic Intelligence, ed. Loch K. Johnson, vol. 1 (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 123--38.

  3. "The Soviet Party Leadership," 3 April 1972, page 1, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130045-3.pdf.

  4. This can be confirmed by looking at CIA documents which discuss their internal procedures and document types, such as: "Dissemination of CIA Reports," https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-04718A000400090035-2.pdf; "Dissemination of CIA Unevaluated Information Reports," https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-04718A002700080033-0.pdf; "Dissemination of Intelligence," 1 January 1954, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-03362A000700030001-8.pdf; for background on the types of intelligence collected by the CIA and its processing into "finished intelligence", see: John Hollister Hedley, "Challenges of Intelligence Analysis," 125--127.

  5. Fischer clarifies that HUMINT may include reporting from clandestine agents, as well as "overt reporting from foreign intelligence officers, diplomats, and attachés based on personal observations and professional contacts... allied foreign (''liaison'') services...émigrés and defectors from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as open sources such as newspapers, radio and television broadcasts, and official government statements." Benjamin B. Fischer, "'We May Not Always Be Right, but We're Never Wong': US Intelligence Assessments of the Soviet Union, 1972--91," in The Image of the Enemy: Intelligence Analysis of Adversaries Since 1945, ed. Paul Maddrell (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2015), 96.

  6. This will be explored in more detail in a dedicated video, but an introduction to this argument can be found in: Sheila Fitzpatrick, On Stalin's Team: The Years of Living Dangerously in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015); E. A. Rees, ed., The Nature of Stalin's Dictatorship: The Politburo, 1924--1953 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), esp. chapters 1--3. 7.

  7. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80S01540R003100120009-1.pdf

  8. "Inner Antagonisms in the Leadership of the All-Russian Communist Party and Stalin's New Government," 18 August 1947, page 1, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80-00809A000500830068-3.pdf.

  9. More specifically, a meeting of specialists (including members of the Board of National Estimates, its staff, and other Soviet consultants) was held after Stalin's death to discuss the Soviet power structure, and to determine if Stalin's death was likely to destabilize the Eastern Bloc or not, and the results of this meeting were then summarized in a memorandum produced for CIA leadership. Whether or not the Soviet Union or Eastern Bloc would be destabilized by changes in Soviet leadership or its decisions is a reoccuring theme throughout all the documents, which makes sense considering the CIA was primarily tasked with analyzing Soviet policy for the purposes of informing American response.
    "Meeting of Consultants," 25 April 1953, pages 1--7, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R004000050088-9.pdf.

  10. "Titoism and Soviet Communism: An Analysis and Comparison of Theory and Practice, October 1957, page 17, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T00246A073800530001-4.pdf.

  11. "Materials for Exploitation of Soviet Sensitivities Revealed by the 30 June CPSU Resolution and Other Soviet Statements," July 1956, page 17, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-02771R000200300001-3.pdf.

  12. "The Soviet Leadership: Toward a New Configuration?" 7 November 1972, page 2, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R002000120025-5.pdf.

  13. As the rest of the memorandum concludes, Rosefielde wasn't entirely correct in his criticism and lacked full understanding of the CIA's internal processes, but this is still an interesting example of the CIA being quite off-base:
    "Comments on 'Why the CIA's Estimate of Soviet Defense Procurement Was Off by 200%: The Economic Consequences of Quality Change' by Steven Rosefielde," 1 January 1977, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80M00165A002400080004-7.pdf.
    This memorandum also accords with the conclusion made by Moskoff in 1981, based on the unclassified information up to that point, which was that the CIA was generally competent and skilled in analyzing hard facts, such as economic statistics, but was perhaps too pessimistic in its new predictions. Although this article is interesting given what was just around the corner: William Moskoff, "CIA Publications on the Soviet Economy," Slavic Review 40, no. 2 (1981): 269--72; Fischer notes that American intelligence agencies were successful in monitoring Soviet weapons systems, and pioneered estimative intelligence, but had a frequent problem of poor quality intelligence especially in regards to Soviet decisionmaking; Benjamin B. Fischer, "'US Intelligence Assessments," 94--95.

  14. Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, and Michael S. Goodman, The CIA and the Pursuit of Security: History, Documents and Contexts (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020), 64.

Video/Film Sources

[-] HexReplyBot@hexbear.net 2 points 7 months ago

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