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Did the CIA Conclude That Stalin WASN'T a Dictator?
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Because some expressed not being interested in watching this video, here is the transcript. Youtube transcripts have limited, if any, punctuation, so I ran it through DeepSeek to add punctuation and rewatched the video while reading along to confirm its accuracy.
If you've searched the web for info on Stalin, you may have heard the claim that there is a CIA document concluding that Stalin wasn't a dictator—that even they had to admit it. This document is touted as proof either that he wasn't a dictator, or at least that even the CIA didn't believe he was, despite the propaganda they were spewing about him.
Now, I won't be discussing here if Stalin was or wasn't a dictator, or how Soviet leadership actually worked; that'll be a separate video, if anything. Today, I just want to look at this one document and see if it truly serves as the compelling evidence that people think it does. In so doing, we'll also see a bit of an example of how to evaluate a source in general.
So, here is the document in question. It's a two-page information report from 1955 and released to the public in 2008, as can be seen here on cia.gov. Before we analyze the text itself, though, let's first ask ourselves some questions to determine its basis as a source, as the background and context behind a document are in many ways just as important for evaluating it appropriately.
The first question we might ask is: who is behind this document? As in, who is the author? Probably what bugs me the most when people talk about this document is they say "the CIA," as in "the CIA said," "the CIA concluded," "the CIA admitted." But that isn't the case at all. For one, the CIA collects information reports from thousands of sources, agents, and informants of varying levels of veracity and credibility all the time. Maybe we could say "the CIA" metonymically if we're talking about an organization-wide statement, policy, or official ruling by, say, the upper leadership. A good start would be a memorandum, or beyond that, an official report, which will usually note who prepared it. However, this is not the case of our document. It's specifically an "information report," meaning it's an input, not an output. The text is labeled "unevaluated information," which is what the CIA labels its raw or unfinished information that it collects at the beginning of the intelligence cycle, meaning the text has not been verified for its accuracy, nor is it necessarily representative of the agency's opinion. These are quote "comments from an anonymous source" who presumably spoke these words or gave them to the CIA to be recorded, meaning we simply don't know who is behind this. Was it some low-level bureaucrat? Foreign observer? How well did they know the Soviet Union? Were they a Soviet defector? In any case, the document definitely needs to be contextualized as the comments or opinions of one particular person at a particular place and time, not some declarative, definitive statement by the CIA. This is not an official finding; it's not even an internal memo; it's an anecdotal report given to CIA information gatherers.
Plus, the Soviet Union was notoriously a hard target for the CIA, with scarcely any reliable sources on the ground. As one scholar has put it, "Neither the CIA nor US military intelligence was able to recruit a single agent with access to the innermost secrets of the Kremlin or the Soviet High Command." Point being, we're almost certainly working with hearsay from someone without direct knowledge of the inner workings of the Soviet government. They might not even be a Soviet citizen. And what's more, we lack the ability to judge fully how credible, biased, experienced, or believable this source was as well. This alone more or less debunks the argument given, but let's continue.
The second thing we normally ask is: why are they saying what they're saying? What was their purpose in writing this info, and how did they come to know it? Unfortunately, we again don't have much to go off of for that either. The comment in question is basically just a paragraph, and so the source doesn't justify or explain why they believe this, which means even if there was a factual claim in here, this wouldn't be a great source for it.
Also, on the subject of purpose, many people, beginning from the erroneous conclusion that this is an official memo, will assume they had no reason to lie about their enemies behind closed doors. But for one, as already said, this is an input to the CIA, and so we have to think about the source's purpose in reporting it to them. Did they have strategic or personal motivations? Were they just plain incorrect or deliberately disinformative? For the same reason as before, we can't really answer that. But from the context we do have, their purpose seems to be to inform on the current internal stability in the country, meaning this wasn't really intended to be used as a statement on Stalin's reign.
But second, we can also look for evidence intertextually as well. If it was true that the CIA believed or knew deep down that Stalin wasn't really a dictator, why would that need to be said to the CIA in a report of theirs? As in, what structural purpose would this document serve in enabling their work in that regard? Remember, we're looking at their paperwork here. Such documents don't usually outright say, "Let's lie about this or that"; the documents themselves are written from the perspective of believing, or wanting people to believe in, the lie. So we would expect to find more indirect insinuations or reactions to the belief, or just any documentation of actions taken as if he wasn't a dictator, not a literal statement saying he isn't.
Anyway, these are things to consider when evaluating a source, which might not rule out the information from being true, but at the least tell you how much stock you should put into believing a claim by itself. In our case, it's clear that this is a weak source; it has inexact origins and is being misconstrued to imply something it was never really meant to imply.
But while we're here, let's at least evaluate the text itself and see if it actually says anything significant. It begins:
So we start off with a claim that the Western idea is exaggerated, perhaps because it doesn't take into account collective leadership, which was a Soviet ideal that, in theory, leadership decisions should be made as a group. Thus far, though, this isn't necessarily saying there was no dictatorship at all, but it's at least disagreeing with the Western idea of it.
It continues:
So from this we learn that some collective leadership was always there, with Lenin and Stalin being strong leaders who coincided with less collective leadership, and future leaders probably would allow more. The assumption, though, is that it will now grow post-Stalin.
And finally:
So, taken together, the source seems to believe there is a dictatorship in the Soviet Union, that Stalin was the captain, but that his absolute power or singularity is often exaggerated. As it so happens, this understanding is closer to the conclusion that many modern scholars have arrived at: that Stalin wasn't a despot in the sense of having absolute, total power, but he was still dictatorial in the sense of having near-absolute power at the head of a small, unaccountable group of people. So our claim isn't exactly earth-shattering.
But to get back to the point, even if this document was 100% factual, it doesn't exactly say the Soviet government was non-dictatorial. It definitely doesn't say it was democratic, had checks and balances, or anything like that. There's no indication of Stalin being constrained by the people, for example. It's at best only saying, in the opinion of the source at least, there was more of an oligarchic dictatorship rather than a one-man dictatorship.
Now, as already noted, the first two lines are often cited without explaining the full context, or indeed even looking at the rest of the page. But more importantly, what about cherry-picking of this document as a whole compared to others? From a cursory glance, there are literally dozens of CIA documents calling Stalin a dictator created around the same time, and many of these actually have better provenance or detail.
For example, in another information report made the year prior, with the exact same clearance level and apparent manner of obtainment, we read about "the cult of Stalin," "the visible evils of despotism," and "the struggle to establish a new dictator." It continues: "Stalin was a fanatic, an all-powerful dictator with a persecution complex and a mania for greatness." So on what grounds is our information report to be believed, but this other, equally as valid information report is to be ignored?
[continued below]
I find it really weird that they have done such a good job thinking critically to disabuse us of the validity of this source but then do such a bad job interpreting its contents. "Wide powers" does not mean "near-absolute" power, even the President of the US has "wide powers" and he obviously is not a dictator (though we can make token remarks about how the current one is trying with the expansion of the police state, etc.) Then this is backpedaled to calling the SU a bureaucracy, which I actually agree with, but it doesn't really reconcile these views, so it's like a preemptive motte-and-bailey.
@ClathrateG@hexbear.net
Or what about this one from 1947, stating that "ever greater concentration of power in the hands of Stalin himself is taking place. During the war he was already, to all intents and purposes, a dictator with unlimited powers, but at that time this was considered as a temporary state of affairs. It has now been made permanent. The USSR has now entered upon a period of personal dictatorship." This report, by the way, is also just far more detailed, with dozens of points explaining the argument.
But then we move beyond the realm of just information reports—meaning beyond just the raw intelligence—and look at the processed memorandums, briefs, and research reports prepared by the CIA from these inputs. For example, in a staff discussion just after Stalin's death, everyone seems to agree that he was a personal dictator. They talk about if "the enormous power concentrated in Stalin personally could be transferred to a successor or successors." One person "[REDACTED] began by stating flatly that any concept of solidarity or cooperative committee relations among the men in the top ruling group was utter nonsense," said he "[REDACTED] believed that modern totalitarianism inevitably removedd into personal dictatorship. Stalin had become more and more like Hitler."
Meanwhile, in another analysis, "Stalinism is defined as the theory and practice connected with Stalin's personal dictatorship, one-man rule." In the analysis of Khrushchev's secret speech, we read: "The Soviet leadership has recently reaffirmed that the Soviet people are irrevocably subordinated to authoritarian one-party dictatorship, iron discipline, individual leadership—in spite of the now proven fact that the party could not protect the people, the Soviet state, or itself against a Stalin."
And okay, one more: "Pure collectivity—the equal sharing of power and authority by a number of men—has never existed in the USSR. Stalin had succeeded in establishing an almost absolute dictatorship." And on and on they go.
So in sum, our document is already in the least credible category of reports and is contradicted by other, more detailed reports of the same type. But on top of that, it's contradicted in the more reliable categories repeatedly. Perhaps most revealing of all, none of these documents imply the CIA knew or acted as if Stalin wasn't a dictator. I could highlight every last instance of them literally saying the words "dictator," but what's more important is how they report on him and Soviet politics in general with the assumption that the system works dictatorially. For example, there's no talk of "elections are underway; we have to try to influence the results," or "we're not sure who the people will support," or "Stalin be outvoted." Here, they're talking about how the supreme leader acts and what they expect he personally will do.
Now, in the end, any such document at best tells us what the CIA thought about the Soviet Union, not necessarily what it actually was. They may have their reasons, but they're not infallible either. The CIA certainly had a lot of resources behind it and motivation to understand their enemy, but they were still an outside observer trying to peek across the Iron Curtain. To quote one analysis: "The CIA and Western intelligence in general faced an extremely difficult task in the early years of the Cold War, particularly in attempting to gain insights into the Soviet leadership, its deliberations, and what they intended to do. Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union was in several, if not most, respects a secret state."
So the CIA shouldn't be misconstrued as this authoritative, all-knowing source. It would be folly to take one comment in any such report as some smoking gun proving the fact, and that goes both for and against Stalin being a dictator. Such an assertion will be proven not by an off-hand CIA remark, but by examining the actual material reality on the ground and the much more revealing, reliable sources that the '50s CIA didn't have access to—namely, the Soviet government's own internal documents. So it's no wonder historians spend more time in the Soviet archives than on cia.gov.
All this to say: please stop using this CIA report as some sort of proof that Stalin wasn't a dictator. This is an unevaluated, anecdotal report from one unnamed source, not a statement of fact by the CIA. Even if that was legitimately what the 1950s CIA as a whole believed—which they didn't—that wouldn't sufficiently prove the claim anyway. This report is not the proof you think it is, and the fact that it's been touted as conclusive for so long despite the obvious shortcomings would say more about current research standards than any of the actual realities of Stalin's regime.
Footnotes
"Comments on the Change in Soviet Leadership," 2 March 1955, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-00810a006000360009-0.
The "Intelligence Cycle", and the obtainment of raw, human intelligence ("HUMINT") is discussed in the following: Mariusz Antoni Kamiński, "Intelligence Sources in the Process of Collection of Information by the U.S. Intelligence Community," Security Dimensions, no. 32 (2019): 82--105 (esp. 82--90); John Hollister Hedley, "The Challenges of Intelligence Analysis," in Strategic Intelligence, ed. Loch K. Johnson, vol. 1 (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 123--38.
"The Soviet Party Leadership," 3 April 1972, page 1, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130045-3.pdf.
This can be confirmed by looking at CIA documents which discuss their internal procedures and document types, such as: "Dissemination of CIA Reports," https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-04718A000400090035-2.pdf; "Dissemination of CIA Unevaluated Information Reports," https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-04718A002700080033-0.pdf; "Dissemination of Intelligence," 1 January 1954, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-03362A000700030001-8.pdf; for background on the types of intelligence collected by the CIA and its processing into "finished intelligence", see: John Hollister Hedley, "Challenges of Intelligence Analysis," 125--127.
Fischer clarifies that HUMINT may include reporting from clandestine agents, as well as "overt reporting from foreign intelligence officers, diplomats, and attachés based on personal observations and professional contacts... allied foreign (''liaison'') services...émigrés and defectors from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as open sources such as newspapers, radio and television broadcasts, and official government statements." Benjamin B. Fischer, "'We May Not Always Be Right, but We're Never Wong': US Intelligence Assessments of the Soviet Union, 1972--91," in The Image of the Enemy: Intelligence Analysis of Adversaries Since 1945, ed. Paul Maddrell (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2015), 96.
This will be explored in more detail in a dedicated video, but an introduction to this argument can be found in: Sheila Fitzpatrick, On Stalin's Team: The Years of Living Dangerously in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015); E. A. Rees, ed., The Nature of Stalin's Dictatorship: The Politburo, 1924--1953 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), esp. chapters 1--3. 7.
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80S01540R003100120009-1.pdf
"Inner Antagonisms in the Leadership of the All-Russian Communist Party and Stalin's New Government," 18 August 1947, page 1, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80-00809A000500830068-3.pdf.
More specifically, a meeting of specialists (including members of the Board of National Estimates, its staff, and other Soviet consultants) was held after Stalin's death to discuss the Soviet power structure, and to determine if Stalin's death was likely to destabilize the Eastern Bloc or not, and the results of this meeting were then summarized in a memorandum produced for CIA leadership. Whether or not the Soviet Union or Eastern Bloc would be destabilized by changes in Soviet leadership or its decisions is a reoccuring theme throughout all the documents, which makes sense considering the CIA was primarily tasked with analyzing Soviet policy for the purposes of informing American response.
"Meeting of Consultants," 25 April 1953, pages 1--7, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R004000050088-9.pdf.
"Titoism and Soviet Communism: An Analysis and Comparison of Theory and Practice, October 1957, page 17, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T00246A073800530001-4.pdf.
"Materials for Exploitation of Soviet Sensitivities Revealed by the 30 June CPSU Resolution and Other Soviet Statements," July 1956, page 17, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-02771R000200300001-3.pdf.
"The Soviet Leadership: Toward a New Configuration?" 7 November 1972, page 2, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R002000120025-5.pdf.
As the rest of the memorandum concludes, Rosefielde wasn't entirely correct in his criticism and lacked full understanding of the CIA's internal processes, but this is still an interesting example of the CIA being quite off-base:
"Comments on 'Why the CIA's Estimate of Soviet Defense Procurement Was Off by 200%: The Economic Consequences of Quality Change' by Steven Rosefielde," 1 January 1977, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80M00165A002400080004-7.pdf.
This memorandum also accords with the conclusion made by Moskoff in 1981, based on the unclassified information up to that point, which was that the CIA was generally competent and skilled in analyzing hard facts, such as economic statistics, but was perhaps too pessimistic in its new predictions. Although this article is interesting given what was just around the corner: William Moskoff, "CIA Publications on the Soviet Economy," Slavic Review 40, no. 2 (1981): 269--72; Fischer notes that American intelligence agencies were successful in monitoring Soviet weapons systems, and pioneered estimative intelligence, but had a frequent problem of poor quality intelligence especially in regards to Soviet decisionmaking; Benjamin B. Fischer, "'US Intelligence Assessments," 94--95.
Huw Dylan, David V. Gioe, and Michael S. Goodman, The CIA and the Pursuit of Security: History, Documents and Contexts (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020), 64.
Video/Film Sources
De Sampigny, Serge, Yvan Demelandre, and Mathieu Schwartz, dirs. Stalin in Color. C. Productions, 2014. https://archive.org/details/docu.-war.-stalin.-in.-colour.-hdtv.x-264.720p.-ac-3.-mvgroup.org.
Klotz, Georges, dir. Science Of Spying. NBC, 1965.
https://archive.org/details/science-of-spying-secrets-of-the-cia.
Our History, "12 December 1937, Elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR," https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x95rpb4.
SRAS, "Russian Archives and SRAS Archive Services," 26 December 2020,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E_mSoPl5R2M.
I found a YouTube link in your comment. Here are links to the same video on alternative frontends that protect your privacy: