cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/40671

Cuban president Miguel Díaz-Canel received Pramila Jayapal and Jonathan L. Jackson, representatives of the US Democrat Party and members of US Congress who have expressed their solidarity with Cuba. In the meeting, the Cuban president condemned the tightening US blockade of Cuba.

In public statement, Cuba’s president repudiated the “criminal damage” of the economic blockade, particularly the consequences of the “energy siege” decreed by the Trump regime.

On Monday, these US congresspersons called for the immediate end of the fuel blockade imposed on Cuba: “The illegal fuel blockade imposed by the United States on Cuba—located just 90 miles south of the United States—adds to the longest-running embargo in world history and is causing incalculable suffering to the Cuban people,” they stated in a joint declaration published on Jayapal’s official page.

In the letter, they warned that the US blockade of Cuba constitutes “a cruel collective punishment” that has caused “permanent damage.”

The US threat against CubaOn January 29, Trump signed an executive order declaring a “national emergency” over the alleged “unusual and extraordinary threat” that, according to Washington, Cuba represents to US national security and the region.

The document accused the Cuban government of aligning with “numerous hostile countries,” harboring “transnational terrorist groups,” and allowing the deployment of “sophisticated military and intelligence capabilities” from Russia and China.

On that basis, the imposition of tariffs on countries that sell oil to the Caribbean nation was announced, along with threats of reprisals against those who act against the White House executive order.

This step comes amid an escalation between Washington and Havana, which has consistently rejected the outlandish US allegations and warned that it will defend its territorial integrity. The Cuban president responded that “this new measure reveals the fascist, criminal, and genocidal nature of a clique that has hijacked the interests of the US people for purely personal ends.”

On March 7, Trump announced that “a big change will soon come to Cuba,” which—he added—is “reaching the end of the road.”

The United States has maintained an illegal economic and commercial blockade against Cuba for more than six decades despite the UN General Assembly passing 33 resolutions condemning it. The embargo, which severely affects the country’s economy, has now been reinforced with numerous coercive and unilateral measures by the White House.

Translation: Orinoco Tribune
OT/CB/SL

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cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/40719

A criminal complaint filed with Argentina’s Justice has exposed an alleged corruption scheme involving preferential mortgage loans to members of Javier Milei’s Government and Liberty Advances legislators.

In the midst of complaints about alleged preferential credit lines from Argentina’s National Bank for Government officials and legislators, two new criminal complaints were filed on the subject. The cases were filed in various federal courts and point to possible crimes such as fraud against the public administration, abuse of authority and violation of duties of a public official.

Among those reported are former bank officials and officials who agreed to large loans, in some cases amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars, which reinforces the seriousness of the case.

The judicial filing points to irregular maneuvers in the granting of nearly 400 million pesos (over 285,000 dollars) in credits specifically intended for high-ranking officials, raising serious questions about the integrity of public financial management.

Lawyer Alejandro Díaz Pascual formally presented the accusation, citing alleged crimes of fraudulent administration, abuse of authority, and incompatible negotiations.

The complaint directly names Daniel Tillard, former president of the National Bank (BNA), and Juan Curuchet, former supervisor of the Central Bank, as the principal individuals responsible for facilitating these questionable transactions.

This formal accusation initiates a significant legal process that aims to thoroughly investigate the extent of the alleged malpractices within the state-owned banking institution, particularly concerning the allocation of public funds under preferential conditions.

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The text reads: “A new criminal complaint against National Bank loans to officials complicates the Central Bank. The presentation made this Monday focuses on a delicate situation: at the time that Federico Furiase and Pedro Inchausti received the millionaire loans, they were directors of the Central Bank, which is in charge of supervising banks like the Nation.”

Investigation Details Unfold
The judicial document meticulously details that bank authorities allegedly authorized these financial operations without adhering to established technical criteria for risk assessment.

These loans were reportedly granted under preferential market conditions, often lacking sufficient guarantees and without verifiable proof of repayment capacity. Such actions, as outlined in the complaint, represent a direct and substantial detriment to public assets, indicating a severe breach of fiduciary duty and responsible financial governance within a state institution. The practices described suggest a deliberate circumventing of standard banking procedures, potentially at the expense of national financial stability.

Under Corruption Involved
The ongoing investigation has identified a clear pattern of arbitrary decisions that purportedly favored key figures within the President Javier Milei’s circle.

Among the direct beneficiaries identified is Felipe Núñez, an advisor to Economy Minister Luis Caputo and director of the Bank of Investment and Foreign Trade (BICE). Núñez reportedly received 373 million pesos, approximately 350,000 dollars, in February 2025. Furthermore, the complaint names Federico Furiase, the current Secretary of Finance, who allegedly obtained a mortgage loan of 367 million pesos, nearly 276,000 dollars, in August 2025, a period during which he served as a director of the Central Bank.

The list of beneficiaries extends to include Emiliano Mongilardi, a member of the board of the state-owned oil company YPF, who reportedly secured financing of 302 million pesos, approximately 211,000 dollars, in October 2025. Finally, Juan Pablo Carreira, associated with the Government’s Official Response Office, received a credit for 112 million pesos, equivalent to about 77,000 dollars, in December of the same year.

This comprehensive detailing of individuals and amounts paints a troubling picture of systemic favoritism in the allocation of state financial resources.

The mechanism of financing under scrutiny reportedly operated through the approval of loans without adequate credit analysis and the deliberate omission of essential internal controls. The complaint strongly emphasizes the existence of direct links between the beneficiaries of these loans and the senior bank directors who authorized their files. This interconnectedness raises significant concerns about potential conflicts of interest and a lack of transparency in the decision-making processes, suggesting a coordinated effort to misuse public financial institutions for private gain.

In response to inquiries regarding the case, spokespersons for the National Bank have confirmed that they will make the appropriate judicial presentations. The unfolding scandal gains particular prominence within a national context marked by severe economic adjustment, where the discretionary management of state resources by the Liberty Advances far-right administration is now subject to intense public and judicial scrutiny.

This revelation of million-dollar credits being granted to officials occurs at a critical juncture for the Argentinean economy.

For the first time in two decades, the balance of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has registered a negative figure, according to data released by the Central Bank (BCRA). This broader economic instability further amplifies the gravity of the alleged corruption scheme, as it suggests a mismanagement of public funds at a time when financial prudence and integrity are more vital than ever for the nation’s stability and development.

The National Bank is the main financial tool of the Argentinean State and should be oriented to guarantee access to credit for workers, medium and small enterprises and popular sectors. But the scandal reveals a reverse logic: as credit becomes increasingly inaccessible to the majority – in a context of adjustment policies and declining purchasing power- sectors of political power gain access to funding worth millions.

(Telesur) by Laura V. Mor

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cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/40183

Claudia Rosel
Associated Press

SOLEDAD SALINAS, Mexico — In the Central Valleys of Oaxaca, Mexico, Indigenous mezcal producers are watching a spirit once dismissed as the drink of the poor move far beyond their communities.

A global boom has brought new income to rural areas, but it has also pushed production toward an industrial scale, increasing pressure on forests, water and traditional methods.

Over the past decade, demand for mezcal has rapidly surged as international brands promoted its artisanal image. Production has gone from 1 million liters (260,000 gallons) in 2010 to more than 11 million (2.9 million gallons) in 2024, driven largely by demand from the United States, its largest overseas market.

Mezcal comes from the agave plant, also known as maguey in Mexico. The most commonly used species for commercial mezcal is agave espadin due to its relatively fast maturation of about six years, though more premium bottles are made from harder-to-find wild varieties such as cuish and tobala.

Much of the mezcal now leaves Oaxaca, which produces about 90 percent of Mexico’s total, to be poured in bars from New York to Tokyo.

Seven people who work in the mezcal industry recently spoke about what the spirit’s rapid transformation has meant for their lives, communities and land.

Armando Martínez Ruiz, 52, producer

“In my case, I have had a brand for six years, but it is very difficult to export it, to have a distributor. That is why the big brands come and, basically, they undercut us very easily, because they already have the entire market.”

Luis Cruz Ruiz, 62, producer

“Before, people in this town lived in houses with thatched roofs. Then we were able to build with sheet metal, and now they are made of cement. We survived because of the maguey. My children could go to university because of the maguey.”

Félix San German, 58, agave farmer

“There was a time when we sold a lot of maguey pineapples to Jalisco. They came here and bought entire truckloads. Now they have not come for some time, but we sell to big brands which can ask for 50 tons of pineapple a week.”

Félix Monterrosa Hernández, 37, producer

“Mezcal is not a business for us, but a means of survival. So many years of planting maguey, of caring for it and cultivating it, to sell one liter for 150 pesos ($8), is no business.”

Luis Cruz Velasco, 32, producer

“There are people who criticize us for what we do that affects the forest, and yes, we know it has an impact, but we have to look for a livelihood and food. If the government gave us more support after all the taxes we pay, we would not have to rely only on maguey.”

Gladys Sánchez Garnica, 33, producer

“From one day to the next, entire mountains were cut down to plant espadin. Here in our community that does not happen because we have a protected area that we are working on.”

Edgardo Martinez Santiago, 40, daily worker

“I’ve been working on maguey for five years now. We will cut eight tons today, but sometimes we do 20. Most of us live off it, and it benefits the entire town because we have more economic stability than when I was a kid.”

The post Mezcal producers in Oaxaca pose for photos while reflecting on economic impacts of the drink appeared first on ICT.

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cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/40168

By Chris Gilbert  –  Apr 1, 2026

The debates about Venezuela on the left today leave a great deal to be desired in many respects. However, one of the most symptomatic pitfalls, in my view, has been the excessive focus on the question of whether Delcy Rodríguez’s government, in the wake of the January 3 attacks, has made a tactical retreat of the Brest-Litovsk type or not.

In these debates, “Brest-Litovsk” has become a kind of shorthand. It refers to V. I. Lenin’s decision, in the months immediately following the October Revolution, to make a separate peace with Germany that involved ample concessions, doing so as a way to save the revolution.

For many, this historical example is taken as the model of correct revolutionary decision-making from the Venezuelan leadership. For this group, Lenin’s decision serves to justify the concessions that Rodríguez has made under duress to US imperialism, as a means for guaranteeing the revolution’s survival and buying time.

By contrast, there is a second group that is skeptical. They claim that a tactical retreat of the Brest-Litovsk kind is impossible in Venezuela, allegedly because there is no strategic vision or the concessions are too substantial. Instead of a retreat, they believe there has been capitulation.

One symptomatic feature of this debate is how both groups’ excessive focus on the Brest-Litovsk dilemma—which centers on the question simply of whether to fight or make a tactical retreat—erroneously compares Venezuela today, which is a relatively longstanding revolutionary process, to the Russian situation just four months after the October Revolution had taken place. The Russian Revolution was glorious and extraordinary (arguably it was the most important event of the twentieth century), but it was just getting going at the time of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

Thus, the focus on Brest-Litovsk amounts to a failure to accurately locate the historical moment, and it effectively denies that the Bolivarian Revolution has had substantial material and organizational achievements over the past quarter of a century. On a theoretical level, we see how focusing the debate on a “Brest-Litovsk moment” completely sidelines Hugo Chávez’s claims about the revolutionary “irreversibility” that had been achieved over the course of the revolution.

Unfortunately, this is typical of how intellectuals from the global North—even sympathetic ones—tend to perceive events in Venezuela, to say nothing of their perspective on the rest of Latin America. For many years, a large group of global North intellectuals insisted that the Bolivarian Revolution had made no real progress because it had failed to liquidate the bourgeoisie and nationalize all the major means of production.

Another common claim was that the popular movement in Venezuela and the government were in a relation of “dual power.” Since dual power refers to the period in Russia between February and October 1917, before the October Revolution, this implicitly suggests that Chávez (and later Maduro) were simply “Kerenskys,” and the real revolution is still to take place! All of this, along with other related positions, implies that there has been no real revolution in Venezuela, and therefore no substantial revolutionary trajectory or transformations.

Chávez’s view, of course, was the complete opposite of those sketched above. Right or wrong, the Venezuelan leader believed he was carrying out a real revolution, and he believed that, during the course of it, the leadership was passing power and social control over to the people through a variety of mechanisms.

Chávez repeatedly argued that these steps toward grassroots control of production and other aspects of social life—the popular power that has come to exist in the community councils, the civilian-military alliance, the communes, and the popular militias—all also constitute steps toward what he called irreversibility.

Two PerspectivesWho is right here? Is it the intellectuals who imagine themselves perpetually seated at the Brest-Litovsk negotiating table, deciding whether to fight or retreat, just months after the taking of power? Or is it Hugo Chávez, who thought that the longstanding Bolivarian Revolution could be something real, deep-rooted, and hard to undo?

It is worth observing that Comandante Chávez, with whom those engaged in this debate so systematically disagree, had most of the verdicts of history on his side. That is because history has shown that once working-class people gain participation in decision-making about production, territorial control, and national defense, it always takes an extraordinary effort to roll it back. Although popular participation may not be absolutely irreversible, it does take significant effort to eradicate a revolutionary process that has undergone substantial steps in social transformation.

That is why, in the former Eastern Bloc countries after 1991, educational systems were profoundly changed to promote recolonization, and workers’ rights were systematically destroyed. In the post-Soviet states, the cruelest kind of shock treatment was applied. Fortunately, extreme as this shock therapy was, it was not sufficient to fully terminate Russia’s hard-won and deeply ingrained delinking from the imperialist world economy. That is what has allowed a newly sovereign and anti-imperialist (even if no longer socialist) Russia to emerge under the leadership of Vladimir Putin.

What history has shown, then, is that if you want to break the back of a revolution, you need to destroy its bases in popular power. This requires work and dedication. It usually involves extensive and sustained violence, along with powerful cultural campaigns that wipe out historical memory.

Need it be observed that there is little evidence of this in Venezuela in the past few months? The Bolivarian army remains intact; the PSUV and its leadership are the same as ever; and the 5,000-plus communes and communal circuits are still functioning and receiving more, not less, financial support.

Yes, it is true that Venezuela’s oil industry, and especially its commercial side, has partly passed out of the country’s control. However, it should be remembered that this new situation also represents a de facto easing of the blockade, which was a longstanding aspiration of Maduro’s government, even if no one imagined it would take the form it has.

Locating the Historical MomentIn revolutions, timing is everything. That is something that both Lenin and Fidel Castro agreed on, the latter going so far as to say that “Revolution means understanding the historical moment.”

What historical moment are we in now: one similar to Brest-Litovsk, or is there a better comparison?

In fact, given that we are twenty-five years into the revolutionary process and the bulk of the Bolivarian Revolution’s organizational achievements remain intact, we should not turn so hastily to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty for comparison. Instead, we need to look for different historical references. In this respect, both China and Vietnam’s openings to the world market and foreign investment—each of which took place after an extended period of revolutionary consolidation—are much more relevant examples to consider.

Of course, many foreign intellectuals at the time of these openings insisted that the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions were being abandoned by their leadership. There was no shortage of claims about restorations or Thermidor-type reversals taking place.

However, today most of those skeptical voices—except for the most entrenched and incapable of self-criticism—would recognize that history has proved them wrong: the steps taken by China in the late 1970s, with its Reform and Opening Up, and by Vietnam in its Renovation process in the next decade, were actually what saved these revolutions in the face of the imperialist neoliberal counterrevolution taking place at the time.

Descendents of Cacique Ähuänumä: The 4F Huo̧ttö̧ja̧ Commune (Part I)

At present, history seems to repeat itself, as a large group of international observers falls into defeatism or myopia with regard to Venezuela. This manifests in how they show surprisingly little interest in the current status of the revolution’s main organizational pillars—most of which appear very stable and thus have much future potential in an emancipatory process that is far from dismantled.

In sum, many in the cosmopolitan intellectual sector seems to think that the Venezuelan state is like a car stalled at an intersection that is called Brest-Litovsk: the car could go left, right, backward, or forward. Like self-appointed traffic police, they eagerly observe the vehicle.

It never occurs to most of these observers that, after twenty-five years of revolutionary construction, the Venezuelan state-vehicle might be politically or socially different from any of the other state-vehicles that exist on the planet. They do not recognize that its inner workings might be distinct, that it may have been rewired in new, relatively irreversible ways, and that changing all that would require concerted and significant counterrevolutionary efforts.

In so doing, these observers repeat the patterns of bourgeois ideologues by seeming to deny that a revolution has ever taken place in the country—and that it therefore has to be reckoned with.

Cosmopolitan InternationalismRecently we have seen the emergence of a new generation of anti-imperialist intellectuals who are organized mostly in online networks and collectives. This should be seen, in most respects, as a welcome development. It is likely a reaction to the socialist currents and magazines that emerged in the global North following the 2008 crisis, one of whose main weak points was their failure to be sufficiently anti-imperialist. It was a weakness that became evident to all as the US-Israeli genocide in Palestine unfolded.

A correction of course was necessary. The downside, however, was that the new anti-imperialist intellectuals, who correctly understand that the main contradiction today is between US imperialism and oppressed nations, have frequently replaced the earlier generation’s blind spot with regard to imperialism with an anti-imperialism that is too cosmopolitan, too little rooted in concrete struggle. To the extent that this limitation has become ingrained, it reflects a failure to overcome their own class position and material conditions—which include easy air travel, privileged passports, and financial independence or flexible work conditions—that facilitate visits and virtual monitoring of developments across a wide range of countries and regions.

The main problem is that, on the spectrum that extends between “free-floating” and “organic” intellectuality, this group tends too much toward the former position. Undoubtedly, a revolutionary internationalism focused on anti-imperialism is an urgent necessity in our time, but it should be driven by people organically engaged with, even embedded in, a concrete revolutionary project or struggle. From that situated engagement (and the praxis, commitment, and self-critical reflection it calls for), an intellectual can then reach out and engage with other projects, theoretical claims, and social imaginaries.

Amilcar Cabral insisted that “rice is cooked inside the pot, not outside,” meaning that revolutions require a profound understanding of local subjective and objective conditions. Without such rootedness, and the understanding that goes with it, facile comparisons, made from the middle-class stratosphere, will replace productive, mutual learning processes. One set of leaders or one form of struggle will be held out as better than another, more combative, more heroic, and so on, without consideration of the material situation and history from which they emerged. For that reason, access to a multiplicity of processes and projects in diverse national conditions needs to be accompanied by an understanding that the times and character of each revolutionary process will be distinct and should be respected.

This is what Chávez himself insisted on, never allowing his internationalism to removed into cosmopolitanism. It can be observed that those actively participating in the defense of Iran, Cuba, or Palestine, and doing so from their respective territories, do not engage in the same invidious and facile comparisons as the cosmopolitan sector is inclined to do. That is because people with a rooted praxis of national or popular emancipation understand that the main project is not to sort out the good from the not-so-good, and then “criticize” the latter. In fact, the central project is to win: to defeat US imperialism.

That in turn requires respect for differences in timeframes, local conditions, and methodologies among various peoples and nations, all of it in the name of building the amplest anti-imperialist movement, which is the only one with a prospect of victory.

(Monthly Review)

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cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/40206

Peru is facing a political crisis that has lasted for a decade, a period in which it has had eight presidents. This instability has been marked by figures aligned with the continuance of Fujimorism and the conservative right.

This critical scenario could be redefined on Sunday, April 12, when general elections will be held with a record 37 presidential candidates and the historic return to a bicameral system of the parliament.

The current crisis stems from the constant confrontation between the presidency and the parliament. The Peruvian Congress has extraordinary power through the constitutional figure of “vacancy [of the president] due to permanent moral incapacity.”

This mechanism, which is subjective in nature, allows for the removal of the president without the need to prove a specific crime. It has been applied against presidents such as Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, Martín Vizcarra, Pedro Castillo, and José Jerí.

Polls and profiles in the race
A few days before the first round, pollsters (Ipsos, IEP, CPI) reflect an unprecedented dispersion of voter choice, where no candidate exceeds 13% of voting intention:

• Keiko Fujimori (Fuerza Popular): Occupies first place with 11%. In her fourth candidacy, she represents the extreme right and the continuity of the current model, having promoted legislation from parliament that favored large capital.
• Rafael López Aliaga (Renovación Popular): With 9%, he proposes contracting the government from 18 to 8 ministries and eliminating programs with a gender perspective, following the model of Argentina’s Javier Milei.
• Carlos Álvarez (País para Todos): In third place (7%), he bases his campaign on xenophobia and “iron fist” proposals, such as the death penalty and withdrawal from the San José Pact.
• Roberto Sánchez (Juntos por el Perú): A rising leftist option (4-5%), he supports a pardon for Pedro Castillo and the convening of a Constituent Assembly.

The key to governability will lie in the new bicameral Congress. The Senate, which cannot be dissolved by the president, and a fragmented Chamber of Deputies will condition the administration capacity of any head of state.

https://orinocotribune.com/jose-maria-balcazar-swears-as-peruvian-interim-president-after-jeris-removal/

An unpredictable electoral scenario
To win in the first round, a candidate requires more than 50% of the valid votes, a threshold almost impossible to reach for any candidate given the current fragmentation. Of the 25 million Peruvians in the electoral roll, 40% remain undecided or plan to vote blank or null, making the final result a mystery.

The complexity is aggravated by a “giant” ballot and the population’s lack of knowledge about the new functions of senators and deputies.

Given this outlook, it is highly likely that the two most-voted candidates will have to face a runoff on June 7, 2026.

(Telesur)

Translation: Orinoco Tribune

OT/JRE/SC

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cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/39567

María Pérez lost power for about three months after Hurricane Maria struck Puerto Rico in September 2017. Her home in Salinas, on the island’s southern coast, sits near a river. As the hurricane knocked out the island’s grid and sent rainwaters surging down from the mountains, Perez’s house flooded with a swirling mix of muddy water and animal feces, rising 3 feet high and warping the hallways. For the next three months, she went without power as she cleaned out the home and began the long process of rebuilding.

Five years later, when Pérez got word that Hurricane Fiona was expected to make landfall, she was prepared. This time, she and her family boarded up the doors and windows, sealed every opening with silicone, and evacuated to her daughter’s home, which lost power as the storm hit the island.

Pérez has a heart condition that makes heat dangerous for her. She relies on air conditioning to stay cool, especially during the long summer months when temperatures can top 90 degrees Fahrenheit and the air is thick with humidity. With no power after Fiona, her health was once again at risk.

The experiences cemented something in her: She needed electricity she could count on, independent of a grid that not only collapsed during storms but also carries the highest rate of outages in the country.

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So when she learned more than a year after Fiona that the U.S. federal government would make solar panels and battery storage available to low-income Puerto Ricans and people with medical conditions, she jumped at the chance. Over the next couple of years, she gathered documents proving she owned her home, submitted financial records showing she and her husband lived on $900 a month in Social Security payments, and hosted multiple visits from solar company representatives who measured the property, inspected the electrical setup, and assessed the feasibility of installation. She cleared every hurdle.

Then in January, the Trump administration announced it was terminating the program’s funding. Overnight, the prospect of a dozen solar panels and a battery system to safeguard her health — a future she had spent more than a year working toward — vanished.

“My turn was next,” Pérez told Grist. “It’s done in shifts, and I was next. Why did this happen?”

A man in a wheelchair looks at a flooded road after the passage of Hurricane Fiona in Salinas, Puerto Rico, in September 2022. Jose Rodriguez / AFP via Getty Images

Pérez was one of up to 40,000 low-income or medically vulnerable Puerto Ricans who were expected to receive solar panels and battery systems through the Energy Resilience Fund, a $1 billion program established by Congress in 2022. President Donald Trump and his administration — with the help of the Puerto Rican governor — have chipped away at the effort since reentering office, initially pausing funding before permanently rescinding the payments over the course of the year. Just 6,000 solar and battery systems were installed before the money disappeared.

The Department of Energy has since redirected more than a third of the intended solar funding to the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, or PREPA, a government-owned utility with a checkered reputation on the island. The utility has for decades been plagued by chronic corruption and serial mismanagement, and for the last roughly nine years, it has been navigating bankruptcy proceedings, one of the longest utility bankruptcies in the country. PREPA also has a poor track record in effectively carrying out major improvement initiatives. After Hurricane Maria made landfall, Congress allocated more than $17 billion to modernize the island’s grid. But more than a decade later, PREPA has completed just 16 projects, spending less than $100 million of those funds. (Spokespeople for PREPA did not respond to a request for comment.)

The Energy Department earmarked its latest infusion of cash for “key emergency activities designed to address critical vulnerabilities across generation, transmission, and distribution systems.” It also arranged for the grant to be “noncompetitive” — meaning it didn’t solicit bids before reallocating the solar funding to the utility.

“Why would you cancel something that is working as intended and being executed, to give it to someone that has a bad history?” said one former Energy Department official, referencing PREPA. “Why are we risking these funds?”

Puerto Rico’s grid has long been fragile and unreliable. The island depends largely on imported oil, gas, and coal for generating electricity. Although its population centers are clustered in the north around San Juan, most of the power plants are located on its southern coast. A network of transmission and distribution lines crisscrosses through mountainous terrain to move electricity across the island.

When Hurricane Maria made landfall as a Category 4 storm, this network collapsed. High-speed winds twisted and flattened transmission towers. Substations flooded. Power lines snapped or toppled over, leading to the longest blackout in the country’s history. Every Puerto Rican on the island lost power. In fact, some residents in remote parts of the island went without it for nearly a year.

Most of the roughly 3,000 people who died as a result of Maria were not felled by the hurricane itself, but by the collapse of the grid and health care infrastructure. Diabetics who needed insulin didn’t have a way to refrigerate their medicine. Dialysis patients couldn’t get the routine treatment they needed. And those who depended on oxygen machines and ventilators lost access.

Estimates for repairing the island’s power lines topped $100 billion. Congress stepped in to provide funding, earmarking more than $15 billion to PREPA to rebuild its grid. The funding came at an opportune time for the utility. Just two months prior to Maria, saddled with $9 billion in bond debt and no clear path to paying it off, PREPA had filed for bankruptcy. With the infusion of federal cash, the utility now seemed to have the resources to both right its financial ship and rebuild a stronger grid in Maria’s wake.

A worker repairs power lines about two weeks after Hurricane Maria swept through the island. Mario Tama / Getty Images

Four years later, that optimistic outcome was longer on the horizon. Outages continued to be common, the cost of electricity on the island was double the national average, and communities faced long lead times to restore service after storms and flooding. These problems continued even after PREPA contracted out the job of generating electricity to Genera, a subsidiary of the natural gas company New Fortress Energy, and the job of moving that power across the island to Luma Energy. Privatizing these efforts was pitched as a solution to the island’s grid woes, but in practice, neither company substantially improved reliability or affordability for Puerto Ricans. In response, a cadre of nonprofits, private solar companies, and wealthy Puerto Ricans began installing rooftop solar and battery systems. Within a year of Hurricane Maria, more than 10,000 new solar and battery systems were installed by private parties — nearly double the uptake in all the years prior combined. By early 2022, some 42,000 rooftop solar systems were enrolled in the island’s net-metering program.

When Hurricane Fiona hit, it put those solar systems to the test. By and large, those who had installed panels kept their lights on after the storm. Sunnova Energy, one of the major solar installers on the island, reported that 97 percent of its 30,000 customers had access to power in the days after the storm. That included fishermen who required electricity to refrigerate their catch, hospitals and fire stations that had set up solar for backup power, residents in remote parts of the island, and those who relied on power to operate medical equipment or refrigerate prescriptions.

Aerial view of a solar microgrid in Adjuntas, Puerto Rico, in July 2025. Ricardo Arduengo / AFP via Getty Images

The lessons from Fiona spurred lawmakers in Washington, D.C., to once again act. This time, with clear evidence of the resilience of a distributed energy system, new funding was specifically set aside for solar and battery systems for low-income Puerto Ricans and those who depended on electrical medical equipment. Led by the late Representative Raúl Grijalva, Congress eventually allocated $1 billion as part of an appropriations package “to carry out activities to improve the resilience of the Puerto Rican electric grid.” Jenniffer González-Colón, the governor of Puerto Rico, was then the resident commissioner for Puerto Rico, the island’s one non-voting member in the U.S. House of Representatives, and championed the effort alongside other congressional members.

The task of interpreting the language in the appropriations package and disbursing the new funds fell to the Energy Department, which was helmed at the time by Jennifer Granholm, a Democrat appointed by then-President Joe Biden. Although Congress had said the money could be spent to assist low-income households with purchasing solar and battery systems, it did not mandate that this be the only use. To clarify, Energy Department officials began discussions with the lawmakers who had championed the funding and made clear the money was intended to be used for distributed solar systems, according to people involved in those conversations, who requested anonymity for fear of jeopardizing their current employment.

As the agency was weighing important questions about the implementation of the program, Grijalva and other lawmakers sent a letter to Secretary Granholm in April 2023, emphasizing the role solar and battery systems had played in keeping lights on during Hurricane Fiona. “Residential solar and storage systems are critical lifelines when Puerto Rico’s power grid fails during natural disasters,” the letter said. It encouraged the department to consider “solar power and storage for individual households” and to “prioritize low-income people with disabilities.”

Congress’ intent was not to duplicate existing federal efforts to repair the grid and strengthen the island’s energy systems, which were already funded to the tune of $20 billion thanks to the aid made available post-Maria. Instead, it wanted the agency to use the new $1 billion to “ensure that the most vulnerable households have access to localized power and backup battery storage,” said one of the Energy Department officials who attended the meetings with Grijalva and other lawmakers, including Representatives Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ritchie Torres, and Nydia Velázquez.

The goal was to ensure that “if something else happens, another storm, another long-term outage happens while the long-term reconstruction is taking place, we don’t see what happened after Maria,” they added.

The Energy Department immediately began designing programs to distribute the funds, identify local partners, and issue awards. It set up three main initiatives: About $490 million was directed to Sunnova Energy and Generac to install solar and battery systems for low-income households, especially residents reliant on powered medical devices or those living in areas prone to outages. Another $48 million was awarded to four nonprofits — Barrio Eléctrico, Environmental Defense Fund, Let’s Share the Sun Foundation, and Solar United Neighbors — to deploy up to 2,000 residential solar and storage systems for low-income Puerto Ricans with health issues. Another $365 million was awarded to solar companies and nonprofit groups to install solar and battery systems at community health care facilities and community centers. It took the better part of 2023 and 2024 to establish all three programs and begin disbursing funds.

Just as some of the funding began flowing, Trump won his second term as president, vowing to undo Biden’s climate programs. Within a year, all three Puerto Rican solar initiatives were gone.

Governor González-Colón’s position had shifted by then, too. In a separate press release the same day announcing the reallocation of funds to PREPA, she said that the Trump administration had prioritized the energy needs of Puerto Rico, and that the island could not rely “on piecemeal approaches with limited results.” (A spokesperson for the governor’s office did not respond to a request for comment.)

Governor Jenniffer González-Colón welcomes then-Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem to discuss security in March 2025, in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Edgardo Medina / NurPhoto via Getty Images

The final nail in the coffin came in January when the Department of Energy announced in an email that it was cancelling $350 million in grants to set up systems for low-income households. “The electric system of Puerto Rico cannot afford to operate with more distributed solar,” the agency said. The funds haven’t officially been redirected to PREPA, but former DOE officials said the money will likely also end up in the utility’s coffers.

A spokesperson for the Energy Department shared a link to a webpage with answers to frequently asked questions about the fund. The page, which was created six days after Grist first inquired about the funds, states that the department’s goal is to provide reliable power “for the greatest number of Puerto Ricans and provide a quicker end to the energy emergency.” By repairing existing fossil fuel power plants and modernizing the grid, “all 3.2 million residents, including low-income and medically vulnerable households, experience more reliable power,” the website notes.

The page also states that it did not make the decision to cancel the solar programs lightly and said continuing to fund rooftop solar would “exacerbate reliability issues with the distribution grid and only cover a very small segment of the population.”

While high levels of distributed solar can create grid management challenges, there’s little evidence that the uptick in rooftop solar installations has worsened the island’s grid reliability.

When Wanda Ríos first learned about the $1 billion program, she knew it would benefit her neighbors in Salinas — and specifically the La Margarita community, where a majority of the residents are elderly and face significant health challenges. More than 80 percent of the homes in La Margarita, like that of María Pérez’s, are in a FEMA-designated floodplain. Every time the water levels rose, the power went out. At the time, just five houses out of around 300 in the neighborhood had battery and solar systems.

“Because we have the river, everything gets shut down,” she said. “And that’s why it was important that everybody produce their own energy in their own house.”

Ríos, who is a community organizer and leads the AbeynoCoop, an energy cooperative that has been trying to improve access to solar and battery systems in Salinas, began work securing federal funds in 2023. She got in touch with David Ortiz, a senior program director for Puerto Rico at Solar United Neighbors, a solar advocacy group. Together with other partners, they applied for a $6 million grant from the Energy Department’s pool. The funding would be sufficient to install about 150 solar systems in Salinas.

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By the winter of 2023, they learned the agency was awarding them the grant, but the work that followed to finalize it was immense. Ortiz, Rios, and their partners in the work had to identify community members who needed the systems and develop budgets estimating the cost of work. That meant knocking on doors and convincing residents that the systems could help them, and that they should take the time to collect the various financial and medical documents needed to qualify. It took more than a year to get everyone on board.

But over the course of last year, the program came to a standstill. Ortiz needed a final green light or sign-off on a new budget and updated program costs, but he couldn’t get the agency to set up a meeting — let alone begin installing panels.

“In our case, and in another grantee’s case, we both hadn’t started installing because we had been waiting for a very long time to try to get the meeting for definitization to happen,” said Ortiz, referring to one of the last steps in the project approval process.

Then, out of the blue, a letter arrived in January informing Solar United Neighbors that their grant was being terminated. The news was devastating. Ríos had to announce the termination on Facebook. “People were pretty sad,” she said. “We were wasting their time for two years.”

Ríos had turned away from other opportunities to pursue grants, she said, because federal rules prevented her from applying to different sources of funding for the same project. The residents who signed up with Solar United Neighbors, too, hadn’t known they should be looking into other options to secure their energy systems.

“They probably have another opportunity to get a system, but they didn’t because they trust me, they trust Abeyno Coop,” Ríos said.

Solar United Neighbors is being represented by Lawyers for Good Government, a nonprofit advocating for organizations that have lost federal funding over the past year under the Trump administration, and Earthjustice, an environmental group. For her part, Pérez isn’t giving up. She’s determined to finance the system herself with the help of grants from nonprofits and other private entities. She has been calling solar companies to estimate what it might cost and working with Ríos’ cooperative to find alternatives.

“I’ll find a way, because I’ve always been a salesperson,” she said.

Benton Graham contributed reporting to this story.

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline Solar was poised to help Puerto Ricans survive blackouts — until Trump axed nearly $1B in funding on Apr 2, 2026.

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cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/39415

This article by Arturo Sánchez Jiménez originally appeared in the April 1, 2026 edition of La Jornada, Mexico’s premier left wing daily newspaper.

Academics and members of solidarity organizations with the island said that it is urgent for Mexico to resume oil shipments to Cuba, and that in the face of the energy blockade imposed by the Donald Trump administration, they have promoted various initiatives to support the Cuban people.

Nayar López Castellanos, a professor at UNAM and member of the Network in Defense of Humanity; Ángel Chávez-Mancilla, of the Mexican Communist Party; and Tamara Barra Monzón, of the Mexican Movement of Solidarity with Cuba, agreed that the current situation “is unfortunately not new,” but it is going through a critical phase that requires immediate measures, such as the resumption of hydrocarbon sales from Mexico, because otherwise, the humanitarian aid sent will only be “a small palliative.”

Nayar López argued that the suspension of hydrocarbon shipments contradicts the historical principles of Mexican foreign policy. “I don’t think it’s right to have submitted to this oil blockade.”

He argued that the decision to suspend supplies is a response to pressures affecting not only Cuba, but also the sovereignty of nations seeking to trade freely. He pointed out that the eventual resumption of shipments would represent “a historic turning point” consistent with the national diplomatic tradition of respecting the self-determination of peoples, as demonstrated when Mexico did not break relations with the island or support its expulsion from the Organization of American States in the 1960s.

He argued that a coordinated response from countries in the region could alter the current situation. “What would happen if Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico each decided to send five oil tankers at the same time? Could the U.S. Navy respond in the Gulf?” he asked. In his view, Washington’s policy “is an attempt to starve and deprive an entire nation,” which lacks broad social support in Latin America.

Ángel Chávez asserted that the island’s current situation is a result of the intensification of economic and energy pressure measures aimed at generating internal instability. He indicated that sending oil from Mexico would have immediate effects on the daily lives of the population and would represent a clear political signal in the face of external pressures. “The working people must raise the slogan ‘Mexican oil for the Cuban people,’ because it is an essential element for the continued functioning of the island’s entire electrical and energy system.” He emphasized that the humanitarian aid approach proposed by the Mexican government “is certainly necessary, but without the possibility of oil trade, it is merely a small palliative.”

Tamara Barra emphasized that sending crude oil would represent a decision with an immediate impact on strategic sectors and basic services. “If there is no oil, hospitals cannot function, schools cannot operate, bakeries cannot open… daily life suffers severe disruption.”

Photo: Jay Watts

Thirty Years of Solidarity

The Mexican Movement of Solidarity with Cuba (MMSC) will celebrate its 30th National Meeting in Aguascalientes, in the context of the 30th anniversary of its founding as a unitary organization in support of the island’s revolution.

The movement was founded on February 24, 1996, in the context of the first National Meeting of Solidarity with Cuba, as a space to bring together groups and individuals sympathetic to the Cuban revolution and defenders of the right of the Caribbean people to their free self-determination, reviving the historical tradition of friendship between Mexico and the island.

Since then, the organization has promoted ongoing actions against the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States; dissemination campaigns about the social achievements of the revolution and political, cultural and fundraising activities in support of the inhabitants of the island.

It has also played a role in defending relations between Mexico and Havana, such as during the administration of Vicente Fox, a member of the National Action Party (PAN), and has promoted the annual July 26th march commemorating the start of the revolution. Furthermore, it has hosted two continental meetings of solidarity with Cuba, in 2011 and 2025, with the participation of international figures.

Tamara Barra Monzón, a member of the movement, pointed out that the MMSC currently maintains a presence in more than 25 states of the country and highlighted the preparation for the next national meeting in Aguascalientes, to be held in May, which will be attended by representatives of different state committees and guests from Cuba.

Photo: Jay Watts

• 

  Analysis

  The Hidden Connections Between the Ukrainian Military & Drug Cartels

  April 1, 2026April 1, 2026

  It is difficult to believe that European intelligence services, which rigorously monitor arms trafficking, would ignore the flow of weapons & drones into the Americas.

• 

  Soberanía

  Goodbye Grift: Mexico Neuters US-Funded NGOs – Soberanía 101

  April 1, 2026April 1, 2026

  Mexico tax authority’s decision to revoke the tax-deductible status some NGOs operating in the country, including prominent organizations linked to the opposition and US funding.

• 

  Uncategorized

  President Sheinbaum Delivers Social Housing to Tamaulipas Fishing Community

  April 1, 2026April 1, 2026

  In Tamaulipas the construction of Bienestar housing has reached 60% of the six-year goal of 84,000 homes.

The post Organizations Urge Mexico to Resume Crude Oil Shipments to Cuba appeared first on Mexico Solidarity Media.

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cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/39432

This article by Santiago Cruz originally appeared in the March 23, 2026 edition of Rebelión. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those ofMexico Solidarity Mediaor theMexico Solidarity Project*.*

By March 2026, the war in Ukraine had solidified into a global proxy conflict where the West reaffirmed its hegemony. Latin America was no longer a spectator; motivated by the promise of quick profits or the defense of ideological values, many citizens abandoned their families to join the battlefronts. However, the situation became critical when it was discovered that Mexican cartels were exploiting this influx to train their hitmen.

These organizations, which already have unlimited resources to buy political support and weapons, found in Ukraine the solution to their only weakness: the lack of high-level tactical training, including drone operation. While the media dismisses it as propaganda, evidence from private chats confirms not only their presence in the conflict, but also the resale of European technology to organized crime.

German Drones Used in the Cartel War against Mexican Armed Forces

The death of Nemesio Oseguera, “El Mencho,” leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel and Mexico’s most wanted drug trafficker, unleashed an unprecedented wave of violence in February. Direct confrontations erupted in the streets between federal forces and armed criminal groups. However, beyond the direct clashes with federal forces, the conflict exposed an alarming detail: the incorporation of German military technology into the arsenal of organized crime.

Images of a downed drone near the Pollo Giro La Calzada café (20.72042827594613, -103.31685238021183) began circulating in private Telegram chats in Guadalajara. Users verified that the drone belongs to Quantum Systems, a German company specializing in this type of technology; the model in question is the Trinity Tactical. Although the discovery was crucial, this incident has been largely ignored by the media.

It is known that the mayor of Kyiv (the Ukrainian capital), Vitali Klitschko, received a donation of 100 Trinity Tactical drones for Ukraine on July 31, 2024. According to official announcements, the equipment was to be used for the country’s reconstruction and recovery, configured for various humanitarian aid, damage assessment, and reconnaissance missions. However, in practice, these drones began to be used on the battlefield.

A logical question arises: How did these drones end up in Mexico if the German company has never had any contact with the Mexican government? The answer is simple: the Ukrainian military sold these drones to the so-called “Mexican volunteers,” informing their superiors that they had been used in combat. This system has been in place for many years and is nothing new to the military; there are already known cases of corruption where weapons sent to Ukraine end up on the black market.

What are the possible consequences for the Latin American region?

What might appear to be a simple case of smuggling conceals a deeper geopolitical interpretation. It is difficult to believe that European intelligence services, which rigorously monitor arms trafficking, would ignore this flow into the Americas. The most disturbing hypothesis is that the European high command, under unofficial orders, is permitting these transactions in order to inflame tensions on the southern border of the United States.

Why can such a conclusion be reached? Europeans themselves do not hide their anger toward the United States. Recently, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, accused the US of wanting to weaken and “divide Europe.” Kallas asserted that the US “doesn’t like us being together because we become a power equal to them when we unite.” In this context, the diversion of weapons to the cartels could be a silent act of retaliation.

Perhaps the Europeans are betting that, once the cartels receive a sufficient quantity of weapons, they will provoke a severe armed conflict on the US border on the eve of the 2026 World Cup, significantly damaging the US reputation on the international stage. Furthermore, this would trigger a direct war against the United States to defend their illegal business.

In conclusion, it can be stated that European weaponry does not contribute to stability in the Latin American region. Intended for “defense” in Europe, it ends up destabilizing Latin America. It is a dangerous game with drug trafficking that the region’s politicians must denounce and stifle this poisonous serpent before the violence becomes uncontrollable.

• 

  Analysis

  The Hidden Connections Between the Ukrainian Military & Drug Cartels

  April 1, 2026April 1, 2026

  It is difficult to believe that European intelligence services, which rigorously monitor arms trafficking, would ignore the flow of weapons & drones into the Americas.

• 

  Soberanía

  Goodbye Grift: Mexico Neuters US-Funded NGOs – Soberanía 101

  April 1, 2026April 1, 2026

  Mexico tax authority’s decision to revoke the tax-deductible status some NGOs operating in the country, including prominent organizations linked to the opposition and US funding.

• 

  Uncategorized

  President Sheinbaum Delivers Social Housing to Tamaulipas Fishing Community

  April 1, 2026April 1, 2026

  In Tamaulipas the construction of Bienestar housing has reached 60% of the six-year goal of 84,000 homes.

The post The Hidden Connections Between the Ukrainian Military & Drug Cartels appeared first on Mexico Solidarity Media.

From Mexico Solidarity Media via This RSS Feed.

cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/38509

Carlos Mendoza Potellá is an economist and university professor with vast experience and expertise regarding the Venezuelan oil industry. In this exclusive interview with Venezuelanalysis, Mendoza Potellá offers his analysis on the recent reform of the Hydrocarbon Law, the longstanding influence of Western conglomerates over Venezuela’s energy sector, and the struggle for sovereignty.

In late January, the Venezuelan National Assembly approved a reform of the Hydrocarbon Law. What are your views on the new law?

In broad terms, it is the relinquishing of our condition as a sovereign nation, plain and simple. We are not a nation anymore. We are a territory with some delegate administrators implementing decisions made abroad. Who decides? Emperor Trump, who has his proconsul Marco Rubio.

The approved law meets the maximum demands that the Venezuelan right and the oil conglomerates have been making for at least the last 25 years. The 2002 coup against Chávez was to impose something like this, the return to the old concession model. It is the fulfillment of all the dreams of the old “meritocratic” leadership of [state oil company PDVSA], the people who did everything to minimize the fiscal contributions to the country, whether that meant buying 37 refineries abroad or other disasters that wrecked the country.

The reform is a victory for international oil capital, alongside a discourse that hands over the destiny of the industry to major corporations and diminishes national participation as some unproductive “rentierism.”

The Venezuelan oil industry has gone through various stages, with varying degrees of influence from major transnational corporations, whether that is the period prior to the formal nationalization in 1976 or the Oil Liberalization (Apertura Petrolera) of the 1990s. How do we situate the new law within that context?

I believe this is a step backward beyond the apertura or the pre-nationalization period –perhaps it’s a return to 1832! In 1829, Simón Bolívar issued a decree transferring the Spanish crown’s mining rights to Gran Colombia. This, in turn, was based on old medieval law, essentially establishing that mines were the property of the sovereign, the king. In fact, that is where the term “royalty” comes from –as a tribute to the king. And in 1832, when Venezuela separated from Gran Colombia, that decree ratified the nation’s ownership of its mines.

Obviously, oil didn’t emerge until 30 or 40 years later, but by 1866 concessions were already being granted. For a time, people spoke of “material that comes from the subsoil,” even though everyone already knew it was oil.

Our first boom was with asphalt. In 1883, Guzmán Blanco granted the Lago Guanoco concession to his buddy Horacio Hamilton, who later transferred it to the New York & Bermúdez Company, a subsidiary of the US firm General Asphalt. The asphalt boom lasted 50 years, and with it, streets and highways were built all over the United States.

But the example of New York & Bermúdez is significant because when Cipriano Castro came to power in 1899, he found out that the company had not paid taxes and attempted to collect them. What did the corporation do? It financed the so-called Revolución Libertadora led by Manuel Antonio Matos, a banker from La Victoria, which was ultimately defeated after two bloody battles. It was the first instance of foreign hydrocarbon interests seeking to control national politics. And it was always linked to the United States.

In the 1920s, then-dictator Juan Vicente Gómez tasked his minister, Gumersindo Torres, with drafting a hydrocarbons law, but the foreign companies did not like it. And Gómez told them, “Well, then, write the law yourselves!” Later, in 1936, the López Contreras administration drafted a very good law, but since it wasn’t retroactive, the companies did not mind because they already had their concessions granted.

Lake Maracaibo was one of the main hubs of the Venezuelan oil industry in the 20th century. (Archivo Fotografía Urbana)

When do we start seeing the first steps toward Venezuelan oil nationalism?

It was precisely in 1941 that Medina Angarita took office and commissioned a massive dossier on all the concessions in the country, informing the US government that Venezuela was aware of the importance of its oil. This was during World War II, and the oil companies were haunted by the specter of the 1938 Mexican nationalization under the government of Lázaro Cárdenas.

What was [Franklin D.] Roosevelt’s response? He sent a delegation from the State Department, not to intercede on behalf of the oil companies, but to convince them to accept Medina’s reform, because Venezuelan oil was vital to the war effort. The law passed in 1943 was quite progressive. Its first article stated that hydrocarbons are a matter of national public interest, and as such, concessions were granted for a maximum term of 40 years. Eighty percent of the concessions were granted at that time, to expire in 1983.

Venezuelan production grew through the 1970s, but as the end of the concessions approached, the transnational corporations began implementing policies to somewhat ease the hostility toward foreign investment.

Thus, a policy of “Venezuelanization” of the industry’s management was put into effect. That is why, when the so-called nationalization took place (1976), companies such as Shell and Creole, a subsidiary of Standard Oil-Exxon, had Venezuelans serving as president or vice president. These executives later assumed leadership of the newly created national companies. Their passports were Venezuelan, but their hearts belonged to foreign corporations!

Historically, how was the relationship between foreign corporations and Venezuelan authorities? And how did they respond to the 1976 nationalization?

The corporations grew accustomed to the idea of an industry tailored to their interests. I mentioned how they were the ones who drafted the first Hydrocarbons Law. Oversight bodies, such as the Technical Office of Hydrocarbons, were constantly undermined in their efforts to regulate oil activities. And so the companies could extract oil without paying royalties, violate technical standards for field exploitation, or export gasoline instead of fuel oil.

The 1970s were a turbulent time for the oil sector, marked by geopolitical tensions and the 1973 crisis in the Arab countries. In 1973, James Akins, the Nixon administration’s Director of Energy at the State Department, wrote an article in Foreign Affairs titled “The Oil Crisis; This Time the Wolf Is Here.” He argued that Venezuela could be key to reducing dependence on the Middle East, and that in the face of growing oil nationalism, it was necessary to cede some ground and consider other models of participation, while maintaining control over critical areas such as refining and commercialization.

Put differently, it was possible to offer some token concessions to the nationalist aspirations of oil-producing countries like Venezuela. And that rhetoric spread to the transnational corporations. The president of Shell said at the time, “Venezuela is going to have to take action regarding its oil industry,” while the head of Creole spoke of “the Venezuelans’ oil”!

There were growing signs of how the nationalization would take shape and how the transnationals were restructuring. A good example is the Venezuelan Petroleum Corporation (CVP), created in 1960. Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo, whom I consider a visionary and a deeply nationalist figure, had conceived it as a company that would develop until the time came for the state to take over production. But the governments did not let it grow; they did not assign concessions it was entitled to, and by the time of nationalization, the CVP was simply one more operator among 13 or 14.

In contrast, [Petróleos de Venezuela, SA] PDVSA, created with the nationalization, did have a very clear vision from the start. I remember hearing senior PDVSA executives talking among themselves, discussing how one came from the “Exxon culture,” which was more vertical, and the other from the “Shell culture,” which was more horizontal. And these were the managers! They were the leaders of the Venezuelan oil industry, which had very little “Venezuelan” about it. What we are seeing now is the reconstitution of all these things.

Mendoza Potellá has long criticized “grandiose” plans surrounding the Orinoco Oil Belt. (El Universal)

Circling back to the current reform, we have seen that sovereignty is a central issue. How is it affected on different fronts?

For me, a fundamental issue is the return of concessions. Because that means going back decades, handing control back to transnational conglomerates. With taxes and royalties, the problem is not whether the rate is 30% or 15%; that flexibility existed in the past. But now it is the transnational corporations that tell the government what their operating costs are and how much goes to the Venezuelan state. There is no oversight body to verify this; instead, the company says, “I need you to lower royalties to this level” for the project to be profitable.

The return of international arbitration is also a brutal setback, because it means that disputes are not settled in Venezuelan courts, but in other bodies that have a history of defending corporate interests. There is no role left for the Public Solicitor’s Office (Procuradoría General), which is essentially the nation’s attorney.

For months we were told we were ready to confront imperialism, but the truth is that everything is being imposed on us. Even the National Assembly is castrating itself. It has enacted a law stating that oil projects no longer require the parliament’s approval; they need only be notified. And on top of all that, there is also the constitutional issue. The reform conflicts with Articles 1, 12, 150, 151, and several others of the Constitution. But this is not merely a constitutional violation; it is a total surrender. A surrender of sovereignty that calls into question our status as a republic.

One of the issues under debate is the distinction between a country that owns oil and a country that produces oil. How should we understand the difference?

Of course, that’s fundamental. A country that owns oil simply collects royalties, and it does so according to its political capabilities. At the moment, Venezuela’s capabilities are limited, because the military cannot confront the enemy, and allies like Russia and China have not shown themselves willing to take any risks. So, there is little room to impose conditions on the US.

But this is a country that has grown used to the multinational corporations having free rein over its oil sector. Unfortunately, there are many people, within the industry itself, who believe that “the foreign conglomerates developed this and therefore have a right to these privileges.” Curiously, that is the same rhetoric Trump uses!

This struggle for sovereignty is fundamental in oil-producing countries. We have seen this with the countries of the Middle East, which try to assert themselves but remain highly dependent on the United States. Obviously, they have the advantage of not being as close as we are. But in my opinion, historically we have lacked nationalism on this issue.

Trump Energy Secretary Chris Wright recently toured Chevron’s facilities in Venezuela alongside Acting President Delcy Rodríguez. (EFE)

One of the arguments in favor of reforming the Hydrocarbon Law was the need to attract investment to so-called “green fields,” on the grounds that when the previous law was passed in 2001, there were many mature fields ready for development and this is no longer the case. However, major corporations have not shown much enthusiasm. What is your reading on this?

Those are fantasies about oilfields that have always been unviable; it is the obsession with the Orinoco Oil Belt. Humberto Calderón Berti, minister of mines in the 1980s and a major proponent of PDVSA’s internationalization, was already talking about green fields back then. By the way, Calderón Berti is now talking about the possibility of fracking in Lake Maracaibo, which would make the lake’s environmental disaster even worse.

The idea that an avalanche of investment is coming is an illusion, and the oil companies themselves know it. Trump talks about investments of $100 billion, but transnational corporations like ExxonMobil use the word “uninvestable.” With market volatility, no one is thinking about investing in oil with extremely high production costs. There is a study that concludes that increasing production to 2.6 million barrels per day based on the Orinoco Belt would require US $90 billion in investments and $122 billion in operating expenses over the next 10 years to drill 13,000 new wells! In other words, it is completely unfeasible.

On top of that, OPEC’s forecasts for oil demand over the coming decades aren’t particularly ambitious. (1)

So who stands to benefit from this new landscape? On the one hand, small “rogue” companies that can take on a well here and there. But above all, the conglomerates that are already here, like Chevron, which know the lay of the land and can expand their operations or make their current operations more profitable. The same goes for Eni and Repsol, which have some crown jewels, like the offshore Perla natural gas field. The corporations that come will be betting mostly on conventional fields, not the Orinoco Belt.

It is very commonplace to hear about US refineries in the Gulf of Mexico that are built to receive Venezuelan crude. That is true, but it is not oil from the Orinoco Belt! It is oil from the Oriente (East) and Occidente (West) oil-producing regions.

Let us stay for a moment on the Orinoco Oil Belt, since that is where the talk of the “largest oil reserves on the planet” centers, as well as the prospects for a massive increase in production. What are the myths and realities surrounding these deposits?

The Orinoco Belt is a geological miracle. Eighty million years ago, 10–15 percent of all life that existed on the planet was fossilized north of the Orinoco River. It is something to cry out to the heavens. But that is not exploitable oil. It is extra-heavy crude, a sticky mess that needs to be upgraded. First it must be converted into liquid petroleum so it can flow through pipelines, and then taken to be refined and turned into gasoline.

In the 1970s, the United States saw the energy crisis coming and asked, “When conventional oil runs out, where can we find oil around the world?” In three places: the Soviet Union, Canada, and Venezuela. And where in Venezuela? In the Orinoco Oil Belt. Pérez Alfonzo spoke of the belt as “something for the future,” but the United States wanted to accelerate exploitation and sent a delegation in 1971 to convince President Rafael Caldera to begin the process. In fact, the name was changed from “Tar Belt” to “Oil Belt” to make it more attractive.

The US Geological Survey estimates that there are 513 billion barrels of “technically recoverable” oil. But that is absurd, because there is no capacity. What makes a reserve recoverable has to do with economic ability, the market, and the available technology. Nevertheless, the Orinoco Belt has been at the center of grandiose projections over the past few decades, alongside the highly lucrative business of certifying reserves.

Former President Hugo Chávez imposed the state’s sovereignty over the oil industry in the 2000s. (Archive)

The oil reform took place in a specific context, following years of economic sanctions that have left PDVSA in a very difficult situation. What would be an alternative path? How can the industry recover without surrendering sovereignty?

There are no magic solutions, obviously. We are facing imperialism in the Trump era; we see all its destructive potential. It is a phase where the US, paradoxically, recognizes its weakness and is entrenching itself in its “backyard.” But we must be aware that the industry’s current course is one of total capitulation.

Whether we can recover, whether it is possible or not, we must think about it rigorously, in a sovereign manner. And above all, we must have a serious plan; we cannot be dreaming of 5 or 6 million barrels a day.

There are 17,000 conventional oil wells, with the capacity to produce, abandoned around the country. Of the 35,000 wells in Venezuela, only half are currently producing. The others require investment, though not particularly large ones. And what kind of oil will these wells produce? Crude grades ranging from 20 to 30 degrees. But we need a plan, to examine wells one by one. These are wells that will produce 20, 50, or 100 barrels a day, but it is light and medium crude—the “classic” Venezuelan oil.

So, from a nationalist perspective, what does the future hold for Venezuela’s oil industry?

The future is to build a post-oil Venezuela. This was already being discussed by theorists such as Francisco Mieres and Pérez Alfonzo in the 1970s. Then, in recent years, many began talking about a post-oil or post-rentier country, but mostly to cover up their incompetence and inability to maintain production levels.

There is no magic solution, and the oil industry will have to play an important role. But the current situation is dire. We are in a new phase of absolute political dependence. It’s not just about oil, or that the US controls revenues, imposes concessions, and so on. It is that the country has lost the ability to make its own decisions.

There are also expectations of the people, who to a large extent have become accustomed to the idea that their oil will last forever. That creates the illusion that things can improve very quickly. The path will be slow, but it has to start with regaining sovereignty.

Note

(1) The interview was conducted before the launch of the US-Israeli war against Iran.

The post Carlos Mendoza Potellá: ‘The Hydrocarbon Law Reform Is a Surrender of Venezuelan Sovereignty’ appeared first on Venezuelanalysis.

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In a few days YPF will be reselled for pennies in exchange for three days worth of carry trade, but eh, it's nice.

por @missingcosmonaut

https://x.com/NeoMexicanismos/status/2037241851783135534

cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/38044

One day before the hearing scheduled for March 26, in which Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores are to appear before US courts, the defense team has publicly denounced the United States government for attempting to prevent the president from being able to pay for his legal representation.

In this regard, in an interview with Sputnik, Venezuelan political scientist Carolina Escarrá warns that this type of action reflects the political and economic nature of the process, above any legal basis.

The specialist maintains that the hearing will be resolved more by geopolitical negotiations than by legal arguments and that Washington has acted from the outset with a clear interest: to control the natural resources of the Venezuela.

For Escarrá, the “kidnapping” of Maduro responds to “an economic interest, of transnationals linked to the [US] political elite… They had to generate a commotion in Venezuela to access oil, gold, and rare earths.”

**The dismantling of the “Cartel de los Soles”**One of the central elements she highlights is the modification of the original accusation after the detention.

Escarrá notes that the 2020 indictment, promoted by then-Attorney General William Barr, “was full of elements linked to the Cartel de los Soles.” However, after President Maduro’s abduction, the charges underwent significant changes.

“When they get to President Nicolás Maduro and the First Lady, Cilia Flores, they immediately modify that indictment, and there are only two mentions [of the Cartel de los Soles]. It is as if it were no longer the name of a cartel but of a political culture of corruption,” explained the analyst. “That is how they handle it in the complaint itself,” she added.

This modification, in Escarrá’s view, makes it possible “to perceive that it is not really a matter of drug trafficking, nor related to organized crime or anything of the sort, but that there was a deeper political and economic reason,” she states.

The political scientist further contextualizes: “The kidnapping and prosecution of President Maduro respond to the US security strategy, in which Washington openly admits it seeks to counterbalance China in the region, for which it needs the continent’s natural resources.”

“Venezuela has always been like a containment barrier against the power that the US holds over the rest of the continent,” she argues.

Violations of due processRegarding expectations for the March 26 hearing, Escarrá considers the scenario uncertain and dependent on political negotiations. The analyst refers to the concept by analyst Alfredo Clemente of the “fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.”

“This thesis raises the question: what is the origin, what is the underlying reason behind this entire trial? And the only answer is a financial and geopolitical reason that seeks to remove China… from Venezuela and from the region itself,” she asserts.

Escarrá warns that what is at stake is not a conventional judicial process. “This is not an act of justice or legal procedure… but an act of supremacy of force, closely linked to the entire vision of Manifest Destiny, of US supremacism, of imposing things as they see fit,” she recalls.

From the standpoint of international law, the analyst underscores the irregularity of the process.

“International law is clearly being violated here, because one cannot try the president of another country, nor can one do so in courts that are not of that country,” she states.

The expert also indicates that even US domestic law is being violated.

Unexpected obstaclesClemente argued that under US jurisprudence from the case Zivotofsky v. Kerry, recognition of a foreign government is an exclusive power of the president, meaning that New York courts would be obliged to accept the legitimacy of President Maduro’s mandate and, therefore, his sovereign immunity.

He adds that the doctrine of estoppel (acts of one’s own) would prevent the United States from recognizing acting president Delcy Rodríguez as the legal authority of Venezuela while maintaining a judicial process against the figure from whom her authority originates.

“Trump has boxed himself into a legal dead end,” said Clemente. “If the government of Delcy Rodríguez is legal, then the origin of her power [the appointment and mandate signed by Maduro] must be legal by necessity.”

“This is where the doctrine of acts of one’s own, known in Latin as estoppel, comes into play,” explained Clemente. “This rule says that a state cannot go against what it has already recognized. The United States cannot recognize the ‘flower’ [Rodríguez’s administration] and pretend that the ‘root’ [Maduro’s mandate] does not exist or is ‘criminal.’ It is a legal absurdity: one cannot say on Saturday that a government is legal and on Monday try to prosecute the man who gave life to that government.”

The specialist also emphasized that blocking Venezuelan funds to prevent President Maduro from paying his chosen lawyer constitutes a “structural error” that, according to the US Supreme Court ruling United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, would irreversibly invalidate the trial.

For the analyst, Washington’s recognition not only confirms the legitimacy of the Venezuelan president in the eyes of the US regime but also exposes that the military assault of January 3 was an illegal act of war and outlines a roadmap that includes a habeas corpus motion and dismissal of the case in the future.

Behind the DOJ’s Politicized Indictment of Maduro: A CIA-Created ‘Network’ and Coerced Star Witness

(Noticias LatAm)

Translation: Orinoco Tribune

OT/CB/SL

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cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/37860

By Resumen  –  Mar 23, 2026

As the Trump Administration ratchets up its threats of war and economic strangulation on Cuba the international Nuestra América Convoy has arrived in Cuba. The convoy unites more than 600 solidarity activists from 38 nations, representing over 140 social, political, and cultural organizations across nearly every continent. Participants include parliamentarians, judges, ambassadors, intellectuals, trade unionists, and community leaders committed to justice and sovereignty.

The international humanitarian mission converged in the capital to delivering essential supplies and to reaffirm global support for the island amid intensified US economic pressure and threats of invasion.

The solidarity groups were greeted personally by Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez. at the welcoming ceremony held at the Cuban Institute of Friendship with the Peoples (ICAP), where the group handed over significant donations of food, medicines, hygiene products, medical equipment, and energy-related items like solar panels. These contributions aim to alleviate hardships caused by the long-standing US blockade.

Diaz Canel speaking to the delegates at the Palace of the Conventions.

At the welcome Díaz-Canel described the blockade as an “economic and energy asphyxiation project” targeting the Cuban people. He expressed profound gratitude for the convoy’s courage and self-financed efforts, noting that participants covered their own travel and stay expenses to maximize aid delivery.

David Adler, coordinator of the Progressive International and a key organizer, highlighted the mission’s scale. He emphasized that the convoy represents millions worldwide who reject collective punishment and demand an end to coercive unilateral measures.

Nuestra América Convoy Strengthens Global Resistance NetworkThe initiative, initially conceived as a maritime flotilla inspired by other humanitarian efforts, expanded rapidly into a multi-modal global convoy. Aid arrived by air from Europe and Latin America, with charter flights coming from the US and sea components following from Mexico.

Three vessels—the Granma 2.0 from Puerto Progreso, Yucatán, and two sailboats from Isla Mujeres—are en route, carrying additional tons of supplies. This Latin American contribution underscores regional unity against external aggression.

European solidarity activists delivering aid. Photo: el necio

Participants stressed that Cuba’s challenges—blackouts, shortages, and infrastructure strain—stem largely from tightened sanctions and financial restrictions. The convoy’s direct aid bypasses these barriers, demonstrating practical internationalism.

Organizers declared March 21 an “International Day of Solidarity with Cuba”, resulting in coordinated actions worldwide, including protests at US embassies. The effort builds on prior mobilizations and signals international sustained pressure for policy change.

Tenth CELAC Summit in Bogotá Reaffirms Zone of Peace amid Discrepancies About Cuba Within US-Led Bloc (+Venezuela, China, and Africa)

Geopolitical and Regional ImplicationsThe Nuestra América Convoy reflects deepening Global South solidarity in response to unilateral coercive measures. In Latin America and the Caribbean, it reinforces CELAC principles of non-interference and regional self-determination, countering attempts to isolate progressive governments.

Globally, the mission challenges the normalization of economic blockades as foreign policy tools, highlighting their humanitarian costs and questioning their legality under international law. It amplifies calls in forums like the UN General Assembly—where annual resolutions condemn the US embargo—for multilateral respect of sovereignty.

The convoy’s convergence in Havana strengthens networks among progressive movements, trade unions, and civil society, potentially influencing future coordinated actions on issues like debt relief, climate justice, and anti-imperialist resistance. For Cuba, it bolsters resilience and morale amid ongoing crisis

Message of Brotherhood and Continued CommitmentThe welcoming ceremony featured expressions of mutual respect and shared struggle. Díaz-Canel reiterated Cuba’s readiness to collaborate on common causes, from health cooperation to sustainable development.

Photo: Ricardo López Hevia

Activists reaffirmed their pledge to continue advocacy until the blockade ends. Many highlighted personal connections—family ties, cultural affinities, or admiration for Cuba’s achievements in education and medicine despite adversity.

As additional delegations arrive and aid distribution begins, the Nuestra América Convoy stands as a powerful symbol of people-to-people diplomacy. It demonstrates that solidarity transcends borders, offering tangible relief while pressing for systemic change in international relations.

In a world marked by polarization and power asymmetries, such initiatives remind us that collective action rooted in justice can challenge dominant narratives and support nations defending their right to self-determination.

(Struggle La Lucha)

From Orinoco Tribune – News and opinion pieces about Venezuela and beyond via This RSS Feed.

cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/38047

Delegates returning from delivering humanitarian aid to Cuba reported interrogations and confiscation of equipment by immigration authorities, actions they describe as a strategy of government intimidation.

The Brazilian activist Thiago Ávila was also the victim of an arbitrary detention in Panama City while preparing to board a connecting flight to his country.

Members of the Nuestra América Convoy, a solidarity initiative that recently delivered 14 tons of humanitarian aid to Cuba, denounced the US government for leading a campaign of harassment and intimidation within the US and Panama following the activists’ return from Cuba.

Through social media, it was reported that delegates arriving at the Miami airport are being detained at customs for exhaustive interrogations. Among those affected are high-profile figures such as Amazon labor leader Christian Smalls and journalist Katie Halper.

According to the reports, federal agents have proceeded to confiscate activists’ electronic devices. Members of the group indicated that this practice is not isolated, recalling that last Monday, other members, including human rights lawyer Noura Erakat, were also treated in a similar manner, which they describe as clear government intimidation.

Thiago Ávila’s illegal detention in PanamaÁvila’s communications team, who has more than 1.2 million followers on Instagram, reported that the activist was held incommunicado in Panama City after being subjected to interrogations and biometric procedures by hostile agents communicating in English.

“We know that what we bring on our boats is a drop in an ocean of Cuba’s needs, which has lived for more than six decades under the US blockade,” Ávila had stated upon his arrival in Havana last Tuesday.

The Nuestra América Convoy, inspired by the Global Sumud Flotilla that delivered aid to Gaza in 2025, managed to deliver solar panels, medicines, and food in an effort to alleviate the energy and economic crisis that Cuba is enduring to the US military naval blockade that has tightened the economic warfare imposed on Cuba for over 60 years and has prevented any oil from reaching the nation for months.

Ávila, who had already been deported by agents of the Israeli colony in 2025 after being intercepted in international waters while attempting to break the siege on Gaza, was expected to soon join a new maritime humanitarian mission to Palestine.

So far, neither Panamanian authorities nor US Customs and Border Protection have issued official statements regarding these procedures, which social movements have condemned as a violation of the right to free movement and solidarity among peoples.

Inspiring Nuestra América Convoy: 600+ Activists Deliver Aid to Cuba, Defying US Blockade

(Telesur)

Translation: Orinoco Tribune

OT/CB/SL

From Orinoco Tribune – News and opinion pieces about Venezuela and beyond via This RSS Feed.

cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/37983

In the wake of Washington’s January 3 military attack and then problematic détente with Caracas, corporate media suggest a meaningful shift in Venezuela policy, implying relief for a country long subjected to economic coercion. However, far from dismantling the sanctions regime, the US has merely adjusted its application through licensing mechanisms, leaving the core structure of coercive measures fully intact.

Reuters reported “US lifts some Venezuela sanctions,” followed by news of sanctions being further “eased.” Both NBC News and ABC News likewise reported sanctions “eased,” while the Financial Times wrote that Washington “relaxes sanctions.” Reuters later found that “US waives many of the sanctions,” and the Los Angeles Times noted “targeted relief from sanctions.” The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) described a “huge easing of sanctions.”

Not a single sanction has been rescinded

In fact, there is no evidence of any revocation of executive orders, removal of Venezuela-related sanctions authorities, and certainly no formal termination or suspension of Washington’s sanctions regime.

At a February 21 meeting I attended in Venezuela, Anti-Blockade Vice Minister William Castillo described sanctions as a “policy of extermination.” These measures, “the most cruel aggression against our people,” had been renewed the day before by Trump. To do so, he had to certify the original mistruth first fabricated by Barack Obama in 2015: that Venezuela poses an “extraordinary threat” to US national security.

Castillo cited 1,087 measures imposed by the US and another 916 by its echo, the European Union. These unilateral coercive measures have a corrosive effect on popular support for the government, which is precisely the purpose of this form of collective punishment, illegal under international law.

In 2023, Castillo described Washington’s economic aggression as a means to destroy Venezuela without having to invade. The Bolivarian Revolution’s successful resistance, including positive GDP growth while under siege, suggests why the US felt compelled to escalate with a military incursion on January 3, killing over 100 and kidnapping the country’s lawful head of state and his wife.

In Castillo’s words, the US escalated from “a war without gunpowder…against the civilian population” to an actual one. As grave as the direct US military aggression has been – including 157 fatalities since last September in alleged drug interdictions of small craft in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific – the body count from the coercive economic measures has been far higher. Former UN Special Rapporteur Alfred de Zayas estimated that sanctions have caused over 100,000 excess deaths.

There is even a literal playbook on how to apply sanctions to inflict “pain” on civilians for “maximum effectiveness.” The author of The Art of Sanctions is Richard Nephew, a former US State Department senior official in the Biden administration who was responsible for implementing such policies.

Licenses vs. sanctions

What has happened in practice is a much more limited form of relief under the sanctions regime. The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) has issued broad licenses allowing certain dealings primarily with Venezuela’s state oil (PDVSA) and gold (Minerven) sectors.

OFAC licenses carve out limited exceptions principally benefitting US and other foreign corporations, not necessarily the Venezuelan people. Activities are authorized that would otherwise be illegal under US law, even though such activities are lawful under international law. They come with conditions, limits, and reporting requirements and can be revoked at any time.

In practical terms, sanctions remain in place, although certain transactions are temporarily allowed under strict licensing rules. “The result is a hybrid scheme in which formal sanctions and operational licenses coexist, enabling limited flows of economic activity,” according to Misión Verdad.

This flexible arrangement of sanctions combined with licenses allows US and other foreign corporations to make a profit off of the coercive system. Under sanctions alone, the targeted people overwhelmingly suffer but, secondarily, US and other corporations are shut out. Under this hybrid system, control is maintained and money is made.

However, most foreign investors are reluctant to make important investment decisions when there is uncertainty, especially given Mr. Trump’s mercurial reputation. A temporary license does not provide the security that corporations normally require. Recuperating the Venezuelan oil industry would necessitate “a gigantic investment.” Such investments will be unlikely if Venezuela is sanctioned, the licenses notwithstanding.

Media framing and blaming

Meanwhile, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and “First Combatant” Cilia Flores remain in a New York City jail, reportedly in solitary confinement.

Regarding what happened on January 3, corporate media sources overwhelmingly use relatively anodyne terms such as “downfall,” “removal,” or “ouster,” rather than the more pointed “kidnapping” or “abduction.” When the legality of this clearly illegal act of war is questioned by either the media or by the Democrats, it is mainly confined to whether President Trump required congressional approval.

Likewise, application of international law regarding the illegality of unilateral coercive measures is largely absent from media coverage. Where legal issues appear, they tend to address mechanics (e.g., the US-controlled fund arrangement), rather than whether sanctions themselves violate international law.

When media outlets express concern about Washington’s restrictions, it is often that easing them would “reward Maduro loyalists.” While the plight of the Venezuelan people may be acknowledged, the blame is mainly attributed to corruption and economic mismanagement, with little if any opprobrium for sanctions.

As former political science professor at the Universidad de Oriente Steve Ellner (pers. comm.), notes, corruption and mismanagement do exist. But the overwhelming factor has been the sanctions regime. The blockade targeted Venezuela’s oil industry – at one point accounting for 99% of foreign-exchange earnings – forcing the country out of normal dollar-denominated markets and into black markets to survive.

What Alfred de Zayas dubs the “human rights industry” similarly exhibits a convenient blind spot regarding sanctions. WOLA, for example, advocates “addressing the complex humanitarian emergency.” Yet the NGO strongly opposes sanctions relief for the people, because the coercive measures are such an effective “pressure” tool on the leadership.

Former WOLA staffer David Smilde is preoccupied with “restoring” American-style democracy by imposing pressure on the “regime.” He argues: “The democratic transition in Venezuela…requires the support of international organizations.”

In contrast, acting President Delcy Rodríguez views ending interference by foreign actors in Venezuela’s internal affairs as a precondition for credible elections. In particular, she calls for the US “blockade and sanctions against Venezuela [to] cease.” With sanctions still in place, the US remains the biggest obstacle to free and fair elections in Venezuela.

Roger D. Harris is with the Venezuela Solidarity Network, Task Force on the Americas, and the US Peace Council. He recently visited Venezuela.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

The post US Sanctions on Venezuela Continue: Corporate Beneficiaries and a Targeted Society appeared first on Venezuelanalysis.

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cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/38015

Tens of thousands of people marched across Argentina on March 24, the 50th anniversary of the military coup that launched the brutal dictatorship responsible for the disappearance and murder of over 30,000 people. The massive demonstrations in Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Rosario, and other major cities loudly rejected far-right president Javier Milei, whose government gives cover to the state’s crimes during the dictatorship and whose policies echo the political and economic legacy of that reactionary regime. Milei has targeted workers’ rights, reproductive rights, pensions, health care, education, and other social services, exacerbating a social and economic crisis that has made life more precarious for millions of people. His government represses dissent in the streets while politicians — including much of the so-called opposition from the center-Left and Right — facilitate these vicious attacks against the working class and the poor.

But the crowds that descended on the capital — joining las Madres de Plaza de Mayo, who have fought for the return of the disappeared for decades — along with thousands of people across the country, signify a growing resistance against Milei and the political establishment. Workers fighting plant closures, teachers and healthcare workers opposing austerity, retirees demanding dignified pensions, activists demanding an end to the government’s support for Israel’s genocide in Palestine, and students advocating for the right to education — all marched together, alongside human rights and left organizations.

Myriam Bregman and Nicolás del Caño — congresspeople representing the Partido de Trabajadores Socialistas (PTS), Left Voice’s sister organization — played a leading role in mobilizing support for Tuesday’s marches, linking the fight for memory and justice with the struggle against Milei’s austerity agenda. Bregman, a human rights lawyer, led the contingent representing the Center for Professionals for Human Rights (CeProDH). She marched alongside Nicolás del Caño, Christian Castillo, Andrea D’Atri, Alejandrina Barry, Raúl Godoy, and other leaders of the PTS/FIT-U.

In the historic Plaza de Mayo, Del Caño emphasized the importance of upholding the banners once carried by those who fought in the Cordobazo, a massive student-worker uprising against the dictatorship in 1969 — those “who fought for a society free of exploitation and oppression.” Christian Castillo, also a PTS congressperson, declared that “this is a massive mobilization repudiating the government’s historical revisionism and its economic plan — a plan that bears striking similarities to that of [José Alfredo] Martínez de Hoz from those years,” noting that Argentina’s dictators had similarly imposed harsh austerity plans on working people.

Both in the city of Buenos Aires and across the country, the PTS/FIT-U organized large contingents of thousands, including fellow workers, students, members of the feminist movement, environmental activists, and advocates from other sectors. It was, without a doubt, the left-wing political force that mobilized the largest numbers nationwide. The PTS has consistently organized against Milei’s agenda since his election, asserting that Milei represents continuity, not a break, with the parties of capital that have impoverished large swaths of the population and further solidified the crushing weight of imperialist debt imposed by the IMF. It is one of the few voices condemning Milei’s support for Israel’s genocide in Palestine and Donald Trump’s acts of imperialist aggression in Latin America, from the kidnapping of Nicolás Maduro to threats against Cuba to the war in Iran.

Speaking at the end of the march, Bregman said,

Today, as we bring this day to a close, I believe we must leave with a profound reflection in mind. We are missing a piece — we need to reclaim from that generation of the ’70s the understanding that we have the right to rebel against oppression, that ours is a legitimate right to resistance.

Furthermore, she added,

we must reclaim those banners, and we must devise the necessary strategy. So that, once and for all, we can go on the offensive ourselves. For we have the right to fight to put an end to this capitalist system — a system that brings about wars, imperialist aggression, and exploitation — and to build socialism.

As our comrades wrote about the march for La Izquierda Diario,

In the face of the brutal offensive by the Right and big capital — and amid the deep crisis of Peronism — militancy aimed at building a new political force for the working class has become essential. It must be a force that offers a way out of the ongoing national crisis. The PTS/FIT-U is committed to playing a part in this construction. Consequently, the active involvement of every worker and every young person is fundamental: of all those who wish to fight for a socialist perspective as the solution to the ever-deepening decay of capitalism.

The post Tens of Thousands March in Argentina against Milei, amid Echoes of the Dictatorship appeared first on Left Voice.

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Turns out voting for Neolib-Pinochetist was a bad idea, who could have seen that comming

https://x.com/maiamindel/status/2036827669451468953

cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/37339

By Nikos Mottas

Today, more than six decades after the Cuban Revolution, the United States continues to enforce one of the most prolonged and comprehensive systems of economic warfare in modern history. The blockade—tightened, codified, and expanded over decades—seeks not merely to pressure, but to suffocate. 

Sanctions on fuel, financial strangulation, extraterritorial enforcement, and constant efforts to disrupt Cuba’s access to energy and trade are not isolated measures; they form a coherent strategy aimed at exhausting a society that refuses to abandon its chosen path.  

Alongside this economic siege persists the political objective that has remained unchanged since 1959: to undermine, destabilize, and ultimately overthrow the Cuban Revolution. This reality is not an exception. It is the normal functioning of U.S. imperialism toward any state that refuses subordination.

It is from this standpoint—not nostalgia, not abstract speculation—that the question must be posed: what would the relationship between Cuba and the United States look like if the balance of power had been different at a decisive historical moment?

By then, the Cuban Revolution had already crossed a line that Washington had never accepted could be crossed. This was not a routine political shift, nor even a radical reform. It was a rupture in ownership, sovereignty, and class rule. Cuba ceased to function as an extension of U.S. capital and began to exist on its own terms. That was enough.

The response followed a familiar pattern: invasion, sabotage, assassination attempts, diplomatic isolation, and an economic siege designed not simply to punish, but to break. None of this was improvised. It was the normal behavior of an imperial power confronted with defiance in what it considered its own sphere. Cuba was not targeted because it was unstable. It was targeted because it had proven that it could stand.

The deployment of Soviet missiles to the island in 1962 did not create this confrontation. It altered it. For the first time, the United States had to consider that an attack on Cuba might carry consequences it could not fully control. The long-standing asymmetry—where imperialism could escalate without fearing a comparable response—was briefly unsettled.

For a moment, Cuba was no longer simply exposed. It was shielded, however imperfectly, by a deterrent that imposed limits. As we know, that moment did not last.

The missiles stationed in Cuba were not under Cuban sovereign control. That fact matters, and it should not be blurred. The deterrent that emerged in October 1962 existed on Cuban soil, but its fate lay in the hands of a distant power. When the great revisionist Nikita Khrushchev chose to withdraw those missiles through negotiations with Washington, the decision did not merely reduce immediate tensions. It removed the only effective constraint that had been placed on U.S. freedom of action in the Caribbean, and it did so without the participation of the country most directly concerned.

This is where the issue must be located. The question is not whether nuclear war should have been avoided. Of course it should have been. No serious political position treats the annihilation of millions as an acceptable risk. But avoiding catastrophe does not resolve the contradictions that produced the crisis. It only displaces them.

In this case, they were displaced onto Cuba.

The settlement of the crisis left intact the central fact that had defined the preceding years: the United States remained committed to overturning the Revolution, while Cuba lacked the means to impose decisive fear on its adversary. What had briefly changed—the existence of a limit—was reversed.

Fidel Castro would later make clear, with characteristic clarity, that the security of a small country cannot depend on the promises of a powerful adversary. This was not a theoretical claim. It was the distilled experience of a revolution that had already faced invasion, sabotage, and permanent siege.

Che Guevara grasped the same reality from a broader angle. A revolutionary process, he insisted in substance, cannot rely on assurances from an enemy whose interests require its defeat. Imperialism does not become restrained because agreements are signed. It becomes restrained when it is forced to reckon with consequences it cannot easily absorb. This is the point where the discussion becomes uncomfortable, but it cannot be avoided.

None of this amounts to a defense of nuclear weapons. Marxists do not regard instruments capable of destroying humanity as anything other than products of a violent and antagonistic world order. The horizon must be their abolition. But political judgment cannot begin from that horizon alone. It must also begin from the world as it exists. And in that world, the absence of deterrence is not neutrality. It is exposure.

Imperialism does not act according to moral limits. It acts within the limits imposed upon it. Where the cost of aggression is low, it advances. Where the cost becomes unpredictable or unacceptable, it hesitates, recalculates, or changes form. This is not a matter of theory alone. It is one of the most persistent patterns of modern history.

In that light, the question is not whether a nuclear-armed Cuba would have transformed the nature of U.S. hostility. It would not have. The question is whether it would have altered the scope and confidence with which that hostility could be exercised. It is difficult to argue that it would not have.

What existed in October 1962 was not Cuban control over nuclear weapons, but something more limited and, in a sense, more revealing: a temporary condition in which imperialism was forced to confront a boundary it could not casually cross. When that condition was removed, the boundary disappeared with it.

It may be argued that Cuba—particularly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union—would not have been able to sustain a nuclear deterrent independently. That objection, while not without basis, misses the central issue. Deterrence does not operate on the level of eternity, but on the level of historical periods. For nearly three decades, such a deterrent would have imposed a different strategic discipline on U.S. imperialism, reshaping not only its immediate calculations but its long-term assumptions about what could and could not be done to Cuba. Even its eventual disappearance would not erase the political consequences of its prior existence. If anything, the argument only reinforces the deeper contradiction: that the security of a revolutionary state was made contingent on decisions taken beyond its control.

The decades that followed did not bring peace in any meaningful sense. They brought a more stable form of pressure. The genocidal U.S. blockade remained and was further intensified. Covert operations continued. The Revolution was subjected to constant economic and political strain. The difference was that this pressure could be applied without the risk of escalation into something the United States could not manage.

This is where the doctrine of “peaceful coexistence” must be examined carefully, and without illusions.

In its basic formulation, the idea that states with different systems should avoid direct military confrontation is neither absurd nor inherently objectionable. In a nuclear age, the prevention of general war is a necessity. But the problem lies not in the principle itself. It lies in the way it was applied.

After Stalin’s death, this reorientation did not emerge gradually or innocently. It was formally codified at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, where a new line began to take shape—one that presented “peaceful coexistence” not as a temporary condition within an ongoing struggle, but as a strategic framework capable of regulating that struggle itself. Under this approach, the antagonism between socialism and capitalism was no longer treated as a dynamic and irreconcilable conflict expressed unevenly across the global system, but increasingly as a relationship to be managed through state diplomacy at the highest level.

This was not a minor adjustment. It marked a qualitative shift. The center of gravity moved—from revolutionary initiative toward interstate equilibrium, from the expansion of anti-imperialist rupture toward the stabilization of relations between nuclear powers. What had been, in Lenin’s understanding, a tactical necessity within a hostile world began to assume the character of a guiding principle.

Cuba became one of the first and clearest points at which this contradiction surfaced in its sharpest form. For Moscow, the crisis was a problem of strategic balance with Washington. For Havana, it was a problem of survival under immediate threat. These were not interchangeable concerns. A doctrine that prioritizes the first without adequately addressing the second inevitably produces uneven outcomes.

Khrushchev’s decision must be understood within this framework. It was not simply an act of caution under pressure. It was the practical expression of a strategic line that placed the preservation of superpower equilibrium above the full and uncompromised defense of a revolutionary state confronting imperialism at close range. The withdrawal of the missiles was, in this sense, not only a retreat from confrontation, but a confirmation of priorities: stability at the level of the state system took precedence over the transformation of its most vulnerable frontiers.

That is what happened in 1962. The missiles were withdrawn. War was avoided. But the structure that allowed imperialism to exert sustained pressure on Cuba remained intact. What disappeared was not danger, but the one element that had briefly forced that danger into check.

This is why the question of deterrence returns, however uncomfortable it may be.

To acknowledge its importance is not to glorify it. It is to recognize that, within an unequal system, the ability to impose limits matters. Without such limits, imperialism does not become less aggressive. It becomes more confident.

The issue is not whether deterrence creates risks. It does. The issue is whether, in the case of a small revolutionary state facing a nearby imperial power with a proven record of intervention, the absence of deterrence creates a deeper and more permanent vulnerability. The history of Cuba after 1962 suggests that it does.

This is the contradiction that “peaceful coexistence,” in its historical form, failed to resolve. It reduced the risk of general war, but it did so in a way that left intact—and in some respects normalized—the ongoing subjection of exposed revolutionary states to pressure, coercion, and siege.

Cuba survived. That fact stands. But survival came under conditions that were neither neutral nor inevitable. The Revolution endured within a balance that remained structurally unequal, and the outcome of the missile crisis helped fix that balance in place.

The lesson, then, is neither a hymn to escalation nor a lament for what might have been. It is a recognition of how power actually operates. Imperialism does not abandon its objectives because it is reasoned with, nor does it restrain itself because equilibrium has been declared. It adjusts to limits. Where no such limits exist, it expands the field of coercion until it meets them. 

Cuba understood this not as theory, but as lived reality. That is why, in the aftermath of the crisis, Fidel Castro insisted that “the security of a country cannot depend on the good faith of its enemy.” The statement was not rhetorical. It was a political conclusion drawn from experience.

In October 1962, for a brief and exceptional moment, the United States encountered such a limit in the Caribbean. It hesitated—not because it had renounced imperialism, but because the cost of acting had changed. When that limit was removed, the hesitation disappeared with it. What followed was not peace, but a long, disciplined form of pressure—one calibrated precisely because it no longer risked uncontrollable consequences.

This is the enduring truth the crisis leaves behind. Not that nuclear weapons secure justice—they do not—but that in a world structured by imperial force, vulnerability invites aggression, while constraint imposes caution. The tragedy of 1962 is not that war was avoided. It is that the avoidance of war was achieved in a way that restored to imperialism the very freedom of action it had briefly lost—and left revolutionary Cuba to confront, for decades, an adversary that had learned once again that it could press forward without fearing a limit it could not break.

* Nikos Mottas is the Editor-in-Chief of In Defense of Communism. 

From In Defense of Communism via This RSS Feed.

cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/37112

As the Trump administration continues to bombard Iran, a top Pentagon official revealed that U.S. wars in the Western Hemisphere are also expanding, unveiling an effort dubbed “Operation Total Extermination.”

Attacks on Latin American drug cartels are “just the beginning” Joseph Humire, the acting assistant secretary of war for homeland defense and Americas security affairs, told members of the House Armed Services Committee last week.

Humire indicated that many more strikes in Latin America are on the horizon. The comments came a day after President Donald Trump again teased American annexation of Cuba. “I do believe I’ll be the honor of — having the honor of taking Cuba,” Trump said last week. “Whether I free it, take it, I think I can do anything I want with it.”

Humire announced that the Department of War supported “bilateral kinetic actions against cartel targets along the Colombia-Ecuador border” — Pentagon-speak for March 3 strikes on unnamed “Designated Terrorist Organizations” previously reported by The Intercept. “The joint effort, named ‘Operation Total Extermination,’ is the start of a military offensive by Ecuador against transnational criminal organizations with the support of the U.S.,” he said.

The U.S.–Ecuadorian campaign has already strayed into Colombia after a farm was bombed or hit by “ricochet effect” on March 3, leaving an unexploded 500-pound bomb lying in Colombia’s border region. In response to a request for comment, U.S. Southern Command referred The Intercept to a statement on X by the Ecuadorian Ministry of Defense confirming the bomb landed in Colombia.

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Humire referred to the attacks as “joint land strikes” and said that America was providing Ecuador with “capabilities that they otherwise would not have.” The U.S. has since conducted at least one more strike with Ecuador. “Yes — as @POTUS has said — we are bombing Narco Terrorists on land as well,” self-styled War Secretary Pete Hegseth wrote on X on March 6, announcing the new strike. Days later, in a war powers report announcing the introduction of U.S. armed forces into “hostilities” in that country, the White House informed Congress of “military action taken on March 6, 2026, against the facilities of narco-terrorists affiliated with a designated terrorist organization.”

The attacks in Ecuador are also part of, and an expansion of, Operation Southern Spear: the U.S. military’s illegal campaign of strikes on boats in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific Ocean. The U.S. has conducted 46 attacks since September 2025, destroying 48 vessels and killing almost 160 civilians. The latest strike, on March 19 in the Pacific, killed two more people and left one survivor. The Trump administration claims its victims are members of at least one of 24 or more cartels and criminal gangs with whom it claims to be at war but refuses to name.

“Rushing to war on one man’s whims is the exact opposite of what the Constitution demands.”

“This Administration is barely paying lip service to the constitutional or international law governing the use of force. But we have these rules for a reason,” said Rebecca Ingber, a former State Department lawyer and now a law professor at Cardozo Law School in New York. “Rushing to war on one man’s whims is the exact opposite of what the Constitution demands.”

Gen. Francis Donovan, the SOUTHCOM commander, told lawmakers last week that “boat strikes are not the answer,” but teased an even larger campaign. “What we’re moving for right now might be an extension of Southern Spear, but really a counter-cartel campaign process that puts total systemic friction across this network,” he told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. “I believe these kinetic [boat] strikes are just one small part of that.”

Humire could not say how many land strikes were being conducted across almost 20 Latin American and Caribbean nations. “I don’t have an exact number,” he replied to a question. But when asked by Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, if the War Department would “be moving to a lot more terrestrial strikes,” Humire replied, “Yes, ranking member.”

The Office of the Secretary of War did not respond to a request to clarify how great that increase might be.

Humire said the U.S.–Ecuadorian campaign was “setting the pace for regional, deterrence-focused operations against cartel infrastructure throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.” The word “deterrence” has become a popular Pentagon euphemism for the use of lethal strikes, in contrast to previous efforts to U.S. government efforts to marshal economic, diplomatic, and military means to convince adversaries to abandon a specific course of action. “Deterrence has a signaling effect on narco-terrorists, and raises the risks with their movements,” Humire claimed.

Joseph Humire, the acting assistant secretary of war for homeland defense and Americas security affairs, speaking at a House Armed Services Committee hearing in Washington, D.C., on March 17, 2026.  Photo: Michael Brochstein/Sipa USA via AP Images

In January, the U.S. attacked Venezuela and abducted the country’s president, Nicolás Maduro. It now rules the country through a puppet regime. Federal prosecutors have reportedly drafted a criminal indictment against Venezuelan Interim President Delcy Rodriguez, threatening her with corruption and money laundering charges if she does not continue to do the bidding of the Trump administration. Trump also recently teased the possibility of making Venezuela the 51st U.S. state.

The Trump administration is reportedly undertaking a regime-change operation in Cuba, attempting to push out President Miguel Díaz-Canel as a requirement for negotiations between the U.S. and that island nation. U.S. officials are said to favor Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, the grandson of 94-year-old Raúl Castro, the former Cuban president and brother to Fidel, the leader of Cuba from 1959 to 2008. Díaz-Canel referenced U.S. plans to “seize the country” on X late Tuesday and said the U.S. would be met with “impregnable resistance.”

“I am holding Cuba,” Trump said recently, noting his costly regime-change war in the Middle East takes precedence at the moment. “We’re going to do Iran before Cuba.” Trump imposed an oil blockade on Cuba in January, plunging the country into a humanitarian crisis. The island’s national electrical grid has already collapsed three times this month, with one blackout lasting more than 29 hours. U.N. human rights experts have condemned Trump’s fuel blockade on Cuba as “a serious violation of international law and a grave threat to a democratic and equitable international order.”

Trump, who has repeatedly spoken of “taking” Cuba, is the latest in a long line of U.S. presidents who have attempted to overthrow the Cuban government. During the Cold War, the CIA launched the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. The agency also tried to assassinate Fidel Castro at least eight times. The U.S. also conducted a covertcampaign of bombing Cuban sugar mills and burning cane fields, among other acts of sabotage.

In the wake of the Bay of Pigs debacle, the Pentagon prepared top-secret plans to pave the way for an attack on the island. In the spring of 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff circulated a top-secret memorandum titled “Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba.” It described numerous false-flag operations that could be employed to justify a U.S. invasion, including a plot to “sink a boatload of Cuban refugees (real or simulated)” and even staging a modern “Remember the Maine” incident by blowing up a U.S. ship in Cuban waters and blaming the incident on Cuba. Other U.S. plans for covert action on the island specifically prioritized attacking Cuba’s electrical grid.

Asked if the Joint Chiefs of Staff were involved in analogous actions today, spokesperson Maj. Annabel Monroe referred The Intercept to Southern Command, who then referred The Intercept to the State Department, which did not respond to a request for comment.

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Humire said that the War Department was “currently focused on partner-led deterrence operations,” but would not rule out unilateral U.S. strikes across Latin America. He said that, in addition to Ecuador, the U.S. had forged agreements with 17 partner-nations in the Western Hemisphere, as part of the so-called Americas Counter Cartel Coalition. This international body, formally announced by Trump at his Shield of the Americas summit earlier this month, will focus on “bi-lateral and multi-lateral operations against cartels and terrorist organizations.”

Humire was asked if any of the 18 nations were concerned about issues of sovereignty regarding the U.S. potentially conducting attacks in their countries. “Members of the coalition specifically signed a joint security declaration mentioning that they want this support and most of them all are looking for this,” he replied. But the barebones statement they signed is astonishingly vague and offers little of substance on the subject.

Humire indicated that the U.S. had leveraged gunboat diplomacy in Venezuela to strong-arm Cuba and assist in “gaining compliance from Nicaragua,” as well as “shifting the Caribbean in a favorable direction toward U.S. interests.”

Recent official leaks about the potential U.S. indictment of President Gustavo Petro of Colombia on drug charges — the official reason for Maduro’s kidnapping, and the means reportedly used to keep his successor, Rodriguez, in line — suggest the U.S. may employ that tactic as leverage or an eventual pretext for military action. (Petro has denied ties to drug traffickers.)

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“It sounds as if Petro is potentially on the chopping block,” a former defense official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity due to his current employment, told The Intercept. The source said leaks about the potential indictment of Petro, coupled with the U.S.–Ecuadorian attack, which has stirred up tensions along the South American nations’ border, increasingly look like a coordinated campaign to foment “discord” if not conflict. Asked in January about attacking Colombia, Trump responded: “It sounds good to me.”

The U.S. attacks on the Colombia–Ecuador border come as America has recently established a “permanent FBI presence in Ecuador,” joining agents from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and the Department of Homeland Security. Just before the U.S. began attacks on the Ecuador–Colombia border, Donovan traveled to Quito, Ecuador’s capital, to meet with President Daniel Noboa and senior Ecuadorian defense officials.

Last August, Lt. Col. Phillip Vaughn — the commander of an Expeditionary Task Group overseeing Air Force Special Operations in the Caribbean and South America — coordinated meetings to increase “interoperability between U.S. and Ecuadorian forces” to “counter illicit actors operating along Ecuador’s northern border” with Colombia including “operational planning scenarios, execution of close air support procedures,” and “multiple topics on Joint Terminal Attack Controller support,” which relates to targeting and airstrikes.

America’s Western hemisphere blitz is part of what Trump and others have called the “Donroe Doctrine”: a bastardization of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. While President James Monroe’s policy sought to prevent Europe from colonizing and meddling in the Western Hemisphere, Trump has wielded his variant as a license for America to do exactly that.

The National Security Strategy, released late last year, decrees the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine a “potent restoration of American power and priorities,” rooted in the “readjustment of our global military presence to address urgent threats in our Hemisphere.” Humire defined “America’s immediate security perimeter” as “Alaska to Greenland in the Arctic to the Gulf of America and the Panama Canal and surrounding countries.” Trump has also threatened to annex Greenland (and possibly Iceland), turn Canada into a U.S. state, and conduct military strikes in Mexico. Humire also detailed efforts to strong-arm Panama to cut ties with China to ensure access to the Panamanian-owned canal that he nonetheless called a U.S. “national asset.”

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In addition to his wars in the Western hemisphere, Trump has also launched attacks on Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen during his second term — most of them sites of U.S. conflicts during the war on terror.

Smith, the House Armed Services Committee ranking member, told Humire that Trump’s wars in the Americas also appeared to be morphing into a new “forever conflict” with no clear goal or “end point.” Asked what “level of achievement” would be necessary to “stop kinetic action,” Humire responded with a wall of words about border security, terrorism, and cartels. When Smith interrupted to clarify if the boat strikes would continue unabated, Humire confusingly replied: “No, correct.”

The post Pentagon Reveals Attacks in Latin America Are Just the Beginning appeared first on The Intercept.

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cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/35175

On a dirt road that cuts through the Rio Novo settlement in the southeast of Pará state, battered motorcycles carry small loads of organic food to sell in the city, while passing trucks loaded with minerals for export.

Parauapebas, Brazil’s so-called “mining capital,” hosts numerous rural worker communities, including the 5,000 families of Terra e Liberdade, the largest landless encampment in Brazil. The city is also home to the largest open-pit iron ore mine in the world, in addition to other valuable deposits.

The scene of historical land conflicts, such as the Eldorado dos Carajás massacre, in which 21 people died after being shot by military police during a protest in 1996, southeastern Pará is now witnessing a new front of dispute.

Driven by the energy transition, mining companies are eyeing land in already established agrarian reform settlements, seeking deposits of three minerals essential to the arms and high-tech industries: copper, manganese, and nickel. These elements are used in equipment such as chips, wind turbines, electric cars, military jets, and warships.

An exclusive survey by Repórter Brasil in partnership with Mongabay, based on data from the National Mining Agency, or ANM, identified 676 mining processes for copper, manganese, and nickel in Carajás since 1969. A quarter of them, 166, were filed in the last five years (2021–25).

Mongabay / Repórter Brasuk

Of the total number of requests, 292 (43 percent) relate to 82 agrarian reform settlements, distributed across nine municipalities in southeastern Pará. The analysis includes only valid mining applications, both in operation and in the planning phase. Some were filed before the settlements were formally established. All of them, however, are currently located on public land designated for agrarian reform, where 14,852 families of small-scale farmers now live, according to INCRA, the national land reform institute.

The findings are part of the Energy Transition Observatory, a data journalism project by Repórter Brasil, in partnership with INESC (Institute of Socioeconomic Studies) and PoEMAS (Research and Extension Group on Politics, Economics, Mining, Environment and Society), which monitors the impacts of renewable energy projects on conservation units, traditional peoples, and agrarian reform settlements.

For this analysis, the report extracted the coordinates of rural settlements from the databases of INCRA and cross-referenced them with the geographic references of mining applications on the QGIS geoprocessing platform.

The analysis was conducted by Repórter Brasil with support from PoEMAS, a network of researchers from public teaching and research institutions.

The survey considered mining processes in operation (mining application, right to apply for mining and mining concession) and in planning (research application, research authorization and artisanal mining application).

Vale leads the search for critical minerals in Carajás

With an approximate area of 55,000 square kilometers (21,235 square miles), according to the Brazilian Geological Survey, Carajás concentrates some of the world’s largest mineral deposits, notably iron, gold, copper, manganese, and nickel — the latter three considered strategic minerals for the energy transition and the defense and aerospace industries. They are also known as electrification minerals.

Copper is essential due to its high electrical conductivity, used in solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicles, and transmission networks.  Manganese is fundamental to lithium-ion batteries and electronic equipment, as well as being used in alloys for armored vehicles and warships. Nickel is used in the composition of alloys for engines and structures of military jets, in addition to allowing for batteries with greater autonomy and being important for energy storage systems.

Brazil’s largest mining company, Vale (VALE3 in Brazil’s stock market), leads the race for these minerals in Carajás: There are 201 applications for copper, nickel, and manganese, of which 80 (40 percent) currently overlap with rural settlements. The applications are in the name of the company and its subsidiaries Vale Metais Básicos, Salobo Metais, and Mineração Onça Puma.

Iron ore mining pit in the Parauapebas region, southeastern Pará; the region is home to some of the largest mining deposits on the planet. Cícero Pedrosa / Repórter Brasil

Last year, at an event attended by Brazil’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the mining company launched the Novo Carajás Program, an initiative to expand the production of copper and high-grade iron. The projected investment is 70 billion reais ($13.5 billion) by 2030.

“In the medium and long term, critical minerals will have a relevance to the world just as oil has had in the last 100 years,” stated Gustavo Pimenta, CEO of Vale, at another business event held in June 2025.

When questioned about the impacts of mining on settlements, Vale stated that “the granting of a mining right does not mean the effective realization of a project, whose implementation depends on social, environmental, legal, regulatory, technical, and economic viability.”

The mining company also said that the settlements “are established on rural properties that have been expropriated, acquired, or reverted to public ownership because they do not fulfill their social function” and that it “complies with Brazilian legislation applicable to the subject.”

The mining company did not respond to how it acts to mitigate the impacts on the settlements.

View of the MST Terra e Liberdade camp in the Parauapebas region, southeastern Pará. The camp is the largest landless occupation in Brazil, housing more than 5,000 families. Cícero Pedrosa / Repórter Brasil

In the Serra dos Carajás region, the activities of the Brazilian multinational are being questioned. Mineração Onça Puma, a subsidiary focused on nickel mining, is facing a lawsuit from the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office, or MPF, for suspected contamination of Indigenous people in the Xikrin do Cateté Indigenous Territory by heavy metals.

A study by the Federal University of Pará analyzed 720 Xikrin Indigenous people and found that 98.5 percent of them were contaminated. In Feb. 2026, the MPF requested the court to freeze 60 million reais (11.6 million) from Vale to finance technical studies on the contamination of the Cateté River and environmental remediation actions.

Vale has always denied any connection between its operations and the contamination of the Cateté River, claiming that studies conducted by a court in Pará indicated that Onça Puma’s activities are not the source of contamination. (Read more about Vale’s position).

In May 2024, Sumaúma news outlet reported that Vale bought, irregularly, 24,000 hectares (59,305 acres) of INCRA land that should be destined for land reform. The report also mentions that Vale pressured landless rural workers to demobilize social movements in the region.

Settlers fear contamination of river near copper mine

The Onça Puma operation takes place within the Tucumã Settlement Project, according to data from INCRA and ANM cross-referenced by the Energy Transition Observatory, a network of environmental organizations from Brazilian civil society.

Neighboring the Xikrin territory, the settlement is the agrarian reform area with the highest number of requests for electrification minerals in Carajás. There are 62 in total: 42 for copper and 20 for nickel.

In addition to Vale’s nickel operations, the area houses the copper mining venture of Ero Brasil, a subsidiary of the Canadian company Ero Copper.

Truck transporting minerals for export on a dirt road that cuts through a settlement in southeastern Pará. Cícero Pedrosa / Repórter Brasil

In recent months, while copper prices reached record highs on the global market, driven by high demand and supply constraints — such as the drop in Chilean production caused by water scarcity — residents of the Tucumã settlement decried potential environmental impacts on the territory. Last December, images of large quantities of dead fish in the Carapanãzinho River circulated on social media, causing apprehension in the community.

Two settlers, who preferred to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals in the region, said they suspect that the river has become polluted due to the activities of Ero Brasil.

Copper extraction in Tucumã began in mid-2024 and plays a “critical role” in the company’s operations, according to the company’s sustainability report.

The document attributes the success of the undertaking to its “ability to work with communities.” Among its sustainability guidelines, the mining company highlights that it is “committed to the responsible management of tailings and mining waste in all its operations” and that it has a “proactive” stance to mitigate potential environmental impacts.

However, the settlers reported that the copper mine is causing problems such as constant dust, structural damage to houses (due to explosions), water scarcity, and fish mortality. “When detonation happens, a cloud of dust covers everything,” one of the settlers said. “We can’t even see the mountain range.”

Members of the MST camp in front of the Parauapebas city hall during a protest for better health and education conditions in August 2025. Cícero Pedrosa / Repórter Brasil

The residents interviewed for this report say that the Tucumã environmental agency collected fish and water samples, but it hasn’t released results yet.

They said that the mine operation initially brought hope for jobs and infrastructure to the region. However, they said the accumulated impacts have made life in the area unviable.

According to residents, a relocation plan for the P7 community is being discussed between Ero Brasil and the Tucumã City Hall, which would include compensation for the properties. However, the promise they heard is that this will only happen in 2027.

Ero Brasil and the Tucumã City Hall were questioned about the relocation plan and collection of fish and water samples, but haven’t responded.

“We are worried, because staying here for another two summers … we will suffer too much,” one of the settlers said. “We are waiting, without really knowing if anything will happen sooner, if it will only be within that timeframe.”

INCRA was also questioned about the relocation of settlers from the Tucumã Settlement Project, but did not respond.

Mining advances into areas that were ‘shielded’

Mineral extraction in agrarian reform areas was facilitated after a new norm that was published during far-right President Jair Bolsonaro’s (2019-22) government. The regulation relaxes rules for mining, energy, and infrastructure projects in settlement areas.

The text establishes that a mining company must request approval from the regional INCRA unit, which must analyze the compatibility of the economic activity with the National Agrarian Reform Program, managed by INCRA, and establish conditions for coexistence between the activities.

In case of impacts on agrarian reform, the regulation provides for compensation to INCRA and settlers, profit sharing, infrastructure improvements, support for productive activities, resettlement, or relocation of affected families, among other obligations.

The instruction defends “respect” for the rights of settlers, but does not establish any form of consultation with rural workers.

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INCRA was questioned about mining activities within settlements, the impacts of the projects on communities, and ways to mitigate them. The federal agency stated only that “granting mining rights anywhere in the national territory is not within the purview of INCRA.”

“The fact that a regulation from the Bolsonaro government has not yet been revoked, even with the articulation of social movements, is quite worrying and revealing about the influence that mining has in the Lula 3 government,” assesses Maurício Angelo, director of the Mining Observatory, an investigative journalism center that covers mining, referring to Lula’s ongoing third term.

“They are advancing precisely into areas that until now were shielded from the market, such as community lands, border areas, conservation units, and agrarian reform settlements,” said Juliana Neves Barros, author of a book about mining conflicts in Carajás.

According to Bruno Malheiro, a geography professor at the University of the State of Pará, Carajás and the Amazon as a whole are at risk of becoming a “sacrifice zone” for the energy transition.

“Throughout history, mineral processes have always developed through the suspension of regulations, the deregulation of rules, and even the disobedience of the legal framework regarding mining and other regulations,” Malheiro said. “Now, with critical minerals, to expand extraction processes, the entire legislation is being changed.”

Impoverished population

Neighboring Tucumã, the municipality of Parauapebas has been the top collector of CFEM, a tax collected on mining activity, for at least 20 years. Only last year did it lose this title to its neighbor, Canaã dos Carajás. Both collected more than 1 billion reais ($193 million) in mining tax in 2025.

In 2021, at the peak of iron ore prices, Parauapebas had a per capita GDP which placed the city among the 40 richest in Brazil. Even with the fall in prices of its main mineral in the following years, in 2023 the city still ranked among the 300 richest, considering the per capita GDP of the 5,570 Brazilian municipalities, according to official data.

However, the high revenue is barely felt by a significant portion of the population.

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In June 2022, a year after the municipality collected a record 2.4 billion reais ($464 million) in CFEM, 40,367 families in the city, with a population of 268,000 people, were registered in Brazil’s registry that identifies low-income families so they can access social programs.

Of these 40,367 families, 14,402 were in extreme poverty, while 7,223 were in poverty. The data is taken from a report from Territories in Network, an initiative of the Vale Foundation.

In August 2025, members of Brazil’s powerful Landless Rural Workers Movement (MST) held a protest in front of the city hall, demanding better conditions for rural education and repairs to a secondary road affected by mining activity.

“It’s frightening to think how a city so rich, which some even call the ‘mining capital,’ is so poor in public policies and benefits for the population,” Valbiane Thaís Pantoja da Gama, educator and MST representative, resident of the Terra e Liberdade encampment, said. “It’s our wealth that’s just going away. Only misery remains for the population.”

Diego Junqueira*, from*Repórter Brasil, collaborated on editing and data analysis.

The Energy Transition Observatory project is supported by the INESC, Ford Foundation, and the Pulitzer Center.

This story was originally published by Grist with the headline Mining rush for critical minerals threatens Amazon land reform settlements on Mar 14, 2026.

From Grist via This RSS Feed.

cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/35241

On Thursday, Chile’s new right-wing president, José Antonio Kast, confirmed that his government is considering using the presidential power of pardon to grant leniency to police officers and military personnel convicted of crimes committed during the 2019 social uprising.

The statement reopens the debate on the state’s responsibility for the repression of the protests that began in October 2019, when millions of people took to the streets to protest inequality, the cost of living, and the abuses of the neoliberal economic model.

During the social uprising, thousands of arrests were made, hundreds of people were injured, and numerous complaints of human rights violations were filed. Various international reports documented cases of eye injuries, torture, and other abuses committed by state agents, leading to legal proceedings and convictions against members of the Chilean National Police and military personnel.

The government and right-wing groups have attempted to justify the measure by arguing that the officers acted in a context of violence and public disorder. However, human rights organizations warn that granting pardons to officers convicted of these crimes could represent a serious setback for justice and reparations for the victims of repression.

For the victims’ families and social organizations, the debate highlights the deep political divisions surrounding the legacy of the social uprising and the role played by the state’s repressive forces during that period.

Dauno Tótoro, leader of Left Voice’s sister group, the Revolutionary Workers’ Party of Chile (PTR) and author of the book “Así mataron en octubre” (How They Killed in October), stated that “Kast is considering pardoning uniformed officers convicted in cases related to the uprising. This cannot be allowed! They just want more impunity.”

Kast estudia indultar a uniformados condenados por causas del estallido. Y en campaña dijo que no indultaría criminales. Parece que la "emergencia" del gobierno de emergencia era dejar libres a condenados por brutales crímenes.
¡No se puede permitir! Sólo quieren más impunidad.

— Dauno Totoro (@DaunoTotoro) March 13, 2026

At the same time Kast made this announcement of impunity for the officials who repressed protestors, he forcefully launched his xenophobic policy against migrants. A joint police operation carried out identity checks targeting exclusively migrants in the heart of Santiago. About 45 people were taken to a police station to have their immigration status checked.

According to La Izquierda Diario de Chile, officers conducted identity checks targeting exclusively migrants who were present at the scene. An official from the Policia de Investigaciones (PDI; Chile’s civilian investigative police force) stated that the purpose of the procedure was to verify the immigration status—both legal and illegal—of those who were checked.

At around 7:30 p.m. on Thursday, after an operation lasting approximately an hour and a half, about 45 people—the maximum capacity of the PDI’s official bus on site—were transported to a civil police station. According to the same official, their immigration status would be reviewed there and the relevant information recorded, after which they would be allowed to leave.

During the procedure, some of the bystanders present reacted by applauding and cheering the police action as the migrants were loaded onto the institutional bus.

As Teresa Melipal, editor of La Izquierda Diario in Chile and member of the Revolutionary Workers’ Party (PTR), points out, “In the face of these attempts to downplay or erase responsibility for the 2019 repression and the xenophobic advances of the Kast government, it becomes more urgent than ever to resume organizing from the bottom up. We must organize in workplaces, schools, and communities; build militant unions, student centers, and independent activist groups capable of confronting the attacks being prepared against workers and the people. We cannot passively wait for the government’s measures to advance or for the far right to continue gaining ground. Only mobilization and grassroots organizing can stop these attempts to impose impunity. We must resume organizing in workplaces, schools, and communities, and strengthen unions, student centers, and activist organizations—without waiting for the attacks from the government or the far right to pass, as this will only embolden them further.

This article was first published in Spanish in La Izquierda Diario on March 13, 2026

The post The New Government in Chile is Already Repressive appeared first on Left Voice.

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cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/35212

The administration of US President Donald Trump has launched a series of military and political offensives in the last several months in different corners of the globe. The goals of Washington’s various military and diplomatic actions have been the subject of heated debate. Are they aimed at reestablishing a threatened hegemony? Do they strive to secure a unipolar position that was never really in danger? Or are these the dying (and most violent) breaths of an empire in decline?

What is certain is that these actions have had a major impact on the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean, as the US government appears eager to secure key territories and/or to conquer natural resources that are indispensable for the geopolitical and military conflicts it anticipates.

The Monroe Doctrine has now been revived under the so-called Donroe Doctrine. Washington has demonstrated that it will secure hemispheric control at all costs, whether by imposing new tariffs (as it did against Brazil), directly supporting a presidential candidate (as happened with Nasry Asfura in Honduras), or the granting of USD 20 billion to save an ally (such as the far-right libertarian government of Javier Milei in Argentina).

This is how Miguel Ruiz, professor at the Central University of Ecuador and scholar of international relations between the United States and Latin America, understands this current moment. Ruiz spoke with Peoples Dispatch to understand this phenomenon:

“The world is undergoing a profound geopolitical transition that, like an onion, has several layers, some more visible than others. On the surface, we can see aspects such as Trump’s tariff offensive; a radical shift to the right in various parts of the world besides the United States itself, such as in some countries in Europe and Latin America; the increase in US belligerence in Latin America (Venezuela, Cuba); the aggression of Israel and the US toward Iran, etc. All these more visible aspects are merely symptoms of deeper processes, among which I would highlight two fundamental ones:

a) the so-called ‘fourth technological revolution’ (AI, robotics, manufacturing 4.0) that the world is undergoing is redefining the strategic branches and priority geographical areas of the global economy;

b) parallel to changes in the productive forces, there is another no less important trend: the emergence and consolidation of new centers of accumulation on a global scale, such as China and India.”

Regarding the consequences of these factors, Ruiz asserts that they are causing fundamental economic transformations:

“The combination of both factors, to which we must add the relative decline in the competitiveness of the US economy, is driving the most visible transformations in global geopolitics, such as the opening of new resource frontiers, the struggle for control of critical minerals, attempts by the declining power to delay its decline and, in the case of our continent in particular, the updating of the Monroe Doctrine with the Trump Corollary, which aims to reinforce control over Our America while undermining the good economic and diplomatic relations we have with China and other leading countries in the emerging multipolar world.”

Cuba in Trump’s strategy

As is well known, Trump’s project in Latin America goes beyond simple diplomacy and economic pressure. Military action began in the Caribbean Sea in September 2025 against dozens of small vessels, extrajudicially executing over 140 Venezuelans, Colombians, and Trinidadians. “Operation Southern Spear”, it was later dubbed, culminated in a military attack against Venezuela on January 3, 2026, “Operation Absolute Resolve”. In the January 3 operation, the US carried out airstrikes across areas of Venezuela, killing 100 people, and kidnapped Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and the First Lady Cilia Flores, who now sit in a prison in New York. Now, through gunboat diplomacy, the US has tacit control over Venezuela’s oil reserves.

Read more: Tactical retreats: Why Venezuela’s revolution still stands

In the aftermath of this operation, Trump triumphantly declared that Cuba was next. To this end, in addition to depriving the island of Venezuelan oil, a lifeline for Cuba in the 21st century, he threatened to increase tariffs on any country that sends hydrocarbons to Cuba. This has provoked a serious humanitarian crisis in Cuba, whose energy grid depends heavily on fuel to function.

Ruiz thus asserts that the war on Cuba appears to be a unifying link for US interests in the region: “Cuba has been inconvenient from the point of view of the US power elite, but not because it poses a threat to US security, far from it, as those same interests often argue. It has been inconvenient because since the triumph of the Revolution in 1959, Cuba has become a beacon of what the United States has been boycotting in Latin America for 200 years: a commitment to recovering sovereignty (political, economic, cultural) that has always been threatened by colonialism and neocolonialism, as well as a permanent effort to build Latin American integration that is not subordinate to the interests of the empire.”

“Although the pretext for suffocating the Cuban people was (and continues to be) the fight against socialism,” Ruiz remarks, “what really terrified the US elites from the beginning of the Revolution was its ability to call on the rest of the region to embark on emancipatory paths of a sovereign and anti-imperialist nature.”

When asked what the United States hopes to achieve with the fall of Cuba’s revolutionary government, the professor at the Central University explained: “In more general terms, a first objective would be to bury once and for all that counter-example that they want to avoid at all costs in a region that, like Latin America, remains particularly important to control.”

Another main objective, Ruiz outlines, is that the US government dreams of somehow replacing the political structures of Cuba with one controlled by the US. This would allow them to “regain control of the island as a space to secure and expand the economic and geopolitical interests of the power factions that currently rule the US. These factions have interests in certain branches of accumulation (both legal and illegal) for which Cuba could be useful: real estate, tourism, casinos, and even drug trafficking. In other words, they would seek to turn Cuba back into what it once represented for the US economy, but under the new conditions of the 21st century.”

Read more: Countries step in to supply oil to Cuba as US considers limited opening of sales

Is it possible to take action in the face of imperialism?

Given this reality, it may seem impossible for progressive and left-wing social and political movements to offer any kind of resistance to US power in relation to Cuba. However, Ruiz believes that, despite being a very complex challenge, it is not impossible: “A first line of action involves the well-founded denunciation of the ongoing aggressions. This denunciation must be accompanied by organization and mobilization in all possible arenas, including the streets, the media, institutional spaces, and parliaments. It is essential to acknowledge that we are currently at a moment in which, in most Latin American countries, progressive movements are on the defensive. So, continuing to defend ourselves against oligarchic and imperial attacks is the number one priority.”

But Ruiz also explains that progressive and left-wing movements must not only resist, but also act proactively: “We should also aspire to change the balance of power so that, where possible, we can regain important areas of power that we had in the not-too-distant past, such as state powers. The challenge now is to do so in broader coalitions than before, including a plurality of social actors who do not necessarily agree on the entirety of a program, but who do converge on its essential aspects of defending national and regional sovereignty, to build a horizon that allows Our America to stand on its own two feet. It is also imperative to resume the project of non-subordinate integration, as well as to maintain measures of solidarity with the countries that suffer most from imperial aggression, as is the case with Cuba at the moment.”

The post “Cuba is where the broader aspirations of the US elite as a whole intersect”: Why the US wants to destroy Cuba appeared first on Peoples Dispatch.

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cross-posted from: https://news.abolish.capital/post/34035

Amid months of threats by US leaders to attack drug gangs in Mexico, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum slapped back Monday against President Donald Trump's assertion that her country is the "epicenter" of cartel violence by urging him to stem the flow of illegal arms across the border—and domestic demand for illicit narcotics.

“If the flow of illegal weapons from the United States into Mexico were stopped, these groups wouldn’t have access to this type of high-powered weaponry to carry out their criminal activities,” Sheinabum said during her daily press briefing, citing a 2025 US Department of Justice report showing that approximately 3 in 4 guns used by Mexican criminal organizations were illicitly trafficked across the international border.

“There’s a very important aspect that needs to be addressed, which is reducing drug use in the United States,” she added.

In a separate interview with W Radio, Sheinbaum took aim at Trump's Saturday speech at his so-called "Shield of the Americas" summit with mostly right-wing Latin American leaders, during which he called Mexico the "epicenter of cartel violence" and announced a "brand-new military coalition" to tackle drug gangs.

“The epicenter of cartel violence is not Mexico, it’s the United States,” she said. “The cartels are fueled by the United States’ demand for drugs and armed with US weapons, and thanks to the United States, they are able to orchestrate enormous bloodshed and chaos throughout Latin America.”

In the latest in a series of threats to attack criminal organizations in Mexico—a scenario vehemently opposed by the Mexican government and most Mexicans—Trump said Saturday that allied right-wing Latin American governments have made “a commitment to using lethal military force to destroy the sinister cartels and terrorist networks.”

Mexicans are wary of US interventions, having lost half their national territory to the United States in an 1846-48 war that two US presidents—Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses Grant—said was waged under false pretext to conquer territory and expand slavery. The US also invaded and briefly occupied the port city of Veracruz in 1914 and launched a punitive invasion targeting the revolutionary Pancho Villa's forces in 1916-17.

Sheinbaum's remarks came after Mexican troops, supported by US intelligence, killed Jalisco New Generation Cartel chief Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes—known as “El Mencho”—during a raid last month. The operation sparked a wave of retaliatory cartel violence in some Mexican states.

Mexico has also arrested hundreds of suspected drug traffickers, destroyed numerous secret narcotics labs, and handed over dozens of alleged cartel criminals to US authorities in recent months.

Last year, the US Supreme Court dismissed a lawsuit brought by the Mexican government against US gun manufacturers, unanimously ruling that Mexico did not plausibly show the companies aided and abetted illegal arms sales.

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