Literally just mainlining marketing material straight into whatever’s left of their rotting brains.
this post was submitted on 23 Nov 2023
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It seems by your periodically hostile comments ("oh so smug terms the 'soul'") indicates that you have a disdain for my position, so I assume you think my position is your option 2, but I don't ignore self-reports of sentience. I'm closer to option 1, I see it as plausible that a sufficiently general algorithm could have the same level of sentience as humans.
The third position strikes me as at least just as ridiculous as the second. Of course we don't totally understand biological life, but just saying there's something "special" is wild. We're a configuration of non-sentient parts that produce sentience. Computers are also a configuration of non-sentient parts. To claim that there's no configuration of silicon that could arrive at sentience but that there is a configuration of carbon that could arrive at sentience is imbuing carbon with some properties that seems vastly more complex than the physical reality of carbon would allow.
i think it is plausible to replicate consciousness artificially with machines, and even more plausible to replicate every information processing task in a human brain, but i do not think that purely information processing machines like computers or machines using purely information processing tools like algorithms will be the necessary hardware or software to produce artificial subjectivity.
by 'special' i meant not understood. and again, i submit not that it is impossible to make a subjectivity producing object like a brain artificially out of whatever material, but that it is not possible to do so using information processing technologies and theory (as understood in 2023). I don't think artificial subjectivity is impossible, but i think purely algorithmic artificial subjectivity is impossible. I don't think that a purely physicalist worldview of a type that discounts the possibility of subjectivity can ever account for subjectivity. i don't think that subjectivity is explainable in terms of information processing.
here's a syllogism to sum up my position (i believe i have argued these points sufficiently elsewhere in the thread)
Premise A: Qualia (subjective experiences) exist (a fact supported by many neuroscientists as per one of my previous posts wikipedia quote)
Premise B: Qualia, as subjective experiences, are fundamentally irreducible to information processing. (look up the hard problem of consciousness and the philosophical zombie thought experiment)
Premise C: therefore consciousness, which contains (or is identified with or consists of or interacts with or is otherwise related to) Qualia, is irreducible to information processing.
Premise D: therefore the most simplistic of physicalist worldviews (those that deny the existence of Qualia and the concept of subjectivity, like that of Daniel Dennett) can never fully account for consciousness.
thats it, nothing else i'm trying to say other than that. no mysticism, no woo, no soul, no god, no fairies, nothing to offend your delicate aesthetic sensibilities. just stuff we don't know yet about the brain/mind/universe. no assumptions, just an acknowledgement that we do not have a Unified Theory of Everything and are likely several fundamental paradigm shifts in thinking away in many fields of research from anything resembling one.
Excellent post. I may bookmark it for later summary use.
Little late to the thread but really enjoying your posts. Curious on your thoughts if you don't mind:
As a philosophy newbie myself, could it be a lot of this discussion/debate is due to people having no exposure to the metaphysical concepts of objectivity/subjectivity? It seems a bit portion of your argument is that people who believe we can achieve ai sentience are already committed to a (leap of faith) absolute belief in the "physicalist" model/understanding of the universe?
Also regarding the idea of a "Unified Theory of Everything", do you believe in this as a possibility? Is having that as a goal or destination in of itself a representation of a particularly misguided "physicalist" way of thinking that many people are already committed to/trapped within?
i don't think its about a lack of exposure to the concept of subjectivity and objectivity as much as it is a fundamental disbelief in anything approaching metaphysics whatsoever, which yes, stems from the absolute belief in a purely physicalist understanding of the universe. the difference between physicalists and myself is similar to the difference between an atheist and an agnostic. the atheist assumes that there is and can be no god or gods, whereas the agnostic makes no assumptions whatsoever regarding this. the physicalist assumes the ability of their belief system to be refined into perfection without much in the way of fundamental revision, assumes the nonexistence of any phenomena that cannot be described by physics, whereas i believe that one or several paradigm shifts in philosophy and science and the philosophy of science are necessary to improve our understanding of reality, i do not assume that the physicalist model of the universe is correct or able to be trivially modified to be correct. and when analysis in fact shows the inability of physicalism to explain a phenomena we all experience every waking moment of our lives like subjectivity or qualia, i take that as evidence against the model, instead of ignoring it in the hope that someday the model might be trivially revised somehow to account for this fundamental explanatory gap.
a 'unified theory of everything' may or may not be possible, but it should be especially possible under physicalism - if everything is indeed reducible to physical matter and physcial processes, then surely we should eventually be able to describe matter and related physical processes in sufficient detail to describe all of reality, including subjectivity. but i don't think its necessarily physicalist to believe humans can comprehensively understand existence, for example if subjectivity is fundamental to reality in a way similar to matter, then understanding subjectivity and matter both, and their relationship to one another or to whatever reality they both refer to, could help us understand existence in a more coherent sense.
Premise B is where you lost me.
The premise of philosophical zombies is that it's possible for there to be beings with the same information processing capabilities as us without experience. That is, given the same tools and platforms, they would be having just as intricate discussions about the nature of experience and sentience. without having experience or sentience.
I'm not convinced it's functionally possible to behave the way we behave when talking & describing sentience without being sentient. I think a being that is functionally identical to me except that it lacks experience wouldn't be functionally identical to me, because I wouldn't be interested in sentience if I didn't have it.
thats' the entire point. if the existence of complex unconscious behaviors (or even just computers and math) proves that information processing can be done without internal subjective experience (if we assume a stone being hit by another stone, for example, is not experienceing subjectivity), and if there is something humans do beyond what is possible for pure information processing, then that is proof that consciousness is fundamentally irreducible to it. if there is something we can do that a philosophical zombie (a person with information processing but not subjectivity) could not, it is because of subjectivity/qualia, not information processing. subjectivity can influence our information processing but is not identical with it.
I think my point didn't exactly get across. I'm not saying philosophical zombies can't exist because subjectivity is something beyond information processing, I'm saying it's plausible that subjectivity is information processing.
To say "a person with information processing but not subjectivity" could be like saying "a person with information processing but not logical reasoning".
I would argue a person that processes information exactly like me, except that they don't reason logically, wouldn't process information like me. It's not elevating logic beyond information processing, it's a reductio ad absurdum. A person like that cannot exist.
I was saying philosophical zombies could be like that, it's possible that they can't exist. By lacking subjectivity they could inherently process information differently.
i know this is necroposting but i have to clarify.
one of the major premises of the p-zombie thought experiment is that there is nothing about information processing (AS WE CURRENTLY UNDERSTAND IT***) that entails or necessitates subjectivity. Information processing has zero explanatory ability for subjectivity. You cannot just assume that 'subjectivity is information processing' without proving it somehow, that's not how science or philosophy work. Making a positive claim like 'information theory can account for and explain subjectivity' requires proof. and since no proof has been provided we must assume the negative claim, that subjectivity is not explained by information processing theory. If subjectivity is information processing (the way we currently understand information processing), prove it! Show your work. If you think information theory only needs trivial modifications to account for subjectivity it should be easy to elucidate what kinds of modifications those could be and what kinds of experiments we can conduct to test those modifications.
***For if information processing theory requires substantial revision to account for subjectivity, which i think is at least plausible if not obviously true at this point in history, then the claim that 'subjectivity is information processing' becomes vague and meaningless - we do not know what this hypothetical revised information theory looks like, what it claims and assumes as logical axioms or empirical truths, so making any statements about this hypothetical future information processing theory is completely pointless and meaningless.
You had a small fallacy in the middle, when you said "assume the negative claim", you then made a positive claim.
"subjectivity is not explained by information processing theory" is a positive claim, but you said it was negative. I know it has the word "not" in it, but positive/negative doesn't have to do with claims for or against existence, it has to do with burden of proof. A negative "claim" isn't actually a claim at all.
The negative claim here would be "subjectivity may not be explained by information processing theory". People usually have more understanding about these distinctions in religious contexts:
Positive claim: god definitely exists Positive claim: god definitely doesn't exist Negative claim: god may or may not exist.
The default stance is an atheistic one, but it's not "capital A" atheist (for what it's worth I do make the positive claim against a theological God's existence). Someone who lacks a belief in God is still an atheist (e.g someone who has never even heard of a theological God), but they're not making a positive claim against his existence.
So the default stance is "information theory may or may not account for subjectivity", we don't assume it does, but we also don't discount the possibility that it does as necessarily untrue, like you are.
If you notice, you made another mistake, you misread what I was saying. I never made a positive claim about subjectivity being information processing. I only alluded to the possibility. You on the other hand did make a positive claim about subjectivity definitely not being information processing.
you are focusing on minor points of rhetoric instead of engaging with my broader point and the relevant LLM discussion. I am in fact assuming the null hypothesis in this argument.
first: the null hypothesis is a general statement or default position that there is no relationship between two measured phenomena, or no association among groups.
in this case, the phenomena whose relationship is in question are information processing theory and subjectivity.
consider Hitchen's Razor, which states that 'what may be asserted without evidence may be dismissed without evidence'
even if your specific argument is different, the subject of the OP with which i presumed you more or less agree, argued that not only can information processing theory account for subjectivity, but that it does, and that LLM chatbots possess such subjectivity. This is asserted without proof, and according to hitchen's razor I dismiss this pair of theses equally without proof.
as to your stance that information processing may or may not account for subjectivity, we can formulate this position as the positive claim that 'information processing may account for subjectivity' without losing any meaning. if nothing else, assume this is the position i am arguing against. i am not opposed to agnosticism on this matter.
i offer a syllogism:
A: if information processing can account for subjectivity, it would have done so by now - or, if it can account for subjectivity with only trivial modifications, we would have some indication of paths towards such an account.
B. we do not, in fact, have such an account within current information theory, or theoretical paths of investigation towards such an account.
c. therefore, information theory as it is today, or only trivially modified, does not account for subjectivity