starman2112 comments on Teleportation problem

[–] starman2112@sh.itjust.works 2 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago) (5 children)

My transporter clone and I may be indistinguishable to you, but I can distinguish between us pretty easily. A transporter is not interrupting a chemical process and then letting it continue, it is stopping a chemical process and then starting another one elsewhere. Death or no death is very meaningful to me, the person who is about to be disintegrated at the entrance of this transporter.

The person who shows up at the lever looks like me, acts like me, thinks they're me, and they are not me. No matter how arbitrarily similar we are, they're a different person. If the transporter fails to disintegrate me, I do not see through that person's eyes. I do not hear through that person's ears. Because they're a different person.

So it stands to reason that if the transporter does disintegrate me, I still will not see through that person's eyes nor hear through that person's ears. And because my eyes and ears are gone, I will never see or hear anything again. There's a word for this state of existence, in which you do not experience anything.

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[–] flying_sheep@lemmy.ml 1 point 1 year ago (4 children)

No you can't. Only through the logic of knowing that the transported one must be the copy. Both will feel like you do. If you eliminate that location part (e.g. like in “The Prestige”), nobody will know or care who is “copy” or “original” (if concepts like that even apply in whatever fictional mechanism that movie uses)

I don't know what you mean by the talk of “chemical process” and how it's supposedly meaningful if one ends or not. I'm a brain believing it's alive. If one recreates or simulates that brain’s functionality sufficiently well and puts it into roughly similar simulated or real body, that person is me.

I'm saying that you're essentially believing in souls. That the ego in your head that believes it's an entity because it has access to your memory and philosophy is just an illusion. No less real, but not in any form required to be continuous.

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[–] starman2112@sh.itjust.works 1 point 1 year ago (3 children)

If you eliminate that location part (e.g. like in “The Prestige”), nobody will know or care who is “copy” or “original”

I will. Or rather, if my original body gets disintegrated, I won't. Because I'm dead.

I'm saying that you're essentially believing in souls.

Nope. I'm explicitly denying the existence of a soul. My experience is bound to my physical body, and nothing else. If my physical body is disintegrated, then my existence ends, even if someone constructs a perfect copy of my body somewhere else. That will not be my physical body.

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[–] flying_sheep@lemmy.ml 1 point 1 year ago (2 children)

A you died. A you remains. Nothing is lost, so calling it a “death” is like calling sleep “a small death”: purely philosophical and with no relevance to your ability to live your life after.

It's a trick of perspective. If you acknowledge that “you” is just a electrochemical reaction, you're just like a computer program: only defined by what's happening, not which CPU is running it.

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[–] starman2112@sh.itjust.works 2 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago) (1 child)

This is equivocation. Under one definition, a me died. Under a much more meaningful and relevant definition, the only me died. Someone else that looks and acts and sounds like me is alive, but I am not experiencing life through his senses. He's a different guy, even if no other person can tell the difference between us. I already explained this.

If you acknowledge that “you” is just a electrochemical reaction, you're just like a computer program: only defined by what's happening, not which CPU is running it.

I said that consciousness is a chemical reaction, and also that my experience of life is bound to my physical body. If you destroy my physical body, my experience of life ends. I do not care if an identical program is running on a different CPU right now, I am running on this one.

I want you to imagine for a moment that I'm about to shoot you in the head, but I explained that "it's fine, because I just scanned your body and at some point I will make a perfect reconstruction of it. Nobody will ever know the difference between the you that I shoot in the head and the you that I reconstruct later." You don't want me to shoot you in the head. I know that for a fact. You know there's a difference between the you that's experiencing life right now, and the you that I will reconstruct elsewhere.

It doesn't matter whether I reconstruct you later, or I've already done so, or if I do so at the exact moment the bullet enters your brain. I know that you know that when you get shot in the head, you die, regardless of how perfectly I can recreate you elsewhere. Does this analogy help you to understand why I think that a transporter that disintegrates your body kills you?

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[–] flying_sheep@lemmy.ml 2 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago)

Believe me, I've been there. I've thought what you think for decades, but at some point it clicked and I knew.

My point is that there is no part that makes the one that died “the only you”. Your “point of view” is an illusion. Your belief in your ego being a unique continuous thing is product of how our brains functions, not a fact.

Think about the freeze example some more. Think about what would happen to “you” if you ship-of-theseus’d your brain while frozen by dividing all molecules randomly into two piles, adding copies of the respective other pile, and reassembling everything: what molecule holds the “you” particle?

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