noauto, which means that the filesystem in question won't mount until you issue an explicit mount command for it, can be an alternative to nofail in fstab. Back in the days of optical drives, that used to be one of the options you put on them.
For external (and network) drives, though, I find it's better to hand the problem over to autofs (which will mount the filesystem only when you try to access it) and keep them out of fstab.
You can try just tracking down Akonadi's executable and removing its executable mark or renaming it, which may, however, break other stuff (in particular, make sure you're not running kmail—it seems to be the most substantial program with a non-optional dependency). Or you can ditch KDE and move to a lighter DE that doesn't have this stuff (TDE, Mate, XFCE . . .)
There are two ways to spin up a Linux machine: you can either use a desktop-ready distribution that includes everything you need to use it right away (including some stuff you don't want), or you can start with the bare bones and build it up to usability. If you want to take the second philosophy to the extreme, Gentoo will let you turn off all optional features you don't want before they're even built.
Exactly. It's Yet Another Privilege Escalation Vulnerability. Unless you're dealing with a multiuser machine, the attacker first needs to use some other vuln to get into an unprivileged account. Without that additional vulnerability, this exploit is useless.
And I think all programs should follow user theming, regardless of desktop environment, widget set, or anything else. ('Scuse me while I give GTK4 the stinkeye again.) You can never tell whether someone's colour selection is a matter of accessibility rather than just personal preference, so you absolutely should not ignore it. Defaults matter very little as long as you can change them.
What exactly is the point of stable release? I don't need everything pinned to specific versions—I'm not running a major corporate web service that needs a 99.9999% uptime guarantee—and Internet security is a moving target that requires constant updates.
Security and bug fixes—especially bug fixes, in my experience—are a good enough reason to go rolling-release even if you don't usually need bleeding-edge features in your software.
I think part of what you're missing may be a set of very old assumptions about where the danger is coming from.
Linux was modeled after UNIX, and much of its core software was ported from other UNIX versions, or at least written in imitation of their utilities. UNIX was designed to be installed on large pre-Internet multi-user mainframe+dumb terminal systems in industry or post-secondary education. So there's an underlying assumption that a system is likely to have multiple human users, most of whom are not involved in maintaining the system, some of whom may be hostile to each other or to the owner of the system (think student pranks or disgruntled employees), and they all log in at once. Under those circumstances, users need to be protected from each other, and the system needs to be protected from malicious users. That's where the system of user and root passwords is coming from: it's trying to deal with an internal threat model, although separating some software into its own accounts also allows the system to be deployed against external threats. Over the years, other things have been layered on top of the base model, but if you scratch the paint off, you'll find it there underneath.
Windows, on the other hand, was built for PCs, and more or less assumes that only one user can be logged in to a machine at a time. Windows security is concerned almost entirely with external threats: viruses and other malware, remote access, etc. User-versus-user situations are a very minor concern. It's also a much more recent creation—Windows had essentially no security until the Internet had become well-established and Microsoft's poor early choices about macros and scripts came back to bite them on the buttocks.
So it isn't so much that one is more secure than the other as that they started with different threat models and come from different periods of computing history.
Your problem is that you're starting from the wrong premise: the primary goal of most people working on Linux is not to make more people switch to it, strange as that may sound, it's to create an operating system that they personally want to use. Which can mean a lot of different things, depending on the person. So it's inevitable that there are a lot of different distros, and the only reason there aren't even more is that most of the one-man shows that don't attract many users peter out and vanish after a few months or years.
There's an old joke from a couple of decades ago about what operating systems would be like if they were airlines:
Linux Airlines
Disgruntled employees of all the other OS airlines decide to start their own airline. They build the planes, ticket counters, and pave the runways themselves. They charge a small fee to cover the cost of printing the ticket, but you can also download and print the ticket yourself. When you board the plane, you are given a seat, four bolts, a wrench and a copy of the seat-HOWTO.html. Once settled, the fully adjustable seat is very comfortable, the plane leaves and arrives on time without a single problem, the in-flight meal is wonderful. You try to tell customers of the other airlines about the great trip, but all they can say is, “You had to do what with the seat?”
Gentoo is still very much a "You had to do what with the seat?" distro, while most others have retired that concept to varying degrees, at the cost of the seats being less easy to perform unusual adjustments on.
One detail about Rust in the kernel that often gets overlooked: the Linux kernel supports arches to which Rust has never been ported. Most of these are marginal (hppa, alpha, m68k—itanium was also on this list), but there are people out there who still use them and may be concerned about their future. As long as Rust remains in device drivers only this isn't a major issue, but if it penetrates further into the kernel, these arches will have to be desupported.
(Gentoo has a special profile "feature" called "wd40" for these arches, which is how I was aware of their lack of Rust support. It's interesting to look at the number and types of packages it masks. Lotta python there, and it looks like gnome is effectively a no-go.)
I consider bootloader attacks a very low-probability threat, and quite honestly I don't trust the average board vendor to produce anything that's actually secure anyway. If I were in the habit of carrying a laptop back and forth across international borders I might feel differently, but for a desktop stuck in a room in Canada that hardly anyone enters when I'm not present, Secure Boot is a major hassle in return for a small security gain. So I just don't bother.
sudo is already an optional component (yes, really—I don't have it installed). Don't want its attack surface? You can stick with su and its attack surface instead. Either is going to be smaller than systemd's.
systemd's feature creep is only surpassed by that of emacs.
Because even a headless server with no email capability can write to a log, as long as it can mount its root drive.
That being said, if your system is hiding stuff behind some kind of splash screen at boot time, turn it off. I suspect your error would have been right there on screen in plain white-on-black text if it had happened on one of my systems (granted, I use OpenRC and not systemd, but I expect the latter also provides a running commentary on what it's doing at boot until the graphics stack loads).