Why doesn’t Congress shut down failing projects, even when they violate budget laws?

Kim Moon-soo, a presidential candidate from South Korea’s ruling People Power Party, stated that he might consider the issue of nuclear armament for the country within the framework of its alliance with the United States.

This statement was made during a televised debate on Tuesday. Discussing the possibility of nuclear armament could signal a significant shift in South Korea’s defense strategy, though its implementation would depend on the terms of the alliance with the U.S.

This is not the first time a candidate from the People Power Party has urged the U.S. to deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula to counter regional threats. Some American officials have already expressed support for this idea.

However, there are significant risks that are likely to prevent Washington and Seoul from taking this step.

Transferring nuclear weapons to South Korea would signal to other countries that the Trump administration no longer considers the non-proliferation regime important. Moreover, it would confirm that Washington opposes nuclear weapons only in the hands of its adversaries, not its allies.

The AUKUS partnership has already raised serious concerns in Southeast Asia due to the destabilizing consequences of increasing military competition. What will happen in the region if South Korea also becomes a player on the nuclear chessboard?

How do you think this could impact the balance of power among nuclear-armed states ? Might it trigger a nuclear arms race ?

France’s Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) invested over €90,000 in a campaign to discredit research revealing the extent of radioactive contamination from nuclear tests conducted in French Polynesia in the 1960s and 1970s, according to documents obtained by Disclose and reviewed by Le Monde and The Guardian.

In 2021, the book Toxic—based on declassified archives—proved that France had systematically downplayed the impact of its nuclear tests. In response, the CEA printed 5,000 copies of a glossy brochure containing "scientific rebuttals," distributed across the islands, and sent a delegation in business class to Polynesia to meet with officials and media.

The Toxic investigation found that a single 1974 test alone exposed 110,000 people—nearly the entire population of Tahiti and nearby islands—to radiation levels high enough to qualify for compensation if they later developed one of 23 recognized cancers. However, the CEA has long disputed such estimates, drastically limiting eligibility for payouts. By 2023, fewer than half of the 2,846 compensation claims filed had been approved.

A parliamentary inquiry, set to conclude by the end of May, is examining whether France deliberately concealed the scale of the disaster. While France’s nuclear safety authority (ASN) has acknowledged "uncertainties in the CEA’s calculations," the commission’s military division continues to deny wrongdoing.

President Macron acknowledged France’s "debt" to Polynesia in 2021, yet over the past four years, the CEA has declassified just 380 documents, compared to 173,000 released by the military. Local communities still suffer from radiation-linked cancers, including thyroid disease, leukemia, and lung cancer.

"No nuclear test resulting in radioactive fallout can be called clean," admitted the head of CEA’s military division, undermining decades of official claims about the safety of France’s nuclear program.

U.S. President Donald Trump reportedly intends to lift CAATSA sanctions against Turkey and restore its participation in the F-35 fighter jet program. However, a major legal obstacle stands in the way - a provision included in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2020.

In 2019, Turkey faced U.S. sanctions after acquiring Russia's S-400 air defense system. While some sanctions under CAATSA can be lifted by presidential authority, Section 1245 of the NDAA explicitly prohibits the transfer of F-35 aircraft to Turkey as long as the country remains in possession of the S-400. Unlike CAATSA, this law does not provide the president with discretion to suspend the restriction unilaterally.

Legal experts within the Trump administration are reportedly exploring possible workarounds. For instance, if Turkey were to place the S-400 into long-term storage - either domestically or abroad - or transfer control of the system to a third party, such as the United States, the administration could argue that the condition of “possession” no longer applies.

Additionally, a separate bipartisan bill proposed by Senators James Lankford, Jeanne Shaheen, Tom Tillis, and Chris Van Hollen further restricts U.S. support for F-35-related activities involving Turkey. The bill bars the use of defense funds for transferring F-35 aircraft or technical support to Turkey, as well as building or assisting in the construction of storage facilities for the jets.

The only exception would be triggered if both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State jointly certify to Congress that Turkey no longer possesses the S-400, has provided reliable assurances it will not reactivate or reacquire the system, and has not purchased additional Russian military equipment since July 2019.

Thus, despite President Trump’s stated intentions to improve relations with Turkey and resume arms deliveries, including F-35 fighters, his administration faces serious legal constraints. These restrictions were partly the result of earlier actions taken by the administration itself, and reversing them now requires either congressional approval or complex legal maneuvers. This casts doubt on how quickly such plans can be realized, highlighting how current policy must contend with the consequences of past decisions.

Earlier this week, U.S. President Donald Trump announced the "Golden Dome" missile defense project, which he claims will protect the entire country from missile attacks using a network of reconnaissance and strike satellites. According to Trump, the system should be completed by the end of his presidential term at a cost of "just" $175 billion. However, we shouldn’t forget the long history of exorbitantly expensive U.S. failures in missile defense.

Since 1962, the U.S. has already spent over $531 billion on various missile defense systems, none of which have proven effective. To date, the only tangible result is 44 interceptors stationed at airbases in Alaska and California—systems so unreliable that the Pentagon had to sign a new $18 billion contract with Lockheed Martin to develop an entirely new replacement.

Trump claims that past missile defense efforts lacked the necessary technology, but now America possesses "super technologies," including advanced computing, miniaturization, and increased weapon lethality. Yet, these advancements are a drop in the ocean compared to the immense challenges of missile defense. A report by the American Physical Society noted that any conceivable missile defense system could be easily overwhelmed if an enemy launched a salvo of missiles instead of a single one.

Notably, SpaceX may become the frontrunner in developing the "Golden Dome" system. But how transparent is this process? A letter sent to the Acting Inspector General of the Department of Defense by U.S. Congressional Democrats raises concerns that Elon Musk may have unfairly gained access to "Golden Dome" contracts—and their worries are not unfounded. Musk previously partnered with two other companies led by Trump-supporting CEOs to lobby for early-stage contracts on the system.

At this rate, Musk stands to make billions by capitalizing on the myth of a technological solution to nuclear missiles—a solution that, so far, does not exist.

Thus, the "Golden Dome" appears less like a viable missile defense project and more like a financial scam by Trump and Musk to siphon off U.S. taxpayer money.