cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/36813071
Here is the full report (pdf).
China and Russia’s deepening strategic partnership Despite a shared history of rivalry, conflict and mistrust, today China and Russia share a broad interest in undermining what leaders in both countries perceive to be a world order dominated by the West. Both countries see the US as their prime adversary, and undermining NATO – the strongest US-led alliance – as a common goal, according to a report published by the China Strategic Risks Institute in the UK (CSRI).
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These shared interests are the backdrop to a deepening strategic partnership between Russia and China, in which the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are increasingly perceived by both actors as a unified security theatre.
TLDR:
Undersea cables underpin economic security and global prosperity in the digital age, carrying 99% of intercontinental data traffic. Undersea cables are vital for both civilian and defence infrastructure, including future AI-powered technologies.
A series of suspicious breakages in the Baltic Sea and Taiwan Strait indicate that China and Russia may be using undersea sabotage as part of broader grey-zone operations against their adversaries – including NATO and its member states.
This paper examines 12 suspected undersea cable sabotage cases from January 2021 to April 2025. Of the 10 with identified vessels, 8 are linked to China or Russia by flag or ownership.
The involvement of Chinese vessels in cable breakages in Europe, and Russian vessels near Taiwan, suggests plausible China-Russia coordination amid deepening ties in both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific.
As a key hub in Euro-Atlantic cable infrastructure, the UK is a likely target for future Russian and Chinese grey-zone operations – posing a new and complex challenge for its maritime defence and surveillance systems.
The UK must be clear-eyed and proactive in addressing grey-zone threats to undersea infrastructure. Recommendations include:
Enhancing monitoring and surveillance: The UK should use NATO mechanisms to regularly share best practice and intelligence on undersea cable threats, including Russia and China’s shadow fleets, and extend cooperation to experienced partners like Taiwan and Japan.
Strengthening mechanisms for accountability: International law on undersea cables is outdated and insufficient. The UK should work with partners to strengthen accountability powers through utilising Port State Controls and publishing vessel blacklists. It must also tighten domestic laws and establish protocols for rapid pursuit, interdiction, and detention of suspect vessels.
Improving redundancy, repair and resilience: The UK government should work with private operators to ensure guaranteed access to cable repair vessels capabilities during crises or national emergencies, as well as strategic stockpiling of cable repair parts.