Egypt

There is a phrase in Arabic that loosely translates as “death and destruction,” but is significantly more subtle and expressive than the terse wording in English. It implies that loss of life is only a beginning and that the tragedy will be compounded by economic devastation — in essence, that death is just the start of one’s troubles. It is an apt metaphor for the conflict in Gaza. Apart from the huge death toll and an Israeli bombardment that has left less than 8% of Gaza’s housing units and 30% of all structures still standing, the economic devastation has lapped over the borders, most notably Egypt’s, which is currently dealing with the resulting economic fallout and sustained diplomatic pressure.

Apart from the heightened security risk of having an armed conflict next door and the need to cope with an estimated 100,000 Palestinian refugees, Egypt has seen its financial fortunes plummet over the past year and a half. Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea have been disastrous for Egypt. Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Amb. Tamim Khallaf recently said that the attacks, which have diverted traffic that would otherwise have passed through the Suez Canal, have cost Egypt more than $8 billion, a tremendous burden for a cash-strapped country. However, the economic pressure, serious as it is, has not been as taxing as the diplomatic pressure brought to bear on Cairo since the beginning of the war.

Almost immediately after the start of the conflict, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his governing coalition began a concerted effort to persuade first the European Union and then the United States to pressure Egypt to accept Palestinian refugees. Egypt refused, for three reasons. The first reason was that Cairo feared that any displacement would become permanent, by the vicissitudes of battle or the deliberate design of the far-right Israeli governing coalition. As Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has repeatedly said, Egypt will not be “part of an attempt to liquidate the Palestinian issue.”

The second reason was more pragmatic. Letting in women, children, and the injured is one thing. Allowing in up to 2 million people with no opportunity to conduct appropriate vetting is another. A mass influx of refugees would certainly include armed members of Hamas who would continue their fight against Israel from Egyptian territory. That would lead to Israeli retaliation against Egypt and, more worryingly for the Egyptians, raise the specter of “foreign interference.” The fear here, according to Egyptian defense analysts, is of a military domino effect. In this scenario, if Israel attacked Hamas on Egyptian soil, Egypt would be forced to retaliate in kind. That, in turn, might lead to the US retaliating against Egypt, presumably by imposing economic sanctions, in support of Israel. While such US retaliation is admittedly unlikely, none of the analysts or military personnel spoken to for this article would take it off the table.

The third reason was both the most difficult to quantify and the most pressing for the Egyptian government. Public opinion in Egypt shows overwhelming support and empathy for the Palestinians, and there was already a simmering anger over the perception that Egypt had not been active enough in helping them. This came at a time when Egyptians were already palpably frustrated with the state of the economy. Any suggestion that the government buckle under pressure from the Americans, in favor of Israel at the expense of the Palestinians, was likely to turn that simmer up to a boil. That was not — and still is not — a possibility that the government was likely to entertain under any circumstances.