I've read about secret sharing as a means of doing multisig in Monero, and I know services like Haveno & RINO implement 2-of-3 wallets as a service (for exchange escrow and shared custody respectively). I'm interested in a different sort of implementation, one that doesn't rely on a third party host.

Nunchuk.io, for example, develops a BTC wallet that allows multiple users to collaboratively create multisig wallets & share custody of bitcoin. They can sign/approve transactions via an integrated messenger (which is third party hosted, but doesn't technically need to be afaik). This has multiple use cases, but it interests me primarily as a trustless escrow service between individuals.

As a non-programmer, I'm curious if anything about XMR secret sharing prevents the development of an equivalent application for Monero. Haveno and RINO have their own use cases, but I'd be more interested in something that can work between individual users without any third party company/service/platform.

@monero

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[–] [email protected] 1 points 1 year ago (2 children)

The fact that multisig was not widely used yet, was indirectly related to the unfortunate CCS Wallet Incident, which happened a few months ago, as well.

@ErC (ErCiccione), a contributor, commented elsewhere a few days ago:

This is a bit of a dog biting its tail. Multisig was shipped and has been live for a long time. Nobody really used it, so it ended up being unstable and full of problems, but that came out only relatively recently (couple of years ago) when services started to build on it.

People are now saying, “If multsig had been used…” “should have” “could have” (Hindsight is 20/20 😢). Anyway, fluffypony replied, “when it reached a level of maturity (this year? late last year?) it should have been prioritized.”

We can expect that multisig will be now more prioritized and to be carefully tested and tuned, soon to be available more generally, if not right now. So perhaps the answer to your question is, “No, but maybe soon…”?

[–] [email protected] 1 points 1 year ago (2 children)

@Saki @japananon

Multisig is like the gpg of email, best practice in theory but rarely used due to usability.

AFAIK it's still only available via the CLI version of monero wallet?

[–] [email protected] 1 points 1 year ago

Rino.io has a great multisig gui.

[–] [email protected] 0 points 1 year ago (1 children)

@UncleIroh @Saki RINO claims to use it for their enterprise shared custody service:

https://www.rino.io/

And Haveno is supposed to be using it for escrow:

https://github.com/haveno-dex/haveno/blob/master/docs/trade_protocol/trade-protocol.md

I foolishly assumed this meant it was mature enough to implement more broadly, but I guess not.

[–] [email protected] 1 points 1 year ago (1 children)

You can try out their claims. I havnt tried multisig their myself jusy tried a normal account ages ago. My only wish is to have email as an option only or some other network id. Xmpp/nostr/monero. They could use monero for spam protection? Also im not sure how multsig with other parties work, is the email shared with other participant? May be good idea to make that private too..but how to monitize i dont know..

[–] [email protected] 0 points 1 year ago (1 children)

@xmr_unlimited I'm not terribly interested in RINO... they're a third party service, not a piece of software so it doesn't fit my use case. The fact that I need to register & sign in to even try it out is a big turn off.

What I am curious about, though, is if they've refined XMR multisig at all in developing their service, and if so whether they've pushed those improvements upstream or not.

[–] [email protected] 1 points 1 year ago

Im pretty sure participants can get their funds out without rino if they saves all their keys

[–] [email protected] 0 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago) (1 children)

@Saki Interesting, thank you. Was the CCS wallet not using multisig the reason for the breach, then? I haven't followed the incident in detail, I wasn't sure what allowed the attacker access in the first place.

[–] [email protected] 1 points 1 year ago

Nothing is sure. It might be skilled attacker(s), it might be simply bad opsec, or it might be an inside job. Several people think and say that we need to minimize trust via mltisig (in retrospect, this seems so obvious but that’s just hindsight).