this post was submitted on 01 Oct 2023
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I learned a lot just by reading your response. If I might steal a moment of your time, I'd like to ask a follow-on question.
If consciousness is completely an emergent behavior, why does it exist at all? Can't we simply be robots that execute this programming? Why create the story after the fact? Why should there be a watcher?
Of course, these are difficult questions and I don't expect you to be able to address them completely, but I wonder if there is a reasonable answer.
This is the hottest question in theory of mind right now thanks to David Chalmers. It's called the Hard Problem of Consciousness and it's about connecting the reductionist view of the brain's function with the first-person experience of consciousness.
I think that any explanation of consciousness completely from "the outside" will result in not being able to quantify the experience part of it. Any explanation completely from "the inside" will eventually run into the same issues as empiricism where it will be limited by subjectivity. I think that fundamentally we can't rigorously combine these two views because they aren't compatible. The starting points for each view carry different base assumptions.
Both may be true from within their perspectives but combining them is basically just stating that a subjective experience "maps" to a physical function. There isn't any explanatory usefulness of mapping. It doesn't explain why the subjective experience is there just that it happens when these other physical things happen. I'm not sure we'll find an answer that truly resolves the hard problem, but we're still trying.