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SAN FRANCISCO, CA - In the wake of a devastating supply chain attack in the npm registry that left millions of enterprise applications compromised and billions of user records exposed, developers across the JavaScript ecosystem expressed deep sorrow today, lamenting that such a crisis was completely unavoidable.

“It’s a shame, but what can you do? This is just the price of building modern web apps,” said Senior Frontend Engineer Mark Vance, echoing the sentiments of a community that completely relies on a 40-level-deep nested tree of unvetted packages maintained by pseudonymous strangers to capitalize a single string. “There’s absolutely no way to foresee or prevent someone from taking over a long-abandoned utility package and injecting a crypto-miner into every production build in the world. It’s just an act of nature.”

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[-] mabeledo@lemmy.world 2 points 15 hours ago

Because distro packages rely on a small group of trusted maintainers, while anyone can publish anything to the NPM registry.

Also, distro packages are usually full fledged applications or libraries, which require a certain number of developers upstream to maintain them. There are thousands of NPM packages out there that are essentially walking corpses waiting to be infected.

[-] moonpiedumplings@programming.dev 1 points 47 minutes ago

I disagree. There are many process failures and areas where security can be improved, independent of trusting a distro maintainer or developers.

For example, 2FA should probably be enforced for the process of publishing packages. It does appear to be enforced for new packages but older packages still have legacy settings. Github now forces 2fa for basically everything, and they applied that even to existing organizations and repos. There is no real reason that NPM (owned by Github) isn't able to do the same.

Or another example, is sandboxed builds. Many of these packages, like NPM and Rust packages, have build time scripts, which are executed unsandboxed at compile/install time of these programs. That is how these NPM worms have been so pervasive. You don't have to actually run the javascript package for it to do bad things, just merely installing it.

On the other hand, the build systems that distro's use, often involve sandboxing the builds to limit the attack surfaces (including limiting network access). Although, Linux distros usually rip out build scripts and build systems in order to replace them with their own, but this also further limits the code you have to audit.

Even better is to sandbox the program itself to further limit harm but that's not done on Linux distros and is somewhat outside the scope of this discussion.

If you are an NPM developer, I recommend Deno, with it's built in, on by default sandboxing... that people like to disable. But it's there and is better than giving random NPM package #245 access to your home directory. You could also use podman or docker but yeah.

this post was submitted on 16 May 2026
201 points (97.6% liked)

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