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this post was submitted on 09 Apr 2026
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It used to be around €1500 for a full node that could be shared by up to 4 stakers. Staking is different from mining coins though. You put tokens into some sort of holding and keep ownership of them. You then "mine tokens" by having the node do work while it is holding your stake.
Wait you mean the chat users have to pay to send traffic through the mix pool? This sounds worse and worse. Is BitMessage still around?
I would say once you're observed sending data into Tor or anything resembling it, you're already compromised even if your correspondent hasn't been uniquely identified. I can't see getting excited about the app.
No, it's free. They have a whitepaper on their website: https://getsession.org/whitepaper
All in all there's a pool of tokens that gets paid out to the stakers. The full network of nodes determines what nodes are eligible by testing each other. The pool gets a constant flow of tokens over time, while transaction fees and specific purchases (like a custom username instead of one of those long IDs) feed the pool as well.
Keep in mind I'm not here to sell it. I really wish it was more like free Tor nodes, in which case I would be hosting one already.
Hmm ok, but it still sounds kind of sus. One of the insights of the Mixmaster era is that what really matters is the amount of message reordering you can do, and that's why remailers typically had 24 hours or more of latency. So I've never believed in Tor (near real time). Even with a text chat network, more than a few seconds of latency will have a significant usability hit. And also, as mentioned, using the service at all probably makes you into one of the usual suspects.
The Guardian (newspaper) handles this in an interesting way, for 1-way communication from users to the Guardian itself. They have a news reader app used by millions of subscribers to access news articles and stuff. And if you want to send them a confidential news tip, the app has a feature where you can enter a text message for their editors. The news reading protocol includes some space for this type of message in every transaction, under a layer of encryption so that an eavesdropper can't see if a message is present. Allowing user to user communication through such a scheme could easily lead to mayhem, but for sending stuff to an identified recipient (the Guardian) that has some establishment cred, it's clever.