I can only read this as the first vpn you refer to being mullvad and the second being proton.

It’s hard to understand how you can come to the conclusion that a vpn offering exit nodes (wrong terminology but bear with me) in a bad country makes the vpn service bad.

One of the types of traffic shaping and monitoring that vpns are used to avoid is geofencing, where your ip address is a determinant of how your traffic is treated.

Users who are outside the bad country but want to be treated by its internet as if they are inside would use a vpn server inside the bad country.

Users who are inside the bad country and want to make a connection to the internet outside the bad country without being observed would use a vpn server inside the bad country.

Users whose internet backbone goes through the bad country would be well served by the vpn servers in the bad country.

There are many other situations where a vpn with servers inside a bad country might be useful, but those are just a few.

To put an extremely fine point on what I’m saying: mullvad users in gaza are well served by the single Tel Aviv mullvad server for self evident reasons. They must lean harder than others on mullvads unloggable design, the same one that caused Interpol to have their servers blacklisted until they disallowed port forwarding, but based on the history of that design and law enforcements inability to make hay out of it I think those users are safe.

How does having an exit node in Israel equal a VPN being corrupted?