Chapter One precedes with some debunking of simplifications / disclaimers about what its not saying / very careful rhetoric which I cannot replicate.
We are not concerned here with the ultimate
consequence of rule by terror—namely, that nobody, not even the executors, can ever be free of fear; in our context we are dealing merely with the arbitrariness by which victims are chosen, and for this it is decisive that they
are objectively innocent, that they are chosen regardless of what they may
or may not have done.
At first glance this may look like a belated confirmation of the old scapegoat theory, and it is true that the victim of modern terror does show all the characteristics of the scapegoat: he is objectively and absolutely innocent because nothing he did or omitted to do matters or has any connection
with his fate. There is, therefore, a temptation to return to an explanation which automatically discharges the victim of responsibility: it seems quite adequate
to a reality in which nothing strikes us more forcefully than the utter innocence of the individual caught in the horror machine and his utter inability to change his fate. Terror, however, is only in the last instance of its development a mere form of government. In order to establish a totalitarian regime, terror must be presented as an instrument for carrying out a specific ideology;
and that ideology must have won the adherence of many, and even a majority,
before terror can be stabilized.