cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/11731437

Russia is attacking one transport system with two different sets of tools. Inside Ukraine, it can openly use drones and missiles against locomotives, railway stations, and transport infrastructure. Across the border, in NATO territory, the same objective requires different methods: reconnaissance, proxy recruitment, sabotage, and information operations. The Polish-Ukrainian border changes the method, but it does not change the target.

...

On a larger level, protecting railways will require not only Ukrainian air defence and Polish railway security but also integrated early warning incident mechanisms, solid intelligence exchange, joint disruption of Russian recruitment networks, quick attribution, and coordinated protection of transport infrastructure on both sides of the border. If the rail corridors between the two countries and the supporting transport and border infrastructure are viewed as one system, ensuring the security of both Ukraine and Poland will be crucial to limiting and preventing the potential impact and spillover effects of damaging strikes and unexpected sabotage.

Both countries need to understand that physical damage is only one Russian objective. Moscow also wants fear, disruption and Polish-Ukrainian tensions. Otherwise, even an unsuccessful act of sabotage can still achieve part of the Kremlin’s objective.

...

Archived

other discussions
 

Russia is attacking one transport system with two different sets of tools. Inside Ukraine, it can openly use drones and missiles against locomotives, railway stations, and transport infrastructure. Across the border, in NATO territory, the same objective requires different methods: reconnaissance, proxy recruitment, sabotage, and information operations. The Polish-Ukrainian border changes the method, but it does not change the target.

...

On a larger level, protecting railways will require not only Ukrainian air defence and Polish railway security but also integrated early warning incident mechanisms, solid intelligence exchange, joint disruption of Russian recruitment networks, quick attribution, and coordinated protection of transport infrastructure on both sides of the border. If the rail corridors between the two countries and the supporting transport and border infrastructure are viewed as one system, ensuring the security of both Ukraine and Poland will be crucial to limiting and preventing the potential impact and spillover effects of damaging strikes and unexpected sabotage.

Both countries need to understand that physical damage is only one Russian objective. Moscow also wants fear, disruption and Polish-Ukrainian tensions. Otherwise, even an unsuccessful act of sabotage can still achieve part of the Kremlin’s objective.

...

Archived

 

cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/11731437

Russia is attacking one transport system with two different sets of tools. Inside Ukraine, it can openly use drones and missiles against locomotives, railway stations, and transport infrastructure. Across the border, in NATO territory, the same objective requires different methods: reconnaissance, proxy recruitment, sabotage, and information operations. The Polish-Ukrainian border changes the method, but it does not change the target.

...

On a larger level, protecting railways will require not only Ukrainian air defence and Polish railway security but also integrated early warning incident mechanisms, solid intelligence exchange, joint disruption of Russian recruitment networks, quick attribution, and coordinated protection of transport infrastructure on both sides of the border. If the rail corridors between the two countries and the supporting transport and border infrastructure are viewed as one system, ensuring the security of both Ukraine and Poland will be crucial to limiting and preventing the potential impact and spillover effects of damaging strikes and unexpected sabotage.

Both countries need to understand that physical damage is only one Russian objective. Moscow also wants fear, disruption and Polish-Ukrainian tensions. Otherwise, even an unsuccessful act of sabotage can still achieve part of the Kremlin’s objective.

...

Archived