The delicate process that Ecuador is currently experiencing, which involves, among other things, the privatization of security, involves the reconfiguration of the State under neoliberal principles and also the projection of the strategic interests of the United States in the region.
Under the guise of security, which has become the sole national theme, within the framework of the “internal armed conflict” that Noboa himself declared in 2024, using the fight against narcoterrorism and organized crime as a pretext , the country faces not only increased violence but also the erosion of state power and increased dependence on private foreign (mercenary) forces to address the crisis; and not without significant consequences.
As is well known, one of the fundamental pillars of the modern state is the legitimate monopoly on the use of armed force. However, the increasing privatization of security has fragmented this monopoly, since what once seemed to be an exclusive function of the state is now shared with private actors, who often have more power and influence than a country and who operate according to the logic of capital and the market, rather than the public interest.
In fact, the increased participation of private actors in conflicts and wars is closely linked to the privatization process driven by neoliberalism; that is, their prominence as actors in security dynamics responds to strategies and policies specific to this new stage of capitalism.
Although the use of private entities and the displacement of state functions in matters relating to security has a long history, it was in the nineties of the last century, a decade that evidenced the negative effects of the implementation of the first neoliberal policies, that their participation increased hand in hand with the reconfiguration of the post-Cold War international order.
In other words, the increase in corporations, troops, or resources from private capital was accompanied by the rearticulation and global expansion of the capitalist accumulation system—in the face of the implosion of the Soviet Union and socialism with it; by the (relative) change in the traditional security paradigm—which moved from a unidirectional (state-centric) and unidimensional (military) archetype to one that incorporated other actors and other issues in its dynamics and definition; and by the decrease in military budgets, armaments, and armies—and the consequent surplus of troops, military equipment, and arsenals—produced massively within the framework of the capitalism vs. socialism confrontation.
Among the tasks performed by private military or police actors are the protection of strategic infrastructure, military training and advising of the armed forces, logistical support, intelligence functions, surveillance tasks, personnel protection, maintenance of weapons systems and even direct participation in combat .
In contexts where the state appears “incapable” of protecting its population, as in the case of Ecuador, the involvement of private actors can lead not only to a lack of accountability, the weakening of military and police institutions, and human rights violations (especially in armed conflict scenarios), but also to the use of privatized violence as an inherent symptom of the supposed “weakening of the state,” allowing powerful groups to consolidate their control. In other words, the state's perceived lack of capacity (or will) can be intentionally fostered to benefit those who profit from violence, such as criminal groups, corrupt political elites, or, as in this case, private security corporations.
As private actors take over tasks that are under the authority of states, the latter lose their exclusivity in the exercise of coercive functions ; and when coercive power no longer emanates solely from the state apparatus, there is a risk that it will be subordinated to military, economic, or business interests (which of course also happens with the power of the state, since, in fact, it often becomes a threat to the security of those it governs).
On the other hand, the privatization of state functions related to security, defense, and the use of armed force almost naturally leads to the militarization of security processes. This, in turn, requires the adoption of logics, language, and structures typical of the military sphere in the management of social or economic problems, for example. Thus, while the state loses sovereignty to private actors to whom it has ceded control of strategic capabilities, it also adopts mechanisms characteristic of militarization (such as states of emergency or war) that will inevitably have negative repercussions for the population, especially for groups that are often the target of security policies that perpetuate violence.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, there are more than 16,000 private military and security companies employing approximately 2.4 million people . Some of these corporations carry out training or equipment tasks, but others, especially those from the United States, are contracted in the region to assist public security forces, combat organized crime, and even “terrorist groups.”
In the specific case of Ecuador, one of the countries with the highest homicide rates in the region, the security crisis associated with drug trafficking, gangs, and the (lack of) control of cocaine trafficking routes to Europe and the United States has led the country to adopt a security strategy based on the militarization of public security. This includes the deployment of armed forces to combat threats and the use of private security forces. In 2015, for example, the average homicide rate in Latin America was 17.6 per 100,000 inhabitants, a 5% decrease compared to the previous year. However, Ecuador's homicide rate increased by 31% compared to 2014, reaching a record high of 50.9 per 100,000 inhabitants last year . This meant going from being the second safest country on the continent in 2017 to the most unsafe and violent in 2014.
While the above has been used as part of a state narrative to justify Daniel Noboa's militarized security strategy, which includes an alliance between the Ecuadorian government and private armed forces under the command of Erik Prince, a former U.S. military officer and founder and owner of the private company Blackwater (now Academi), it is true that violence in Ecuador is on the rise. It goes without saying that this powerful military corporation has been involved in various armed conflicts around the world and in controversies involving the killing of civilians, such as the Nisour Massacre in Baghdad, Iraq, in 2007, when Blackwater forces contracted by the United States opened fire on Iraqi civilians, resulting in 17 deaths and 20 injuries.
The strategy between Noboa and Prince, announced in 2025 (which remains unclear but aims to strengthen counter-terrorism capabilities, train law enforcement, and protect Ecuador's maritime space ), has not only proven insufficient to eradicate drug trafficking and gang violence, but also reveals a significant shift in the security policy of this Latin American country. This is especially true considering that the strategy between the state and forces associated with Blackwater is accompanied by a constitutional reform that eliminates the prohibition on establishing foreign military bases and armed or security forces within its territory. This reflects, on the one hand, the deepening of neoliberal policies that promote the weakening of the state in strategic areas and, on the other hand, Ecuador's important position in guaranteeing the extraterritorial interests of the United States.
Its location, situated between Colombia and Peru, the world's first and second largest producers of cocaine, respectively, makes Ecuador a key territory within the global drug trafficking system. The Port of Guayaquil on the Pacific coast, the country's most important port because it handles 85% of its various imports and oil, makes the territory a major logistical hub for cocaine destined for Europe and the United States; in turn, making it a strategic point for organized crime groups.
Control of traffic routes through "cooperation" with an "ally" country, which does not have permanent military bases on its territory but whose government, led by a businessman of American nationality, does intend to reinstate the base in Manta, a former US base, and the installation of another in the Galapagos Islands, becomes a fundamental part of the power's security interests.
What we are witnessing in Ecuador is thus part of a significant restructuring of hemispheric power in which the U.S. wields considerable influence, with dangerous repercussions for this Andean nation. The transfer of the strategic task of security to someone like Prince, who is part of political-military networks linked to the U.S. military-industrial complex, undoubtedly implies the projection of U.S. geopolitical interests in Latin America, but it also entails a significant domestic realignment.
To begin with, the involvement of private military companies in public affairs leads to the erosion of sovereignty. When the State, which is by definition the guarantor of security, delegates strategic functions involving intelligence gathering, training, military operations, and so on, to private contractors, a fragmentation of the institutional power structure becomes evident, which can lead to the privatization of conflicts or war and the inability to guarantee order.
At the same time, the commodification of security transforms what has traditionally been seen as a right into a commodity dependent on monetary capacity to acquire it, leading to neoliberal securitization where the corporate management of risks and threats is prioritized over guaranteeing rights and fulfilling the State's obligations. Reducing the social functions inherent to the state apparatus can lead, for example, to the strengthening of control and surveillance mechanisms.
On the other hand, when the State becomes less social and more police-oriented, regimes of exception and their inherent mechanisms such as repression, surveillance, discipline, systematic violation of rights, counterinsurgency or lack of accountability become normalized because, unlike state armed forces, which go through a process of legal regulation, private ones operate without any transparency.
As an example of the above, it suffices to say that since Noboa assumed the presidency (late 2023), he has signed 17 decrees that effectively normalize the state of emergency. The curfew recently imposed in Guayas, Los Ríos, Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas, and El Oro—provinces with 6.5 million inhabitants (35% of the population) and where more than half of the nation's homicides occur —is a prime example. The operation, which involved the deployment of 75,000 military personnel in a joint maneuver between the government and U.S. forces, resulted in the arbitrary detention of 253 people, and to this day, it remains unknown how many are actually linked to organized crime.