(This takes 4¼–5½ minutes to read.)
Quoting G. Bruce Strang’s ‘In Dubious Battle: Mussolini’s Mentalité and Italian Foreign Policy, 1936–1939’, pages 98–103:
In December 1936, Ciano, with Mussolini’s approval, undertook to reverse the course of Italo‐Yugoslav relations, and negotiations with the Stoyadinović government began in January 1937. Ciano hoped to sign an Italo‐Yugoslav alliance, but the Yugoslav negotiators balked. Instead, they reached a reasonably comprehensive agreement short of an alliance. Both parties secured several objectives, with Ciano making by far the more important concessions. There was, of course, the usual language regarding mutual non‐aggression and friendship.
Ciano also offered to relax considerably restrictions that [Rome] had placed on ethnic Slavs living [under Italian Fascism]. Negotiators reached an economic agreement which was to [the Kingdom of] Yugoslavia’s benefit, as it went a long way to restore trade lost during [the Kingdom of] Yugoslavia’s adherence to League sanctions against [Fascist] Italy.¹⁸
Most importantly, there were two secret clauses in the agreement. One gave [a Fascist] pledge regarding the independence of Albania, which partially placated Yugoslav concerns about [Fascist] expansionism there. In the other clause, Ciano promised to rein in the Ustaša even further. Italian police would intern Pavelić and other Croat leaders, and prevent any Croat terrorist action emanating from Italian soil.¹⁹ In short, [Fascist] Italy made some serious concessions in order to achieve the agreement.
In return, [Rome] won some important tactical victories over France, Britain, and even [the Third Reich]. The Italo‐Yugoslav agreement occurred at the same time as an outright Yugoslav rejection of a French offer for a pact of mutual assistance that would link the powers of the Little Entente. The rebuff of the French démarche by Milan Stoyadinović, the Yugoslavian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, sent a clear signal rejecting a close association with Western security interests.
As the Italo‐Yugoslav agreement promised neutrality in the event of third party conflicts, it formally ruptured the Little Entente; the terms of the two pacts were irreconcilable. Furthermore, the Yugoslav defection from the French camp meant that Czechoslovakia seemed increasingly isolated.
Stoyadinović also wounded French prestige, as he failed to give Delbos prior notice of the signing as was required under the Franco‐Yugoslav Treaty of 1927, and he cavalierly rejected the French suggestion that he delay the public signing of the agreement with Ciano.²⁰ The Italo‐Yugoslav accord represented a clear set‐back for French policy in the Balkans, and a corresponding gain for France’s [Fascist] enemy.²¹
Similarly, Ciano aimed this blow at Great Britain. [London] had maintained friendly relations with the Yugoslav Regent, Prince Paul, and had issued a guarantee of assistance to [the Kingdom of] Yugoslavia in event of [Fascist] reprisals in the aftermath of sanctions.
Whitehall counted on a friendly [Belgrade] both to resist [the Third Reich’s] encroachment in the Balkans and to support indirectly [the British Empire’s] important Mediterranean ally, Greece. Its adherence to sanctions during the Ethiopian crisis had apparently confirmed both [the Kingdom of] Yugoslavia’s friendship with England and its support for the League of Nations.
After the Italo‐Yugoslav accord, however, Foreign Office officials could no longer make such easy assumptions regarding [the Kingdom of] Yugoslavia’s loyalty. In addition, the lowering of tensions with [the Kingdom of] Yugoslavia allowed [Fascist] Italy to re‐orient its naval forces away from the Adriatic and toward the Mediterranean; [Fascist] Italy thus improved its relative power in any potential confrontation with Britain.
Finally, the accord seriously damaged British prestige and influence in the Balkans. Eden concluded that the accord showed that “Italy’s hostility to us is at present real, and I believe vindictive.”²² The agreement fulfilled von Neurath’s October 1936 prediction that [Fascist] Italy could detach [the Kingdom of] Yugoslavia from the Anglo‐French orbit and add it to the Rome–Berlin Axis.
The policy was a great success for the [Fascist] Foreign Minister; as Grandi wrote to Ciano, the latter had successfully courted a country which previously had been a mercenary “in the service of England against Italy.”²³
Ciano’s final aim in signing the accord with [the Kingdom of] Yugoslavia was to give both countries some ability to resist and some protection from the seemingly inevitable German [re]absorption of Austria. After the 1 June 1936 agreement with [the Reich], Ciano viewed the Anschluss as a foregone conclusion; the only question was when it would occur.²⁴
In order to protect [Fascist] Italy from the increase in [the Reich’s] power and its penetration of South‐east Europe, Ciano wanted to develop [the Kingdom of] Yugoslavia as a counterweight. Stoyadinović feared potential [Reich] domination and resented the stinginess of Britain and France in supporting [the Kingdom of] Yugoslavia with arms and economic aid, so Ciano’s overture seemed opportune.
Both [Fascist] Italy and [the Kingdom of] Yugoslavia could benefit from lessening [the Reich’s] domination of their respective economies and from the resulting benefits of increased trade.²⁵ In addition, [Rome’s] preferential association with [Belgrade] allowed it to continue and even to extend its influence in the Danubian basin. [Fascism] maintained its rôle as the primary sponsor of Hungarian revisionism, and the accord with [Belgrade] even provided [Rome] with a diplomatic opening to the previously hostile Kingdom of Rumania.
Finally, as Ciano later wrote, the accord allowed [Rome] “to view with calmness the possibility of the Anschluss.”²⁶ In short, the Italo‐Yugoslav accord of 25 March 1937 fulfilled several goals for [Fascism]. In part it reflected Ciano’s knowledge of the extent to which [Fascist] Italy was becoming increasingly dependent on [the Third Reich], and his desire to preserve some freedom of manoeuvre within the close co‐operation developed within the Rome–Berlin Axis.
Ciano’s more important aim, however, was to weaken Anglo‐French power and prestige in the Balkans and the Mediterranean, and simultaneously to strengthen the [Fascist] challenge to the [liberal] powers.
(Emphasis added. Click here for details.)
Quoting Perica Hadži‐Jovančić’s The Third Reich and Yugoslavia: An Economy of Fear, 1933–1941, pages 84 & 178:
Another important feature of 1937 was Italy’s return to the Yugoslav market. The two countries renewed their economic relations in September 1936. This was formalized with the agreement signed in Belgrade on 25 March 1937.⁵²
Although confident of [the Third Reich’s] strong position in the Yugoslav market, Heeren warned in April that complications in German–Yugoslav trade might make some of Yugoslav exporters look overseas for new markets; as [the Kingdom of] Yugoslavia’s new trade agreement with [Fascist] Italy was also based on clearing, this could have implications for other [the Kingdom of] Yugoslavia’s clearing partners.⁵³
In 1937, [the Kingdom of] Yugoslavia registered a positive balance with clearing countries like Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary and [Fascist] Italy, and a rising free trade with countries such as the United States, Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark. It all helped to partly reduce its dependence on [the Third Reich]; the German share of Yugoslav exports fell from 23.7 per cent in 1936 to 21.7 per cent in 1937.⁵⁴
[…]
On 7 December, Cincar‐Marković informed Heeren of [the] Yugoslavia[n] rejection to allow the right of passage for [Fascist] vehicles on the way to the front in Albania, as Belgrade insisted to remain strictly neutral in the present Greek–Italian conflict. He even expressed his astonishment that [the Reich] could have supported such a request from [Fascist] Italy.
According to Cincar‐Marković, the Yugoslav side considered the agreement of 25 March 1937 as a foundation for mutual relations with [Fascist] Italy, although [the Regio Esercito] had violated some points of that agreement with the occupation of Albania. More importantly, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister informed Heeren that [the Kingdom of] Yugoslavia was willing to accept the signing of non‐aggression pact with [the Reich] and [Fascist] Italy, as mentioned by [Berlin] during their talks.⁶⁵
(Emphasis added.)
Further reading: ‘A Late Offensive. Italian Cultural Action in Belgrade in the Last Phase of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1937–1941)’
‘Mussolini of Yugoslavia? The Milan Stojadinović régime and the impact of Italian fascism, 1937–1939’
‘Milan Stojadinović and Italian–Yugoslav relations (1935–1941)’ (mirror)
‘Milan Stojadinović and Count Ciano — A History of a Friendship’
Click here for other events that happened today (March 25).
1887: Chuichi Nagumo, Axis admiral, came to be.
1892: Felix Schwalbe, Axis lieutenant general, joined him.
1938: The Third Reich’s head of state gave a speech at Königsberg; the approval of the annexation of Austria was his main concern. Less importantly, the submarine Scirè entered Fascism’s Navy service.
1939: As the Fascists commissioned Lanciere into service, Reich intelligence chief Wilhelm Canaris reported to his Chancellor that his agents had detected Polish troop movements on the Polish border with Danzig. The Chancellor met with Wehrmacht chief Walther von Brauchitsch regarding this latest development in his attempt to acquire Danzig. Slovakian forces resumed their counterattack against the invading Hungarian forces, and Hungarian aircraft raided the Slovakian airfield at Spisská Nová Ves, killing thirteen. Imperial troops defeated the Chinese 102nd Division west of Nanchang, Jiangxi Province, China.
1940: Hungarian Prime Minister Pál Teleki met with Fascist Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano; Teleki voiced neutrality for the Kingdom of Hungary, and Fascist submarines U‐47 and U‐57 both sank Allied vessels, massacring sixteen. As well, the strength of the Imperial counteroffensive near Wuyuan, Suiyuan Province, China had grown to three thousand men with artillery and aerial support. On an indirectly related note, Swiss intelligence warned the Kingdom of Norway regarding evidence of a Fascist invasion, but Oslo chose to ignore the warning! (Coincidentally, French head of state Reynaud wrote to the British War Cabinet, proposing ideas to undermine any possibility of further Soviet ‘expansion’ in Scandinavia, but surprisingly Chamberlain refused to cooperate with this.)
1941: The Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s Prime Minister Dragiša Cvetković signed the Tripartite Pact at Vienna, Austria; the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had secretly also allowed Wehrmacht troops to travel on Yugoslavian railroads for an attack on Greece. Aside from that, Rodolfo Graziani stepped down as the Governor‐General of Axis‐occupied Libya, succeeded by Italo Gariboldi, and Petre Dumitrescu became the Romanian 3rd Army’s commanding officer. In Vichy France, the Brevet Sportif Populaire reorganized as Brevet Sportif National to oversee the issuance of official certifications to children between the age of 12 and 18 who wished to join a club.
1942: The Axis’s Krupp iron works and factories at Essen experienced an Allied bombing, wasting five civilians and leaving eleven wounded. The Axis’s main offensive against Taungoo, Burma commenced in the morning, striking northern, western, and southern sides of the city nearly simultaneously, and fierce house‐to‐house fighting would continue through the night. Axis submarine U‐552 attacked an Allied tanker one hundred kilometers southwest of Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada at 0413 hours, slaughtering fifty‐three but leaving four alive. At 0609 hours, U‐105 sank British tanker Narragansett four hundred miles east of Hampton Roads, Virginia, slaughtering all forty‐nine aboard. Far out to sea, 530 miles east of Newfoundland, U‐94 attacked British tanker Imperial Transport, causing the crew to temporarily relinquish ship.
1943: The Axis offensive at Bougainville in the Solomon Islands came to a halt, and the Spanish foreign ministry announced the closure of its border with France and stopped with refugee from cross into Spain without transit papers.
1944: One hundred eighty four Jews arrived at Auschwitz after the Axis arrested them from their hiding places in the Hague.
1945: An Axis V‐2 rocket hit Whitfield Street in St. Pancras, London in the late afternoon, massacring nine, seriously injuring forty‐six, and severely damaging the Whitfield Memorial Chapel at Tottenham Court Road. That evening, another rocket hit Broadfield Square in Enfield, London, slaughtering seven and seriously injuring one hundred. Apart from that, Maximilian von Weichs stepped down as the commanding officer of Armeegruppe F., and somebody received an order to destroy the facilities of Deutsche Werke Kiel before Allied capture, but the recipient disobeyed it. On Iwo Jima, Tadamichi Kuribayashi died, possibly through ritual suicide, no‐one ever found his body.
