On Thursday, U.S. SOUTHCOM Commander Gen. Francis L. Donovan met with the Colombian and Ecuadorian defense ministers in San Lorenzo, Ecuador. The trio agreed on a plan to significantly expand their military cooperation along the Ecuador-Colombia border, moving past episodic U.S.-partnered missions and toward sustained combined operations against groups Washington has designated as terrorist organizations. This development is significant because it occurs at the time U.S. military forces are already operating on the ground with Ecuadorian forces in Esmeraldas, with the precise manner of cooperation publicly unknown. Additionally, on Aug. 23, Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella announced all illegal armed and criminal groups will be classified and treated strictly as “terrorists” under a new “Comprehensive Security and Public Order Strategy,” further laying the groundwork for expanded military cooperation with the U.S. and Ecuador. The new U.S.-Colombian-Ecuadorian tripartite framework and broader commitments made at the recent Americas Counter Cartel Coalition (A3C) in Panama raise an even larger question: what types of U.S. military cooperation will occur across the Americas, and under what authorities?

The framework, in deepening the integration of U.S. military forces on land, may see those forces advising foreign military forces, participating in combined operational planning, and supporting or even participating in future combined patrols and lethal strikes inside Ecuadorian and Colombian territory, and potentially elsewhere in the region. The distinction is important because ‘security cooperation and security assistance’ can describe varying levels of activity, each governed by different authorities and with different levels of risk and consequences. U.S. military engagement with foreign security forces is best understood as four increasingly consequential forms of involvement, each with their own unique legal and political requirements and associated costs: training and equipping; advising and assisting; partner-enabled U.S. operations; and direct employment of U.S. forces. Training and equipping foreign security forces is the day-to-day practice of U.S. military security cooperation with foreign military forces. The purpose of the Global Train and Equip program is to conduct or support programs that provide training, services and equipment to the national security forces of foreign nations, with the goal of enhancing the capability of partner nations. The legislative authorities to provide such training include 10 U.S.C. 333 and require human rights vetting of foreign security forces under the Leahy Laws and inclusion of training components on the law of armed conflict, human rights, the rule of law, and civilian control of the military. The second, and deeper, level of partnership with foreign security forces is advise and assist. Such longer-term advisory teams were developed because shorter-duration Mobile Training Teams under traditional train-and-equip authorities “did not provide the continuity” nor customized solutions necessary to achieve strategic goals. The U.S. has previously created two such teams in Latin America: one in El Salvador in 1984 and one in Colombia in 2003. These activities are conducted under different authorities depending on the activity. Two examples are 10 U.S.C. 321 and 10 U.S.C. 322, if the primary purpose of the activity is training of U.S. Forces. The next level is partner-enabled U.S. operations. Under 10 U.S.C. 127e, the secretary of defense, with the concurrence of the U.S. ambassador or chief of mission in a given country, may provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals that support or facilitate authorized ongoing U.S. special operation forces to combat terrorism. At this level, the previously noted relationship is reversed, with foreign forces now supporting or facilitating a U.S. military operation. However, 10 U.S.C. 127e does not in itself provide the authority to introduce U.S. armed forces into hostilities; separate authorities, such as a specific Authorization for Use of Military Force, are required for that purpose. The highest, and most intense, level of interaction is direct U.S. force operational employment within a foreign country. Such operations may be conducted in accordance with Article II of the U.S. Constitution, which, under the War Powers Resolution of 1973, requires congressional notification within 48 hours after the employment of forces. A War Powers Resolution notification was made in September 2025 following the opening boat strike that preceded Operation Southern Spear, and in January 2026 for Operation Absolute Resolve in Venezuela.

Beginning on March 3, 2026, U.S. and Ecuadorian military forces launched joint operations, named “Operation Total Extermination”,

including a combined strike against Comandos de la Frontera inside Ecuadorian territory. On March 9th, the president notified Congress of the operation, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution.” The report was made under 50 U.S.C. §1543(a)(3) regarding substantial enlargement of U.S. forces already located in a foreign country, and not the §1543(a)(1) provision regarding introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities. On August 7, 2026, Ecuador’s Ministry of Defense announced, and posted photos from, Operation “Piraña del Norte,” in which Ecuadorian forces, with U.S. support, destroyed a clandestine facility in Esmeraldas; no War Powers Resolution notification specifically addressing that operation has yet been made public. With Colombia’s entry into the Shield of the Americas and plans to host a coalition intelligence and operational headquarters in Medellin, Ecuador’s expanding partnered military operations with U.S. forces, and the U.S. looking to operationalize its activities in the region, security cooperation relationships could span all four levels of categories and authorities, including combined military operations that may require additional War Powers Resolution notifications to Congress. The question remains: as the Trump administration seeks to expand U.S. joint military operations across Latin America, will it continue to rely on presidential war powers or seek congressional authorization?