I turned 39, and I had a great time enjoying some cigars and some Kraft burgers at Red Oak, our local American restaurant and lounge, and the missus and I are actually finally making it official: going down to the Xi'an Municipal People's Government Marriage Registration Office. Woohoo! Yeah, it's going to be great.

Also, dang, here in Xi'an we've had some insane weather this season. We've been consistently around 40°C, or like 100°F, across the entirety of the summer. It was brutal. And then suddenly, the first week of September, boom, right down to the 20°C, like 60s and 70s Fahrenheit, which, honestly, I'm all for.

I was really sick of the heat. And I love fall and winter, especially here in Shaanxi, which is really a great season in this province. Oh, and a little fun thing that's happened: I got dinner with one of my favorite fellow China podcasters and one of the inspirations for this podcast, Lazlo Montgomery, the host of the China History podcast. It was so much fun.

Let me tell you, Lazlo Montgomery is an absolute delight. He's a joy to be around. We talked for hours and had so much fun exploring the Muslim Quarter here in Xi'an. And, oh, I will be grabbing—next month I'll be grabbing dinner with Fred Engst too, since he'll be in town for the unveiling of a new statue of his parents here in Xi'an.

So how's about that? How's about that? All right, my friends, let's get into it. Let's get into it. So, in this episode, we'll be talking about something that I've been wanting to do for a while, and my fans, especially the Hoxhaist fans out there, have been wanting me to do for a while because it's actually a super important thing to talk about when discussing the international dimensions of the Cultural Revolution and Maoist China's broader relationship with the world during the Cold War.

You see, after the Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese didn't have much in the way of friends other than, like, pro-Beijing anti-revisionist parties around the world, you know, like the Communist Party of blah blah blah, Marxist-Leninist, or the, you know, Revolutionary Communist Party of blah blah blah. And, I mean, they had some ambivalent, ambiguous relationship with the North Vietnamese and North Korean ruling parties. But overall, China seemed isolated, with one tiny exception: a tiny place called the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.

Albania is 7,245 km, or 4,502 miles, away from Beijing, and is separated from China by almost the entire landmass of Eurasia, at only 28,000 km2, or 11,000 km2 large. Albania is smaller than Maryland. It's an itty-bitty place. In 1966, it only had 1.8 billion people, although its leader, Enver Hoxha, joked that along with the Chinese, Albania makes up one-eighth of humanity. Hahaha. Its major resources are oil, chromium, copper, nickel, coal, grapes, citrus fruits, and wheat. But due to tons of economic sanctions put upon them by both the Western and Eastern blocs, Albania greatly struggled to develop during the 1960s and 70s. Okay, so before we do anything, we need to do some background on socialist Albania.

The Albanians were really unique in that during World War II, the Communist Party of Albania and its Albanian National Liberation Army liberated their country from German and Italian occupation almost entirely alone. I mean, there was a little help from the Yugoslav partisans and the broader allies, maybe. But by the time the Soviets reached the Adriatic Sea in 1945, the Albanian communists had declared a People's Socialist Republic the year before.

Their leader was a charismatic and intelligent hardline Marxist-Leninist and faithful student of Stalin, named Enver Hoxha. And after the liberation of the—uh, after liberation, the Communist Party of Albania changed its name to the Party of Labor of Albania, or Partia Punes e Shqipërisë. Help, I don't speak Albanian. Let's just call it the PPSH. Throughout this episode, you might hear me refer to the party as the PPSH, and I do that to distinguish the Party of Labor of Albania from the People's Liberation Army of China.

So, shortly after Albania and China both established socialism, the Soviet-Yugoslav split occurred, and Hoxha was not about to let Tito and his revisionist clique try to dominate Albania. Indeed, Tito had actually hoped Albania would become a Yugoslav Republic. He firmly declared his allegiance to Stalin and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and on November 23, 1949, Albania and the newly born People's Republic of China recognized each other.

Although it would not be until 1954 that they would exchange ambassadors. During the 1950s, much like China, Albania required a lot of help from Soviet technicians, engineers, and specialists to help get their economy off the ground. That was until the 20th Congress of the CPSU, when Khrushchev denounced Stalin and began a series of economic reforms that would put the Soviet Union back on the road to capitalism.

Enraged, Hoxha and the PPSH railed against de Stalinization and declared themselves the sworn enemies of Soviet revisionism, refusing to follow the rest of the Eastern bloc on the road of market reform. In response, in the 1960s, the Soviets yanked all economic aid and assistance from Albania, and Albania became the sole Eastern Bloc people's democracy to side with Beijing in the Sino-Soviet split.

There was indeed a major struggle against a pro-Soviet faction within the PPSH too, with many former comrades and leadership being purged or sidelined for their sympathy with Khrushchev. And, um, across the Sino-Soviet split and the Cultural Revolution, Albania and China would be the closest of comrades in their fight against both Moscow and Washington.

In May 1966, a week after the May 16 circular started the Cultural Revolution in China, the Albanians sent a party delegation to Beijing, Shijiazhuang and Dazhai, to see how their Chinese comrades were doing in the realm of agriculture. The Albanians were seemingly only slightly aware, though, of the Cultural Revolution, with no official statement by that delegation in support of the new revolutionary movement.

Albania's engagement with the Cultural Revolution really started a month later, when Premier Zhou Enlai went to the Albanian capital of Tirana for an official state visit, from June 24 to June 28, 1966.

Zhou's arrival in Albania was met with extraordinary enthusiasm, marked by mass welcome rallies attended by over 100,000 people, a testament to the warmth of the fraternal bond between the two countries. Albanian leaders consistently extended very flamboyant and grand welcomes to Chinese delegations. Indeed, you know, during his stay, Zhou engaged in very exp— not expensive— extensive discussions with top Albanian leaders, including Enver Hoxha and Premier Mehmet Shehu.

One of the key agenda items actually included Mao Zedong's Ten Theses on the Work in the Village, which was a document that underscored the ongoing and serious class struggle within China. And the Albanians, in turn, reaffirmed that Mao was a great philosopher and that it was imperative to unite against the dangers of Soviet-style revisionism.

And it's really interesting to really look at the Wilson Center archives, because if you look at all the transcripts of the meetings of, you know, in 1966 between the Albanians and the Chinese, you really see how, like, deeply into theory they are. Like, they've— you can definitely tell that this isn't just, like, realpolitik or, like, just some official window dressing.

Like, these guys take Marxist theory very seriously, and the Chinese and Albanians were in complete agreement that while Joseph Stalin had made errors, it would be strategically wrong to publicly proclaim it, and underscored their shared commitment to defending Stalin's legacy against de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union.

And after Zhou's visit, China maintained a consistent, invisible presence in Albania throughout the Cultural Revolution. Chinese economic experts, friendship tours, international exchange students, and high-level delegations continuously visited the country, reinforcing bilateral ties across the ten years of the Cultural Revolution.

And these exchanges spanned various sectors, including the party, government, youth league, journalists, trade unions, archivist delegations. And, you know, Enver Hoxha really, you know, demonstrated the importance of the Chinese delegations by personally welcoming all first, second, and third-level Chinese delegations. I mean, that probably kept him pretty busy.

And the Chinese and Albania Friendship Association began to send cultural troupes between the two nations. I've seen a really interesting video from late 1966, where an Albanian girl in traditional ethnic Albanian costume is singing a song titled "The People of the World Love Chairman Mao," in Albanian and Mandarin. I think you can see it, if I recall, it's on the website of Carma Hinton's documentary, Morning Sun: A Film About Cultural Revolution.

At morningsun.org, you can find a small clip of this performance you can dig about around for it. On September 30, 1966, Premier Mehmet Shehu returned the favor to the Chinese by heading a senior delegation from the PPSH and the Albanian government to meet with Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai again. The discussions encompassed a wide range of critical topics, including the Cultural Revolution, the state of bilateral relations, and unmasking of traitors within both communist parties.

Shehu notably drew parallels between Chinese figures like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, and Albanian figures like Koçi Xoxe or Xhemere Dishnica, providing detailed accounts of Xoxe's alleged attempts to undermine the PPSH.

The next day, the Albanians enjoyed being on the Tiananmen roaster to oversee the National Day parade and the Red Guard rally that evening. Upon their return home, Albanian party cadres began to discuss Mao's new policies through the ranks of the Albanian masses.

However, it should be noted that Mao's theories were still disseminated by the Party of Labor and its mass organizations like the Democratic Front of Albania. There was no organic, spontaneous, quote-unquote, "Albanian Maoism" that would permeate Albanian society, à la Maoism among, you know, radicals in Western countries.

There would be no, you know, Gauche Proletariat, like in France, or the, you know, Revolutionary Union in the United States. That just would not happen. So, at a meeting in Shanghai in the late summer of '67, two Albanian PPSH cadres were sent by Hoxha to request an Albanian translation of The Little Red Book. Mao gave them permission, saying, "See if you find my quotations useful."

He added, "Chinese experience may serve other countries, but they must judge this for themselves." Funnily enough, Mao said, "Personally, I find the quotations book worthless," and nothing more than a collection of materials with historical insights into China. He even advised the Albanians to prioritize the publication of quotations from classical Marxist thinkers such as Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin instead.

The Albanian delegates, who were reportedly utterly baffled by Mao's remarks, nevertheless reiterated the utmost political importance of Mao's quotations for their country, reflecting their strong desire to adhere to Beijing's friendship. Upon the release of The Little Red Book across Albania, The Voice of the People newspaper wrote an editorial entitled, "In Albanian: Chairman Mao's Quotations, a Great and Precious Gift from the Fraternal Chinese People."

A week later, East German diplomats in Tirana reported that a Chinese professor was already teaching Mao's quotations at Tirana University. And what's very interesting is that, well, and I really wanted—I'm really excited to talk about this—is that the Albanians did not just disseminate the works of Mao Zedong. Hoxha really took it upon himself to partially replicate the Chinese experience with his very own ideological and cultural revolution initiated in May of '66.

Although it was really in '67 that it really started, you know, really taking off. So, in February of 1967, Hoxha declared Albania to be the first atheist state in history and called for a campaign to dismantle all religious institutions in the country. He appointed his missions to be carried out by his own version of the Red Guards, dubbed the Albanian Youth. And the ideological and cultural revolution had a curious beginning.

Originally, Hoxha had declared in 1961 that internal economic and social conditions for the restoration of capitalism had now been eliminated in Albania, and that the class structure was no longer necessary within the party or society. However, upon the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in China, Hoxha abruptly reversed this summation and seemingly changed ideological course entirely.

The Albanian Cultural Revolution started with a notable number of reforms: the abolition of ranks in the military, reintroduction of political commissars into the Albanian People's Army, sending mid to high-level officials to work in factories and fields, collectivization of the remaining remote mountain areas that still had private ownership, and a concentrated effort to stamp out foreign media.

And what's interesting is the ideological and cultural revolution was very mainly characterized by its anti-religious aspect. One study showed that within the month of May '67, 2,169 religious objects were destroyed and violated or converted into other usages. This figure includes 600 monasteries and 327 buildings of the Catholic Church.

Ironically, this is around the time the Chinese authorities actually began to discourage the Red Guards from destroying ancient temples, relics, and the other symbols of the old world. Because, remember, in May of '67, the Party Center put out the order to protect cultural relics. And that's when you really see the definitive end of the destroy the old world campaign. Hoxha, though, at that time had really begun his own campaign of wiping away the old Albania.

In his own variation of Mao's theory of the role of the superstructure in the process of a cultural revolution, the Albanian government decreed the superstructure must get rid of all retrograde things and foreign elements.

In other words, Hoxha justified it with the inappropriateness of the basis within the superstructure. And Albania became very notable because it was such a militant anti-religious campaign. They even had a museum of atheism in Tirana, where a former church was turned into a national museum devoted to ridiculing the old religious order.

Despite the inspiration of the Cultural Revolution in China, the Albanian Cultural Revolution never really reached the massive scale of the former. The Albanian Youth were only used to attack religious institutions and already toppled landlords. And there really was no mass, spontaneous workers or women's organizations that particularly aided the attack on the old society.

And unlike the People's Liberation Army in China, the Albanian People's Army was consigned mainly to the background, acting as something to be transformed rather than a tool with which to transform.

Although a $200 billion loan from the Chinese in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was a major injection of life into the Albanian People's Army, who then used the funds to update their technology and engage in massive amounts of defense research.

In the end, it was a top—the ideological and cultural revolution was very much a top-down initiative orchestrated primarily by Hoxha and the Central Committee of the PPSH and the Democratic Front of Albania.

My former professor, Isa Blumi, an Albanian-American historian of the Balkans, says that the ideological and cultural revolution was launched for more calculated and pragmatic reasons than the ideological conviction that Mao held, which caused him to launch the Chinese Cultural Revolution. But I'm sure that my Hoxhaist listeners would vehemently disagree. I don't know. I'd love to hear your thoughts.

Isa Blumi further writes in his substantial article about the ideological and cultural revolution, Hoxha's class war, that initially subtle criticism of the work of enterprise directors found its way into the public. And while this sounds like the workplace denunciation seen in the Cultural Revolution in China, the criticism in Albania were directed strictly through party-led trade unions, and the vocabulary of party line was far more prevalent than the Chinese vocabulary of mass line.

Instead of Maoist bombarding the headquarters to transform the party, Hoxha wanted to concentrate on creating a, quote-unquote, "new man" out of the Albanian working class, transforming the people themselves. The party transforming the people. The ideological and cultural revolution copied the cultural revolution's dazibao, or big character posters, by creating fletërrufe, or wall newspaper, but only used them for propaganda, sloganeering and targeting of misguided citizens.

On the 9th of April, 1968, a call for new workers' committees, à la the revolutionary committees in China, was released by the PPSH. However, by the end of 1969, the Party of Labor pulled the plug on the workers' committees because they felt that the Soviet-era managers, who Hoxha characterized as the revisionist class in Albania, had been decisively pushed from power.

This brought about a notable doctrinal difference between the Albanian Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Compared to the Albanian view that all contradiction had ceased, the Chinese believed that capitalist roaders had to be consistently fought until communism was achieved due to old ideas having the ability to regenerate in society and in the party.

Anti-revisionism outside of the PPSH ranks, like, you know, specifically Maoist anti-revisionists, was decisively impossible. Hoxha said that even if demanded by our Chinese comrades, there was to be no independent pro-Beijing activity in Albania.

Like I said before, there really was never an organic Albanian Maoism, so to speak. Any Maoist works or propaganda material from China was to be solely distributed by Albanian authorities.

This stringent handling of ideology in broader society was seen by Hoxha as a way of making sure that Sino-Albanian anti-revisionism would stay on its intended course at all times.

Unfortunately for Hoxha, in my personal opinion as a Maoist, he made a fatal error of not waging cultural revolution primarily on his opponents in the party itself, but rather on aspects of Albanian culture that had already been stripped of their power by the foundation of the People's Socialist Republic.

At the end of the ideological and cultural revolution in November 1969, a high-level Chinese party and government delegation, led by Li Xiannian, member of the Politburo and vice premier, and he eventually became president of China under Deng Xiaoping, and Li Desheng, alternate member of the Politburo, visited Albania.

The primary purpose of this visit was to participate in the celebrations marking the 25th anniversary of Albania's liberation and the victory of its People's Revolution. The visit was highlighted by a grand military review and mass parade in Tirana, as well as one in Beijing, both of which served to publicly underscore the robust military and political alignment between the two nations.

The Chinese leaders conveyed their warmest greetings to Albania, and cultural exchanges were promoted through events such as Albanian Film Week, organized by the Sino-Albanian Friendship Association in China. And this period was characterized by propaganda really emphasizing the eternal and unbreakable friendship between the two peoples.

And, you know, speaking of the Albanian Film Festival, it really is amazing just how much cultural exchange happened between those two countries. There was a yearly Albanian art exhibition at the National Museum of China in Beijing every November. Dancing and theater troupes were frequently exchanged between the two countries.

Ping-pong tournaments were held quite often during the Cultural Revolution. When it comes to Albanian-Chinese friendship, though, the one thing I unfortunately couldn't find a lot of information about in English or even in Chinese—sorry, once again, like I said, I don't read a lick of Albanian—there was stuff about Albanian expats in China.

Maybe, maybe I can find some stuff about that before our upcoming episodes on expats, tourists, and defectors in China, which will guest star Fred Engst during the Cultural Revolution coming up in December. Anyways, back to the story.

However, unfortunately, the early 1970s marked a significant turning point in Sino-Albanian relations. As China's evolving foreign policy began to clash with Albania's rigid ideological stances, leading—it led to the emergence of definite strains.

The visit of Henry Kissinger to China in July of 1971, followed by the public visit of President Richard Nixon in '72, caused profound apprehension in Tirana.

Hoxha dispatched a harsh and rude letter on August 6, 1971, directly urging China not to proceed with Nixon's visit, clearly articulating the depth of his ideological opposition to any rapprochement with the capitalist West.

The impact in Tirana was described as having, quote-unquote, "apocalyptic dimensions," according to some bourgeois Western scholars and some cables from the U.S. State Department.

Reflecting this profound dissatisfaction, Albanian newspapers and radio stations notably did not report Nixon's visit to China in 1972.

Compounding Albanian distrust, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai informed the Albanian ambassador in Beijing about Kissinger's secret visit, but conspicuously said no word why this had been kept secret from Albania.

Nevertheless, despite the emerging cracks between the two, Albania continued to definitely play a crucial role in China's international standing, particularly concerning its UN representation.

Even as the ideological beef began to surface, Albania maintained its unwavering diplomatic support for China on the world stage.

Albania had consistently sponsored resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly since 1963, advocating for the People's Republic of China's admission and the expulsion of the Republic of China in Taiwan.

This persistent advocacy culminated on October 25, 1971, when the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758, co-sponsored by Albania and 22 other nations.

The resolution recognized the PRC as the only legitimate representative of China and mandated the expulsion of the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek. This was a monumental diplomatic victory for China, and it was really—they couldn't have done it without Albania. They really can't, couldn't. In the months leading up to the historic UN vote, Albanian Foreign Minister Nesti Nase engaged in critical coordination with Chinese officials.

On June 15, 1971, Nase informed Zhou Enlai about the specific diplomatic steps Albania intended to undertake to facilitate China's recognition in the UN. Subsequently, Albanian diplomat Sokrat Plaka traveled to Tirana to coordinate the strategy Albania would employ at the General Assembly, informing the Chinese counselor in Tirana about the preparatory work for the resolution.

It was tireless work behind the scenes, and we really, like I said, we really got to give it to Albania, the props for all that they did for China at the time. So, you know, right on Nesti and Sokrat, that was a Brosef move.

In November of 1972, a high-level Albanian military delegation, led by Minister of National Defense Beqir Balluku, visited China. The delegation included key military officials responsible for various weapon types within the Albanian People's Army.

The primary objective of this visit was to request substantial military assistance from the Chinese government, as the Albanian People's Army was kind of in a rough place. It was still relying on a lot of outdated World War II Soviet armaments, despite recent advances in technology, you know, during—thanks to the 1968 and 1969 Chinese loans.

Balluku presented a detailed request for modern infantry weapons, various types of artillery, including long-range and self-propelled systems, reactive artillery, anti-tank missiles, coastal artillery modernization, including radio locators and surface-to-surface missiles for the, you know, this was all going to be used in the famous bunkers that lined the coast of Albania, and of course, significant quantities of ammunition.

Albania's defense was particularly vulnerable in terms of air defense, and it really faced complete air supremacy from surrounding powers. So they really needed anti-aircraft artillery and missile systems on their coastline and in the highlands, hence more guns for the bunkers.

While the immediate outcomes of these specific military requests were not explicitly detailed in the documents I read so far, it seems China's economic aid to Albania was granted then, but seriously declined after 1973. This time also witnessed the widening of ideological rifts and the emergence of significant policy differences between Beijing and Tirana.

Beyond the Nixon visit, Albania also expressed strong disapproval of the emerging Three Worlds theory, viewing it as another significant deviation from orthodox Marxist-Leninist principles. From Tirana's perspective, this theory signaled a further move by China towards aligning with American imperialism.

The shift in Chinese foreign policy contributed to growing friction within the alliance. And I do want to say we will be talking a lot about the nuances of Chinese foreign policy in the early '70s, both the good things and the bad things about it, in upcoming episodes.

China began to renew diplomatic relations with Titoite Yugoslavia, and while still continuing to denounce Yugoslavia as state capitalist and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia as a revisionist party, they began to, quote-unquote, "voice Yugoslavs' concerns regarding internal Albanian politics" and exerted pressure on Albania to tone down the aggressive anti-Yugoslav narrative. This was completely unacceptable for Enver, who in response intensified his anti-Tito rhetoric.

This perceived Chinese meddling in Albania's internal affairs caused a great deal of tension and also included some purges within the PPSH apparatus and the Albanian People's Army. Indeed, you see a lot of purges within the Albanian cultural, military, and economic establishments between '73 and '76.

In October of 1974, Albania had already made a substantial request for financial assistance from China, seeking 5 billion yuan in loans, a postponement of loan repayments from 1976 to 1980, and direct grain and oil assistance.

However, the period from 1975 until Mao's death witnessed a significant deterioration in Sino-Albanian relations. And it's really shocking to me because, from what I read, it really marked a pronounced decrease in high-level exchanges and state visits, and a lot of decreased amount of friendship, activism, and work, and escalation of public disputes.

By mid-'76, Sino-Albanian relations had, according to the U.S. State Department and CIA spy reports, plummeted to an unprecedented low. Zhou Enlai was dead and Mao was failing in health, and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was now firmly controlled by revisionists and rightists within the Communist Party of China.

State visits were almost now entirely nonexistent, reflecting a growing estrangement between the two former allies. Public expressions of solidarity, once a hallmark of the alliance, waned considerably.

When Chairman Mao died on September 9, 1976, the Albanian government sent a statement to their Chinese comrades eulogizing him as "a great revolutionary" and ordered three days of official mourning in the country. However, Tirana pointedly neglected to endorse Huo Guofeng and his anti-Gang of Four campaigns, and publicly denounced Deng Xiaoping.

In a telling sign of cooling relations, Albanian leaders' speeches at the National Assembly in December 1976 conspicuously omitted any attention or mention of China or its new leadership. Furthermore, Albanian mass media refrained from giving information about the latest events in China.

This demonstrated a clear ideological break with China's post-Mao leadership, which was perceived as deviating from true Marxist-Leninist principles. The deepening friction was also evident in practical terms. By the end of December 1976, the two sides were unable to sign a protocol relating to the next exchange of goods for 1977, and a complete and open breakdown in economic cooperation occurred.

Rumors also began to circulate that Albania had requested the withdrawal of Chinese technical experts from the country—with evidence suggesting these technicians were indeed returning home, albeit allegedly for vacation. By the summer of 1977, Tirana newspapers had escalated their public criticism, openly accusing China of opportunism and flagrant departures from the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. And a flurry of polemics occurred.

The Sino-Albanian split, which was formally declared in 1978 with the termination of Chinese assistance, was a grave cataclysm situation for the PPSH leadership and Albanian socialism. Mao's death removed Albania's main benefactor, and the ascendancy of Huo Guofeng, a rightist in the party who had ended the cultural revolution and was keen on instituting market reforms, coupled with the purge of the Gang of Four, further alienated the Albanians.

The Sino-Albanian split, however, was marked by a very dramatic retconning, retroactive continuity of sorts.

Unlike the Soviet-Albanian split of 1956, where Hoxha declared that Stalin was a great revolutionary, who had been posthumously usurped by Khrushchev, and unlike many Maoist parties, for example, the Communist Party of Peru, Communist Party of the Philippines, Revolutionary Communist Party USA, who maintained loyalty to Mao and the Gang Of Four, but denounced the Hua and Deng administrations as having restored capitalism, or some of the very few pro-Beijing parties that stayed loyal to Hua and Deng, like the Communist Party Marxist-Leninist USA and the Communist Party of Australia Marxist-Leninist,

Hoxha and the Albanians, as well as many anti-revisionist Marxist-Leninist parties who sided with the Albanians in the split, made a very dramatic announcement.

They declared that, in fact, Mao had been a revisionist all along, and that, in fact, China had never been socialist. In 1978, Hoxha published "Imperialism and the Revolution," which was mostly an analysis of imperialism after the death of Lenin, but the second half of the book was a stormy polemic against Mao Zedong Thought as an anti-Marxist theory and claimed that China had always been a chauvinistic power within the socialist bloc, and that Mao had plotted to transform China into a new social imperial superpower like the Soviet Union.

In 1979, Hoxha published his "Reflections on China," a two-volume series of supposed diaries that he kept chronicling his secret opposition to and struggle against Mao across the 1960s and '70s. Although many historians believe that there is no evidence that these diaries actually existed prior to 1979, and Issa Blumi once outright told me in a class I had with him that he considers them a post-Mao fabrication.

But who knows? What do you guys think? Was Hoxha a steadfast opponent of Mao all along, or did he need to justify his gear shift in an opportunist way? Let me know in the comments or on Twitter or on our podcast Discord chat. Read what Hoxha said and get back to me on it. I want to hear you decide for yourselves. So while the pro-Deng camp within the pro-China parties and movements seem very quiet in their response to Enver Hoxha, Peking Review doesn't seem to really have much to say about Hoxha's late '70s theoretical works and his actions in the 1980s. I know that the orthodox Maoists hit back at Hoxha pretty hard with a flurry of more polemics.

The RCP USA published in its theoretical journal, "Beat Back: The Dogmatic Revisionist Attack on Mao Zedong Thought," comments on Enver Hoxha's imperialism and the revolution. The Communist Workers' League of Germany posted, "Hoxha vs. Mao Zedong: Defend Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought," and the Ceylon Communist Party released "Enver Hoxha Refuted."

Enver Hoxha died on April 11, 1984, but by that time, the three-way split between the Hoxhaists, the Maoists, and the Dengists was irreparable, and Albania stayed hostile to both the People's Republic of China and the Marxist-Leninist forces around groups like the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement until the collapse of socialist Albania in 1991.

And the rest, they say, is history. All right, y'all, and with that, how about we put a bookmark in the story and we will continue onward this October with our next chronological episode in which we will explore the year 1970, during which Mao and Lin Biao clash at the Lushan Conference, and the contradictions between the two come to the surface in a way that will eventually lead to the dramatic Lin Biao incident. You don't want to miss the next one, y'all. So until next time, from the ancient city of Xi'an, formerly the Han and Tang capital of Chang'an, zàjiàn!