It is a super important detail, but it's still unforgivable for an app that expects privacy to be part of its brand identity.

No your don't understand, you're supposed to encrypt the keys.

Then you encrypt that key

And then that key

Until it's all encrypted /s

opportunistic TPM integration would be nice.

I.e. use the security chip of the device, if one is found. Otherwise use password.

OR use a Nitrokey etc, which can act as a secure device to store these keys too.

Take that, Windows. You dont need a builtin TPM if you can use a Nitrokey 3 with a secure element, externally.

Yeah but it really shouldn't be that way. Just add a pin or something, it's way too easy for people to just grab devices or install malware to leak keys. The current standard for security is that everything is encrypted at rest regardless of whole disk encryption.

Signal is still better that most of the stuff out there but it's not above well intentioned criticism

Some way to encrypt the decryption key.

This could also mean TPM + Pin. Or using a Nitrokey, externally, which stores the password to decrypt the decryption key.

That is how user account unlocking (on GrapheneOS with Pixel phones) is done.

With what? Where would you store the encryption key for the encryption key on a desktop system where it would not be accessible to an attacker?

Perhaps there could be a pin or password that must be entered every time to decrypt it into memory.

Yo dawg

You could archive chats encrypted too.

"if you've lost physical security, you've lost all security."

It originally needed a phone number because it was originally a phone texting app.

You have the source. Read it if you want.

I don't think it is a honeypot per se can you supply evidence.

But yes, their "leadership" does appear to ensure that this thing never goes mainstream with their focus on "journalists" or whatever. Exec does not seem to understand the core use base at best.