submitted 5 days ago* (last edited 5 days ago) by to c/philosophy@hexbear.net
 

I have noticed a mentality that a lot of people have, a thought-terminating mentality that I will refer to here as the "consensus-divining rod."

A person who uses the consensus-divining rod does not believe things because they investigated them, examined the evidence, developed some understanding of the subject (whether a simple, abstract, high-level understanding or a detailed, academic understanding), and were convinced by what they found.

Rather, they believe things by looking to see which way the wind is blowing in the institutional "consensus." What do most people say? The thought never even crosses their mind to ask why people believe what they believe. They simply look at the dominant viewpoint within dominant institutions and treat its dominance as proof that it is correct.

Let's say someone believes X, so you ask them, "Why do you believe X?" They respond, "Because it is the institutional consensus."

You say, "Okay, maybe it is. But what if I disagree with that consensus, and here are some good reasons why I think it is wrong? How would you respond to that?"

Their response is almost always the same.

They completely ignore the substance of your argument and instead demand evidence that a large number of people within dominant institutions disagree with X, either a majority or at least a substantial minority. If you cannot provide such evidence, they dismiss your ideas without ever engaging with their substance. They will often resort to personal attacks, calling you crazy for holding a different view.

This mentality does not come up only when you argue against what someone considers the dominant consensus. It also appears when someone asks a genuine question about a widely accepted viewpoint because they want to learn more about it and understand it.

For example, suppose I also believe in X, which happens to be the dominant viewpoint within the relevant institutions. A third party has just learned about X and has some questions. They ask an honest question about it.

The consensus-diviner will not actually answer the question, because they do not even know why they believe in X in the first place. They might point out that the question should not be taken seriously because it challenges the consensus. They might even insult the person for daring to question it.

I encountered an example of this recently on r/AskPhysics. Someone posted a peer-reviewed paper from a legitimate academic journal that appeared to reach a conclusion contrary to a long-standing belief: that a local system cannot violate Bell inequalities. The person simply asked how the paper could have reached this conclusion if the conclusion was supposedly "known" to be wrong.

The thread had dozens of responses, yet not a single one offered a substantive analysis of the paper. The top-voted response essentially said that the paper contradicted the consensus and that its author was not famous, so it must be wrong.

Many other replies were outright insulting, claiming that the person clearly knew nothing about the subject if they did not understand that the paper was "obviously" wrong.

So I read the paper myself, and I did find what I believed to be an error. The paper appeared to confuse a Pearson correlation coefficient with the Bell correlator, then used the wrong quantity in its calculations. Consequently, it incorrectly concluded that it had violated the Bell inequality.

I posted my mathematical analysis explaining why I thought the paper was wrong. In the same post, I also called out the subreddit for attacking the person, downvoting them, and making vague appeals to the "consensus" without actually examining the paper's substance.

Clearly, the person had come to the subreddit because they wanted a substantive answer, not personal attacks and vague appeals to the consensus as a divining rod for determining why the paper was wrong.

Guess what happened? The moderators swiftly permanently banned me.

My comment was the only one in the entire thread that actually examined the mathematics and explained, substantively, why the paper was wrong. Yet I was permanently banned for criticizing what I saw as an absurd display of groupthink and dogpiling.

I encounter this mentality in every field, not just physics.

Consider economics. China, one of the largest economies on Earth, is governed by a Communist Party, and certain varieties of Marxist economics have consequently played a significant role in its academic institutions. There are entire economics textbooks devoted to these traditions.

Suppose you read one of these textbooks, find some of its arguments interesting, and ask someone outside China what they think of one particular argument. They may simply dismiss it because it does not reflect the dominant economic views in their country. Some may immediately treat you as a crank or a crackpot without ever addressing why the argument is supposedly wrong.

This also shows up, of course, in philosophy. Most academics believe in the "hard problem of consciousness." Personally, I think there is a fatal flaw in Chalmers' argument, that it relies on an axiom that I, personally, find to be entirely unconvincing. Very rarely, however, can I have a genuine conversation with a person about this. If I point out that I disagree with the problem because I disagree with this axiom used to derive it, I am called a crackpot and a crazy person for daring to not believe in the "hard problem of consciousness," that it is just an established fact.

People will then assume that, because I questioned it, I must simply not understand the "consensus," so they will tell me to go read the Wikipedia page or some philosophy encyclopedia and then I'll "understand." I try to explain to them that I already understand it, I've read all those and far more, and I'm saying I don't believe in it because I disagree with this axiom, and if you think the axiom is correct, please tell me why you think my criticism of it is wrong. They, again, won't address my point, but will just express bewilderment that I don't already agree with the consensus, and will continue to treat me as a stupid person who just don't know anything and hasn't researched anything for saying I disagree with it.

Even if you think I'm wrong... tell me why I'm wrong? Otherwise, my mind won't change.

This mindset is also widespread in politics. Most countries have an Overton window: a range of political positions considered acceptable or reasonable within mainstream discourse. If your opinion falls outside that window, you will often find that people refuse to engage with the substance of your argument. Instead, they express bafflement that you could hold such a position in the first place.

I do not know about other people, but for me, belief is not really a choice. I believe things because I am convinced of them, and I am convinced of them because I have seen, read, or heard an argument that made sense to me. At least in the way my own mind works, the consensus-divining rod cannot, by itself, lead me to believe something.

Of course, we cannot be experts in every field. But I do not spend my time thinking about every field, either. Most of what biologists do, for example, never even crosses my mind.

However, if some specific aspect of biology becomes particularly relevant to me, then I will research it enough to develop a basic understanding of why biologists hold the position they do. I want to understand it well enough that, if someone asks me why I believe that position, I can give them an answer that makes sense and reflects the reasoning that convinced me.

If I genuinely believe that position is correct and someone challenges it with an argument, I should be able to explain why I think their argument is wrong, at least to the extent of my understanding. I should not simply dismiss them as a crank for disagreeing with the consensus.

If someone presents an argument against a position I have never researched, I will simply admit that I do not know enough to respond. I will not immediately Google what most people believe and then attack the person for disagreeing with it.

When I bring up consensus, it is to make a different point: "Most people disagree with what you are saying, so how do you respond to their arguments?"

In other words, I use consensus as an invitation to explain a substantive disagreement, not as a reason to dismiss someone immediately as wrong.

This approach is also useful when dealing with people who use what I would call the "anti-consensus-divining rod." These people mindlessly believe whatever is opposite to the consensus. They also fail to provide substantive arguments, instead launching into irrelevant rants about institutions and their supposed corruption or incompetence.

Asking for a substantive response is therefore a useful way to determine whether a critic actually has reasons for their position or is simply reacting against whatever the mainstream believes.

If their argument intrigues me, I will research the topic further. I want to understand where they are coming from, or discover whether their argument is obviously mistaken and has already been addressed in the relevant literature.

If the argument does not interest me, I will simply move on. I will not attack someone for rejecting a consensus on a subject I know virtually nothing about, especially when I cannot even formulate a surface-level argument explaining why I think they are wrong.

I think if you find yourself behaving this way, you really need to reflect on that. Rather than attacking someone, use it as a learning opportunity. Actually do some research and figure out why, the people in these institutions, actually say that. You might learn something new, and grow as a person, rather than just being an asshole. Then, the next time you encounter a person saying something similar, you could actually explain to them why they are wrong.

Indeed, even if the person is obviously wrong and believes something obviously silly, the issue is, people have a tendency to interpret dishonesty as evidence they are right. If they were wrong, you could address their questions in an honest fashion. If you are incredibly intellectually dishonest, don't address the substance of what they say, and just hurl personal attacks, they will interpret that as evidence they are right, because why would you so desperately avoid addressing their actual argument if it was wrong?

The results of that behavior is that, yes, you and your friends might have enjoyed dogpiling on a person and belittling them, but the person themselves will probably walk away from that conversation more confident in their beliefs than ever, because they just put a challenge to a whole group of people, and not a single person could answer the challenge and give a substantive counterargument.

Ask yourself: what is your goal? Is your goal to actually change the person's mind, or just boost your own ego by hurting someone else? Because, it clearly does not achieve the former.

So, again, I implore you, if you are engaging in this kind of thought-terminating behavior:

  1. Stop and ask yourself why you are doing it, what is your motivation, etc, are you really trying to change the person's mind?

  2. Could you instead take this moment as a learning opportunity to research why you believe in this thing in the first place, so that you can actually learn something new and grow as a person, who can then defend that viewpoint on the grounds of substance next time it is challenged?

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[–] [S] 9 points 4 days ago* (10 children)

The Chalmerite definition of "consciousness" is quite strange because it strips out from the definition anything any normal person would consider "consciousness," basically erasing all mental problems. It has nothing to do with self-awareness, cognition, intelligence, etc. He reduces consciousness down to just what we observe ("experience" or "perceive", which I am using all three as synonyms), but most normal people would just consider what we observe to be reality, and not consciousness at all.

Of course, he doesn't do this in a vacuum, there are other philosophers who have tried to establish that what we observe is not reality. Most people seem to find these arguments convincing, but I do not. I would recommend you read Benoist's book Toward a Contextual Realism, as well Alexander Bogdanov's book The Philosophy of Living Experience. What both books have in common is that they criticize the idea that the common arguments against direct realism actually work (i.e. arguments from illusions, dreams, etc), and thus defend a direct realist position.

Indeed, the moment I say this, you are probably thinking in your head some "obvious" argument to debunk direct realism, but before posting it as an "obvious" debunk, I would implore that you actually read their books, because they almost certainly address that specific argument already.

If what we observe is just reality, then it is not "subjective," nor is it "objective," nor is it "mental." Reality just is what it is.

Physics cannot derive reality because physics is a description of reality. A description is always categorically different from that which it is describing. There is no "gulf" between the two which implies a distance that could be crossed. There is no distance. They are not even categorically the same thing at all. It is incorrect to think, for example, if you create a better scientific description of fire, it becomes "closer" to a real fire. That is not how it works. No sufficiently detailed description of fire will have the paper it is written upon suddenly burst into flames as it becomes a real fire, one with real brightness where you can really feel its warmth.

Description of reality, and reality, are always distinct categories. It is like the old saying, "don't confuse the map for the territory." You cannot expect a description of reality to become reality. The mathematical models of the material sciences are descriptions of reality, they are the maps, and what we observe is the territory, it is reality. The former cannot "become" the latter. It is nonsensical to demand that, but this is precisely what Chalmers demands when he says a materialist must derive "experience" from the physical models.

In a direct realist framework, you simply cannot even formulate Chalmers' demand in a way that is coherent at all, as it always comes out looking clearly like an absurd demand. To defend it, you have to justify abandoning a direct realist framework, and, again, I would implore you to read those authors, because, in my view, there is no convincing argument to abandon a direct realist framework.

For example, here are briefly some of the major arguments in favor of indirect realism and why I find indirect realism still to be unconvincing:

  1. It confuses interpretation for observation. It claims because we misinterpreted what we perceived, that means we perceived something "false." And if what we perceive can be "false," then clearly what we perceive is not reality. This is the form that arguments from illusions and dreams take on. Interpretation and observation ("experience" / "perception") are not the same things. The former requires a level of cognitive processing, whereas the latter does not. Misinterpreting what you observe does not prove you observed something falsely, only that you interpreted it falsely. As Benoist would say, it makes no sense to even apply the category of truth or falsity to reality. Reality just is what it is.
  2. It confuses subjectivity for contextuality. It claims that because we see two different things, if we are looking at it from different contexts, then that proves what we perceive is subject-dependent, in the sense that it is not reducible beyond the conscious subject. However, we can also just say that it is context-dependent; i.e., the way reality realizes itself is not reducible beyond the context of its realization. The subject is not fundamental here; the subjects are just viewing reality from two different contexts, so they of course perceive different things.
  3. It tries to argue that if the brain plays a role in what we perceive, then what we perceive must lie outside of reality. But this is a complete non-sequitur. The brain is part of reality, and anything the brain does is a real process taking place in reality, so how on earth does real + real = not real? There is just no logical connection from the premise to the conclusion. What we perceive is still real: that reality may something require taking into account the brain to explain, but you cannot explain what we perceive just by taking into account the brain on its own, either. You have to take into account many other things as well, so it seems arbitrary to even single out the brain. The air in the room mediates what we perceive before we perceive it, so why doesn't this supposed "consciousness" (the claim that what we perceive is a separate substance from reality itself) start with the air in the room, and rather than with my brain?
  4. It confuses different kinds of "indirectness." We can separate indirectness into three different categories: tool-indirectness, counterfactual-indirectness, and transcendental-indirectness. The first is the idea that to observe something, we do so indirectly with a tool. Counterfactual-indirectness says that we can infer something exist without directly measuring it with a chain of inference that ends in a counterfactual whereby we say, if we were in the room, we could have observed this or that. Transcendental-indirectness is the claim that everything we perceive "transcends" reality in the sense that it is all indirect and no direct observation of reality is ever possible. Indirect realism is the last category, but indirect realists often try to use arguments regarding tool-indirectness or counterfactual-indirectness as justification for transcendental-indirectness, which is a non-sequitur. Whether or not we perceive all of reality with our naked eyes is an entirely separate question as to whether or not what we do perceive is reality. Both tool-indirectness and counterfactual-indirectness rely, in their construction, in the assumption that you can observe reality. Transcendental-indirectness is distinct in that it is the only one which denies this. (There are different kinds of direct realists, and some would go as far as to also deny tool-indirectness and counterfactual-indirectness, but that is not a requirement of direct realism.)
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  • [–] 1 point 2 days ago (1 child)

    I'm actually quite sympathetic to direct realism, and I agree that it tends to be dismissed much too hastily by professional philosophy. That said, I'm struggling to see a tension between that position and the standard (what you're calling "Chalmerite") account of consciousness. The standard view doesn't dismiss stuff like intelligence or cognition, but rather just (very plausibly) separates those capacities from the experiential aspect of consciousness (qualia). While I don't think tht whole p-zombie line of argument is especially convincing, I do think it is useful to be able to distinguish between things like intentionality and qualitative experience. Of course, in minds like ours all of this comes as part of a package, but I see no reason to think that minds like ours occupy the whole of the space of all possible minds, and I don't see any reason to think that (say) intelligence or goal-directed agency must always come with the kind of subjective experience we have. That's all the definition is supposed to do.

    None of that seems to me to be in tension with direct realism. I can talk about qualia and the what-it-is-likeness of my experience of the world while also admitting that that experience directly reflects the world as it truly is. We need not believe in something like the Cartesian theater to think that what it is like for me to see a chair is a distinct physical process from the chair itself. I'm extremely sympathetic to your picture of sense organs as measurement devices (and also tend to think, as I suspect you do, that the "explanatory gap" is overblown), but I'd like to hear more about the tension you see here.

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  • [–] [S] 1 point 2 days ago* (last edited 2 days ago)

    I'm rejecting that we have "subjective experience," as I am a direct realist. What you call "experience" is what I would call "reality," and there is nothing subject-dependent about reality. Yes, what you are saying is in direct conflict with direct realism. You say that experience "reflects the world," which is indirect realism. I am, again, a direct realist. What we perceive is not a "reflection of" reality, like a representation of reality in the mirror. What we perceive just is reality. The term "what it is like" is also one of those phrases that really carries no meaning. You are also presupposing, as a matter of axiom it seems (at least, in this post, you didn't give a reason to justify it), that reality (experience) is part of "consciousness," which of course if I were to grant that assumption, I'd be granting idealism, and I'm not an idealist.

    You also equate "experience" to "qualia" which these are clearly not the same things and are not used the same way at all. "Qualia" refers to a specific category of objects, like greenness and loudness. as opposed to other categories of objects like mathematical objects, or physical objects. I take a more Wittgensteinian approach to objects, so I see no reason to promote certain categories of objects to different "realms," as if objects of qualia exist in the realm of "consciousness," mathematical objects exist in the realm of "math," and physical objects exist in the realm of the "physical world."

    There are no such realms. Autonomous object don't even exist. They are social constructs, norms built by humans as a way to talk about reality, but do not have autonomous existence on their own. Take a dog for example. Try to rigorously define, without any ambiguity at all, precisely where a dog begins and ends in space and in time. When the dog eats food, and the food is absorbed into the body, at what precise moment does the food become part of the dog? Can you rigorously define this without any ambiguities at all? Or when the dog comes into being and passes away, can you rigorously define precisely and unambiguously when these moments happen?

    All objects have a kind of fuzziness to them, because as far as reality is concerned, it is not actually broken up into objects. It is an interconnected whole. Humans develop objects as social norms as a way to judge reality to be something as a way to then discuss it. Objects can only be said to be "real" when they are used in a context that is explicitly or implicitly attached directly to reality: i.e. if I say "look at that dog over there!" and we look and see a dog over there. The symbol may be fuzzy, but what it is "pointing to" is real, which is why Wittgenstein said, if you want to understand the meaning of a word, "don't think: look!" Stop search for rigorous definitions and just look at how it is actually being employed in the real world: what it is pointing to.

    Once you think about objects in this way, then there isn't really a good reason to separate them into different realms. A mathematical object, an object of qualia, a physical object, they can all be given the same exact treatment with no special separation between the two, as if one is an object of "consciousness" or some other realm that doesn't belong to the other objects. Greenness can be just as much as a real property of reality, independent of the observer, as circles or trees are, if they are used to identify something in a real social context (a Wittgensteinian "language game"), where it can actually be observed what is being talked about.

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  • [–] 5 points 4 days ago (1 child)

    It confuses interpretation for observation. It claims because we misinterpreted what we perceived, that means we perceived something "false." And if what we perceive can be "false," then clearly what we perceive is not reality. This is the form that arguments from illusions and dreams take on. Interpretation and observation ("experience" / "perception") are not the same things. The former requires a level of cognitive processing, whereas the latter does not. Misinterpreting what you observe does not prove you observed something falsely, only that you interpreted it falsely. As Benoist would say, it makes no sense to even apply the category of truth or falsity to reality. Reality just is what it is.

    How does this jive with people having different calibrations of their sensors ie people with astigmatism, people who can't hear certain frequencies, and so on? It's not necessarily a case of processing either since people with differently shaped lens will see images differently regardless of whatever happens after photons hit the retina. What about lateral inhibition, which is the source of various optical illusions. Lateral inhibition occurs before the impulses even travel to the brain.

    And if people will disagree based on differently calibrated sensors, I'm not sure why it would matter whether the disagreement is from the sensory level or processing level or post-processing level or whatever. Those disagreements will have to be navigated one way or another.

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  • [–] 3 points 4 days ago* (5 children)

    but most normal people would just consider what we observe to be reality, and not consciousness at all.

    most normal people are chauvinists that put the alleged qualitative uniqueness of the human mind before any definition or faculty of the mind such as intelligence, self awareness, cognition, emotion, pain, awareness... consciousness is the floor, the most basic faculty of any mind and it isn't interesting or intellectually honest to treat it like anything else. the linguistic creep of "sentience" is bad enough

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  • [–] 3 points 4 days ago (4 children)

    Also, "what most normal people" believe is just another way of saying "the consensus."

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  • [–] 3 points 4 days ago (3 children)

    i had another angle typed out, i'm waiting to see if i could put it to use but in essence the problem is semantics

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