All right. So last time in our story, we stopped at the last week of July 1971 when Premier Zhou Enlai had just wrapped up his first meeting with US Secretary of State or then National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and the US National Ping Pong Team's tour of China marked the beginning of a new relationship between China and America. So, let's pick back up on our story on August 1st, 1971, Army Day, the anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army in 1927.

That day, all major newspapers shared an editorial marking the day, as they always did, each August 1st, and called for the People's Militia to be built up for both defense and economic construction. In Beijing, at the Great Hall of the People, the Party Center hosted an Army Day banquet for top civil and military officials along with dignitaries from fraternal Maoist parties from around the world. The next day, on the other side of the Pacific, US President Richard Nixon dropped a big one.

He announced that the USA would support the People's Republic of China being represented with a seat at the UN, but still set the terms that Taiwan, the Republic of China, would still get a seat at the UN, too. In a veiled response, People's Daily attacked the quote ‘illegal occupation by US imperialism of the southern half of Korea’ unquote and predicted a US attack on the DPRK. Xinhua news agency was just as direct, criticizing Nixon's proposal to seat both the PRC and ROC at the UN as a clumsy to China's trick.

Nixon replied to both the Chinese and American press diplomatically, saying that quote, "China may become the world's most powerful nation and that peace depends on our two great superpowers talking." Negotiations with sworn enemies wasn't just happening with the USA during that week.

On August 5th, Vice Minister for Foreign Trade Zhou Huamin flew to Moscow to sign an agreement with his Soviet counterpart for exchange of goods and payments. Sino Soviet trade really had never stopped even during the 1969 border conflict. But this would definitely lubricate the flow of goods and services between the PRC and USSR in a big way.

Still, of course, the Chinese made no bones that negotiation with the Americans and Soviets didn't mean capitulation. On the 7th, Xinhua news agency put out a statement in support of the Black Panther Party and other black communist and nationalist formations, saying that there was an increasingly important role of black workers revolutionary struggles to defeat the USA's working class. That same day, a government statement said that big powers cannot monopolize nuclear weapons and called for the USA and USSR to adopt a no first use policy.

That same day over yonder in Lhasa, the Tibetan Administrative Party Congress opened. The main political report was given not by revolutionary committee head Zeng Yongya but his fellow general Ren Rong. A few days later, the Tibetan Party Congress ended with the election of a new party committee led by Ren Rong, who displaced Zeng Yongya and who went to on to serve in Shenyang far up in the northeast. For more information on that, see our episode on Tibet and Xinjiang during the cultural revolution.

On August 9th, Zhou Enlai was interviewed by New York Times journalist James Reston. Zhou and Reston had a very good conversation and oddly Zhou praised the New York Times for opposing the invasion of Cambodia. Speaking of newspapers, the next day, People's Daily shared a curious story. PLA Hospital number 165's account of relying on Mao Zedong Thought to cure mental illness over standard psychiatric methods.

The article explained how a doctor cured a severely depressed patient by living on the ward with her and reading her Mao quotes. I mean, I will say Mao quotes do make me feel pretty inspired, so maybe there's something to it. On August 12th, Mao called for a National People's Congress after National Day, and the Politburo assigned Zhang Chunqiao, Li Desheng, and Ji Dengkuai to arrange it.

Two days later, Li Desheng flew to Albania at the head of a military friendship delegation. Then on August 15th, amidst a rainstorm, American Maoist William Hinton arrived back for the first time in Longbow Village, whose 1940s land reform campaign he wrote about in his famous book Fanshen. And if you've never read his book, Fanshen, documentary of revolution in a Chinese village, well, honestly, do yourself a favor and turn this episode and start reading it right now because you can't understand the Chinese revolution fully and deeply without reading Fanshen. Anyways, let's get back to the buildup of the main story, the one you guys are here for today.

On August 15th, accompanied by Wang Dongxing, Mao left Beijing on his official private train for his regular summer inspection tour around the South. The 1971 southern tour is key to the incident we're talking about today, so we definitely have to get into it. The next day, by the way, the Nanjing Revolutionary Committee convened a meeting to start reviewing the personnel files of potential girlfriends for Lin Biao's son, Lin Liguo, who was still single and looking for marriage.

Anyways, that day, Mao arrived in Wuhan, greeted by Hubei's Secretary, Liu Feng. In his meeting with Liu, he immediately said about criticizing Chen Boda and Lin Biao due to their behavior at the Lushan conference in September of last year. Recounting the conference's debate on whether or not Mao was a genius, Mao criticized Lin Biao for praising him to the point of absurd hyperbole that implicitly diminished Marx and Lenin.

Mao said he was tired of the cult of personality around him and that Lin was preventing him from scaling it back. Mao also complained that Lin had prevented efforts to cultivate a new generation of leaders after Mao died. Indeed, Mao felt that if Lin had his way, the people's republic would die with Mao, or at least with Lin.

On that same day, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Chunqiao, Ji Dengkuai, and Huang Yongsheng visited Lin Biao in Beidaihe to brief him on plans for a national people's congress. And then the crew all went to see China and Iran's ambassadors to Pakistan sign a mutual recognition agreement, asserting the PRC government as the sole government of China.

The next day, Henan's leaders joined Mao in Wuhan. Mao told the Henan provincial delegation that the Lushan plenum was a failed power grab by people who expected him to die soon. Since the Lushan surprise attack, as he said, Mao thought that he was now paying close attention to the PLA, although did not think it could rebel against him.

On August 25th, Hunan leader and central government agricultural official Hua Guofeng visited Mao, who questioned him over why he was still wearing a Mao badge. Mao went on to tell Hua Guofeng that those who pushed the genius issue to attack Zhang Chunqiao were actually attacking him. ‘I am not a genius,’ he said. Mao went on to say those who thought about the genius theory as being an infallible truth were waving the banner of Mao Zedong to oppose Mao Zedong.

Mao warned Hua that as they had seen across 1967 and 1968, ‘factionalism gets people killed and comrades in the party should work to prevent that from happening again while still continuing revolution under the revolution.’

He went on to say that people should not be killed in struggle criticism transformation and provocatively said that there will still be struggle and contradiction under communism. On August 27th, before leaving Wuhan, Mao told Liu Feng that he wanted to continue mixing in sand by giving Li Xiannian a central military commission job.

Then on the train to Changsha, Mao got his attendance and officials to sing the Internationale and explained the completely Marxist lyrics. After another sing-along of the three rules of discipline and eight points of attention, Mao's train arrived in Changsha. Officials then visited him aboard. Mao recounted to them the histories of the party's line struggles and turning to Hua Guofeng, sang a reprise of the three rules of discipline and eight points of attention.

Mao went on to reminisce about line struggle and Ye Jianying proving his mettle on the long march with clandestine work against the Zhang Guotao line. The next day, talks continued in Changsha, hinting at senior Air Force officers fawning over Lin Liguo.

Mao said that it didn't help someone in his 20s to be called a super genius. Mao asked Sichuan leader Liu Xingyuan and Guangzhou PLA head Ding Sheng, "What are you going to do if he were to oust their old boss, Huang Yongsheng?" Mao then told Wang Dongxing that at some point he should convey to the Politburo the main points that he made on his tour of the South.

On August 30th, another meeting was convened with regional party authorities with Mao. Mao said that Lushan was different from the party's previous line struggles. Lin Biao never owned up to his part in it due to his status. Although he insisted that Lin Biao must continue to be protected, Mao blamed Lin's people for the whole Kerfuffle. He also told the regional leaders not to discuss Lushan openly. Yet, Mao reminded the comrades that genius comes not from any gifted individual or group of individuals, but from a party, which is a vanguard of the proletariat.

On August 31st, Wang Dongxing flew to Nanjing ahead of Mao's train to brief Xu Shiyou and others on Mao's conversations with officials so far this trip. Mao received Xu Shiyou in the evening. Mao asked Xu bluntly why it was that he and Nanchang Uprising leaders who created the People's Liberation Army no longer commanded it.

Meanwhile, on September 1st, Enver Hoxha politely invited a Communist Party of China delegation to the coming party of labor of Albania Congress following his August 6 letter lecturing Mao about Nixon.

Uh anyways, that same day in Nanchang, the capital of Jiangxi province, Mao received regional commander Xu Shiyou, Han Xianchu, and Cheng Shiqing and then proceeded to criticize Lin Biao and the generals close to him. Meanwhile, back in Hubei Province, Lin Biao curiously and nervously told his head of security that there was no point in him having plans for a new residence built at Beidahe because he said, quote, ‘I do not have much time to live.’ What did he mean by this?

On September 3rd, Mao arrived in Hangzhou and received regional commanders Nan Ping, and Xiong Yingtang as well as Chen Liyun (3 syllables) and Bai Zongshan (3 syllables) from the air force. Mao upbraided Chen Liyun for following Wu Faxian at the Lushan plenum last year, asking what were you up to?

Chen was too shocked to answer, declaring that the Lushan incident was not over yet. Mao told the officers that he was now taking a close interest in the running of the PLA. Complaining that there are statues and portraits of him everywhere, Mao reiterated his thoughts on the personality cult from a few days before, saying that it was time to cool down the personality propaganda.

Two days later, Lin Liguo's contacts? in the air force contacted Guangzhou Air Force officer Gu Tongzhou and learned of Mao's recent comments on Lin Biao, which enraged Lin Jr. Liu Feng leaked to Li Zuopeng that Mao considered the Lushan split unresolved, and Li immediately flew to Beijing and informed Huang Yongsheng, who then telephoned Lin Bao's wife, Ye Qun.

On September 6, Nanjing authorities’ quest to find a suitable girlfriend for Lin Liguo was called off as Lin Jr. had become engaged to a 20-year-old army musician named Zhang Ning. That same day, Lin Bao's daughter, Lin Liheng, as well as her fianceé, Zhang Qinglin, and Lin Lee Guo's fiance, Zhang Ning, were all summoned to Beidahe. Lin's children and their partners all arrived at the Lin family homestead to find their father unshaven and shaking nervously. Zhang later recounted being shocked at how sick he looked. Lin Liguo then told his sister Liheng that Mao was moving against Lin Biao over the Lushan split and drew parallels to Peng Dehuai.

Two days later, Lin Liguo left Beidahe for Beijing for a dentist appointment. Lin Liheng, with her brother gone, told members of Lino's staff that she was worried that Lin Jr. was going to try to do something politically drastic and bring her father into it, but she wasn't exactly sure of what. The staff brushed her off, saying she was just being paranoid. That night, Ye Qun stayed up all night crying to Lin Biao.

She told him that she expected him to be purged and sent to the countryside because Mao thought she and him were spies. Back in Beijing, Lin Liguo met with Zhou Yuchi and other members of his Air Force clique at a suburban airfield. They talked late into the night and then agreed to meet again tomorrow, though their discussion was strictly confidential. The next day, Lin Liheng and her fiance took Lin Liguo's fiancee sightseeing, brought back a toy soldier as a souvenir for Lin Biao, which he enjoyed. Meanwhile, Mao decided to abruptly leave Hangzhou for Shanghai.

While on the train, Mao approved Zhou Enlai's request for a plenum of the central committee that month to elect Ji Pengfei and to expel Chen Boda from the party. Upon arriving in Shanghai, Mao summoned Wang Hongwen and Xu Shiyou to his train. Xu was uncontactable, so Wang turned up alone, and Mao then sent him away.

The day afterward, Wang Hongwen and Xu Shiyou visited Mao together. Mao criticized Xu for going off to the countryside the day before without leaving any way to be contacted. Nanjing's Air Force political commissar and Lin Liguo associate Wang Weiguo who Mao criticized a few days before tried to get on the train with them but was denied entry. Mao left Shanghai just after midday on his special train and went straight to Beijing. Almost instantly, Wang Weiguo informed Lin Liguo by telephone that Mao was heading back to the capital.

On September 12th, the day started off tense at Beijing Fengtai Station. Mao received Ji Dengkui, Li Desheng and Wu De and told them that Lushan's black hand was not just Chen Boda. Wu De self-criticized for signing Chen Boda's genius briefing. Mao reassured him that he bears no guilt, but Wu remained petrified. Jiang Qing visited Beijing's summer palace to relax and brought four melons, which she was proud to announce, were a gift from Lin Biao.

Meanwhile, back at the Lin house, Ye Qun suddenly told her daughter Lin Liheng and her fianceé that they were to get married that evening. Shocked and confused, they argued her down to an engagement party. Lin Liguo then told his sister Liheng that the situation was fraught in Beijing and that he was either going to go to Dalian, Guangzhou, or even Hong Kong. It seemed that dirty work was a foot. Lin Liguo and Zhou Yuchi told their clique in the Air Force that Lin Biao was going to fly to Guangzhou tomorrow and address the nation for a special announcement.

That night, Lin Biao took his sleeping pills and went to bed. After her husband was asleep, Ye Qun told the rest of the household to get ready to go to Guangzhou early tomorrow.

Lin Liheng discreetly informed guards that Ye Qun intended to fly the family out of Beidahe for Guangzhou early tomorrow morning. The guards, concerned, reported this immediately to Zhongnanhai. Things escalated across the night. The Central Guards Bureau telephoned Zhou Enlai who was in a late night meeting at the Great Hall of the People to help tell him that Lin Liguo had taken a Trident 1 aircraft from Beijing to near Beidahe.

Wang Dongxing reported to Zhou Enlai that Lin Liheng feared that her brother was up to something, possibly attempting to kidnap her father. Yet Qun called Zhou shortly afterward, explaining to him that Lin Biao needed a plane to visit Dalian. Zhou Enlai felt something was amiss and told her that it wasn't safe to fly that night. Zhou promised to come to Beidahe to smooth any problems personally with Lin Biao, but Ye Qun told him not to because it would upset Lin. She then hung up abruptly. Hm.

Under a different number, Trident 1E aircraft number 256 was dispatched to the airfield serving Beidaihe. Zhou asked Wu Faxian if he had sent an airliner to Beidaihe's local airport. Wu said no and said that there was no such plane there.

Wu called around to his comrades and Air Force officer Hu Ping told Wu Faxian that he sent the trident to Beidahe as a test flight after repairs and thought that this would be trivial. Hu Ping called Wu Faxian back a few minutes later and said that he couldn't send the trident back to Beijing as Wu instructed that the engine was now broken.

Sensing something was now certainly wrong, Zhou told Li Zuopeng to ensure that the trident did not take off without the combined approval of four officials, including himself. Li guessed that Zhou was alluding to Lin Biao and named him when repeating and re-repeating Zhou's orders back to confirm them. The politburo continued on across the night discussing the upcoming National People's Congress.

Afterwards, Zhou asked Huang Yongsheng to stay up and help with the suspicious plane. Meanwhile, at Beidaiha's small airport, a PLA air traffic controller was awoken and told to manage a Trident plane to take off without his team. According to his testimony, later he suspected it was a nuclear mission against the Soviets.

Then the clock struck midnight.

Ye Qun and Lin Liguo awakened Lin Biao, who was completely whacked out on sleeping pills and dressed him and set him off for the airport. Lin Biao's head of security fled the group, wanting no part in whatever was going on. While in the car, Lin asked his wife and son if they could head to Irkutsk in Siberia and asked how long it would take to get there.

Upon arrival at the airport, PLA guards admitted Lin Biao's car into the compound. Li Zuopeng gave his approval over the phone for the Trident to take off. Lin Liguo and Yu Qun boarded the waiting Trident airliner while soldiers watched on in confusion. Lin Biao was too drowsy and weak and had to be hauled up into the plane.

Some witnesses even later claimed that Lin was struggling to not get on the plane and was openly weeping. After the marshall and vice chairman was on the plane, some of the Trident crew ran towards the plane before the engine started, leaving Lin Liguo, Ye Qun, and Lin Biao aboard with a pilot and five others.

The plane revved its engines and slowly surely into the black of the night began to creep away from the gate and towards the runway. The troops on the ground at the airport tried to block the Trident's takeoff with their vehicles, but the plane weaved around them, but clipped one, damaging the wing of the plane. One soldier claimed to have heard gunshots coming from inside the plane, suggesting that a struggle had begun to take place on board.

Beidahe Airport's captain of the PLA Guard Garrison arrived at the airport to find that Lin Biao's plane was already on the runway and getting ready to taxi. The trident then sped down the runway and took off, flying westward into the darkness. Li Zuopeng reported to Zhou Enlai that Lin Biao's plane had managed to take off despite attempts to stop it. Zhou told him to track it. Wu Faxian then called Zhou and said that he had forbidden the Trident plane to take off no matter who asked, but Zhou replied that the plane was already airborne.

Wu ordered several planes to be ready to fly Zhou to wherever Lin Biao landed so that he could speak with him face to face. Zhou then ran to Mao's residence at Zhongnanhai and found that Mao was still awake, taking a late night swim in his swimming pool. He pressed Mao over whether to send fighters to intercept Lin Biao. Mao got out of the pool, looking legitimately shocked.

As he sat on his sofa next to his swimming pool, Mao simply said, "No, let him go. Lin Biao is still vice chairman of the party. Rain will fall. Women will get married. What can we do? Let him go.”

Wu reported to Zhou and Mao that the plane was 100 kilometers from entering Mongolia, but was hard to track by radar, flying unusually low to the ground. Now, while the details are unclear, according to reports, the damaged wing on Lin Biao's plane caught fire sometime shortly after they had entered Mongolian airspace.

The pilot changed route, seeming to try to turn backwards towards China, but it was too late. The trident was going down and exploded upon impact in the depths of the Mongolian desert. Lin Biao, Ye Qun, Lin Liguo, and six others in the crew died in the burning wreckage immediately upon impact.

And thus, Lin Biao, the hero of the Chinese Civil War, one of the grand marshals of the Revolution, vice chairman of the Communist Party of China, grand marshal of the People's Liberation Army, and Mao's appointed successor, close comrade in arms, the second in command of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, was dead.

Mao, looking genuinely hurt and devastated, told Zhou to convene the Politburo immediately. At 3:00 a.m. Zhou Enlai briefed the Politburo and said that, in his estimation, Lin Biao had defected to the Soviet Union or at least tried to.

Meanwhile, Lin Liguo's allies, Zhou Yuchi, Yu Xinye and Li Weixin raced into the darkness onto a helicopter outside Beijing and took off with two bewildered crew. With Zhou Yuchi reported airborne, Mao was moved from his swimming pool residence, off to the Great Hall of the People, well protected from air attack.

Zhou Enlai banned all aircraft from Beijing and grounded all flights from Capitol International Airport. He gave the order that air force ground forces were to shoot down anything approaching the capital. Zhou then called for the deployment of Army infantry battalions to all airfields, both civilian and military.

An hour later, Zhou expanded the ban and grounded all aircraft nationwide and sent central guards officer Yang Dezhong to Wu Faxian at Beijing Xijao airport to assist him.

Li Xiannian, Hua Guofeng, and Li Desheng were dispatched to the PLA's temporary HQ in the Jingxi Hotel to assist them, too. Meanwhile, in the air, a fighter passed over Zhou Yuchi's helicopter. Zhou's pilot turned back, protesting that Mongolia was out of range and that they would be shot down. Air Force fighters searched the darkness for Zhou Yuchi's helicopter, but lacked suitable radars.

A ground station picked it up headed back towards Beijing, but Beijing air defense gunners refused an order to fire at the helicopter, fearing collateral damage. Zhou Enlai telephoned and agreed that they should not open fire. Zhou Yuchi's uncooperative, reluctant pilot Chen Xiuwen, then tried to overpower Zhou, who shot him dead.

The helicopter landed safely in a cornfield north of Beijing, where they were surrounded by a local people's militia squadron. Zhou Yuchi, Yu Xinye, and Li Weixin then entered a suicide pact. On the count of three, the men put their handguns to their heads and killed themselves before the militia could put them in handcuffs.

Sun rose over China that morning with the people of China being none the wiser that their beloved vice chairman chairman Mao's closest comrade in arms was now dead.

At 9:00 a.m. Zhou Enlai telephoned Lin Liheng, Lin's daughter, and they spoke for about an hour. She testified to the premiere that Lin Liguo deceived their father into getting on the plane.

Meanwhile, PLA signals intelligence intercepted Mongolian military transmissions, saying that an airplane from China had illegally entered their airspace, then caught fire and crashed.

Mongolian People's Republic authorities arrived at the crash and identified Lin Liguo's body from his ID card. The rest of them were uh crispy critters, as we would say. So, they could only basically assume who was who.

Zhou Enlai reported to Mao that Mongolia seemed to think that the plane was indeed carrying Lin Biao and that it had crashed the night before, but was warned that it might be a deception.

Around noon, Chen Boda was taken to Beijing's notorious Qingcheng Prison and housed alone in building number 204 with round-the-clock observation by two sentries. Zhou Enlai convened the politburo again in the afternoon augmented by PLA leaders.

They drafted emergency instructions to the armed forces. Zhou then rang all provincial and local military leaders to tell them that Lin Biao had fled and to put all armed forces into emergency readiness.

The next morning, September 14th, the Mongolian government lodged a protest with China that a military plane had entered Mongolian airspace and crashed in the desert. After 50 straight hours of being awake, Zhou Enlai finally got some sleep.

However, he was unfortunately soon woken by an embassy report that nobody had, surprised, survived the crash. A drugged and woozy Zhou Enlai repeated “crashed to death” to himself and made himself presentable before going to report to the chairman.

Zhou was asked by Mao how it could be that the trident crashed into open ground and suggested that perhaps it had ran out of fuel or had gotten lost. Mao, despondent and melancholic, sat down at his desk. He wrote a letter to the whole party in which he called Chen Boda a sham Marxist who believed in the genius theory at the expense of learning from the masses.

Mao's letter called for partywide discussion and criticism of Chen Boda's conspiratorial activities and noted oddly that Lin Biao concurred with him.

Wang Dongxing sent additional security to Beidahe to protect Lin Liheng against reprisals from any remaining Lin conspirators and acting foreign minister Ji Pengfei was informed that Lin Biao was dead causing him to remark that “they all died in a plane crash. What a marvelous ending. What the legitimate fuck.”

The next morning, soldiers scoured Lin Biao's quarters at Beidahe and began searching his papers and sending them to Beijing care of the general party office. Xu Shiyou visited Zhou Enlai in Beijing, who gave him the task of discreetly arresting four of Lin Biao's suspected accomplices in the PLA.

Summoned to Beijing, Wang Hongwen was then tasked with luring Shanghai's public security chief, Wang Weiguo, away from his men to be arrested safely. Wang Hongwen casually invited Wang Guo to Shanghai's Jinjiang Hotel to review a document.

Wang Guo asked him to read it over the phone. Explaining that the document was confidential, Wang Hongwen told Wang Weiguo that the review would be quick and promised to take him to a seafood dinner. Wang Weiguo entered the Jinjiang Hotel conference room to find that Wang Hongwen was not in fact not there. Instead, soldiers arrested him at gunpoint.

On the afternoon of September 17th, Mao and Joe agreed upon the main points of an internal verdict on Lin Biao, classifying it as a line struggle and tying him to Chen Boda.

The next day, Radio Xinjang, still obviously having not gotten the memo, just like the rest of the country, welcomed Mao and Lin Biao's outstanding good health and advertised a new photo album of the pair available for sale in Urumqi.

Mao then approved Zhou setting up a working group to investigate a Lin Bao-Chen Boda conspiracy led by Ji Dengkui and Deputy Wang Hongwen. Zhou Enlai chaired the politburo that night showing photographs of Lin Biao and Ye Qun's charred skeletons.

The Politburo agreed to disseminate an official verdict on Lin by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, listing 16 historical mistakes, but were told to hold off on releasing it to the public. The Politburo put the Air Force under the command of a five man group of officers sidelining Wu Faxian, who declared his resolute support.

A top secret internal party circular charged Lin Biao with treason and revealed the fatal renegade escape of the bourgeois careerist. The Lin Biao circular presented Lin Biao as opposing Mao throughout the 1930s and 40s and he had been a rightist the whole time.

On September 20th, Zhejiang leader Nan Ping sent his deputy Chen Liyun to Shanghai's Jinjiang Hotel to view a document. Inside, Wang Hong Wen arrested him just like Wang Weiguo. Wang Hong Wen asked the soldiers to be gentle with Chen Liyun as he was taken away.

And in a Shanghai basement, he was interrogated about Lin Liguo. The next day, the Chinese government told all foreign embassies that there would be no National Day parade despite earlier rehearsals because it would be a waste of time and money. This caused French media to speculate that either Mao was seriously ill or that a party, Congress, or National People's Congress might be coming up.

The foreign ministry assured the French that Mao was not dead, but offered no specific explanation for National Day's cancellation and several days of grounded flights. Marshall Chen Yi, off from official duties with advanced bowel cancer, was briefed about Lin Biao's death and began formulating a criticism.

On September 22nd, the New York Times reported that Lin Biao's status as successor was being questioned by some elements and speculated that Lin might have been ill. Back in Beijing, PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yongsheng briefed Bureau Chiefs on Lin Biao's flight and death. Access to the September 18th circular remained tight.

Zhou then interviewed embassy staffer Sun Yixian who photographed Lin Bao's crash site. Sun claimed that he sought evidence of a missile blast. When Zhou asked Sun if he had collected papers out of the wreckage, Sun said no. Zhou was enraged, exclaiming that a party member must defend state secrets to the death.

On September 23rd, the New York Times suggested that either Mao or Lin may have died with unusual troop movements since September 12th being signs of a possible succession crisis. The next day, Wu Faxian was called to a meeting in the Great Hall of the People.

Before leaving, he warned his wife that there may be a chance he would not return. Zhou Enlai announced to the Politburo that generals Huang Yongsheng, Li Zuopeng, Wu Faxian, and Qiu Huizuo had all been relieved of duty.

The four generals were then placed under investigation over their links to Lin and told to write self-criticisms under house arrest. But meanwhile, there was something happy going on.

At the UNHQ and NYC, China's Albanian comrades submitted a resolution to the UN to restore the People's Republic of China to all of its rights and expel forth with the representatives of Chiang Kai-Shek. So yeah, Albania was at the UN doing China a solid while all this was going on.

But anyways, on September 26, a central directive informed the public that there would be no national day parade in the capital this year, but smaller local celebrations would still be allowed in the provincial capitals. A meeting for top leaders to criticize Lin Biao began later that day with marshals Chen Yi, Nie Rongzheng, Xu Xiangqian and other veteran PLA officers in attendance.

On September 28th, a central directive limited documents on Lin Biao's flight and death to top leaders like provincial standing committee members and generals. The public was not allowed to know of Lin's death yet. Damage control was still paramount.

On that same day, Lin Liguo associate Wang Fei wrote a confession claiming to have been shown a paper order from Lin Biao to accept commands from Zhou Yuchi, the infamous supposed 571 plot document.

The next day, the 29th, a confidential memo informed leaders that Huang Yongsheng, Liu Pong, Wu Faxian, and Qiu Huizuo had been sacked for conspiring with Lin Biao.

On September 30th, English language newspaper Digest Peking Review carried an advertisement for Lin Biao's speeches. Radio Fujian advertised a Mao-Lin photo album. Literally, the entirety of the Chinese public was none the wiser.

Everything seemed hunky dory at the top and people just assumed that Lin was still working hard alongside Chairman Mao to serve the people and make revolution.

However, that day, Mongolia's press agency publicly announced the September 13th air crash to its own people and said that the PLA plane must have lost its bearing while flying at night.

The politburo agreed staffing arrangements for a Lin Biao-Chen Boda inquiry along with personnel changes in various arms of the Ministry of Defense. October rolled around and autumn of 1971 came.

The People's Daily welcomed National Day with a long article detailing various statistics indicating China had begun experiencing a good amount of economic growth that year along with an article calling for US aggressive troops to leave Korea and criticizing the USA's imperialist voting machine of allies at the UN.

On October 3rd, an awkward broadcast occurred. Radio Hubei described Lin Biao, using the usual formulation, as a shining example to follow. However, literally every other national, provincial, and municipal station had begun to cease mentioning him, with many radio staff not knowing why they'd been ordered to.

That same day in Beijing, a central directive informed leaders that a Lin Biao-Chen Boda inquiry had been set up to be led day-to-day by Ji Dengkui and Wang Dongxing.

The Central Military Commission's administrative group was declared thereby dissolved and replaced by a new organ headed by Ye Jiangying and run by Li Desheng.

Further reshuffling occurred and notice and a notice revealed that Hua Guofeng was to join the state council's business group, running the government day today as its new deputy leader.

In the early evening, foreign ministry officials gathered in the ministry's main auditorium where the notice on Lin Biao's flight and death was read out.

The next day over in the US, Time magazine speculated about Lin Bao's absence from view and hypothesized that Huang Yongsheng may be after his job as defense minister.

Back in Beijing, Mao received members of Ye Jianying’s new central military commission office, informing them that Lin Biao and Chen Boda had conspired to seize power and blamed the two for the treatment of PLA leaders in the late 1960s.

On October 5th, Xinhua News Agency announced that Kissinger would visit China again later in the month to make concrete arrangements for President Nixon's trip.

That same day, Zhou Enlai and Geng Biao received 70 visiting Americans, including the leaders of the Revolutionary Union, Black Panthers, and Young Lords Party. Included in this group were notable American communists such as Huey P. Newton, Eldridge Cleaver, Bobby Seal, Bob Avakian, Mary Lou Greenberg, H Bruce Franklin, C. Clark Kissinger, and many, many more.

However, as Zhou was entertaining these American comrades, a new limited circulation memo informed top leaders that Lin Biao tried to have Mao assassinated and set up a rival government in the South before he fled. A week later, the Communist Party of China declined Hoxha's invitation to the upcoming Labor Party Congress following 1969's blanket policy against such delegation. Hoxha was, according to later sources, furious and said that the Chinese would regret their anti-Marxist snub toward him.

On October 20th, Kissinger and his entourage arrived in Beijing, greeted by Ye Jianying and Ji Pengfei. They joined Zhou Enlai and his interpreters for talks. After the meeting, Mao summoned Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianyang, Ji Pengfei and the meeting's interpreters Wang Hairang and Tang Wenshang to discuss Kissinger. Ye Jianying said that the timing of Kissinger's visit suggested that the USA knew that next week's UN motion to seat the PRC would fail.

After more talks on the 23rd, Mao criticized a draft communique for the Kissinger talks for lacking a voice. He felt it avoided saying anything about revolution or oppression. The next day, Ji Dengkui read Kissinger a revised draft communique. Kissinger was irked by it, saying that the sharp uncompromising language made it hard to accept.

On October 25th, at the UN headquarters, an American motion to let Beijing assume the UN China seat with Taipei keeping a seat of its own was voted down by the General Assembly. Instead, the UN General Assembly passed the Albanian motion to expel forth with the representatives of Chiang Kai-Shek and exclusively seat the PRC. Surprised by Chiang Kai-Shek and America's defeat at the UN, Mao commented that China had been carried into the UN by its brothers in the third world. And it was true. When the vote showed that the people's republic was to take over the China seat at the UN, it is said that the African and Arab delegates danced in the aisles with joy. November rolled around and Kim ll-Sung arrived in Beijing for his second visit to China in just over a year so that he and Mao could discuss the Kissinger talks.

At the talks, Mao brought together his new ad hoc foreign policy group, Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying, Ji Pengfei, Qiao Guanhua, and Wang Hairong. Upon returning to Pyongyang, Kim Il-sung reassured Workers Party of Korea cadres that ‘China engaging with Nixon was no big deal, it was just like the Molotov Ribbontrop agreement of 1939.’

The next day, foreign ministry official Huang Hua, who would soon become deputy head of China's UN mission, signed a mutual agreement with Peru, which is funny because at the same time, Beijing was actually training Communist Party of Peru members in studying military theory and agricultural reform.

And on the third, the foreign ministry threw a bountiful banquet in Beijing for the diplomatic representatives of nations who voted the PRC into the UN the prior month.

On October 6, in a Jiangxi factory dining hall, for over two hours, 80 workers, including Deng Xiaoping, were read the circular revealing Lin Biao's death. Deng Xiaoping contributed no views on Lin in his workshop's discussion group, but he was allowed to take the text of the circular home.

Deng wrote to Mao that he had always thought Chen Boda was a villain, but was genuinely shocked and angered to learn of Lin's betrayal. Thanks to the brilliant leadership foiling Lin Biao and Chen Boda, Deng Xiaoping continued in his letter that he was so happy he could not restrain his emotions.

Two days later, work on getting ready to join the UN continued. Mao approved a report saying that China should make sure to be consultative at the UN and avoid using its security council veto too much. Mao also rejected British overtures to diplomatic recognition.

Unlike the Americans who were ready to compromise, the Brits were trying to remain equivocal on Taiwan. So Mao decided to keep them in timeout. Zhou Enlai, Ye, Ji and Wang and other top cadres, then saw Qiao Guanhua off to the airport as he flew to join the UN in New York.

On November 11th, a Scottish Council for Development and Industry group arrived in Guangzhou. They were the first Western European trade delegation since the 1950s. And while Qiao Guanhua arrived in New York, he told journalists that he wished well people of all walks of life in New York and the rest of America. Future President George HW Bush greeted the PRC UN delegation on the way to the main chair. There they took the China seat and heard other nations remarks.

On October 15th, Qiao addressed the UN. He attacked the USA, thanked those who helped seat the PRC, and talked about history's trend towards revolution. So quite the introduction. On November 18th on local radio, Hangzhou's top PLA officer alluded to Lin Bao's clique exhibiting left-wing extremism and delusions of intellectual grandeur.

On November 20th, receiving Wuhan military leaders, Mao repudiated Lin Biao's ideological contributions, but said that his followers could be rehabilitated. Mao also said that it was worth retaining the eight democratic parties of the United Front. For more info on this, please see our minisode on the United Front parties during the cultural revolution.

In Nanjing, party leaders met to pick through and correct forced confessions extracted during investigations into the supposed May 16th group. Investigations led by PLA officials aligned with Lin Biao. A few days later, Hainan Radio celebrated the end of a nameless clique of party enemies whose bodies and bones were scattered without ever finding a grave.

On November 29th, the Politburo ruled that Mao's four great titles, great leader, great teacher, great commander, and great helmsman, which Lin Biao had coined, were not to be used anymore in any party publications or state media.

On December 1st, People's Daily shared an editorial on summing up experiences and reminded party committees that hidden anti-party me elements were actually very rare and to be careful not to whip up conspiratorial ideas or attack people without firm evidence.

On December 6th, Zhou Enlai told the Military Aviation Industry Forum that it was time to criticize Lin Bao and his anti-party group for anarchism and ultraleftism.

10 days later, the state council's national planning conference began discussing the economic plan for 1972 and criticized the economics of Lin Biao.

The next day on the 17th, a central directive listed the approvals needed to remove officials if they ended up being implicated by investigations into Lin or Chen.

On December 22nd, China's UN delegation returned from New York. Zhou Enlai met them at the airport and they all reported to Mao together in the evening.

And a few days later, People's Daily evaluated the UN26 General Assembly as a victory for the oppressed peoples of the world. And with that, we will end our chronicle of the year 1971. So anyways, let's address the elephant in the room.

What do we make of the Lin Bao incident? Well, scholars are still to this day heavily divided on the issue. So I'll present the two main arguments put forward, or should I say two and a half.

First, there is the prevailing school of thought in official Chinese discourse and among Maoist groups more globally that Lin was quote ‘left in form, right in essence’ and that Mao was indeed the target of a coup by Lin. There is strong evidence for this position.

Lin had not only carefully read Liu Shaoqi's famous ‘how to be a good communist’ and made many approving marginal comments during the cultural revolution. He also told Lin Doudou that Liu Shaoqi's level of theoretical understanding was superior to Mao and he declared that both Liu and Deng Xiaoping were good comrades and commented that it did not make sense to get rid of Liu.

As for the cultural revolution itself, Lin made a dismissive comment in 1967 that the movement had become a revolution without culture. And this perhaps best summed up his attitude, a secret disdain for the entire thing while still claiming to be its second in command. At least that's what his daughter says.

Mao said many times in meetings with the central military commission across 1971 that he was concerned that the PLA had a disproportionate amount of power in the provincial and municipal revolutionary committees and that it was time for the party and mass organizations to give more play to their own initiative in these new bounties of power.

Lin, according to later accounts by his colleagues and daughters, felt deeply upset by this and his son Lin Liquo and his wife Ye Qun even more so. Lin did indeed have every reason to pull off a coup if he wanted his political trajectory to continue, especially after the Lushan conference of 1970 split Mao and Lin irreparably.

His fanatical and dogmatic loyalty to Mao, which often manifested in promoting book worship and blind obedience to authority, had caused issues in society and simultaneously had not paid off for Lin. He certainly felt sidelined and betrayed despite still officially being Mao's successor.

In 1980, the Communist Party of China put forward the summation that Lin Bao's clique and the clique around the Gang of Four had collaborated to sabotage Chairman Mao and the party center, only falling out with each other in 1971 when Lin's coup attempt was exposed.

The Maoist camp within the international communist movement, by and large, takes up a variation of this theory, albeit not looping in the Gang of Four into the conspiracy.

The revolutionary internationalist movement, an international conference of Maoist parties, upheld the idea that Lin was responsible for an attempt to assassinate Mao and that he fled when the plot was exposed. Bob Avakian, chairman of the Revolutionary Communist Party USA, said in his 1979 book, Mao Zedong's immortal contributions that quote,

"Mao recognized quite early that Lin Biao had treacherous characteristics, even though he had played a generally positive role at an earlier stage in the Chinese Revolution. And even though Mao felt it was necessary to unite with Lin during the first stage of the cultural revolution in order to knock out the strongly entrenched rightists associated with Liu Shaoqi” end quote.

Avakian goes on to say that there had been quote “many defects in the way in which Lin had promoted the cultural revolution and by the time of the 9th Congress he had begun to attack many of the achievements and gains of the cultural revolution and that he had argued that revolutionary turmoil was fine for a while, namely for as long as it took for him to get to the top, but that the time had come for the masses to quiet down, put the noses to the grindstone, and just engage in production.” End quote. It was due to this, Avakian and other Maoist leaders during the 1970s and 1980s argued that Lin wanted Mao out of the picture.

This continues to be the general consensus among Maoist parties today. However, some western ‘scholars’ have cited differences with these narratives. One of the most prominent dissident voices is the scholar Frederick Teiwes. In his book, The Tragedy of Lin Biao, he posits the following six-point evaluation.

“Number one, far from being excessively ambitious, Lin was content with an inactive albeit honored position and was thrust into a leading role by Mao and subsequently cast aside for reasons that have little to do with any wishes he may have had for greater power. This view was strongly expressed in the immediate post-Lin period, under the influence of post-Mao accounts of the struggle of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing clicks, more western what recent western analysis have given greater attention to conflict between the two groups."

"Number two, while Lin publicly assumed a proponent's role during the cultural revolution as befitted his new status as the successor and also seemingly took advantage of the situation to settle personal grievances. To the extent that a personal political orientation can be deduced from his actions and private statements, it was in favor of economic and moderation and limiting chaos, particularly the army."

"Three, Lin never opposed Mao politically, but instead operated by the prime political rule of strictly following the chairman's wishes to the extent that they could be determined. Even in the desperate post-Lushan period, his posture was passive and most likely, although not certainly, Hughes says, he had no knowledge of any military coup or assassination plots."

"Four, there was no fundamental conflict between Lin and Zhou Enlai as Zhou accepted Lin's superior status and Lin did not interfere in Zhou's activities. The conflict which did exist was between Lin and his supporters and Jiang Qing's group which fundally mentally developed from competition for Mao's blessing and was concerned more with trivial matters and perceptions of relative power than with policy issues."

"Five. Although the relationship of civilian and military authority caused considerable friction within the party, there is little to suggest that Lin or his top associates in the PLA were pushing for a Bonapartist outcome."

"And finally, six, while Lin did have an interest in the institutional well-being of the military and the PLA as an organization playing a key role in supervising the economy, there is no evidence of his shaping a coherent program to appeal to a military-industrial complex or indeed of any developed policy positions through the entire 1966 through 1971 period.” End quote. _