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Apple announced the iPhone 17e with an Israelli chip (www.jpost.com)
submitted 3 months ago by to c/technology@lemmy.ml
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[–] 3 points 3 months ago (1 child)

I mean, if your goal is to make people as safe from the police as possible as simply as possible then the cellebrite and graphite leaks would steer you towards the last few generations of pixels and any iphone that can get the latest os.

That’s not to say graphene isn’t a fantastic choice, I use it daily and it’s secure from law enforcement hardware, just that the leaked capability matrixes consistently indicate that cops can’t break into appropriately secured iphones and specific android phones as well.

Which is really useful knowledge to have and build your behaviors around that would be completely missed if someone were to base their choice of device around what doesn’t have Israeli connections first.

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  • [–] [S] 7 points 3 months ago (1 child)

    I mean if you base your choice of device around what doesn’t have Israeli connections first that means you're not getting a phone built on the US/Israeli supply chain, and these do tend to be more secure. There's a reason Huawei is banned in the US, and the US has been lobbying all the vassals to stop using Huawei gear. It's not because they're afraid of Chinese surveillance, but rather because Huawei doesn't have American backdoors.

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  • [–] 4 points 3 months ago (1 child)

    From cellebrite’s own documentation (on the first page, of a sales pdf, which was the second or third google result):

    Supported devices include Huawei H1611, Xiaomi Mi 5, ZTE Z832 Sonata 3 and ZTE Z981 ZMax Pro

    I’m, again, not as familiar with huawei and xiaomi product lines and whatnot as I am with the iphones and pixels so I can’t speak to the popularity of specific ones implicated in just that bullet point and the doc I quoted from is at least seven years old, however I do know that many more chinese devices are accessible with these cop metasploit tools.

    The idea that backdoors can be grouped by what nation state intelligence apparatus has control over the manufacturing of the device in question is good reasoning when we have no other information to go off of. In this case though, there is a wealth of information public, leaked and from people who just can’t help but warthunder their classified documents in fights online.

    I would never suggest American/israeli tech power should be accepted as a net positive or reasonable compromise. What I want is for people to critically and carefully consider the devices they trust based on what we know about intelligence apparatuses ability to compromise them as opposed to the fog of information war.

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  • [–] [S] 5 points 3 months ago (1 child)

    These are phones literally from a decade ago. Huawei H1611, Xiaomi Mi 5, and ZTE Z832 Sonata 3 were all released in 2016. This is not a serious argument.

    The idea that you want to avoid devices from known bad actors shouldn't be controversial in any way. Devices developed using an independent tech stack will always be inherently safer.

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  • [–] 1 point 3 months ago (1 child)

    Apologies for the late reply, sometimes I’m not in a good spot to chase down leaks about cop shit.

    As of at least 2021 cellebrite claims they have the ability to access xiaomi and huawei devices, listing explicitly the soc and baseband chips used by the very phones you are claiming are safe because of their lack of amerisraieli death pact ties.

    A famous leak of their support matrix from 2024 confirms this and also explicitly groups android devices by their soc/baseband chips. Reenforcing that the chips ostensibly with no ties to the amerisraeli death cult are not any more secure or private than ones with those ties.

    The point of those is to quickly draw a line that connects the past to the present. We see the same claims, then the affirmation of those claims reported by a third party.

    I think in a vacuum, assuming perfectly spherical semiconductor manufacturing industries and leaving software out of the picture, the point you’re trying to make is the most materialist take: you can’t trust the imperialists tech, the masters tools cannot be used to tear down the plantation, etc.

    In our present day with a hundred years plus of semiconductor manufacturing history encompassing real countries whose attitudes towards one another and development have changed significantly during that span, given reliable information about the explicit capacities western (and lest be serious here, any) le or intelligence apparatus has, the most materialist take is that there’s more to the choice of what device to trust than where the chips come from.

    To butcher a car metaphor, what you’re saying is similar to people claiming buying and driving a Tesla is better than a BYD because you can’t trust Chinese tech. That idea might be fine (or chauvinist) in a bubble but when we can evaluate the Tesla and BYD for ourselves in a parking lot or on the road we might come away with wildly different ideas.

    Technology has to be evaluated based on its capabilities and how it’s being used when that’s possible and I would argue it’s extremely possible in the case of security in phones and that if you think you’re gonna be scooped by the cops you need to be on graphene, the latest ios or maybe a pixel with the latest android.

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  • [–] [S] 3 points 3 months ago (1 child)

    So that's still from half a decade ago. Again, it's not impossible that US and Israel could find vulnerabilities in devices built on an independent stack, but at least it's not part of the design there. And that means these vulnerabilities get fixed over time. Your support matrix from 2024 does not show a single Chinese made device which proves my point. It's US based tech stacks that are compromised.

    The point I'm making is this. One tech stack might have vulnerabilities due to negligence and human error, the other has backdoors baked in by design.

    Just because something is a SoC or not is not really relevant. That's just a type of architecture. What matters is if the specific implementation is compromised or not. I'm not aware of any evidence that recent Chinese devices are compromised. However, your own link shows that iphones are.

    You're right that chips alone aren't the deciding factor, but they are the core of the stack, and if your hardware is compromised then it really doesn't matter what your software is doing at that point.

    While there might be a case for graphene being the most secure software stack, the hardware could still betray you and there's little graphene could do about that. Meanwhile, there is zero evidence for the claim that latest ios or maybe a pixel with the latest android are preferable to HarmonyOS or HyperOS. If anything, you yourself just showed that iOS should not be trusted.

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  • [–] 1 point 3 months ago (1 child)

    The point of using the company claims from 2021 and the famous leak from 2024 was to establish a pattern, not to suggest that information from that long ago could be applied directly to this present moment.

    The pattern is: android devices and old iphones and pixels that need to be updated are vulnerable no matter the country and alliances.

    It can be established because the company’s claims forever were “we can do this” and finally there was a leak showing in pretty good detail that they weren’t lying.

    here is the entire pdf of the leaked android support matrix linked in the article I linked to above. It only goes model by model for pixels, partly because it’s illustrating their capabilities against graphene as opposed to stock android but likely also because there’s thousands of android phones and a model/os version matrix would be insane and have an endnotes page a mile long.

    Page 3: supported extraction listed for android devices by chipset includes huaweis ostensibly non amerisraeli hardware stack. Secured container extraction supported for both huawei and xiaomi implementations present in harmonyos and hyperos.

    Page 4: huawei and xiaomi devices listed as brute force able in both on and off device states (there are notably some exceptions here, some qualcomm chipsets take a day and the p40 phones with their software updates weren’t brute forceable).

    Page 5: huawei and xiaomi, realme, oppo, oneplus and zte are listed as brute forceable in off and on states.

    here’s the same thing but for ios. I’m tired and it gives much more precise detail on a narrower range of devices, so I’ll just summarize:

    Six year old iphones running a month old os version were safe from even “after first unlock” (the most unsafe locked state) compromise.

    some phones running the one and a half year old ios in a “before first unlock” state (the most secure locked state) were subject to a brute forcer that was limited to 5000 attempts per day. That sounds like a lot, but a six digit pin would need constant hammering for 200 straight days. Not unheard of but a very far cry from the “plug it up, get access” that is advertised, documented in many security outlets and something I have literally observed happening inside a cop car at a protest.

    So to summarize: as of two years ago, the ostensibly non amerisraeli tech stack was not secure against the cops. Harmonyos and hyperos were not secure against the cops. Out of date ios and pixel phones were also not secure.

    I want to make clear that what is explicitly shown with regard to pixels and iphones is definitley true of all device families: the newest stuff has fewer vulnerabilities because people just haven’t been pounding on it as much.

    Again, this is intended to help people to make good choices using real world information as opposed to predictions. If I were buying a phone to resist the cops, it would be an iphone or a pixel with graphene.

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  • [–] [S] 2 points 3 months ago (1 child)

    The pattern is: android devices and old iphones and pixels that need to be updated are vulnerable no matter the country and alliances.

    Ok, but what does this have to do with the discussion we're having here. I never said anything to suggest using old phones and operating systems. I repeatedly said I'm talking about new devices here.

    Again, while there could be an argument for a pixel with graphene, it happens to be what I'm currently using because I can't get a Huawei device in Canada, there is zero evidence that stock pixel or iphone are preferable to LATEST Huawei or Xiaomi for people who have the choice.

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  • [–] 1 point 3 months ago (1 child)

    So we don’t have access to the most up to date information on the most recent iteration of cop hardware and software for breaking into phones.

    If either one of us did, it would be a very bad idea to say that we were basing our argumentation on that.

    Based instead on historical data points, like the ones I’ve provided, we can consistently see that at those points in time the latest stock pixel and iphone devices were preferable to anything else including the latest huawei and xiaomi devices for the purposes of avoiding cop access.

    The reason I’ve been engaging with your argument that the latest xiaomi/huawei stuff is preferable to the pixel/iphone equivalent is that I’m concerned someone worried about cops might make a decision about how to use their limited resources based on that argument.

    They’re not bad phones or bad companies and China isn’t a bad country. There’s just real world evidence that the devices aren’t as secure as some alternatives.

    My whole point separate of yours (that I’m paraphrasing here, apologies) that devices made outside the amerisraeli apparatus are inherently safer is that we need to pay attention to the wealth of information about phone security rather than base our decisions on assumptions.

    Heres yet another data point to go by, in this case presented as a blog analysis of the 2025 leak (only a little over a year old at this point!). there’s a million great bits of knowledge in that page if you’re interested in learning a ton about android security but the long and short of it for android devices is about the same as before: graphene is at the top, then stock pixel then literally everything else.

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  • [–] [S] 2 points 3 months ago (1 child)

    Based on historical data points we clearly see that both Android and iOS devices were vulnerable. Your own links shows this clearly. There is no evidence to suggest that Chinese devices are more vulnerable.

    There’s just real world evidence that the devices aren’t as secure as some alternatives.

    No, there isn't. You keep saying this, but you haven't provided a single source showing that these devices are more vulnerable.

    The latest link you provide once again shows that many Android devices are vulnerable. But cellebrite is just one rootkit, not the totality of vulnerabilities either. That's the whole problem. You're ignoring what hardware backdoors may be present in US supply chain, and what other rootkits might exist.

    Given that the US is a known bad actor, it has to be assumed that these devices are not safe. That's just the reality of the situation. Meanwhile, Chinese companies have every incentive to make their devices safe from western malware and have zero incentive to put in backdoors for US or Israel in them. That's what makes these devices inherently safer. The incentives matter.

    graphene is at the top, then stock pixel then literally everything else.

    Again, this is a baseless claim that is not supported by the evidence you've provided. Unless you can show proof that Chinese current devices have vulnerabilities that are not present in current stock Android, then you need to retract your claim.

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  • [–] 1 point 3 months ago (1 child)

    Okay, to address just the request for proof that the security order is graphene, stock pixel then everything else, look at the 2025 link I posted, table 2, android access support matrix - locked devices:

    Huawei - cold and hot brute force extraction at least partially supported

    Pixel - second column of both cold and hot sections, brute force password to decrypt user ce and brute force password are marked not supported.

    Xiaomi - bottom row, hot and cold extraction and brute forcing supported.

    So there you go, pixel over xiaomi and huawei. If you need proof that graphene is at the top, compare the standard android and graphene columns in table 3: android os access support matrix - google pixel in the same most recent link.

    I understand that you’re saying something else may be out there. You’re right, unknown security vulnerabilities might be around that have serious effects on non Chinese phones.

    Im saying there are security vulnerabilities in the hands of police which are least effective against iphones, pixels and graphene and that it’s best to choose devices based on what you know as opposed to what you assume.

    It really seems to me like I’m posting exactly what you say you need to see over and over again, what am I missing?

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  • [–] [S] 3 points 3 months ago* (1 child)

    The devices in that table are ancient. We just keep going in circles here. Huawei doesn't even run Android nowadays. I'm starting to get the impression you're not even reading the links you're using here. The chart even says this clearly that devices they can brute force are up to 2021:

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  • [–] 1 point 3 months ago (1 child)

    It’s really tough to hear you imply I’m not reading the things I post when I made reference to the same p40 model fact earlier today.

    In that same page, on the bottom row the same column that had the p40 comment referenced recently added support for the snapdragon 8 elite.

    On the unlocked devices support matrix (they become unlocked devices once brute forced) support for the dimensity 9400 is referenced.

    Those are both chips used in q4 ‘24 and forward phones and the cop hardware brute forces and extracts them in February of ‘25. That’s not ancient at that time by any measure and not even ancient by the standards of today.

    On that same page support for private space and 2nd space are referenced (those are the name for containers that harmony and hyper use) indicating support for extracting and decrypting harmonyos and hyperos containers indicating support for cracking harmonyos and hyperos. I pointed this out earlier today.

    The fact that older devices have notes on them does not mean newer devices are not supported.

    We are indeed going in circles.

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  • [–] [S] 3 points 3 months ago (1 child)

    It's really tough when I keep pointing out that your examples are not recent, and you continue to double down. Huawei p40 came out 2020 which is over half a decade ago. I repeatedly pointd out that you do not have any recent examples. Yet, you just keep providing more old models. I really don't know what else to say here.

    This is not a chip either, it's a phone that isn't in production anymore. It was succeeded by p50 which was then succeeded by Pura 90. So, if your best example, is a device that's no longer in production, then you clearly need to retract your claim.

    As you must obviously know, harmonyos and hyper have also been evolving since those devices were released just like android and ios have.

    To sum up. You've provided zero evidence that any phones from Huawei or Xiaomi that are actually in production have vulnerabilities. And your argument that the that older devices have notes on them does not mean newer devices are not supported equally applies to iphone and pixel.

    You have failed to provide any evidence to support your assertions, yet you just won't retract them. This is frankly bizarre.

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  • [–] 1 point 3 months ago (1 child)

    I literally just pointed out that while there is a note about a four year old device on the 2025 leak, there is also brute force support listed for socs that came out just a couple of months before the documents date.

    I pointed it out in the post you just replied to.

    My assertion is that pixels, graphene and iphones are safest against the hardware/software tools the police have. I’m using leaks of the capabilities of those tools to back that assertion up. While a leak from 2024 or 2025 might not have phones from 2026 on it, it provides a really clear picture of the capabilities of the police at those points in time.

    I don’t think saying “look, there’s evidence that pixels, graphene and ios were best at foiling the cops a year ago and a couple years ago and five years ago and ten years ago, it stands to reason the same situation is true now” is all that contentious.

    In lieu of actually having access to that software database to look up specific devices and os versions, which neither one of us have, the leaks seem like a pretty solid basis upon which to establish an understanding of police capabilities. The alternative that you’re proposing is literally assumptions.

    So what would convince you of my point? It’s vanishingly unlikely that they’ll be a leak soon that will let us talk about the current latest and greatest, but would a leak that claims the ability to brute force a phone that was new back when the leak is dated be convincing to you? Do you need explicit model numbers or is just the chipset/family enough?

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  • [–] [S] 2 points 3 months ago* (1 child)

    So, to recap, you have not provided any source that suggests modern Chinese devices that are in production today are vulnerable, or any less secure than ios or android. The brute force support is not for the new devices according to your link. It's for the older devices. I specifically screenshotted the relevant text in the last reply. The fact that a old device could be brute forced does not extend to the argument that new device can. There is no logical reason to suggest that.

    Your assertion that pixels, graphene and iphones are safest against the hardware/software tools the police have is not backed by facts. The capabilities of these toolkits DO NOT back up your assertion because they do not show that CURRENT devices are more vulnerable.

    There is nothing that would convince me of your point because your point is not based on facts available to us. It's based on your assertion that android and ios are more secure which is not supported by evidence available. If you were to provide concrete proof that these devices that are currently on sale are vulnerable, then we could have a discussion about that https://consumer.huawei.com/en/phones/

    And given that there is no evidence available to suggest that Chinese devices are more vulnerable, then the next question to ask is which vendor is more likely to be compromised. The answer there is obviously that it would be the American vendor.

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  • [–] 1 point 3 months ago (1 child)

    If you were to provide concrete proof that these devices that are currently on sale are vulnerable, then we could have a discussion about that https://consumer.huawei.com/en/phones/

    The xiaomi 15 ultra that was released in February of last year and still in current production and offered new (and at new prices!) uses the explicitly claimed as brute forceable qualcomm snapdragon 8 elite.

    You asked for huawei though, and their most recent stuff like the mate 80 pro and whatnot runs the kirin 9xxx chips. Kirin chips have historically been considered pretty trash security wise, but a lot of that is from people’s experiences with the three digit families of soc from 2020 and before. they’re supposed to be getting better since the 8xxx and 9xxx series. Still, the 2025 leak table 2 states “Huawei (Kirin/Qualcomm/MTK)” are partly brute forceable in cold state and fully brute forceable in hot state. Considering the 8xxx and 9xxx chips had been out last year at the time of the tables publication and the way that pixel devices are treated in that same table (big red “not supported” X mark actually means sometimes it’s supported depending on the precise version and what you’re trying to accomplish) I think it’s safe to say that by 2025 there was compromise on the 8xxx or 9xxx Kirin chips out there at that time.

    Which would of course encompass the x6 and p60s listed in huaweis current lineup.

    Remember though that I’m not claiming these leaks represent the extent of le capability today, but the extent of their capability then. Over time we can expect (and can see based n the expansion of their claims and the capabilities asserted in their leaks over time!) that they would get access to new methods of compromising phones, we just can’t know the exact extent until something leaks.

    Again, I am trying to show an evidence based analysis as opposed to the one you’re suggesting that relies on assumptions. There’s nothing wrong with the way you’re looking at the world, but when actual evidence is present those ideas have to be examined and maybe even changed to accurately reflect the reality we see.

    Phone security analysis with Chinese characteristics lol.

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  • [–] [S] 2 points 3 months ago

    I think it’s safe to say that by 2025 there was compromise on the 8xxx or 9xxx Kirin chips out there at that time.

    No, it's not to safe that at all. You're making a really wild jump here. It's like saying that if old version of chips iPhone uses were vulnerable we could say that current ones are. You are firmly into speculation territory here. I don't know why it's so hard for you to just admit that your thesis is not supported by evidence.

    Remember though that I’m not claiming these leaks represent the extent of le capability today, but the extent of their capability then. Over time we can expect (and can see based n the expansion of their claims and the capabilities asserted in their leaks over time!) that they would get access to new methods of compromising phones, we just can’t know the exact extent until something leaks.

    Except this equally applies to American phones, and in addition to that, there is a risk of intentional backdoors. So, to reiterate for the tenth time now, American phones are just as likely to be vulnerable to malicious attackers, and on top of that they are produced by companies directly working with US and Israel making it likely they would have intentional backdoors. That's a strictly worse scenario.

    Again, the evidence speaks directly against your analysis. You're trying to contort the evidence here to fit your narrative instead of looking at it objectively.

    Phone security with burgerland characterisitcs lol.

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