[–] [S] 1 point 2 days ago

device_display_name is optional in the federation response. Current Synapse omits it by default, but it can still be sent when explicitly enabled. Older Synapse versions also exposed it through some federation paths.

I believe you are saying that my statement, “Federation copies all of that,” is incorrect. I agree. I should have said, “Federation copies most of that.”

However, the main concern remains: a homeserver can still collect the client type and version, the device being used, room names, topics, avatars, and other metadata. Much of this information is not necessary for delivering end-to-end encrypted messages, and its collection is concerning in itself.

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  • [–] [S] 1 point 2 days ago (1 child)

    These aren’t mutually exclusive trade-offs: Matrix could support communities while minimizing or encrypting metadata by default. There should be a protocol that doesn’t require device details and profile data to be exposed just to participate.

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  • [–] [S] 3 points 2 days ago (4 children)

    Matrix can expose your device name and device details to other homeservers through federation. Profile information such as your avatar and bio can also be queried remotely. A client version is not a dedicated federation field, but it can leak through the device name. Signal at least has Sealed Sender, which hides the sender's identity from its own service in supported cases.

    This is about metadata, not centralisation, self-hosting, or phone-number registration. Those are separate issues, not trade-offs.

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    Matrix Metadata Problem: the server sees everything except your messages

    People pick Matrix because of end-to-end encryption. But E2EE only protects message content — everything around it is plaintext.

    The server sees:

    • Your ID, IP, client type and version, device you use
    • Your presence, typing status, read receipts
    • Which rooms you join and when you join/leave
    • Who else is in those rooms → your entire social graph
    • Room names, topics, avatars (all plaintext state)
    • For every message: who sent it, which room, a millisecond timestamp, type, size

    And federation copies all of that to every other server whose users are in the room. Your "social footprint" isn't one copy — it's as many as there are servers.

     

    Matrix Metadata Problem: the server sees everything except your messages

    People pick Matrix because of end-to-end encryption. But E2EE only protects message content — everything around it is plaintext.

    The server sees:

    • Your ID, IP, client type and version, device you use
    • Your presence, typing status, read receipts
    • Which rooms you join and when you join/leave
    • Who else is in those rooms → your entire social graph
    • Room names, topics, avatars (all plaintext state)
    • For every message: who sent it, which room, a millisecond timestamp, type, size

    And federation copies most of that to every other server whose users are in the room. Your "social footprint" isn't one copy — it's as many as there are servers.

     

    Matrix Metadata Problem: the server sees everything except your messages

    People pick Matrix because of end-to-end encryption. But E2EE only protects message content — everything around it is plaintext.

    The server sees:

    • Your ID, IP, client type and version, device you use
    • Your presence, typing status, read receipts
    • Which rooms you join and when you join/leave
    • Who else is in those rooms → your entire social graph
    • Room names, topics, avatars (all plaintext state)
    • For every message: who sent it, which room, a millisecond timestamp, type, size

    And federation copies all of that to every other server whose users are in the room. Your "social footprint" isn't one copy — it's as many as there are servers.

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