▲ 520 ▼ backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to ssh server compromise (www.openwall.com) submitted 2 years ago by Atemu@lemmy.ml to c/linux@lemmy.ml 96 comments fedilink hide all child comments
[–] SavvyBeardedFish@reddthat.com 17 points 2 years ago (2 children) Archlinux's XZ was compromised as well. News post Git change for not using tarballs from source permalink fedilink source parent hideshow 4 child comments replies: [–] flying_sheep@lemmy.ml 13 points 2 years ago No, read the link you posted: Arch does not directly link openssh to liblzma, and thus this attack vector is not possible. You can confirm this by issuing the following command: ldd "$(command -v sshd)" However, out of an abundance of caution, we advise users to remove the malicious code from their system by upgrading either way. permalink fedilink source parent [–] progandy@feddit.de 3 points 2 years ago* (last edited 2 years ago) I think that was a precaution. The malicious build script ran during the build, but the backdoor itself was most likely not included in the resuling package as it checked for specific packaging systems. https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/03/29/22 permalink fedilink source parent
[–] flying_sheep@lemmy.ml 13 points 2 years ago No, read the link you posted: Arch does not directly link openssh to liblzma, and thus this attack vector is not possible. You can confirm this by issuing the following command: ldd "$(command -v sshd)" However, out of an abundance of caution, we advise users to remove the malicious code from their system by upgrading either way. permalink fedilink source parent
[–] progandy@feddit.de 3 points 2 years ago* (last edited 2 years ago) I think that was a precaution. The malicious build script ran during the build, but the backdoor itself was most likely not included in the resuling package as it checked for specific packaging systems. https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/03/29/22 permalink fedilink source parent