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A recent case involving GrapheneOS's duress feature has sparked a debate about the balance between privacy and law enforcement. If someone is forced to unlock their phone, should they have the right to protect their personal data with an emergency wipe feature?
At the same time, critics argue that the same feature could be used by criminals to destroy evidence during an investigation, making it harder for law enforcement to do their job.
Where do you stand? Should operating systems include features like this, or do the risks outweigh the privacy benefits? .
Maybe they should add a feature where instead of completely erasing some files, it would just hide certain files when an alternative pin-code is inputted. Would work against these kind of ass-hats pretending to be police to look at your photos.
Problem is if it's merely hidden they can seize the phone and get the data out somehow.
Not in a temporary stop like that. They'd have to hold onto it for years until an exploit came out.
They can do that at airports
Admittedly this is 2 years old, but back then even the advanced tech that the NSA used couldn't break the security of grapheneOS phones.
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/14344-cellebrite-premium-july-2024-documentation
https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/12848-claims-made-by-forensics-companies-their-capabilities-and-how-grapheneos-fares
I think that is a feature, at least for some phone OSes. Almost like a dual boot situation
Edit: I'm now thinking even the "wipe" feature as used wouldn't have raised an eyebrow if the phone didn't appear to restart. Maybe they can make it seem to unlock normally even when the distress code is used?