I don't understand why you think it'd be out of the question for it to have phenomoligcal experiences, why couldn't we build a way for it to smell if it has the same pathways to be able to interpret that? How would that be meaningfully different?

The difference is having a phenomenological experience versus data processing. A phenomenological experience actually feels like something. We have literally no reason to believe phenomenology isn’t deeply dependent on the body. In fact, we probably have more evidence that it does depend on the body. Science doesn’t do a good job at justifying phenomenology though… and you aren’t going to conveniently recreate phenomenology using brute force via a technique that hinges itself on conveniently ignoring subjective information such as how things feel.

If your simulation has the “same pathways” to smell, congratulations—you just remade biological life. You made the nose, brain, and the connections between the two. If you didn’t do that, then you made a fancy copy cat machine. It doesn’t actually smell, not anymore than ChatGPT actually thinks.

Maybe you can give it a device that lets it convert air-born chemical signals into information it can act on. That’s a feature of intelligence though… not really a phenomenologically active experience. If you asked this intelligence machine “can you smell like I do?” I imagine it might respond, “no. I can process chemical information much like you do, but my ability to do so is based on data whereas yours is based on feeling or intuition.”

You literally cant experience the world like a computer would—without personal and phenomenal subjectivity. Equally so, a computer cant experience the world like you would. Even simulated, that’s not the same thing as feeling something.

Honestly, … I’m not saying this machine wouldn’t have applications. It very well may be like a supercharged LLM, for all I know. It’s just not human, no more than a Birch can ever be a Redwood.

I don't understand why you think it'd be out of the question for it to have phenomenological experiences

Addressing that more specifically, I think it’s because I have yet to see a single scientific development in the wake of understanding the cause and nature of phenomenology. It’s ignored, rightfully so. Science doesn’t need to concern itself with phenomenology, at least hasn’t so far.

People have similarly argued that consciousness “arises” when an information machine is sufficiently complex. This claim of weak emergence seems ignorant to me; “arise” is doing a lot of magic handwaving. I’d argue it’s the same for phenomenology — you’re not going to stumble upon how to make a machine feel just by brute forcing more complexity.

Also, we should not be so naïve to think that understanding phenomenology is unnecessary for our goals [only because it’s not in the scientific spotlight]. Phenomenology is central to our experience and every other complex life forms experience (given a CNS).

Slime mold is intelligent, bear in mind. No nervous system, I’m doubtful it “feels” anything, but it’s intelligent. Imagine that you reprogrammed some slime mold to process information such that its external behavior perfectly resembled a human. It morphed into a humanoid shape, did human things… but you’d still say it’s not human. It’s all the intelligence, none of the humanity.

Would you consider my humanoid slime mold a “person?” You’re free to, but I think it’s arguable. My dog really connects with me… I don’t believe my slime mold would ever really connect with me.