In his magnum opus, "What Is to Be Done?", Lenin devotes profound reflections to political tactics and harshly criticizes "opportunism" and what he termed "followers," which is the abandonment of tactical autonomy by spontaneously adhering to a plan whose strategy is unknown. In other words, it is the most common mistake made by mobilization without awareness.

Whoever practices it is already a slave to their comfort because their actions are, by default, insubstantial.

Studying history helps. In these times, when many people are wondering what to do, I recall reading somewhere that this question existed even before languages ​​were born. So, what question has been the driving force behind our evolution?

So, given the complex global panorama characterized by a civilizational crisis, a paradigmatic implosion in every sense, a rules-based order in its death throes, and a threatening accelerationism—economically and ecologically—it becomes necessary to address the simplest and most useful question that has ever existed: what to do?

Lenin's most important phrases and arguments starkly attack submission in the face of "spontaneity," defined as "the fear of taking a step forward, the fear of breaking with what is already familiar and habitual... the tactic-process is reduced to political following." "What Is to Be Done?" is a treatise on conscious organization, the accumulation and construction of symbolic goods.

In his work, particularly in key strategic texts such as "Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder" (1920) and in his debates on the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918), Lenin draws a fundamental line of contrast between making a necessary tactical compromise and betrayal. He also makes it clear that the latter has served as a pivotal factor in fostering the division of a bloc that has had to remain relatively homogeneous in the face of an enemy that surpasses it in strength.

It could also be the case that the tactic is not a tactic at all, but rather vices, deep-seated deviations, false consciousness, and blind obedience, thus demonstrating that without a critical mass aware of its power, there is no possible solution or correct tactic. Because the enemy will always seek ways to maximize its power, which can only be countered by a much greater capacity for accumulating force, spearheaded by the conscious masses.

The logic of capital, however incorrigible and self-destructive it may be, has found its most effective tactic in division and manipulation. Great emancipatory processes have been stifled through processes of systemic alienation.

For Lenin, tactics constitute movement. They are the steps taken that must always be thought out and calculated, whether to advance or retreat. Temporarily yielding to an overwhelmingly superior force is not only reasonable but a revolutionary duty if such a decision, however difficult, serves to preserve one's own forces, whereas capitulation implies an unnecessary ideological surrender or complicity with the enemy.

Lenin establishes this premise and supports it with examples such as the "bandit's assault," which he explains as follows:

"Imagine that your car is stopped by armed bandits. You hand over your money, your passport, your revolver, and the car. In exchange, you are freed from their pleasant company. This is undoubtedly a compromise, a pact with the bandits [...] But I ask: Will you find a man in his right mind who would call this compromise 'inadmissible in principle' or declare the person who made it an accomplice of the bandits?"

• Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder. Page 43

For Lenin, tactical concession translates into legitimate compromise: it occurs when circumstances force the surrender of resources, territory, or tactical advantages due to an unfavorable balance of power, as long as the ultimate goal and a certain degree of independence in political decisions remain intact.

Betrayal occurs when a political actor makes a pact with the enemy (the bandits) not out of necessity for survival, but, for example, due to the need to divide the spoils. And history certainly provides examples of this.

In 1918, the young Soviet Russia was exhausted, and the German army was advancing relentlessly. At that time, Lenin insisted on ceding vast swathes of territory to Germany by signing a peace treaty, against the wishes of factions within his own party who favored a suicidal "revolutionary war." Lenin argued that ceding territory would buy time—while they awaited the revolution in Europe—and save the new state from total and devastating destruction. For him, refusing to make this tactical concession was the typical action of someone who treats strategy as empty rhetoric that leads directly to destruction.

In essence, Lenin's tactical maxim states that it is preferable to retreat or make a forced material concession rather than allow a political and doctrinal capitulation that would annihilate the movement. This is summarized in the following statement:

"The entire history of Bolshevism, before and after the October Revolution, is full of instances of maneuvering, agreements, and compromises with other parties, including bourgeois parties!"

• Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder. Page 53

The current political situation coexists with readjustments within a complex framework of relations in which negotiation implies accepting that not all actors do so on equal terms, since there are many political-military, economic and geopolitical elements that demarcate the margins of action for each one.

There are emerging powers whose advance relative to the hegemon necessarily aims to conquer the "phase of mutual destruction," that is, their development goes hand in hand with development and innovation in the military industry that allows them to protect what they have conquered and secure more.

This is the case with China, a strategic partner with whom the hegemon maintains a game of probing, provocative ploys with frictions that can be overcome through diplomatic means—for the moment and that do not endanger relations—because, even though China is the victim of unilateral sanctioning measures associated with tariffs, what develops in the real field is a bilateral economic interdependence solidly structured over years.

Another way to understand it is that not everyone plays by the same rules, and as the game unfolds, the rules can be altered at the discretion of whoever has the power to impose them by force. Therefore, in the ideal scenario, it would simply be a matter of being right and acting in good faith, and preserving those qualities at all costs. But in the convergent scenario, it's about managing friction at different levels by making tactical moves based on existing negotiation incentives. The strategic approach would be to remain in the game because it's the only situation with tactical potential.

When discussing resistance from a political perspective, it implies acknowledging that the playing field is stacked, the referee is bought off, or the scoreboard is rigged. While reformism relies on the utopia of liberal concord, tactical resistance prioritizes the contradictions of the game as potential leverage points.

Because of all this, it could be said that we are in an era where tactics have become an applied mathematical science on a game board. Something that, whether we like it or not, speaks more to calculations than to passion. Which is to say that, according to game theory, the winner is not the one who desires or wants to win, but the one who uses incentives and manages to implement the tactic that reduces the possibility of being eliminated.

In Lenin's words: "Even the smallest chances of gaining an ally must be seized, even if it is temporary, hesitant, unstable, uncertain, conditional. Anyone who does not understand this does not understand a word of Marxism or contemporary scientific socialism in general."