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uOTP : simple TOTP extension for firefox (addons.mozilla.org)
submitted 2 years ago* (last edited 2 years ago) by to c/privacy@lemmy.ml
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cross-posted from: https://lemmy.ml/post/12744832

As I updated the version to 1.4.0 , adding the 'import' feature I am sharing this here.

I made this extension because I couldn't find one that wouldn't ask for too much permissions (such as accessing all websites data).

Eventually I found it nice to have a TOTP that can really be audited, the code is 649 lines of JS, 214 CSS and 52 HTML. Feel free to fork, copy part of it, contribute or just request fix/features.

I have used it for more than a year every day and it works nicely.

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[–] 7 points 2 years ago (15 children)

It's also an extension with 1 review, by a no-name developer, with only 12 installs... definitely would trust that...

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  • [–] [S] 14 points 2 years ago (10 children)

    Well this is 600 lines of code, if you cannot audit that you can indeed ignore it for now. Once again this is the only auditable code out there and not asking for unrelated permissions.

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  • [–] 6 points 2 years ago (6 children)

    It might be safe, it might work well and all, but it does defeat the point of 2FA, so I wouldn't want people to even know about it before they explored undeniably better and safer options, like Authenticator apps for their phones.

    But to be fair, many people around the world only have one single device, so 2FA becomes a difficulty. But that's the point where I'm not knowledgable enough anymore to see what the best way of going about it is.

    From my gut feeling, I'd rather put a dedicated TOTP App on a device than to use a browser extension.

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  • [–] [S] 7 points 2 years ago* (5 children)

    Thank you for your constructive comment.

    Indeed many people thinks 2FA as 2 devices. I am not sure where that came from and what specifically make people think that way. Despite all my research and experience using 2 devices solve no specific security problem. I think there is a whole topic to be argued on this (should I make a blog post on this?).

    As for me I have Aegis on my smartphone (really perfect nothing to say). But I have many unwanted/unnecessary 2FA to go through every day (for the last 3 years). I am cleaning my cookie/connection every time I close my web browser and I am not keeping my computer on all the time. Therefore those 2FA needs to be done a lot (I mean at least 3 time a day). I do not interact much with my smartphone, also this is the least secure device I own so web browser extension is an OK way. I used to have a python script I could have run from one of my IoT through ssh. So far I don't see any vector of attack this would prevent compared to browser extension.

    I see hundreds of thousands of users using other extensions that I wouldn't run on my system and I am sharing a better solution, nothing perfect, nothing that requires mass adoption.

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  • [–] 6 points 2 years ago (2 children)

    2FA being on a separate device is simply the most secure way of doing it. An attacker who gets access to some passwords for my accounts can't do a whole lot without also physically stealing my phone.

    It's simply an extra hurdle for malicious actors to go through.

    Though I guess in most cases, having any 2FA at all will probably already turn off a majority of attackers.

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  • [–] 2 points 2 years ago (1 child)

    can't do a whole lot without also physically stealing my phone.

    ??? Theres a while bunch of loopholes they can exploit without having access to your phone, here's must one.

    https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/web-application-penetration-testing/why-totp-wont-cut-it/

    I do it the way you do it as well but am under no illusion it's bomb proof.

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  • [–] 2 points 2 years ago (1 child)

    Thanks a lot! I selectively keep cookies for login sites, which is not a good solution.

    The threat is websites escaping the browser sandbox and reading stuff. I dont know if this is really that realistic though.

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  • [–] [S] 2 points 2 years ago

    Websites have no way to creep into your browser, extensions included. Usually it is the other way around. Such a leak would be catastrophic for the browser (thinks of all the password manager). At least here it is not even a password manager but only the TOTP so you still have your password as security (still this will never happen realistically).

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  • [–] 4 points 2 years ago (2 children)

    With all due respect, it doesnt matter what the code is right now. This is an extension that you can update at any point in the future to replace with something malicious.

    Trust is near impossible to build in todays internet.

    https://www.kaspersky.com.au/blog/dangerous-chrome-extensions-87-million/32170/

    Note that a plugin’s malicious functionality can evolve over time in line with its owners’ goals. And the owners themselves may change: there have been cases when malicious features appeared in a previously safe extension after its creators sold the plugin to someone else.

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  • [–] [S] 4 points 2 years ago (1 child)

    This is were the manifest/permission is important. I cannot emphasize enough that I had to code this myself because, at the time, nothing else would be OK with me. This was because of 1- way too big of a code base, 2- way too many permissions.

    It is indeed a problem that extensions are not as well maintained as Linux distribution packages but in this specific instance the extension has no right to read any information nor send requests to any server.

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  • [–] 3 points 2 years ago

    I appreciate you have put effort into this, and you have gone out of your way to make it safer, but if the extension were to become malicious at a later date, expanding permissions (and relying on users brainlessly-clicking accept) or using an exploit or sidechannel would undo any of that.

    The downside of browser extensions is that they are operating within a massive codebase, and thus have a huge attack surface if they decide to become malicious.

    For what its worth, I commend your efforts here, its just near impossible to trust any peice of software not backed by the reputation of an established company/developer.

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  • [–] 5 points 2 years ago (3 children)

    Every software started with 0 reviews, by a no-name developer, with only 1 installs.

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  • [–] 11 points 2 years ago (2 children)

    This is a privacy community. Half the posters here think their toaster is listening to their thoughts. Browser extensions are a serious and known vector for malware, installing one from a no-name developer and handing it your tfa codes is a high level of blind trust.

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  • [–] 2 points 2 years ago (1 child)

    So, are you saying you would use an add-on for OTP by a well known developer (Think about the well-known developers of No-Script and Ghostery and their history) ?

    I see no issue with the add-on of the OP being advertised because some people simply do not use phones at all, so TOTP app is not an option for them. And attack vectors via the browser only apply when the user visits shady web links.

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  • [–] 1 point 2 years ago

    Essentially, yeah? Unless you calculate the OTPs by pen and paper, you have to use some kind of software, and therefore you have to trust that it is safe. Writing your own like OP is actually a very safe option, because you can trust yourself, but everyone else needs to trust OP.

    Attack vectors apply to the add-on itself, it is (potentially) the shady site. OP has the potential to update the add-on later with its own malicious code. This is true of all addons, hence the trust issue.

    I dont have any problem with OP advertising their addon, but potential users should be aware of the risks.

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