I feel like a thought experiment that begins from the premise that physical systems don't actually work or do anything so through random chance a pile of dead wood with no actual biomechanical systems could produce an ongoing perfect mimicry of a person is basically just saying "oh yeah, but what if there was literal magic and physics didn't actually do anything, what about that huh? What if we're just squishy meat ghosts instead, and logs can walk and talk if imagine at them hard enough?"

One can arrive at any conclusion one desires by just presupposing a world where a hand picked set of rules are true (that's what neoclassical economists do, for example) but that doesn't make those imagined rules true or in any way support their conclusion. Like yes, if magic were real and you could separate out the core of someone's being and allow it to exist and operate independent of their flesh, then you would be existing in a world where you could do that, but seeing as you cannot the only reasonable conclusion is that the condition of "literal magic" is not present.

I mean the only relevant critique is the Hard Problem of Consciousness , which doesn't really contradict materialism as such, just its crudest forms (i.e. feelings of love are just chemicals in the brain durrr hurrrr)

From the SEP

The How question thus subdivides into a diverse family of more specific questions depending upon the specific sort or feature of consciousness one aims to explain, the specific restrictions one places on the range of the explanans and the criterion one uses to define explanatory success. Some of the resulting variants seem easier to answer than others. Progress may seem likely on some of the so called “easy problems” of consciousness, such as explaining the dynamics of access consciousness in terms of the functional or computational organization of the brain (Baars 1988). Others may seem less tractable, especially the so-called “hard problem” (Chalmers 1995) which is more or less that of giving an intelligible account that lets us see in an intuitively satisfying way how phenomenal or “what it's like” consciousness might arise from physical or neural processes in the brain.