limitedduck comments on Signal under fire for storing encryption keys in plaintext

Signal under fire for storing encryption keys in plaintext (stackdiary.com)

submitted 2 years ago* (last edited 2 years ago) by Recant@beehaw.org to c/foss@beehaw.org

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As mentioned in the comments, plain text keys aren't bad because they are necessary. You have to have at least one plain text key in order to be able to use encryption

[–] limitedduck@awful.systems 56 points 2 years ago (5 children)

I kind of agree that this may be a little overblown. Exploiting this requires device and filesystem access so if you can get the keys you can already get a lot more stuff.

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[–] ericjmorey@programming.dev 12 points 2 years ago

A secure enclave can already be accessed by the time someone can access the Signal encryption keys , so there's no extra security in putting the encryption keys in the secure enclave.

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[+] thingsiplay@beehaw.org 2 points 2 years ago* (3 children)

[deleted]

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[–] TimeSquirrel@kbin.melroy.org 10 points 2 years ago*

It's eventually going to have to be stored in plaintext somewhere. Where are you then putting the encryption key for the encryption keys and how do you start the chain of decryption without the first key?

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[–] limitedduck@awful.systems 4 points 2 years ago (1 child)

Sorry, I don't think I understand what you're suggesting. Are you saying encryption keys should themselves be encrypted?

FYI this story isn't about plaintext passwords, it's about plaintext encryption keys to chat history.

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[–] thingsiplay@beehaw.org 3 points 2 years ago

I deleted my reply, because I don't know what I'm talking.

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